| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Mattermost Desktop App versions <=6.1 5.5.13.0 fail to account for attempting to open extremely long URLs in the Mattermost Desktop App which allows a malicious server owner to crash the application via including a script to call window.open on a very large URL. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00652 |
| In Apache ActiveMQ Artemis prior to 2.20.0 or 2.19.1, an attacker could partially disrupt availability (DoS) through uncontrolled resource consumption of memory. |
| An uncontrolled allocation of resources without limits or throttling in the e-mail handling in OTRS allows excessive allocation which may lead to the abortion of the webserver.This issue affects OTRS:
* 8.0.X
* 2023.X
* 2024.X
* 2025.X
* 2026.X before 2026.4.X
Please note that ((OTRS)) Community Edition 6.x, OTRS 7.x and products based on the ((OTRS)) Community Edition also very likely to be affected |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the Netty HTTP/3 codec allows the creation of an infinite number of blocked streams, which can cause OOM error. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, RedisArrayAggregator pre-allocates ArrayList with initial capacity equal to the RESP array element count declared in an array header. That count is taken from the wire before the corresponding child messages exist. A small malicious header can claim a huge initial capacity. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-redis prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can cause DoS by sending a crafted Redis payload with deeply nested arrays. This forces the server to allocate a massive number of state objects and collections, leading to memory exhaustion and an OutOfMemoryError. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-redis prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can cause DoS by sending crafted Redis payloads across multiple connections without `\r\n`. This exhausts the server's direct memory pool (OutOfDirectMemoryError), preventing legitimate connections from being processed. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions of netty-transport-sctp prior to 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, for each non-complete SctpMessage fragment the handler does `fragments.put(streamId, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(frag, byteBuf))`, wrapping the previous accumulator and the new slice into a *new* CompositeByteBuf every time. After N fragments the accumulator is an N-deep chain of composites, each holding references and component arrays; readableBytes()/getBytes() on the final buffer recurse N levels. There is no limit on N, on total bytes, or on the number of streamIdentifiers an attacker can open (each gets its own map entry). A peer that never sets the `complete` flag can grow this structure indefinitely from tiny 1-byte DATA chunks. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 17.10 before 18.10.8, 18.11 before 18.11.5, and 19.0 before 19.0.2 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to cause denial of service due to uncontrolled resource consumption when processing a specially crafted file upload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix rlimit for posix cpu timers
Posix cpu timers requires an additional step beyond setting the rlimit.
Refactor the code so its clear when what code is setting the
limit and conditionally update the posix cpu timers when appropriate. |
| Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 1.0.0 to before version 2.2.0, the Nezha dashboard exposes two endpoints that create long-lived WebSocket streams to monitored agents: POST /api/v1/terminal → createTerminal() (terminal.go:27-67) and POST /api/v1/file → createFM() (fm.go:28-67). Both call rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId, ...) which inserts a new ioStreamContext into an unbounded map[string]*ioStreamContext (s.ioStreams in io_stream.go:59-67). There is no per-user rate limit, no global semaphore, and no per-server connection cap. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.0. |
| FPDI is a collection of PHP classes that facilitate reading pages from existing PDF documents and using them as templates in FPDF. Prior to version 2.6.7, an attacker can upload a small, malicious PDF file that will cause the server-side script to crash due to memory exhaustion or a script time-out. Repeated attacks can lead to sustained service unavailability. This issue has been patched in version 2.6.7. |
| Quest Bot is an opensource Discord Bot. Prior to version 1.1.8, any user who can access the ticket panel can repeatedly create new ticket channels. The latest release still creates a new database ticket and Discord channel for every completed ticket modal submission, without checking whether the same user already has an open ticket and without applying a cooldown. This issue has been patched in version 1.1.8. |
| Axios is a promise based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js. Axios versions 1.7.0 through 1.15.x did not enforce configured request and response size limits when requests were sent with the fetch adapter. Applications that selected adapter: 'fetch', or ran in environments where axios resolved to the fetch adapter, could receive or send bodies larger than maxContentLength or maxBodyLength despite those limits being explicitly configured. This can cause resource exhaustion in server-side usage when a malicious or compromised server returns an oversized response, when an attacker can supply a large data: URL, or when an application forwards attacker-controlled request bodies through axios while relying on maxBodyLength as a boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.32.0 and 1.16.0. |
| An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability has been reported to affect File Station 6. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to prevent other systems, applications, or processes from accessing the same type of resource.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version:
File Station 5 5.5.6.5243 and later |
| Summarize before 0.17.0 contains a resource exhaustion vulnerability that allows remote attackers to cause disk exhaustion by serving media responses that bypass the enforced size limit through missing or misreported Content-Length headers, chunked transfer encoding, or failed HEAD requests. Attackers who control a podcast feed or media URL can stream an unbounded response to local storage via the temp-file download path, exhausting disk or system resources on the host running the CLI. |
| kafka-python prior to 2.3.2 contains a denial-of-service vulnerability in the protocol parser that allows a malicious broker or machine-in-the-middle attacker to exhaust memory or hang connections by sending a crafted 4-byte frame length value without bounds validation. Attackers can send a specially crafted frame length through the receive_bytes() function to trigger either a multi-gigabyte memory allocation or an uncaught ValueError that leaves the connection in a broken state, causing requests to hang and consumers to stop heartbeating until restart. |
