| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Ajax processor within the Carbon console fails to adequately protect state-changing operations from Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. Specifically, it utilizes the HTTP GET method for these operations, and while the SameSite=Lax cookie attribute is employed for mitigation, this mechanism is bypassed as it permits cookies to be sent with cross-origin top-level navigation requests, including GET requests. This allows an attacker to trick an authenticated user's browser into unknowingly executing unintended actions.
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform unauthorized state-altering requests on behalf of authenticated users. This could lead to consequences such as data modification, account changes, or other actions that could result in data compromise or loss of user control over their account. However, this attack is only feasible if the Carbon console and related services are exposed to the public internet, which is not recommended according to WSO2's security guidelines. |
| When Multi-Attribute Login is enabled, the login interface fails to consistently mask the existence of user accounts. For valid users, the server resolves and displays their canonical username, while for non-existent users, it echoes the original input. This occurs regardless of the validate_username configuration.
The discovery of valid usernames can increase the risk of brute force attacks, social engineering attacks, and targeted information leakage. Attackers can leverage this information to craft more effective phishing campaigns or social engineering tactics to compromise user accounts or extract sensitive data. |
| The Conditional Authentication (Adaptive Authentication) script does not correctly enforce the completion of all required authentication steps when a specific multi-step pattern involving certain authenticators is configured. This allows an attacker to bypass intermediate authentication challenges by exploiting how the script handles callbacks and re-execution of authentication steps.
Successful exploitation allows a malicious actor to gain unauthorized access to a targeted user account. This vulnerability can only be exploited when all of the following conditions are met: the application login flow contains a specific secondary authenticator, the Conditional Authentication script is configured with particular event callbacks and re-executes an authentication step, the targeted user has one of the impacted authenticators enrolled, and the attacker successfully completes any preceding authentication steps. |
| When an Event Publisher output adapter is configured with irrelevant properties, the affected products log these properties. This logging occurs without sufficient validation or sanitization of the property values.
A malicious actor with access to the 'wso2carbon' log files could retrieve sensitive information, such as user credentials or other confidential data, that was inadvertently logged due to misconfiguration, potentially leading to unauthorized access. |
| The Swagger UI Try-out console within the API Publisher documentation allows an external Swagger API definition URL to be loaded, overriding the existing API definitions within the Publisher portal.
By exploiting this vulnerability, malicious actors can deceive users into interacting with these overwritten API definitions. This could lead to the exposure of sensitive information or the initiation of unintended requests to backend services. |
| When internal roles are removed from a user within the WSO2 product, the system fails to invalidate any previously issued authentication tokens associated with that user.
This vulnerability could allow users to retain their previous access privileges even after their roles have been revoked. As a result, a user can continue to perform unauthorized actions or access restricted resources until the expired tokens naturally expire. |
| In multi-tenant deployments, the Publisher REST APIs fail to enforce tenant isolation correctly. This allows a user in one tenant, possessing sufficient privileges to invoke these APIs, to perform operations that impact other tenants.
The vulnerability allows a privileged user to perform publisher operations such as exposing or modifying API Metadata in another tenant environment. This impact is only realized in multi-tenant deployments. |
| The XML and schema validation functionalities within the SchemaValidator Mediator process XML input as part of validation flows. Under certain conditions, the XML parser allows the resolution of external entities when handling user-supplied XML content during validation operations. This behavior can occur when an attacker supplies crafted XML payloads to the relevant mediator flows with sufficient privileges.
Successful exploitation may allow a highly privileged actor to read files accessible within the server hosting the affected product. Additionally, it may be possible to trigger outbound requests to unintended internal or external locations, depending on the server environment and network configuration. Specially crafted XML payloads can also lead to excessive resource consumption during parsing, impacting the availability of the product. |
| The System REST API accepts user-supplied file uploads without enforcing sufficient validation on the file type or destination, allowing files to be written to arbitrary server-accessible locations. Exploitation requires authenticated administrative access with publisher privileges.
Successful exploitation permits an authenticated publisher to upload files to server-accessible locations. Depending on the deployment environment and how uploaded files are handled, this could lead to the execution of uploaded content, potentially resulting in remote code execution. |
| The Class Mediator fails to correctly validate or sanitize `messageContext` properties when they are used to populate dynamic values. This allows authenticated users to potentially access or modify data across different system invocations that should be isolated.
