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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74373 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid1,raid10: fix bio accounting for split md cloned bios Use md_cloned_bio() to control bio accounting instead of relying on r1bio_existed in raid1 or the io_accounting flag in raid10. The previous logic does not reliably reflect whether a bio is an md cloned bio. When a failed bio is split and resubmitted via bio_submit_split_bioset() on the error path, this can lead to either double accounting for md cloned bios, or missing accounting for bios returned from bio_submit_split_bioset() Fix this by using md_cloned_bio() to detect md cloned bios and skip accounting accordingly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74372 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: raid1: fix nr_pending leak in REQ_ATOMIC bad-block error path In raid1_write_request(), each per-mirror loop iteration begins by incrementing rdev->nr_pending. If a REQ_ATOMIC write encounters a badblock within the requested range, the code jumps to err_handle without dropping the reference taken for the current mirror. err_handle's cleanup loop will only decrements for k < i and r1_bio->bios[k] is non-NULL. The current slot is therefore skipped, leaving its nr_pending reference leaked permanently. The reference prevents the rdev from ever being removed, since raid1_remove_conf() refuses to remove an rdev with nr_pending > 0. Fix this by calling rdev_dec_pending() before jumping to err_handle. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74370 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: liveupdate: fix TOCTOU race in luo_session_retrieve() Extend the scope of the rwsem_read lock in luo_session_retrieve() to overlap with the acquisition of the session mutex. This prevents a concurrent thread from releasing and freeing the session between the lookup and the mutex lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74369 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: liveupdate: fix u-a-f in luo_file_unpreserve_files() and luo_file_finish() In luo_file_unpreserve_files() and luo_file_finish(), reorder module_put() and xa_erase() to ensure the file handler module remains pinned while its operations are being accessed. Specifically, luo_get_id() dereferences fh->ops->get_id, so the module reference must be held until after xa_erase() (which calls luo_get_id) completes. For luo_file_finish(), this requires moving the module_put() call out of the luo_file_finish_one() helper and into the main loop of luo_file_finish() itself. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74368 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix memory leak in ath12k_wifi7_dp_rx_h_verify_tkip_mic() In ath12k_wifi7_dp_rx_h_verify_tkip_mic(), the call to ath12k_dp_rx_check_nwifi_hdr_len_valid() may return false when the NWIFI header length is invalid, causing the function to abort early with -EINVAL. When this happens, the error propagates to ath12k_wifi7_dp_rx_h_defrag(), which clears first_frag by setting it to NULL. As a result, the corresponding MSDU is no longer referenced by the defragmentation path and is never freed. This leads to a memory leak for the affected MSDU on this error path. Proper cleanup is required to ensure the MSDU is released when header validation fails during TKIP MIC verification. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00302-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-1.115823.3 | ||||
| CVE-2026-74366 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix NULL deref in change_sta_links for unready link _ieee80211_set_active_links() calls _ieee80211_link_use_channel() for each newly-added link and WARN_ON_ONCE()s if it fails. The call uses assign_on_failure=true, which allows mac80211 to continue despite driver failures, but when a mac80211-level channel validation fails (e.g., combinations check, DFS, or no available radio), drv_assign_vif_chanctx() is never reached. Since ath12k_mac_vdev_create() is only called from that path, arvif->is_created remains false and arvif->ar remains NULL for the failed link. The subsequent drv_change_sta_links() call reaches ath12k_mac_op_change_sta_links(), which allocates an arsta and sets ahsta->links_map |= BIT(link_id) for the broken link before checking whether the link is ready. When the vdev was never created, only station_add() is skipped, but the link remains in links_map. Any subsequent operation iterating links_map and dereferencing arvif->ar without a NULL check will crash. Two observed examples are NULL deref in ath12k_mac_ml_station_remove() on disconnect and in ath12k_mac_op_set_key() when wpa_supplicant installs PTK keys. BUG: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000 pc : ath12k_mac_station_post_remove+0x40/0xe8 [ath12k] Call trace: ath12k_mac_station_post_remove+0x40/0xe8 [ath12k] ath12k_mac_op_sta_state+0xb60/0x1720 [ath12k] drv_sta_state+0x100/0xbd8 [mac80211] __sta_info_destroy_part2+0x148/0x178 [mac80211] ieee80211_set_disassoc+0x500/0x678 [mac80211] BUG: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000 pc : ath12k_mac_op_set_key+0x1f8/0x2c0 [ath12k] Call trace: ath12k_mac_op_set_key+0x1f8/0x2c0 [ath12k] drv_set_key+0x70/0x100 [mac80211] ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel+0x78/0x260 [mac80211] ieee80211_add_key+0x16c/0x2ac [mac80211] nl80211_new_key+0x138/0x280 [cfg80211] Fix this by checking arvif->is_created before calling ath12k_mac_alloc_assign_link_sta(). This prevents the broken link from entering links_map, so all subsequent operations iterating the bitmap are protected. The reliability of arvif->is_created across all error paths is ensured by the preceding patch. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00302-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-1.115823.3 | ||||
| CVE-2026-74362 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext2: fix ignored return value of generic_write_sync() Fix ext2_dio_write_iter() to propagate the error returned by generic_write_sync() instead of silently discarding it, which could cause write(2) to return success to userspace on O_SYNC/O_DSYNC files even when the sync failed. The correct pattern, already used in ext2_dax_write_iter() in the same file and in ext4, xfs, f2fs among others, is: if (ret > 0) ret = generic_write_sync(iocb, ret); Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. [JK: Reflect also filemap_write_and_wait() return value] | ||||
| CVE-2026-74360 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject exclusive maps for bpf_map_elem iterators Exclusive maps (aka excl_prog_hash) are meant to be reachable only from the single program whose hash matches. This is enforced by check_map_prog_compatibility() when the map is referenced from a program such as signed BPF loaders. A bpf_map_elem iterator, however, binds its target map at attach time in bpf_iter_attach_map() instead of referencing it from the program, so the exclusivity check is never reached. On top of that, the iterator exposes the map value as a writable buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74358 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix fast commit wait/wake bit mapping on 64-bit On 64-bit, ext4 dynamic inode states live in the upper half of i_flags, and ext4_test_inode_state() applies the corresponding +32 offset. The fast-commit wait and wake paths open-coded the wait key with the raw EXT4_STATE_* value. Add small helpers for the state wait word and bit, and use them for the FC_COMMITTING and FC_FLUSHING_DATA waits so the wait key follows the same mapping as the state helpers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74353 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: always resume_all after suspend_all Need to restore any good queues even if the suspend_all failed for some. Always run remove_queue as that will schedule a GPU reset is removing the queue fails. v2: move resume_all after remove | ||||
| CVE-2026-74352 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: of: reserved_mem: avoid post-init UAF when alloc_reserved_mem_array() fails The global pointer 'reserved_mem' continues to reference the reserved_mem_array which lives in __initdata if alloc_reserved_mem_array() fails. of_reserved_mem_lookup() is exported for post-init use, that would dereference freed memory and trigger a use-after-free. So reset reserved_mem_count to 0 when alloc_reserved_mem_array() fails. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74351 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: rebase copied fsdlm LVB pointers in locking_state The locking_state debugfs iterator snapshots struct ocfs2_lock_res by value under ocfs2_dlm_tracking_lock and later formats that copy in ocfs2_dlm_seq_show(). That is fine for the inline fields, but the userspace fsdlm stack stores the LVB through lksb_fsdlm.sb_lvbptr. Once the iterator drops the tracking lock, a copied non-NULL sb_lvbptr still points into the original lockres owner, so teardown can free that container before the debugfs dump walks the raw LVB bytes. Rebase the copied sb_lvbptr to the copied l_lksb before dumping the raw LVB. The seq snapshot already carries the inline LVB storage reserved in struct ocfs2_dlm_lksb, so the debugfs reader can dump the copied bytes without borrowing the original lockres lifetime. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: locking_state reader: lockres teardown: 1. ocfs2_dlm_seq_start()/next() 1. file release or another owner copies struct ocfs2_lock_res teardown reaches 2. ocfs2_dlm_seq_show() formats ocfs2_lock_res_free() the copied row 2. the lockres is removed from the 3. ocfs2_dlm_lvb() follows the tracking list copied sb_lvbptr 3. the owner frees the original lockres container Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_dlm_seq_show+0x1bd/0x430 RIP: 0033:0x7f8ec4b1e29d The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810a1e0800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 368 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88810a1e0800, ffff88810a1e0c00) Read of size 1 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ocfs2_dlm_seq_show+0x1bd/0x430 (fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c:3137) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 seq_read_iter+0x29d/0x790 seq_read+0x20a/0x280 find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 rcu_read_unlock+0x18/0x70 full_proxy_read+0x9e/0xd0 vfs_read+0x12c/0x590 ksys_read+0xd2/0x170 do_user_addr_fault+0x65a/0x890 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Allocated by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 ocfs2_file_open+0x13e/0x300 do_dentry_open+0x233/0x7f0 vfs_open+0x5a/0x1b0 path_openat+0x66d/0x1540 do_file_open+0x186/0x2b0 do_sys_openat2+0xce/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0xd0/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 kfree+0x313/0x590 ocfs2_file_release+0x138/0x260 __fput+0x1df/0x4b0 fput_close_sync+0xd2/0x170 __x64_sys_close+0x55/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f | ||||
| CVE-2026-74348 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/dlm: require a ref for locking_state debugfs open debug_lockres_open() copies inode->i_private into struct debug_lockres and debug_lockres_release() later drops that pointer with dlm_put(). That only works if open successfully pins the struct dlm_ctxt. Today open calls dlm_grab(dlm) but ignores its return value. Once the last domain unregister has removed the context from dlm_domains, dlm_grab() returns NULL, yet open still stores the raw pointer and returns success. The later release path is outside the debugfs removal barrier, so it can call dlm_put() after dlm_free_ctxt_mem() has freed the context. KASAN reports this as a slab-use-after-free in dlm_put() called from debug_lockres_release(). Fail the open when dlm_grab() cannot acquire the reference and unwind the seq_file private state before returning. That keeps locking_state from handing out a file descriptor whose release path does not own the dlm_ctxt. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: locking_state debugfs open: last domain unregister: 1. debug_lockres_open() reads 1. dlm_unregister_domain() calls inode->i_private. dlm_complete_dlm_shutdown(). 2. debug_lockres_open() calls 2. shutdown removes the dlm_ctxt from dlm_grab(dlm) and gets NULL. dlm_domains. 3. open still stores the raw dlm 3. final teardown reaches pointer in dl->dl_ctxt and dlm_free_ctxt_mem() and frees it. returns success. 4. debug_lockres_release() later calls dlm_put(dl->dl_ctxt). Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-use-after-free in dlm_put+0x82/0x200 RIP: 0033:0x7f4d349bc9e0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888103a3c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 816 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888103a3c000, ffff888103a3c800) Write of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?) dlm_put+0x82/0x200 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?) kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?) debug_lockres_release+0x53/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587) dlm_put+0x9/0x200 (?:?) debug_lockres_release+0x5c/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587) full_proxy_release+0x67/0x90 (?:?) __fput+0x1df/0x4b0 (?:?) do_raw_spin_lock+0x10f/0x1b0 (?:?) fput_close_sync+0xd2/0x170 (?:?) __x64_sys_close+0x55/0x90 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x10c/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) irqentry_exit+0xac/0x6e0 (?:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) Freed by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 (?:?) kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 (?:?) kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 (?:?) __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 (?:?) kfree+0x30f/0x580 (?:?) dlm_put+0x1ce/0x200 (?:?) dlm_unregister_domain+0xf6/0xb30 (?:?) o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0x6b/0x90 (?:?) ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x41/0x70 (?:?) ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x1c4/0x220 (?:?) ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x38a/0x550 (?:?) generic_shutdown_super+0xc3/0x220 (?:?) kill_block_super+0x29/0x60 (?:?) deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0 (?:?) cleanup_mnt+0x13d/0x210 (?:?) task_work_run+0xfa/0x170 (?:?) exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd6/0x430 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x3cb/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) | ||||
