In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler
t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as
a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer
contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte
buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.
Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header
fields to guard against undersized messages.
Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.
In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a
remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len
against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed
integer overflow on offset.
Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after
skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Fri, 22 May 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-1284 | |
| References |
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Thu, 21 May 2026 15:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-120 |
Thu, 21 May 2026 12:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages. Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop. In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset. Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path. | |
| Title | net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-21T12:12:45.988Z
Reserved: 2026-05-01T14:12:56.013Z
Link: CVE-2026-43495
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-05-21T13:16:18.847
Modified: 2026-05-21T13:16:18.847
Link: CVE-2026-43495
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-22T01:30:23Z