AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt="..."` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Fri, 24 Apr 2026 04:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt="..."` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue. | |
| Title | AnythingLLM vulnerable to stored DOM XSS in chart caption renderer - LLM-driven prompt injection produces executable HTML via unsanitized renderMarkdown(content.caption) in Chartable component | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-116 CWE-1336 CWE-79 |
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cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-04-24T02:57:16.193Z
Reserved: 2026-04-20T14:01:46.671Z
Link: CVE-2026-41318
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-04-24T04:16:20.193
Modified: 2026-04-24T04:16:20.193
Link: CVE-2026-41318
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.