The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.
History

Sat, 30 May 2026 09:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.
Title Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes <= 5.26.0 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Account Takeover via Missing Authorization on Event Reaction Endpoint
Weaknesses CWE-640
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Wordfence

Published:

Updated: 2026-05-30T09:29:00.787Z

Reserved: 2026-04-29T18:01:43.775Z

Link: CVE-2026-7459

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-05-30T10:16:22.610

Modified: 2026-05-30T10:16:22.610

Link: CVE-2026-7459

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-05-30T10:30:20Z