This weakness can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information belonging to other users or the unintended modification of system data by authenticated users. The exact impact depends on how `messageContext` properties are utilized within the affected WSO2 products. |
| The account locking mechanism fails to trigger when secondary user stores are inaccessible. The software does not maintain a consistent state for account locking if it cannot reach all configured user stores, allowing an attacker to repeatedly attempt authentication with invalid credentials without triggering the lockout mechanism for users within active stores.
When the account locking mechanism is bypassed due to the inaccessibility of secondary user stores, users in accessible user stores are left vulnerable to brute force attacks. A malicious actor can exploit this by attempting numerous invalid password combinations against a user account without the expected account lockout consequence. |
| The user self-signup flow in multiple WSO2 products fails to adequately validate user-supplied input. This weakness allows arbitrary unvalidated data to be included within user claims, which are then used by downstream processes.
Allowing unvalidated input into user claims can lead to various security risks. Malicious or malformed data injected during signup could be processed by other parts of the application, potentially enabling attacks such as content manipulation, redirection, user interface inconsistencies, unauthorized actions, and data exposure. The actual impact depends on how the compromised data is consumed and the privileges associated with the affected users. |
| When secondary user stores are configured, the implicit-association resolver incorrectly initializes from a secondary user store and bypasses the primary user store during search and uniqueness checks. This allows a subject to be associated with an unintended local account if the same lookup claim (e.g., username or email) exists in both the primary and a secondary store.
If duplicate claim values exist across user stores, this issue can lead to identity confusion due to incorrect implicit associations when using an external Identity Provider (IDP). Legitimate user accounts in the primary user store may fail to associate correctly with their corresponding external IDP accounts, potentially restricting access if the secondary account has fewer privileges. Deployments are not affected if no secondary user stores are configured, implicit association is disabled, or claim values are globally unique. |
| Unused authorization codes issued to deleted users are not being properly invalidated or removed from the system. This allows for the persistence of these codes, enabling them to be potentially reused.
If an attacker possesses both the authorization code and the associated client credentials (client ID and client secret), they can leverage these unused codes to obtain access tokens on behalf of users who have already been deleted. This may lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and services, contingent on the scopes originally authorized for the compromised authorization code. |
| The Secret Type Management REST API does not correctly isolate access controls when deleting a secret type. The on-delete cascade logic, when triggered, fails to enforce organizational boundaries, leading to the removal of secrets associated with that type across all organizations.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can result in the unintended deletion of secrets across the entire deployment, potentially causing configuration failures, service interruptions, and a denial-of-service condition. This vulnerability requires delete permissions for the Secret Type Management REST API, which are by default only granted to administrators. |
| The user impersonation flow in WSO2 Identity Server fails to properly manage refresh tokens associated with impersonated sessions. This allows an attacker who has obtained an access token for an impersonated user to leverage the refresh token grant to obtain new access tokens, extending their ability to act as the legitimate user.
An attacker who gains access to an impersonated user's access token can exploit this weakness to renew their authorization. This results in the continued ability to perform actions on behalf of the actual user, compromising log integrity and traceability by masking the true actor. |
| The system accepts authentication requests without sufficient validation to enforce tenant isolation when using Email OTP, SMS OTP, or Magic Link as first-factor authenticators. This failure to adequately separate user data between tenants can lead to the exposure of personally identifiable information.
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to disclose personally identifiable information of users in different tenants, resulting in privacy violations and potential regulatory non-compliance. This may include unauthorized access to user details such as mobile numbers. |
| Tokens issued to a low-privileged user are not sufficiently restricted, allowing them to be used to access product-level Admin REST APIs.
Exploitation of this vulnerability allows a low-privileged user to invoke the Admin REST APIs of WSO2 products, potentially leading to full administrative account takeover. This requires the attacker to already possess a low-privileged user account and be able to obtain a valid token for it. |
| The JWT authentication mechanism accepts tokens signed with algorithms other than those explicitly configured or supported. This allows an attacker to craft a JWT with an unsupported algorithm, which is then incorrectly validated, leading to unauthorized access.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in unauthorized access to the system, including the potential compromise of administrative accounts and full account takeover. The CVSS score is adjusted to 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) in single-tenant deployments, reflecting that the impact is contained within a single security authority boundary. |
| The affected product accepts user-supplied input within a URL parameter without enforcing expected sanitization or encoding before rendering it within the response. This condition allows for the injection of malicious JavaScript payloads.
An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to cause the user's browser to redirect to a malicious website, modify the user interface of the webpage, or retrieve sensitive information from the browser. However, the impact is mitigated for session hijacking as all session-related sensitive cookies are protected by the httpOnly flag. |
