| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Craft CMS versions from 4.0.0-RC1 before 4.18.2 and from 5.0.0-RC1 before 5.10.6 contain an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the control panel element-search condition handling. Craft cleanses the outer request-controlled condition array via Component::cleanseConfig(), but Conditions::createCondition() later decodes and merges the JSON string in condition.config without re-running cleanseConfig() on the decoded configuration. Because condition.config is a JSON string during the first cleanse, Yii special config keys such as 'as ...' and 'on ...' can be hidden inside it and, after JSON decoding, are interpreted by Yii as behavior/event configuration during FieldLayout object creation. An attacker with an authenticated control panel session (and a valid CSRF token) can exploit this to execute operating system commands as the PHP/web user. |
| A flaw was found in the Data Science Pipelines Operator (DSPO). A namespace editor can exploit a vulnerability in the spec.database.customExtraParams field, which allows for the injection of dangerous parameters into the MySQL Data Source Name (DSN) string. By manipulating these parameters, an attacker can enable LOCAL INFILE functionality and exfiltrate sensitive files, such as the service account token, from the operator pod. This can lead to privilege escalation, allowing a namespace editor to gain cluster-admin privileges. |
| Chatwoot is a customer engagement suite. Prior to 4.9.0, Chatwoot allowed authenticated account administrators to transfer Portals, Automation Rules, Macros, and Twilio Channels to other accounts through the writable account_id parameter. This could break tenant isolation and cause cross-account data exposure, unauthorized configuration changes, or loss of access to transferred resources. This issue is fixed in version 4.9.0. |
| Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 did not properly filter internal configuration keys from user-supplied task properties when creating or updating a scheduled task through the administrative UI. An account holding permission to create at least one scheduled task type could supply a crafted property value that caused the system to overwrite the configuration of an unrelated, existing task instead of creating a new one. |
| Mermaid is a JavaScript tool that uses Markdown-inspired text to create and modify diagrams and charts. From version 11.5.0 until 11.16.1, Mermaid Architecture Diagrams are vulnerable to prototype pollution when a diagram defines a group with an id of __proto__. Because the group id is used directly as an object property key without validation, an attacker who can supply diagram text can pollute Object.prototype, potentially affecting the behavior of the embedding application. This issue is fixed in version 11.16.1. |
| Mermaid is a JavaScript tool that uses Markdown-inspired text to create and modify diagrams and charts. Prior to 10.9.8 and 11.16.1, Mermaid's configuration setters (mermaid.initialize, mermaidAPI.setConfig, and mermaidAPI.updateSiteConfig) merge caller-supplied configuration into Mermaid's internal config using the assignWithDepth deep-merge helper, which is vulnerable to prototype pollution. This is only exploitable if an application forwards untrusted data directly into one of these configuration entry points, which is outside their documented usage; diagram-supplied configuration (e.g. %%{init: {}}%% or YAML frontmatter) is not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 10.9.8 and 11.16.1. |
| Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the unauthenticated POST /api/v1/prediction/:id endpoint accepted an overrideConfig object and unconditionally spread it into internal flowConfig and flowData objects in packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts and packages/server/src/utils/index.ts without checking apiOverrideStatus. This allowed unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary properties into the flow execution context of any public chatflow, overwrite values such as chatId, sessionId, and chatHistory, and control values resolved through $flow.* template variables consumed by flow nodes. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: avoid corrupting page->mapping in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte
In MCOPY_ATOMIC_CONTINUE case with a non-shared VMA, pages in the page
cache are installed in the ptes. But hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap is called
for them mistakenly because they're not vm_shared. This will corrupt the
page->mapping used by page cache code. |
| axios before 0.33.0 (and 1.x before 1.18.0) can consume inherited properties from nested request option objects when the JavaScript process's Object.prototype has already been polluted by another component. While the top-level merged config uses a null prototype, nested plain objects such as auth and paramsSerializer are cloned into ordinary objects and read without own-property checks. When an application passes placeholder nested objects such as auth: {} or paramsSerializer: {}, inherited username/password values can cause silent injection of an Authorization: Basic header, and inherited encode/serialize values can alter query-string serialization (full serializer replacement requires a function-valued pollution primitive). This is exploitable only in the presence of pre-existing prototype pollution. |
| axios versions >=1.15.2 and <1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions. |
| axios in a Node.js deployment using the HTTP adapter can route requests through an attacker-controlled proxy. axios hardens merged request configuration by creating a null-prototype object, but request interceptors run after the merge; a common immutable interceptor pattern such as {...config} or Object.assign({}, config) converts the hardened config back into a regular object. axios then dispatches that object without re-hardening it, and the Node HTTP adapter reads config.proxy through the prototype chain. If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype.proxy, affected requests can be routed through an attacker-controlled proxy. For plaintext HTTP requests, the proxy can observe Authorization headers, Basic auth from config.auth, method, absolute URL, Host, and request body, and can return its own response. This does not establish browser impact or HTTPS header/body disclosure under normal TLS validation. Affected versions are >=0.31.1 (fixed in 0.33.0) and >=1.15.2 (fixed in 1.18.0). |
| axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.delete(), axios.head(), axios.options()), inherited data is read via (config || {}).data before config normalization, causing an attacker-controlled body to be sent on requests that did not set one. Additional low-level paths, only reachable when calling exported adapters/helpers (e.g. lib/adapters/http.js, unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js) directly with plain configs and no own proxy or paramsSerializer, can inherit polluted proxy values (routing requests through an attacker-controlled proxy) or paramsSerializer values (attacker-controlled URL serialization). These low-level gadgets do not reproduce through normal high-level axios calls on 1.15.2+. The issue is fixed in axios 1.18.0 and 0.33.0. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.0 before 19.0.5, 19.1 before 19.1.3, and 19.2 before 19.2.1 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to modify CI/CD configuration belonging to another user due to improper validation of user-supplied attributes when processing pipeline schedule inputs. |
| Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). Versions 5.7.0 and above, prior to 5.9.21 contain a mass-assignment flaw in the bulk-duplicate element action. An attacker who is only able to duplicate their own entires can submit an arbitrary id through the newAttributes request parameter. The duplication routine overrides its own id = null reset with that value and writes the attacker's attributes into the victim's existing entry row. ElementsController::beforeAction() pulls the request body into $this->_attributes and rejects requests that ship an id or canonicalId key at the top level, actionBulkDuplicate(), reads a separate newAttributes array and passes it straight through to the service layer. Elements::duplicateElement() clones the source element, sets id to null, and then hands the attacker's array to Craft::configure(), which overwrites the reset id with any numeric value inside $newAttributes. PHP Yii's saveElement() then performs an UPDATE against the row with that primary key instead of an INSERT. The attackers's title, slug, authorId, postDate, and UID land on the victim's entry. safeAttributes() on Entry includes id because the base element model exposes it, so the Collection::only() filter does not strip it. This issue has been fixed in version 5.9.21. |
| @nevware21/ts-utils is a comprehensive TypeScript/JavaScript utility library. Prior to version 0.14.0, the _copyProps function in lib/src/object/copy.ts uses for...in to iterate over source object properties without an Object.hasOwnProperty check, and does not filter dangerous keys (__proto__, constructor, prototype). This allows an attacker to pollute the prototype chain of all objects in the application. Version 0.14.0 patches the issue. |
| Vvveb prior to 1.0.8.1 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in the admin user profile save endpoint that allows authenticated users to modify privileged fields on their own profile. Attackers can inject role_id=1 into profile save requests to escalate to Super Administrator privileges, enabling plugin upload functionality for remote code execution. |
| rConfig Core before 8.2.8 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated users to assign arbitrary roles to any account by submitting an unvalidated role field through the Users API during user creation or profile updates. Attackers can exploit the missing allowlist validation and absent admin-level authorization check in StoreUserRequest to mass-assign the Admin role directly to the User model, granting access to privileged features. rConfig Pro and Enterprise are not affected. |
| Sustainable Irrigation Platform (SIP) through version 5.2.16 contains a mass assignment vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to overwrite sensitive configuration settings by supplying arbitrary parameter names in HTTP requests. Attackers can manipulate parameters corresponding to sensitive values such as the passphrase and listening port, and can also achieve the same result through cross-site request forgery due to the absence of adequate request validation. |
| jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.15.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, Java Records using a PropertyNamingStrategy can bypass @JsonIgnore because POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals() records an ignored component under its original implicit name before _renameUsing() applies the naming strategy, allowing the renamed JSON key to be assigned to the Record constructor parameter. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4. |
| HeyForm is an open-source form builder. Prior to version 3.0.0-rc.9, `completeSubmission` accepts a `hiddenFields: [{id, name, value}]` array from the submitter and stores it verbatim in `submission.hiddenFields`, without validating the supplied `id`/`name` against the form's declared `form.hiddenFields` schema. An anonymous form submitter can therefore inject arbitrary key/value pairs (including XSS payloads, fake authorization metadata, integration-relevant values) into the stored submission. These fields are subsequently forwarded as-is to every webhook integration registered on the form. Version 3.0.0-rc.9 contains a patch for the issue. |
