Description
The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c arms the SPI peripheral before its receive context exists. shi_ite_init_registers() sets the state machine to SHI_STATE_READY_TO_RECV and calls irq_enable() while the device initializes at POST_KERNEL priority CONFIG_KERNEL_INIT_PRIORITY_DEFAULT (40), but data->rx_ctx and data->tx are only assigned later by shi_ite_backend_init(), which ec_host_cmd_init() invokes at CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INIT_PRIORITY (default 80).

If the attached host processor starts a SPI transaction inside that window, the Rx-valid-length interrupt fires, shi_ite_int_handler() passes its state check and calls shi_ite_parse_header(), which stores the host-derived request length through the still-NULL data->rx_ctx. On the IT8xxx2 low addresses are not backed by RAM, and with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_PMP the first bytes of the address space are explicitly made inaccessible, so the store raises a fatal access fault in interrupt context. The window widens further when CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INITIALIZE_AT_BOOT is disabled and the application calls ec_host_cmd_init() itself.

The result is a kernel panic on the embedded controller: with Zephyr's default fatal handler the CPU halts, so the controller stops servicing host commands until a hardware reset. Because the trigger is traffic from the attached host processor -- an untrusted peer from the controller firmware's point of view -- software on that host can provoke the fault by forcing a controller reset and issuing transactions during the reboot, turning a recoverable reset into a persistent outage. Impact is limited to availability: the faulting address is fixed and not attacker-chosen, so no memory-corruption primitive follows.

The fix leaves the interface at SHI_STATE_DISABLED with the interrupt masked during device init, moves irq_enable() into shi_ite_backend_init() after the buffers are published, and makes shi_ite_int_handler() reject a NULL data->rx_ctx while write-clearing IT83XX_SPI_ISR and IT83XX_SPI_RX_VLISR so that an unexpected early interrupt cannot storm.
Published: 2026-11-16
Score: 4.7 Medium
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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History

Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c arms the SPI peripheral before its receive context exists. shi_ite_init_registers() sets the state machine to SHI_STATE_READY_TO_RECV and calls irq_enable() while the device initializes at POST_KERNEL priority CONFIG_KERNEL_INIT_PRIORITY_DEFAULT (40), but data->rx_ctx and data->tx are only assigned later by shi_ite_backend_init(), which ec_host_cmd_init() invokes at CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INIT_PRIORITY (default 80). If the attached host processor starts a SPI transaction inside that window, the Rx-valid-length interrupt fires, shi_ite_int_handler() passes its state check and calls shi_ite_parse_header(), which stores the host-derived request length through the still-NULL data->rx_ctx. On the IT8xxx2 low addresses are not backed by RAM, and with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_PMP the first bytes of the address space are explicitly made inaccessible, so the store raises a fatal access fault in interrupt context. The window widens further when CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INITIALIZE_AT_BOOT is disabled and the application calls ec_host_cmd_init() itself. The result is a kernel panic on the embedded controller: with Zephyr's default fatal handler the CPU halts, so the controller stops servicing host commands until a hardware reset. Because the trigger is traffic from the attached host processor -- an untrusted peer from the controller firmware's point of view -- software on that host can provoke the fault by forcing a controller reset and issuing transactions during the reboot, turning a recoverable reset into a persistent outage. Impact is limited to availability: the faulting address is fixed and not attacker-chosen, so no memory-corruption primitive follows. The fix leaves the interface at SHI_STATE_DISABLED with the interrupt masked during device init, moves irq_enable() into shi_ite_backend_init() after the buffers are published, and makes shi_ite_int_handler() reject a NULL data->rx_ctx while write-clearing IT83XX_SPI_ISR and IT83XX_SPI_RX_VLISR so that an unexpected early interrupt cannot storm.
Title NULL pointer dereference in the ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend when a host transaction arrives before backend initialization
Weaknesses CWE-476
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}


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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: zephyr

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-16T21:19:17.897Z

Reserved: 2026-09-18T13:48:54.198Z

Link: CVE-2026-93669

cve-icon Vulnrichment

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Weaknesses