| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Apache Airflow FAB provider: changing a user's password through the Admin user-edit PATCH endpoint does not invalidate that user's existing database-backed sessions. An attacker who already holds a copy of the victim's session cookie keeps full access as that user after the password change, so the password reset does not evict them. Affects deployments using the FAB auth manager with database-backed sessions; an administrator (or the user themselves) performing a routine password change is the trigger, and no attacker interaction with the endpoint is needed.
This is a second, independent route to the outcome addressed by CVE-2026-82311, which corrected an identifier comparison in the session-invalidation helper. That fix does not repair this endpoint, because the PATCH path never calls the helper at all. Deployments that applied the CVE-2026-82311 fix must also upgrade for this one.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-fab are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.0 or later, which fixes the issue. |
| Apache Airflow Apache Kafka provider versions 1.15.0 before 2.0.0 resolve dotted-path strings found in a Kafka connection's `extra` field into Python callables via `import_string`, with no allowlist, and hand them to the confluent-kafka client which invokes them. Deployments that have enabled the Kafka event producer — `dag_run_events_enabled` or `task_instance_events_enabled`, both disabled by default — build that client inside the scheduler process, so a user whose only privilege is editing Airflow connections gains arbitrary code execution in the control plane; the Airflow security model limits connection-configuration users to code execution on workers, not the scheduler. Deployments using Google Managed Kafka are not affected, because that code path overwrites any user-supplied `oauth_cb`; plain brokers and Amazon MSK are exposed. Users are recommended to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-apache-kafka 2.0.0 or later, which adds an allowlist configuration option for connection-string callbacks. |
| Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: from Airflow 3.3 the Keycloak auth manager takes a user's identity from the signed Airflow session token but takes the Keycloak access and refresh tokens used for every authorization decision from separate, unauthenticated cookies, and never checks that the two describe the same subject. A user who holds any valid Airflow login of their own, together with another subject's Keycloak access or refresh token obtained out of band, can pair the two: Airflow then authorizes requests with the foreign token's privileges while the session identity, audit log and cache keys continue to name the attacker's own account. The refresh path re-issues an Airflow session token for the original identity carrying the foreign tokens, so the mismatched pairing survives across sessions.
Affects deployments running Airflow 3.3 or later with the Keycloak auth manager. Earlier versions carried the Keycloak tokens inside the signed session token, so the binding existed and was lost when they moved into separate cookies.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-keycloak are recommended to upgrade to version 0.10.0 or later, which binds the cookie-supplied tokens to the session identity. |
| Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: the unauthenticated token endpoint accepts a client-credentials grant for any confidential client registered in the Keycloak realm, not only the client configured for Airflow. No allowlist restricts which client ids may authenticate, so the credentials of an unrelated application that happens to share the realm are valid Airflow login credentials, and Airflow mints a signed session token for that application's service account. The endpoint also answers unauthenticated credential guesses against Keycloak under Airflow's identity.
Affects deployments using the Keycloak auth manager whose realm is shared with other confidential clients. The attacker needs valid credentials for any one of those clients, not for Airflow. Resource authorization is still evaluated per subject, so the access gained is whatever that service account holds, plus any endpoint gated only on being authenticated.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-keycloak are recommended to upgrade to version 0.10.0 or later, which accepts only the configured client on that grant. |
| Apache Airflow FAB provider: the Authentik OAuth path in the FAB auth manager does not validate the issuer or audience claims of the id_token it accepts. An attacker holding a token that the same Authentik identity provider minted for a different client application can present it to Airflow and be authenticated as the user it names, because the audience claim is never checked. Affects deployments using the FAB auth manager with Authentik OAuth where the same Authentik instance also serves other applications; the attacker needs a valid token for any of those other applications, not for Airflow.
CVE-2026-75156 corrected the same missing validation on the Azure AD path in this file; the Authentik path was left unchanged and is fixed here. Deployments that applied the CVE-2026-75156 fix and use Authentik must also upgrade for this one.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-fab are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.0 or later, which fixes the issue. |
| Apache Airflow FAB provider: resetting a user's password does not delete that user's existing database-backed sessions, despite documented behaviour that it does. The cleanup compares the string identifier Flask-Login stores in the session against the user's integer database identifier, so the comparison never matches and no session is removed. An attacker who already holds a copy of the victim's session cookie keeps access as that user after the password change, so the reset does not evict them.
