In Arm ArmNN through 2026-03-27, an integer overflow in TensorShape::GetNumElements() in armnn/Tensor.cpp allows a crafted TFLite model file to bypass buffer size validation and trigger a heap-based buffer over-read during model optimization. The overflow occurs when multiplying tensor dimensions using 32-bit unsigned arithmetic without overflow detection, causing GetNumBytes() to return an understated allocation size. During Optimize()->InferOutputShapes(), the BatchToSpaceNdLayer reads beyond the allocated buffer.
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Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Fri, 22 May 2026 19:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Integer Overflow in ArmNN Tensor Shape Causes Buffer Over‑read | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-126 CWE-680 |
Fri, 22 May 2026 18:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In Arm ArmNN through 2026-03-27, an integer overflow in TensorShape::GetNumElements() in armnn/Tensor.cpp allows a crafted TFLite model file to bypass buffer size validation and trigger a heap-based buffer over-read during model optimization. The overflow occurs when multiplying tensor dimensions using 32-bit unsigned arithmetic without overflow detection, causing GetNumBytes() to return an understated allocation size. During Optimize()->InferOutputShapes(), the BatchToSpaceNdLayer reads beyond the allocated buffer. | |
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: mitre
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-22T17:40:29.276Z
Reserved: 2026-04-29T00:00:00.000Z
Link: CVE-2026-42627
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-22T19:30:44Z