| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Payment Gateway for Redsys & WooCommerce Lite WordPress plugin before 7.0.2 does not verify the authenticity of incoming payment-provider notifications for one of its payment methods before marking orders as paid, allowing unauthenticated attackers to forge a payment-confirmation callback and complete their own orders without paying. |
| The WP Travel Engine WordPress plugin before 6.8.2 does not verify that an incoming PayPal payment notification was sent to the site's configured merchant account, nor that the paid amount matches the order total, before marking a booking as paid, allowing unauthenticated attackers to mark bookings as fully paid using a token payment made to an attacker-controlled account. |
| The CoCart WordPress plugin before 4.9.0 does not validate a user-supplied price value against the actual product price when items are added to the cart through one of its public REST API endpoints, allowing unauthenticated users to set arbitrary product prices and complete WooCommerce orders at manipulated totals. |
| The Swagger UI Try-out console within the API Publisher documentation allows an external Swagger API definition URL to be loaded, overriding the existing API definitions within the Publisher portal.
By exploiting this vulnerability, malicious actors can deceive users into interacting with these overwritten API definitions. This could lead to the exposure of sensitive information or the initiation of unintended requests to backend services. |
| Missing authentication for critical function in Microsoft Planetary Computer Pro allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Deserialization of untrusted data in Azure Service Bus allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Improper authentication in Azure SQL Database allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Missing authorization in Azure SRE Agent allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. |
| Exposed dangerous method or function in Azure Confidential Ledger allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Application Insights Profiler allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Improper restriction of communication channel to intended endpoints in Azure SQL Managed Instance allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| Opening a crafted DICOM file containing malicious JPEG-compressed pixel data triggers an attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds write, which may allow an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Apache Portable Runtime Utility via apr_dbd_oracle provider.
This issue affects Apache Portable Runtime Utility: from 1.6.0 through 1.6.3 |
| PILOS (Platform for Interactive Live-Online Seminars) is a frontend for BigBlueButton. From 2.1.0 until 4.14.1, PILOS does not send a Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy response header, so pages opened by PILOS via a link that opens a new browsing context (e.g., target="_blank") retain a window.opener reference back to the originating PILOS tab. A malicious destination page reached this way can use window.opener to navigate or manipulate the original PILOS tab, a technique known as reverse tabnabbing, potentially redirecting an authenticated user to a phishing page that mimics PILOS. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.1. |
| h2 is a pure-Python implementation of a HTTP/2 protocol stack. Versions up to and including 4.4.0 accept request header blocks containing more than one Host header, and forward every Host header to the consuming application. Where the consumer downgrades HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1, the resulting request carries two Host header lines, providing a request smuggling primitive. This issue is fixed in version 4.4.1. |
| OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizardis a web application to interactively build a contract out of components from OpenZeppelin Contracts. Versions prior to 0.10.9 generate a Hardhat test file (`test/test.ts`) by interpolating user-supplied `opts.name` (ERC20/ERC721) and `opts.uri` (ERC1155) directly into TypeScript string literals at `zip-hardhat.ts:48` and `:50` without any JavaScript string escaping. No authentication is required: an attacker crafts a URL such as `https[:]//wizard[.]openzeppelin[.]com/#/erc20?name=");require("child_process").execSync("...");("` and shares it with a developer. When the victim downloads the resulting zip archive and runs `npx hardhat test`, the injected Node.js code executes with the developer's local OS privileges. Version 0.10.9 fixes the issue. |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the route `POST /api/tenants/{tenantId}/staff/{staffId}/crypto` accepts and stores attacker-controlled ML-KEM-768 public keys against any tenant on the platform without authentication. The handler logs an "Unauthorized crypto key storage attempt" warning when neither a session nor a registration cookie is present, then proceeds to insert the row regardless. The platform's E2E claim that "even administrators cannot view sensitive information" is broken: any unauthenticated network attacker can register themselves as an additional encryption recipient for any tenant's future patient appointments. A second variant of the bug suppresses the unauthorized-warning log entry. The Zod schema makes the `email` field optional. When the request body omits `email` and the request carries no registration cookie, the comparison `registrationEmail === email` becomes `undefined === undefined`, which evaluates to `true`. The handler treats the request as a legitimate registration flow, skips the warning entirely, and stores the row. Successful storage is still recorded as an `[info]` log line, but the security-relevant warning that operators are most likely to monitor or alert on is gone. The `staff_crypto` table has no unique constraint on `user_id`, so an arbitrary number of attacker rows can coexist for the same staff identifier and all return as `is_active=true`. The supplied `staffId` does not need to match any existing user or pending invite. Schema validation on `passkeyId`, `publicKey`, and `privateKeyShare` is also weak: the literal string `<placeholder-base64>` was accepted, indicating no length, format, or cryptographic-validity check beyond field presence. This weakness is independent of the auth bypass but compounds it: a poisoned directory can also be filled with malformed entries that break legitimate booking flows. The injected key is consumed by the public booking flow. After completing the unauthenticated `bootstrap-challenge` and `bootstrap-verify` ceremony as a "patient", the resulting `bookingAccessToken` is accepted by `GET /api/tenants/{id}/appointments/staff-public-keys`, which returns the attacker-controlled keys alongside any legitimate ones. A new appointment encrypts its tunnel key with ML-KEM to all listed recipients, so the attacker becomes a co-recipient of the encryption and can decapsulate the tunnel key with the matching secret. From there, all appointment payloads for that booking are decryptable. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue. |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the registration handler at `POST /api/auth/register/{userId}` validates the relationship between the WebAuthn challenge and the registration cookie's email but never validates that the `userId` in the URL belongs to that email. An unauthenticated attacker requests a challenge for their own email, generates a registration response with their own authenticator, and submits it against any victim user's URL. The challenge-vs-cookie email match passes, the WebAuthn ceremony validates, and `addPasskey` writes the attacker's credential into the victim's `user_passkey` rows. The next victim-email login accepts a passkey assertion from the attacker's authenticator and issues a session as the victim. User IDs are not strictly secret on this platform, but the exact set of exposure surfaces should be assessed by the maintainers. Staff-list endpoints return user IDs to authenticated tenant members per the route signature; live verification of all exposure surfaces (whether user IDs leak through any unauthenticated route, through invite-confirmation URLs, or through other administrative views) is part of the pending live PoC. Where the attacker knows the victim's email and userId, the analysis below becomes account takeover. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue. |