Affects deployments using the FAB auth manager with `[fab] session_backend=database`. The trigger is an administrator (or the user) running the supported password-reset command as a containment action after a session cookie has been compromised; the secure-cookie backend is out of scope, as it documents that it cannot centrally delete sessions.
apache-airflow-providers-fab 3.9.0 also fixes CVE-2026-86462, a second, independent route to the same outcome via the Admin user-edit endpoint; a single upgrade closes both.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-fab are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.0 or later, which compares the identifiers consistently. |
| Apache Airflow FAB provider: deactivating a user account does not stop tokens issued to that account before deactivation. Password authentication correctly rejects the disabled account, but the Core API continues to accept an existing, unexpired token naming it, and lets that token mint a replacement — so the account keeps its role-scoped access indefinitely after an administrator has disabled it. The user replays their own legitimate credential; no signature forgery or privilege escalation is involved, and the access stays within the roles the account already held.
Affects deployments using Airflow 3 with the FAB auth manager and Core API token authentication, where an administrator deactivates an account whose row remains in the database and whose previously issued token has not expired. The trigger is administrative deactivation as a containment action, which silently fails to contain.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-fab are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.0 or later, which rejects tokens naming a deactivated account. |
| Apache Airflow's environment-variable secrets backend resolved a team-scoped Connection or Variable from the wrong team's scope. The guard meant to prevent this only ran when no team scope was supplied, and its pattern could not match a team name containing an underscore, which team names are allowed to contain. When the guard did not apply, the lookup fell through to an unconditional global read that resolved the stored `AIRFLOW_CONN__<TEAM>___<ID>` variable regardless of which team asked. In multi-team mode an authenticated user of one team could therefore have `POST /api/v2/connections/test` resolve another team's Connection and authenticate outward with that team's credentials; the endpoint uses the credentials rather than returning them. Exploitation requires `[core] multi_team` enabled, `[core] test_connection` set to `Enabled` (it ships `Disabled`), team-scoped secrets provisioned as environment variables in the API-server process, and knowledge of the encoded identifier. Redirecting the test at an attacker-controlled host is separately blocked. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later. |
| Apache Airflow FAB provider versions 3.7.3 through 3.8.0 do not validate the issuer or audience of Azure AD `id_token`s during OAuth login. Deployments are affected only when the FAB auth manager is configured with Azure AD as an OAuth provider. Because the signing keys are fetched from Microsoft's **multi-tenant** JWKS endpoint, an `id_token` minted in *any* Azure tenant — including one the attacker creates — passes signature verification, and the username and role assignments are then read from that attacker-controlled token. Anyone able to register an Azure tenant can therefore authenticate to the Airflow UI with no prior access to the deployment.
The fix for **CVE-2026-59243** was incomplete, and this advisory closes the remaining gap: that fix made the provider verify the `id_token` signature, but did not add issuer or audience checks. Operators who already applied the CVE-2026-59243 fix are **still affected and must upgrade again** — 3.7.3 is the release that shipped that fix, so every version containing it falls inside this affected range. Upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-fab `3.8.1` or later. |
| Apache Airflow's secrets masker did not mask `var.json` Variable values whose value is a dict in the Rendered Templates UI — the dict value failed an `isinstance(str)` guard — so a secret stored as a JSON Variable and referenced in a template via `var.json` was displayed in cleartext to any user with access to that task's Rendered Templates view. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which masks nested Variable values regardless of type. |
| Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`. |
| Apache Airflow's Task SDK rebuilt a `Callback` object from serialized data by re-running its constructor, which imports the module named by the stored callback path. Because `SyncCallback` is itself an Airflow class it passes the default `allowed_deserialization_classes` allow-list, so tightening that setting does not help. A Dag author — who controls a task instance's `next_kwargs` through the task execution API — can therefore cause an arbitrary module to be imported inside the scheduler process, when the scheduler's `awaiting_input` timeout sweep deserializes that value. No non-default configuration is required; the sweep runs unconditionally. Versions before 3.3.0 are not affected: the class existed, but the scheduler sweep that reaches it did not. This is a separate code path from CVE-2026-58076 and CVE-2026-67260, which cover different gadgets reaching deserialization — applying either of those fixes does not address this one. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later. |
| Apache Airflow 3.3.0 moved human-in-the-loop tasks from the triggerer to a new `awaiting_input` task state swept by the scheduler. That sweep deserializes the task instance's `next_kwargs` without an allow-list, so a Dag author — who controls that value through the task execution API — can cause an arbitrary module import and object instantiation inside the scheduler process, or terminate the scheduler job. No non-default configuration is required: the sweep runs unconditionally every 15 seconds, and the default `allowed_deserialization_classes` setting does not cover this code path. Versions before 3.3.0 are not affected, because human-in-the-loop tasks deferred onto the triggerer instead. This is a different code path from CVE-2026-58076, which covers the same unguarded exception-node deserialization reached elsewhere — deployments that applied that fix must upgrade for this issue as well. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later. |
| The Google Cloud Secret Manager secrets backend in Apache Airflow's Google provider never applied the team scope when resolving Connections and Variables: the caller's `team_name` was accepted by the backend but dropped at the internal call boundary, so every lookup resolved against the team-agnostic secret name. In a deployment running multi-team mode with this backend, a task or Dag belonging to one team resolved another team's Connection or Variable, obtaining its credentials in full. No unusual configuration is required beyond enabling multi-team mode and using this backend. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-google 22.3.0 or later, which builds and applies the team-scoped secret name. |
| The AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store and Secrets Manager backends in Apache Airflow's Amazon provider resolved a team-scoped Connection or Variable id through the team-agnostic lookup when the team-scoped lookup missed. In a deployment running multi-team mode with either backend, a caller in one team could resolve a secret belonging to another team by supplying an id that spells out that team's namespace, obtaining its credentials in full. No unusual configuration is required beyond enabling multi-team mode and using one of these backends. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-amazon 9.34.0 or later, which refuses the team-agnostic fall-through for an id that could name a team namespace. |
| The Yandex Lockbox secrets backend in Apache Airflow's Yandex provider resolved a team-scoped Connection or Variable id through the team-agnostic lookup when the team-scoped lookup missed. In a deployment running multi-team mode with this backend, a caller in one team could resolve a secret belonging to another team by supplying an id that spells out that team's namespace, obtaining its credentials in full. No unusual configuration is required beyond enabling multi-team mode and using this backend. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-yandex 4.5.1 or later, which refuses the team-agnostic fall-through for an id that could name a team namespace. |
| Apache Airflow's secrets masker hides values stored under sensitive key names when they are displayed in the UI. The masker's recursion-depth limit did not descend into values nested inside a list, tuple, or set beyond that limit, so an Airflow Variable holding such a deeply-nested value was shown unmasked in the Variables UI. The exposure is limited to the UI: any authenticated user who can see the Variable in the UI can already read its full value through the Variables REST API, so this does not disclose data the user could not otherwise obtain — the masking is a shoulder-surfing defense for the UI, not an access-control boundary.
This is an incomplete-fix follow-up to CVE-2026-42358, whose fix made only the dictionary walk unbounded; lists, tuples, and sets beyond the depth limit remained unmasked in the UI. Deployments that applied the CVE-2026-42358 fix should also upgrade to address this residual case. Upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later. |
| Apache Airflow's Task SDK did not mask the contents of a Variable whose JSON value is a list, so secrets stored in that shape appeared in cleartext in task logs and in the Rendered Templates UI. Masking was applied only when the deserialized value was a string or a dict; a list at the top level matched neither and was returned unmasked. Any authenticated user able to read the logs or rendered templates of a task that references such a Variable could recover the values, with no special configuration required. This is the list-shaped counterpart of CVE-2026-59244, whose fix covered the dict case only, so deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory remain affected and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later. |
| Apache Airflow's Config API did not mask team-scoped sensitive configuration values in multi-team deployments. When an administrator has enabled multi-team mode and exposed the Config API, an authenticated Viewer holding only configuration-read access — with no prior access to the secret — could read a team-scoped Celery broker URL, including its embedded credentials, in cleartext, while the equivalent global option was correctly masked. The secrets masker matched only base section and option names and did not normalize team-prefixed sections before the sensitivity check (CWE-200). This is a distinct masker bypass from CVE-2026-48828 and CVE-2026-48892: deployments that upgraded to apache-airflow 3.3.0 to address those issues remain affected by this team-scoped variant. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which normalizes team-scoped sections before masking. |
| Apache Airflow's XCom `GET /api/v2/{...}/xcomEntries/{key}?deserialize=true` endpoint passed a string-literal payload through `BaseXCom.deserialize_value` without the `_check_forbidden_xcom_keys` guard, allowing an authenticated API user with XCom write-and-read access to instantiate arbitrary `airflow.*` classes on the API server (CWE-502). An authenticated user who can write an XCom value and then read it back with `deserialize=true` triggers the unsafe instantiation. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which rejects reserved XCom serialization keys submitted as JSON string literals. |
