| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: "...")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.
Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`). |
| Velociraptor contains a deadlock condition that may be triggered by authenticated users. The issue stems from a lock management bug in the user management module. |
| Velociraptor's prefetch library contains an out of bound vulnerability which may cause a crash when parsing certain malformed prefetch files. |
| An uncontrolled search path element in InsightVM assessment content in Rapid7 Insight Agent on Windows allows a local, low-privileged user to execute arbitrary code as SYSTEM via a planted executable resolved from the machine PATH.
Assessment content at or below version 0.0.261.0 included a check that invoked the `code` command without a fully qualified path from a process running as SYSTEM. The command was resolved against the machine PATH environment variable at execution time. Where the machine PATH contained a directory writable by non-administrative users and ordered ahead of the legitimate Visual Studio Code installation, a local user could place an executable named `code` in that directory and cause the agent to execute it with SYSTEM privileges.
The version range above refers to InsightVM assessment content versions, not Insight Agent versions. All Insight Agent versions were affected while running assessment content at or below 0.0.261.0. Assessment content is delivered to all Insight Agents via the Rapid7 Insight Platform independently of the Insight Agent version and is not customer-managed.
This issue was resolved in assessment content version 0.0.269.0, which was made generally available on September 15, 2026. Remediation was deployed automatically and no customer action is required. |
| Velociraptor stores the compiled VQL in the hunt object internally to avoid having to recompile the artifacts for each endpoint in the hunt. Although the field "compiled_collector_args" is an internal field, Velociraptor allowed the field to be set from a user API call. This allows another user who can schedule a hunt (minimal role of "investigator" ) to set the compiled VQL statements for the hunt bypassing any ACL checks that would normally be applied.
This flaw can then be escalated to allow the "investigator" user to run arbitrary VQL statements as an administrator user on the Velociraptor server. |
| Velociraptor allows for the creation of notebook backups in its default enabled daily backup feature. When Velociraptor restores the backup, the notebook cell content is interpolated into a template with no ACL checks. This allows a malicious user with NOTEBOOK_EDITOR permission to plant a VQL query which will be evaluated at elevated permissions if the notebook's backup is subsequently restored. |
| Velociraptor allows some sensitive artifacts to be gated by additional permissions. For example, the Linux.Sys.BashShell artifact allows arbitrary command execution on endpoints, and so it requires the EXECVE permission to schedule. However, no such check was implemented for client monitoring artifacts. Additionally there was no requirement that client monitoring artifacts carry the CLIENT_EVENTS type. This allows any user who can schedule client monitoring artifacts to also schedule otherwise restricted artifacts (such as Linux.Sys.BashShell). |
| The Velociraptor verify() VQL function allows a user to verify an artifact for syntatic and other issues. Due to an implementation fault in this VQL function, the global artifact repository is used which allows callers to overwrite existing artifacts without the required permissions. The attacker need only have the NOTEBOOK_EDIT permission (e.g. an analyst role) to be able to call this function. |
| Velociraptor allows reading Stacked result sets from the GUI. Velociraptor's multi-tenant design stores sub orgs within the datastore directory. The path requested by the GUI is not correctly checked against the prefix deny list, allowing result sets to read from denied prefixes.
In particular, a user with read access to the root org can access result sets from child orgs. |
| Velociraptor's web GUI allows specifying a custom type for columns in tables. The URL type takes the cell value and forms a URL which can be clicked in the GUI.The code does not limit the schemes allowed in this URL , allowing an attacker to specify a JavaScript scheme exposing the user to XSS. |
| Velociraptor allows scheduling new collections via VQL queries in notebooks. For a user to schedule a new collection, they require the COLLECT_CLIENT permission. However, this is not enforced when the user can run a VQL query which resets the authorization provider.
This allows a user who can run arbitrary VQL (usually with the "analyst" role) to launch new collections (usually requires the "investigator" role). This vulnerability is an escalation from an analyst to investigator role. |
| Velociraptor's VQL has a query() plugin which allows running a VQL query in a different org or user context. To be able to run as a different user, the calling user needs to have the IMPERSONATE permission (usually only given to administrators). Velociraptor versions prior to 0.77.2 evaluate this permission against the caller's org instead of against the target org.
This allows an administrator in one org to impersonate another user in another org, in which they may not have the IMPERSONATE permission. |
| When Microsoft Excel imports a CSV file, it executes cells beginning with certain characters as formulas, giving such CSV files arbitrary execution.
Velociraptor fails to sanitize such cells when exporting to CSV from various places such as the GUI, offline collector or data exports.
It is not clear if the vulnerability is actually in Microsoft Excel treating a CSV data file as executable content, or if Velociraptor should be sanitizing the data to prevent Excel from executing it. However, since this is such a common use case for Velociraptor we decided to highlight it in an advisory. |
| The hunt_delete() VQL function allows deleting hunts.
Velociraptor misapplied the permission check requiring only COLLECT_CLIENT (usually assigned to the "investigator" role) instead of the "DELETE_RESULTS" permission (usually only assigned to "administrators"). |
| A rogue Velociraptor client can upload a malformed sparse file such that if the GUI attempts to expand the file, a panic occurs which may crash the server process.
The problem is a Divide by Zero bug in the ShouldPadFile() function. |
| Any authenticated Velociraptor user — including one holding only the readerrole — can terminate the entire server process with a single request, by calling SetPassword with a username that does not exist. |
| When Velociraptor is configured to use an OIDC IdP for authentication, it uses the email claim as a username. However, some IdP allow users to change the email claim without verification. Some IdPs do not set the "email_verified" claim and do not actually verify the email.
This allows a user to impersonate another user by setting their email address within the IdP, allowing account takeover. |
| The Velociraptor gRPC API has a VFSGetBuffer endpoint which allows reading files from the datastore. To prevent users from reading sensitive files or accessing other orgs, the requested path is prefix checked against a list of denied prefixes. This prefix check can be bypassed allowing a user to access usually denied files. If the user has read permission in the ROOT org, this allows access to other orgs, in which the user may not have permission. |
| Velociraptor's NTFS parsing library mishandles several out of bound and memory exhaustion bugs which may be triggered by maliciously crafted NTFS images.
Typically Velociraptor's NTFS parser is used on live NTFS filesystems, limiting the opportunity of attackers corrupting the filesystem. However, in some applications (e.g. dead disk forensics https://docs.velociraptor.app/docs/forensic/deaddisk/ ) Velociraptor may be used on untrusted NTFS image files.
If an attacker is able to inject maliciously corrupted NTFS Volumes they can cause a crash and a Denial of Service. |
| The NewNotebook API does not sufficiently sanitize its parameters allowing an authenticated user with NOTEBOOK_EDIT permission to write the notebook record outside the org's data store directory. The file written must have an extension of ".json.db" but can otherwise overwrite other metadata files (such as ACL records, hunts etc). This can corrupt these files and cause data corruption. |