| CVE-2026-74346 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: Fix OOB read during CQ MR registration Sashiko pointed out an unrelated bug during a previous patch: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260512183852.614045-1-jmoroni%40google.com This change fixes the bug by eliminating the cqmr->split field which was not being set properly and instead just checks the CQ resize feature flag directly. The cqmr->split field essentially tracks whether IRDMA_FEATURE_CQ_RESIZE is set, but it was not being set until CQ creation time, which is _after_ CQ memory registration (the only other place where it is referenced). As a result, it would always be false during MR registration and would therefore cause irdma_handle_q_mem to populate cqmr->shadow even for GEN_2 HW and beyond: cqmr->shadow = (dma_addr_t)arr[req->cq_pages]; The issue is that for GEN_2 and beyond, req->cq_pages may be exactly equal to iwmr->page_cnt and therefore equal to the size of arr, which would cause an OOB read by one. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74342 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kernfs: link kn to its parent before the LSM init hook After commit 12e9e3cd03b5 ("simpe_xattr: use per-sb cache"), kernfs_xattr_set() and kernfs_xattr_get() compute the cache via kernfs_root(kn) before any other check. kernfs_root(kn) walks kn->__parent first and falls back to kn->dir.root, both of which are NULL on a freshly kmem_cache_zalloc()'d kn. kn->__parent was being set in kernfs_new_node() after __kernfs_new_node() returned, and kn->dir.root is set even later by kernfs_create_dir_ns() / kernfs_create_empty_dir(). The LSM kernfs_init_security hook is invoked from inside __kernfs_new_node(), before either field has been initialized. selinux_kernfs_init_security() ends with kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ...). kernfs_root(kn) then returns NULL, and &((struct kernfs_root *)NULL)->xa_cache evaluates to offsetof(struct kernfs_root, xa_cache) which faults: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000e0 RIP: 0010:simple_xattr_set+0x27/0x8b0 Call Trace: kernfs_xattr_set+0x63/0xb0 selinux_kernfs_init_security+0x13b/0x270 security_kernfs_init_security+0x36/0xc0 __kernfs_new_node+0x182/0x290 kernfs_new_node+0x80/0xc0 kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x2b/0xa0 cgroup_create+0x116/0x380 cgroup_mkdir+0x7c/0x1a0 Reproduces deterministically at PID 1 (systemd) on an SELinux-enabled distro. The first cgroup mkdir under /sys/fs/cgroup with a labelled parent panics the kernel. The LSM hook's contract is that the kn_dir argument is the parent of the new kn, so kn->__parent should already point at kn_dir when the hook runs. Move kernfs_get(parent) and rcu_assign_pointer of kn->__parent from kernfs_new_node() into __kernfs_new_node() right before the security hook, and unwind the parent reference on the err_out4 path. kernfs_root(kn) then takes its parent branch during the hook and returns parent->dir.root, which is the correct root. This also closes the same-shape latent bug in kernfs_xattr_get() (which today is hidden only by kernfs_iattrs_noalloc() returning NULL on a fresh kn). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74339 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read snd_seq_read() copies a queued variable-length event header to userspace before expanding the payload. Queued variable-length events use SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_CHAINED internally, and data.ext.ptr points at the first extension cell. The read side strips SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_* bits from data.ext.len before the copy, but it leaves data.ext.ptr untouched. A userspace sequencer client can therefore write a direct variable event to itself and read back the extension-cell kernel address from the returned header. Clear the temporary header pointer before copy_to_user(). The original queued event remains unchanged and is still passed to snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so payload expansion keeps using the internal chain. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74337 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix NMI/tracepoint re-entry deadlock on lru locks NMI and tracepoint BPF programs can re-enter the per-CPU or global LRU lock that bpf_lru_pop_free()/push_free() already hold on the same CPU, AA-deadlocking. Lockdep reports "inconsistent {INITIAL USE} -> {IN-NMI}" on &l->lock (syzbot c69a0a2c816716f1e0d5) and "possible recursive locking detected" on &loc_l->lock (syzbot 18b26edb69b2e19f3b33). Prior trylock and rqspinlock based fixes (see links) were nacked because compromised on reliability. This patch converts every LRU lock site to rqspinlock_t and adds a recovery path for some failure windows to avoid node leaks. Failure recovery: - *_pop_free top-level: return NULL; prealloc_lru_pop() already treats that as no-free-element (-ENOMEM). - Cross-CPU steal: skip the victim's locked loc_l, try next CPU. - Post-steal local lock fail: publish stolen node to lockless per-CPU free_llist; next pop on this CPU picks it up. - push_free fail: mark node pending_free=1. __local_list_flush(), __local_list_pop_pending() reclaim the node from pending_list. __bpf_lru_list_shrink_inactive() reclaims the node from inactive list. Nodes from active list are reclaimed by __bpf_lru_list_shrink() or after __bpf_lru_list_rotate_active() demotes it to the inactive. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74336 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: bound S1G TIM PVB walk to the TIM element ieee80211_s1g_check_tim() parses the S1G Partial Virtual Bitmap (PVB) of a received TIM element. The TIM is handed in as the element payload: ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() stores elems->tim = elem->data and elems->tim_len = elem->datalen (net/mac80211/parse.c), so the valid bytes are [tim, tim + tim_len). When walking the encoded blocks the function passes the walker an end sentinel of (const u8 *)tim + tim_len + 2, i.e. two bytes past the end of the element. ieee80211_s1g_find_target_block() loops while (ptr + 1 <= end) and dereferences ptr (and the per-mode ieee80211_s1g_len_*() helpers read *ptr), so it can read up to two bytes beyond the TIM element -- an out-of-bounds read of adjacent skb/heap data when the TIM is the last element in the frame. The +2 appears to account for the element id/len header, but tim already points past that header at the element payload, so the addend is wrong. Pass the correct element end, (const u8 *)tim + tim_len. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74335 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bpf_task_from_vpid() bpf_task_from_vpid() looks up a task in the pid namespace of the current task, via find_task_by_vpid(): find_task_by_vpid(vpid) find_task_by_pid_ns(vpid, task_active_pid_ns(current)) find_pid_ns(nr, ns) -> idr_find(&ns->idr, nr) cgroup_skb programs run in softirq, which may interrupt a task that is itself in do_exit(). Once that task has passed exit_notify() -> release_task() -> __unhash_process(), its thread_pid is cleared, so task_active_pid_ns(current) returns NULL and find_pid_ns() dereferences &NULL->idr: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000050 RIP: 0010:idr_find+0x11/0x30 lib/idr.c:176 Call Trace: <IRQ> find_pid_ns kernel/pid.c:370 [inline] find_task_by_pid_ns+0x3b/0xe0 kernel/pid.c:485 bpf_task_from_vpid+0x5b/0x200 kernel/bpf/helpers.c:2916 bpf_prog_run_array_cg+0x17e/0x530 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:81 __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb+0x12b/0x250 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1612 sk_filter_trim_cap+0x1dc/0x4c0 net/core/filter.c:148 tcp_v4_rcv+0x18d1/0x2200 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2223 </IRQ> <TASK> do_exit+0xa63/0x1270 kernel/exit.c:1010 get_signal+0x141c/0x1530 kernel/signal.c:3037 Bail out when current has no pid namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74331 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware_loader: Fix recursive lock in device_cache_fw_images() A recursive locking deadlock can occur in the firmware loader's power management notification handler. During system suspend or hibernation preparation, fw_pm_notify() calls device_cache_fw_images(). This function acquires fw_lock to set the firmware cache state to FW_LOADER_START_CACHE and then iterates over all devices using dpm_for_each_dev() while still holding the lock. For each device, dev_cache_fw_image() schedules asynchronous work to cache the firmware. If memory allocation for the async work entry fails (e.g., in out-of-memory conditions), async_schedule_node_domain() falls back to executing the work function synchronously in the current thread. The synchronous execution path (__async_dev_cache_fw_image() -> cache_firmware() -> request_firmware() -> assign_fw()) attempts to acquire fw_lock again. Since the current thread already holds fw_lock, this results in a recursive locking deadlock. Fix this by releasing fw_lock immediately after updating the cache state and before calling dpm_for_each_dev(). The lock is only needed to protect the state update. Concurrent firmware requests will correctly see the FW_LOADER_START_CACHE state and use the piggyback mechanism, which is independently protected by its own fwc->name_lock. | ||||