ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Assessment: Fully addressed.
When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted
classes list .
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes
Assessment: Fully addressed.
For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers
Both issues have been fixed.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Apache
Apache mina |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Apache
Apache mina |
Wed, 03 Jun 2026 11:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed. | |
| Title | Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232 | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-502 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: apache
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-03T12:46:58.145Z
Reserved: 2026-05-18T16:53:39.555Z
Link: CVE-2026-47065
Updated: 2026-06-03T12:46:52.056Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-06-03T11:16:19.800
Modified: 2026-06-03T11:16:19.800
Link: CVE-2026-47065
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-03T13:00:11Z