Description
The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.34.0, AMQConnection.start() applies Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax) after Connection.Tune negotiation even though AMQP defines frameMax value zero as unlimited and ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX is zero. When the client default and server-negotiated value are both zero, the result is passed to Utils.framePayloadLimit(int), which interprets zero as Integer.MAX_VALUE and disables the configured maxInboundMessageBodySize cap. A malicious AMQP server, or a man-in-the-middle attacker able to modify Connection.Tune and inject frames into the connection, can then send an oversized frame of any frame type, causing Frame.readFrom() to allocate a large byte array before content-level validation and potentially terminate the client process through memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 5.34.0.
Published: 2026-09-16
Score: 8.7 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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Remediation

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History

Wed, 16 Sep 2026 18:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.34.0, AMQConnection.start() applies Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax) after Connection.Tune negotiation even though AMQP defines frameMax value zero as unlimited and ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX is zero. When the client default and server-negotiated value are both zero, the result is passed to Utils.framePayloadLimit(int), which interprets zero as Integer.MAX_VALUE and disables the configured maxInboundMessageBodySize cap. A malicious AMQP server, or a man-in-the-middle attacker able to modify Connection.Tune and inject frames into the connection, can then send an oversized frame of any frame type, causing Frame.readFrom() to allocate a large byte array before content-level validation and potentially terminate the client process through memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 5.34.0.
Title RabbitMQ Java client: Frame-level OOM: Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0) defeats frame size enforcement
Weaknesses CWE-770
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-16T18:30:58.983Z

Reserved: 2026-08-17T20:49:21.599Z

Link: CVE-2026-75516

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-16T19:17:33.560

Modified: 2026-09-16T19:17:33.560

Link: CVE-2026-75516

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses