| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| heym before 0.0.105 does not act on the result of the credential authorization lookup in the Redis workflow node (backend/app/services/node_execution/nodes/redis_node.py). When _get_accessible_credential returns None — because the credential ID does not exist or the caller is not authorized to use it — the node treats the lookup failure as an empty configuration and falls back to defaults, connecting to localhost:6379 with no password and executing the requested operation there. The same fallback occurs when an accessible credential has an empty config or no redis_host value. An authenticated workflow author who supplies a credential ID they do not own, or one that was deleted, therefore obtains a read/write connection to whatever Redis is listening on the backend's loopback interface instead of an error. Impact depends on the deployment: the stock docker-compose.yml ships no Redis, in which case the flaw surfaces as a misleading connection error rather than data exposure. |
| TDuck survey form 6.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in FormAuthUtils.hasPermission that fails open when a form does not exist, allowing authenticated users to access deleted form submissions. Attackers can read orphaned submission data including personal information by providing a known dataId to the GET /user/form/data/details endpoint after the form has been permanently deleted. |
| BusyBox httpd IP deny rules with invalid CIDR prefix lengths fail open, leaving a parsed IP with a zeroed mask so the rule matches no clients. |
| DBHub is a database MCP server for Postgres, MySQL, SQL Server, Oracle, MariaDB, SQLite. Prior to version 0.22.6, setting `readonly = true` on the `execute_sql` tool does not make the connection read-only. The connectors are written to set PostgreSQL `default_transaction_read_only=on` (and open SQLite in `readOnly` mode), but that code is gated on a config value that is never populated, so it never runs. The only thing left enforcing read-only is a classifier that inspects the first keyword of each statement. Any `SELECT` that writes or has side effects through a function call passes it. With an ordinary role this allows sequence tampering; with a privileged role it allows writing arbitrary files on the server (`lo_export`), reading arbitrary host files (`pg_read_file`), and remote code execution (`dblink` + `COPY ... TO PROGRAM`). The HTTP transport is unauthenticated and binds to `0.0.0.0` by default, so this is reachable by any network caller of `/mcp`. Version 0.22.6 patches the issue. |
| Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, when a configured authenticator or authorizator class cannot be loaded, Server.initializeAuthenticator and Server.initializeAuthorizatorPolicy treat the failure as though no custom class was configured and fall back to AcceptAllAuthenticator or PermitAllAuthorizatorPolicy. A misspelled class name, missing dependency, constructor failure, or classpath problem can therefore start the broker with authentication or authorization disabled even though the operator configured those controls. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1. |
| A missing/improper authentication vulnerability in the WatchGuard AuthPoint Gateway's LDAP Sync first-factor authentication allows a remote attacker to bypass single-factor password verification under non-default operating conditions. Additional authentication factors still apply. |
| Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.2, Tinyauth compares forwarded hostnames case-sensitively while reverse proxies route equivalent hostnames case-insensitively, allowing an authenticated low-privilege user to bypass per-app access controls with a differently cased hostname. The lookup in internal/service/access_controls_service.go through lookupStaticACLs and GetAccessControls, and the Docker-label fallback in internal/service/docker_service.go through GetLabels, can miss the configured app and return an empty access-control object. internal/controller/proxy_controller.go proxyHandler then treats the empty user, group, OAuth, LDAP, and IP restrictions as permissive and returns an authenticated result for an app that should exclude the user. Unauthenticated users remain subject to login, and global login-time allowlists are not bypassed. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.2. |
| Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Slab safeurl allows an attacker who controls a validated URL to reach internal network destinations the library is configured to block.
Only IPv4 addresses are matched against the reserved ranges and the blocklist. Every other address is treated as matching nothing, so a destination that is rejected in its IPv4 form is accepted when written as an IPv6 address, IPv6 entries in the blocklist never match, and a host that resolves to no IPv4 address is accepted regardless of where it points. Deployments that rely on the allowlist instead are unaffected, because there an unmatched address is rejected.
This issue affects safeurl: from 0.1.0 onward. |
| djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, `djust.tenants` isolation was enforced only on the HTTP path. The current tenant was stored in `threading.local()` and set exclusively by the HTTP-only `TenantMiddleware`, so on the live (WebSocket/SSE) path `get_current_tenant()` was always `None` during mount and every event handler — and the tenant-aware `QuerySet` manager failed OPEN (returned the unfiltered queryset, ignoring `STRICT_MODE`), disclosing every tenant's rows to whoever held the socket. `threading.local` was additionally shared across connections on the `sync_to_async` executor thread. This issue is fixed in djust 1.0.7. Tenant storage moved to a `contextvars.ContextVar` (per async task); the resolved tenant is bound around WS/SSE mount and every dispatch; both managers scope the base queryset once and fail CLOSED (`.none()` under the default `STRICT_MODE`); and system check S006 warns when `STRICT_MODE=False`. No known workarounds are available on the live path. |
| Bambuddy is a self-hosted print archive and management system for Bambu Lab 3D printers. Starting in version 0.1.6 and prior to version 0.2.4.4, a fail-open in the authentication code allows any attacker to bypass authentication by flooding a public endpoint to exhaust resources causing database access to fail, granting unauthenticated access to all protected endpoints. Version 0.2.4.4 patches the issue. |
| Craft CMS 5.0.0 through 5.10.12 treats a database connection failure as meaning that Craft is not installed, which makes anonymous installer actions — including install/validate-site — reachable on an installed production site whenever PHP remains available but the configured MySQL endpoint does not. The action accepts a site name, serializes it through Site::getName(), and expands ${NAME} expressions using App::env(). An unauthenticated attacker who obtained a guest session cookie and matching CSRF token before the outage and whose session remains valid during it can submit a predictable variable name (for example Craft's conventional CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY) and receive its value, disclosing Craft secrets, process environment variables, $_SERVER entries, or PHP constants such as the security key, database credentials, or API keys. The issue requires an independently occurring database outage; the vulnerability itself provides no way to induce it. Fixed in 5.10.13. |
| Not failing securely ('failing open') in Visual Studio Code allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in NodePermissionGuard that fails to enforce node-level access control when permission lookups throw exceptions. Attackers with valid Fusion API tokens can write attachments to private datasheets they have been explicitly denied access to by exploiting the unhandled exception in the permission guard. |
| (Holloway) Chew, Kean Ho's Actualizer v1.2.0 and earlier contains a fail-open password validation vulnerability in the Alpha user and root user password loops of Shell/debian-minbase-install.sh. The installer invokes mkpasswd to generate yescrypt password hashes but does not check the command's return value and unconditionally accepts the result. If mkpasswd fails to generate a yescrypt hash, for example because an incompatible mkpasswd implementation or an environment without yescrypt support is used, the resulting password hash variable can be empty and the build proceeds. The resulting image can therefore contain empty password fields for the root and alpha accounts, potentially permitting passwordless authentication depending on the authentication configuration. |
| Description
NGINX JavaScript (njs) and QuickJS (qjs) engines have a vulnerability when a js_access handler performs asynchronous request body processing and an exception is thrown during asynchronous access-control evaluation before an explicit access denial is returned. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request that triggers an error condition in the access validation logic. This may cause the js_access phase to fail open, allowing the request to proceed instead of being denied, resulting in an authentication or authorization bypass and unauthorized access to protected resources.
Impact
This vulnerability may allow remote attackers to bypass js_access controls. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only.
Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated. |
| Not Failing Securely (Failing Open) vulnerability in ash-project ash skips an Ash.Reactor change when the guard controlling it raises, so a change meant to run does not.
An Ash.Reactor change step can be gated by where validations that decide whether the change runs. Ash.Reactor.ChangeStep (lib/ash/reactor/steps/change_step.ex) evaluated those guards in apply_where_clauses/3, and apply_validation rescued any exception into {:error, error}. The reduce treated that identically to a guard whose condition was simply not met and bypassed the change. So when a guard raises (for example on attacker-influenced input), a change that enforces a security-relevant modification is skipped rather than failing the step. The fix distinguishes a raised exception (now {:raised, error}) and halts the step with an error, failing closed.
This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0-rc.17 before 3.32.2. |
| IGEL OS 12 before 12.9.0, 12.8.3 LTS and IGEL OS 11 before 11.11.150 contain a secure boot bypass vulnerability in the GRUB boot stage that allows physically present attackers to gain unauthorized root access by placing an unsigned empty file named igel.conf on a partition. Attackers can exploit GRUB's fail-open signature verification behavior to drop into an interactive GRUB prompt, then boot the device's own kernel with additional command-line arguments to obtain a root shell with the disk unlocked while leaving TPM PCR values unaltered. |
| ### Impact
The registration component does not validate the text-based _Security Question_ CAPTCHA correctly, allowing attackers to bypass the challenge via a specially crafted value.
[CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)
### Details
The public _Registration_ workflow ([`member.php?action=do_register`](https://github.com/mybb/mybb/blob/mybb_1839/member.php#L262-L307)) accepts a hidden field `question_id` — expected to match the question session identifier (`mybb_questionsessions.sid`) — and validates the challenge answer without a fail-closed fallback for invalid identifiers. If the value is blank, forged, or expired, the request continues without a question-related error.
### Patches
MyBB 1.8.(...) resolves this issue with the following changes:
- Commit: https://github.com/mybb/mybb/commit/
- `.patch`: https://github.com/mybb/mybb/commit/.patch
### References
- Release Notes: https://mybb.com/versions/1.8.(...)/
### For more information
Go to [mybb.com/security](https://mybb.com/security/) to report possible security concerns or to learn more about security research at MyBB.
### Contact
The security team can be reached at [security@mybb.com](mailto:security@mybb.com). |
| NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. From next-auth 5.0.0-beta.0 until 5.0.0-beta.32, applications that gate access by checking only for the existence of the auth object returned by the auth() wrapper can fail open when Auth.js has a server configuration error. In middleware, Route Handlers, React Server Components, and other auth() entry points, a non-OK session response is parsed into a truthy error object instead of null, so checks such as !!auth and if (req.auth) evaluate to true for unauthenticated requests. A provider missing both the issuer and authorization endpoint triggers InvalidEndpoints, and an unset AUTH_SECRET or another server configuration error can produce the same behavior. There is no impact while configuration is valid, but after a deployment becomes misconfigured, routes protected only by session existence silently grant access to every visitor. This issue is fixed in next-auth 5.0.0-beta.32. |
| rsync 3.1.0 before 3.5.0 contains an access control bypass vulnerability that allows remote attackers to circumvent hosts deny rules by inducing DNS resolution failures during hostname-based access control evaluation. When a DNS lookup for a hostname-based deny rule fails, the daemon skips the rule rather than defaulting to a deny decision, enabling attackers who can trigger DNS failures to bypass module-level IP access controls and gain unauthorized access to restricted module file trees. |
