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Search Results (380653 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-26855 | 1 Microsoft | 1 Exchange Server | 2026-08-19 | 9.1 Critical |
| Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-26854 | 1 Microsoft | 1 Exchange Server | 2026-08-19 | 6.6 Medium |
| Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-26412 | 1 Microsoft | 1 Exchange Server | 2026-08-19 | 9.1 Critical |
| Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-24110 | 1 Microsoft | 2 Hevc Video Extensions, High Efficiency Video Coding | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2026-68148 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key() The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY. It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys). The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when the last inode that references the key is evicted. However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later. Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct super_block structs. Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent ("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block. | ||||
| CVE-2021-24107 | 1 Microsoft | 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| Windows Event Tracing Information Disclosure Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-24090 | 1 Microsoft | 8 Windows 10, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 1909 and 5 more | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-24104 | 1 Microsoft | 6 Sharepoint Enterprise Server, Sharepoint Foundation, Sharepoint Foundation 2013 and 3 more | 2026-08-19 | 4.6 Medium |
| Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-1640 | 1 Microsoft | 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-24089 | 1 Microsoft | 2 Hevc Video Extensions, High Efficiency Video Coding | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2026-68147 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free. For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.) | ||||
| CVE-2021-27083 | 1 Microsoft | 1 Remote Development | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| Remote Development Extension for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-27082 | 1 Microsoft | 1 Quantum Development Kit | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| Quantum Development Kit for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2026-68146 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Add global mutex to serialize trace_parser access In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release handlers to parse user input. The affected handler paths and their specific functions are: - Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open() - Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write() - Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release() If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state, specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted input or undefined behavior. Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent corruption of parser state. | ||||
| CVE-2021-27081 | 1 Microsoft | 2 Eslint, Visual Studio Code Eslint Extension | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| Visual Studio Code ESLint Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-27080 | 1 Microsoft | 1 Azure Sphere | 2026-08-19 | 9.3 Critical |
| Azure Sphere Unsigned Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-27077 | 1 Microsoft | 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2021-27075 | 1 Microsoft | 6 Azure Container Instance, Azure Container Instances, Azure Container Registry and 3 more | 2026-08-19 | 6.8 Medium |
| Azure Virtual Machine Information Disclosure Vulnerability | ||||
| CVE-2026-68144 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phonet: pep: fix use-after-free in pep_get_sb() pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF. Reproduced under KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0 Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157 pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0 pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10 pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410 __sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0 phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0 __netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0 Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one. | ||||
| CVE-2021-27074 | 1 Microsoft | 1 Azure Sphere | 2026-08-19 | 6.2 Medium |
| Azure Sphere Unsigned Code Execution Vulnerability | ||||