When send() returns an error, the host TX path (send_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/conn.c) unrefs the same buffer again, believing it still owns it. This double-unref over-decrements the net_buf reference count. Because the buffer is a TX fragment whose destroy callback also decrements its still-queued parent buffer, the parent is freed prematurely while reachable on the connection TX queue, producing a use-after-free and corruption of the shared net_buf pool rather than a benign leak.
The error conditions are on the host-to-controller transmit path (controller send failure, or an unsupported H:4 packet type), so they are not driven directly by attacker-supplied radio bytes; a remote/adjacent peer can influence them only indirectly, e.g. by inducing controller TX failures under heavy link load. The consequence when reached is BLE-stack denial of service (crash / pool corruption) with possible further memory corruption, bounded to devices using one of these Bouffalo Lab on-chip controllers.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
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Tue, 11 Aug 2026 17:30:00 +0000
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ssvc
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Tue, 11 Aug 2026 06:45:00 +0000
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Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr |
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Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr |
Tue, 11 Aug 2026 05:15:00 +0000
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| Description | The Bluetooth HCI driver for Bouffalo Lab on-chip BLE controllers (BL60x/BL70x/BL61x), bt_bflb_send() in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bflb.c, violates the bt_hci_driver_api.send() buffer-ownership contract. That contract (documented at include/zephyr/drivers/bluetooth.h) requires the buffer reference to be consumed only on success; on error the caller still owns the reference and unrefs it. The driver instead routed all error paths through a shared label that unconditionally called net_buf_unref(buf) before returning the error code, consuming the buffer on failure as well. When send() returns an error, the host TX path (send_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/conn.c) unrefs the same buffer again, believing it still owns it. This double-unref over-decrements the net_buf reference count. Because the buffer is a TX fragment whose destroy callback also decrements its still-queued parent buffer, the parent is freed prematurely while reachable on the connection TX queue, producing a use-after-free and corruption of the shared net_buf pool rather than a benign leak. The error conditions are on the host-to-controller transmit path (controller send failure, or an unsupported H:4 packet type), so they are not driven directly by attacker-supplied radio bytes; a remote/adjacent peer can influence them only indirectly, e.g. by inducing controller TX failures under heavy link load. The consequence when reached is BLE-stack denial of service (crash / pool corruption) with possible further memory corruption, bounded to devices using one of these Bouffalo Lab on-chip controllers. | |
| Title | Double free / use-after-free in Bouffalo Lab HCI driver send() error paths (hci_bflb) | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-415 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: zephyr
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-11T17:06:37.893Z
Reserved: 2026-06-10T15:13:51.139Z
Link: CVE-2026-11893
Updated: 2026-08-11T17:06:32.466Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-11T05:17:11.567
Modified: 2026-08-11T17:17:45.650
Link: CVE-2026-11893
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-11T06:30:06Z