Description
The Bluetooth Classic SDP client built its outgoing request PDUs with bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which allocates from the sdp_pool net-buf pool with a K_FOREVER timeout and no failure handling, in sdp_client_ss_search(), sdp_client_sa_search() and sdp_client_ssa_search() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. All of these run on the Bluetooth workqueue bt_workq (via sdp_client_work_handler(), the L2CAP sdp_client_connected() callback, or the continuation-state follow-up from a received response), which is the same single thread that dispatches incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, drives L2CAP, and performs connection and channel teardown. sdp_pool holds only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one by default) and is shared with the SDP server role.
An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BT_SECURITY_L0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfp_hf_accept() calls bt_sdp_discover() through hfp_hf_create(), and hfp_ag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state.
With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hci_disconn_complete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves bt_workq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact.
The fix allocates client PDUs with K_NO_WAIT via a new sdp_client_create_pdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF flag, and adds an sdp_pool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with K_FOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately.
An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BT_SECURITY_L0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfp_hf_accept() calls bt_sdp_discover() through hfp_hf_create(), and hfp_ag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state.
With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hci_disconn_complete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves bt_workq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact.
The fix allocates client PDUs with K_NO_WAIT via a new sdp_client_create_pdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF flag, and adds an sdp_pool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with K_FOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
References
History
Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Bluetooth Classic SDP client built its outgoing request PDUs with bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which allocates from the sdp_pool net-buf pool with a K_FOREVER timeout and no failure handling, in sdp_client_ss_search(), sdp_client_sa_search() and sdp_client_ssa_search() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. All of these run on the Bluetooth workqueue bt_workq (via sdp_client_work_handler(), the L2CAP sdp_client_connected() callback, or the continuation-state follow-up from a received response), which is the same single thread that dispatches incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, drives L2CAP, and performs connection and channel teardown. sdp_pool holds only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one by default) and is shared with the SDP server role. An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BT_SECURITY_L0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfp_hf_accept() calls bt_sdp_discover() through hfp_hf_create(), and hfp_ag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state. With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hci_disconn_complete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves bt_workq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix allocates client PDUs with K_NO_WAIT via a new sdp_client_create_pdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF flag, and adds an sdp_pool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with K_FOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately. | |
| Title | Bluetooth Classic SDP client can deadlock the Bluetooth workqueue on buffer allocation | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-833 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Subscriptions
No data.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: zephyr
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-16T21:19:11.844Z
Reserved: 2026-09-18T13:48:48.432Z
Link: CVE-2026-93666
No data.
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses