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Search Results (11778 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64243 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: simple-mux: Fix enum control bounds check simple_mux_control_put() rejects values greater than e->items, but enum control values are zero based. For the two-entry mux used by this driver, valid values are 0 and 1, so value 2 must be rejected as well. Accepting e->items can store an invalid mux state, pass it to the GPIO setter, and pass it on to the DAPM mux update path where it is used as an index into the enum text array. Use the same >= e->items check used by the ASoC enum helpers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64114 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free; if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ } It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic. An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path. Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to. Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it. Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain the self-reported iph->ihl. Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the trigger uses a real netdev. Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock distro kernel. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64102 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace: skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 ("Marker and ULPDU Length fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU"), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64018 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: validate rx_req_idx to prevent out-of-bounds array access In mana_hwc_rx_event_handler(), rx_req_idx is derived from sge->address in DMA-coherent memory. In Confidential VMs (SEV-SNP/TDX), this memory is shared unencrypted and HW can modify WQE contents at any time. No bounds check exists on rx_req_idx, which can lead to an out-of-bounds access into reqs[]. Add bounds check on rx_req_idx in mana_hwc_rx_event_handler() before using it to index the reqs[] array. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112277 | 1 Rdesktop | 1 Rdesktop | 2026-10-19 | 6.5 Medium |
| rdesktop through 1.9.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in process_plane() in bitmap.c that allows malicious RDP servers to crash clients by sending malformed 32 bpp compressed bitmaps. Attackers can declare a large bitmap geometry with a short compressed body in bitmap update PDUs or bitmap cache orders, causing unbounded reads past the receive buffer and denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112279 | 1 Rdesktop | 1 Rdesktop | 2026-10-19 | 6.5 Medium |
| rdesktop through 1.9.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in process_bmpcache2() in orders.c that allows malicious RDP servers to crash clients via crafted revision-2 bitmap cache orders. Attackers can send an uncompressed order with large width/height or an underflowing mode nibble and short payload, causing memcpy() reads past the receive buffer and denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112276 | 2 Netpbm, Netpbm Project | 2 Netpbm, Netpbm | 2026-10-19 | 6.1 Medium |
| Netpbm through 11.16.00 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in rasttopnm that allows attackers to read heap memory by supplying Sun rasterfiles with short colormaps. Attackers can craft colormapped rasterfiles with pixel bytes exceeding the palette length to leak up to 255 adjacent heap bytes into the PNM output or crash the program. | ||||
| CVE-2026-58100 | 1 Freebsd | 1 Freebsd | 2026-10-19 | 7 High |
| kqueue_fork_copy_knote() indexed into the child's file descriptor table using a knote's file descriptor number without a bounds check. Because the child's table is copied before knotes are transferred, a concurrent thread in the parent could grow the parent's table and register knotes with file descriptor numbers beyond the end of the child's table, causing an out-of-bounds read. An unprivileged local user may be able to exploit these races to escalate privileges. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108455 | 1 Microsoft | 11 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021 and 8 more | 2026-10-19 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office PowerPoint allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63860 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/core: Prefer NLA_NUL_STRING These attributes are evaluated as c-string (passed to strcmp), but NLA_STRING doesn't check for the presence of a \0 terminator. Either this needs to switch to nla_strcmp() and needs to adjust printf fmt specifier to not use plain %s, or this needs to use NLA_NUL_STRING. As the code has been this way for long time, it seems to me that userspace does include the terminating nul, even tough its not enforced so far, and thus NLA_NUL_STRING use is the simpler solution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63807 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level When recovering hugepages in the shadow MMU, verify that the base gfn of the shadow page is actually contained within the target memslot, *before* querying the max mapping level given the shadow page's gfn. Failure to pre-check the validity of the gfn can lead to an out-of-bounds access to the slot's lpage_info (which typically manifests as a host #PF because the lpage_info is vmalloc'd) if the guest creates a hugepage mapping (in its PTEs) that extends "below" the bounds of a memslot. When faulting in memory for a guest, and the size of the guest mapping is greater than KVM's (current) max mapping, then KVM will create a "direct" shadow page (direct in that there are no gPTEs to shadow, and so the target gfn is a direct calculation given the base gfn of the shadow page). The hugepage recovery flow looks for such direct shadow pages, as forcing 4KiB mappings when dirty logging generates the guest > host mapping size case. When the 4KiB restriction is lifted, then KVM can replace the shadow page with a hugepage. But if KVM originally used a smaller mapping than the guest because the range of memory covered by the guest hugepage exceeds the bounds of a memslot, then KVM will link a direct shadow page with a gfn that is outside the bounds of the memslot being used to fault in memory. The rmap entry added for the leaf mapping is correct and within bounds, but the gfn of the leaf SPTE's parent shadow page will be out of bounds. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000806ffc #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1002a7067 PMD 10612f067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 13 UID: 1000 PID: 757 Comm: mmu_stress_test Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-48ce1e26eace-x86_pir_to_irr_comments-vm #341 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level+0x79/0x2b0 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages+0x21b/0x320 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x1ee/0x590 [kvm] kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x3a1/0x4d0 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x9bf/0x15d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0xbb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f21c0f1a9bf </TASK> Don't bother pre-checking the bounds of the potential hugepage, i.e. don't check that e.g. sp->gfn + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level + 1) is also within the memslot, as the checks performed by kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() are a superset of the basic bounds checks. I.e. pre-checking the full range would be a dubious micro-optimization. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53375 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vce: Prevent partial address patches In the case that only one of lo/hi is valid, the patching could result in a bad address written to in FW. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53246 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params(). However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE processing and kmemdup() copies). Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO buffer before it is used. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53225 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length. An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter. Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter. The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-53205 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ivpu: Add bounds checks for firmware log indices Add validation that read and write indices in the firmware log buffer are within valid bounds (< data_size) before using them. If out-of-bounds indices are encountered (from firmware), clamp them to safe values instead of proceeding with invalid offsets. This prevents potential out-of-bounds buffer access when firmware supplies invalid log indices. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53186 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/srp: bound SRP_RSP sense copy by the received length srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len, where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received (wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded. A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults. Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53147 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Validate XDomain request packet size before type cast tb_xdp_handle_request() casts the received packet buffer to protocol-specific structs without verifying that the allocation is large enough for the target type. A peer can send a minimal XDomain packet that passes the generic header length check but is shorter than the struct accessed after the cast, causing out-of- bounds reads from the kmemdup allocation. Plumb the packet length through xdomain_request_work and validate it against the expected struct size before each cast. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53146 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions. Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the copy length. | ||||
| CVE-2026-52986 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: don't use simple_strtoul Replace unsafe port parsing in epaddr_len(), ct_sip_parse_header_uri(), and ct_sip_parse_request() with a new sip_parse_port() helper that validates each digit against the buffer limit, eliminating the use of simple_strtoul() which assumes NUL-terminated strings. The previous code dereferenced pointers without bounds checks after sip_parse_addr() and relied on simple_strtoul() on non-NUL-terminated skb data. A port that reaches the buffer limit without a trailing character is also rejected as malformed. Also get rid of all simple_strtoul() usage in conntrack, prefer a stricter version instead. There are intentional changes: - Bail out if number is > UINT_MAX and indicate a failure, same for too long sequences. While we do accept 05535 as port 5535, we will not accept e.g. 'sip:10.0.0.1:005060'. While its syntactically valid under RFC 3261, we should restrict this to not waste cycles when presented with malformed packets with 64k '0' characters. - Force base 10 in ct_sip_parse_numerical_param(). This is used to fetch 'expire=' and 'rports='; both are expected to use base-10. - In nf_nat_sip.c, only accept the parsed value if its within the 1k-64k range. - epaddr_len now returns 0 if the port is invalid, as it already does for invalid ip addresses. This is intentional. nf_conntrack_sip performs lots of guesswork to find the right parts of the message to parse. Being stricter could break existing setups. Connection tracking helpers are designed to allow traffic to pass, not to block it. Based on an earlier patch from Jenny Guanni Qu <qguanni@gmail.com>. | ||||
| CVE-2026-52968 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: pci: fix GAIT table indexing due to double-scaling pointer arithmetic kvm_s390_pci_aif_enable(), kvm_s390_pci_aif_disable(), and aen_host_forward() index the GAIT by manually multiplying the index with sizeof(struct zpci_gaite). Since aift->gait is already a struct zpci_gaite pointer, this double-scales the offset, accessing element aisb*16 instead of aisb. This causes out-of-bounds accesses when aisb >= 32 (with ZPCI_NR_DEVICES=512) Fix by removing the erroneous sizeof multiplication. | ||||