| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems
On 32bit systems the addition operations in ipc_msg_alloc() can
potentially overflow leading to memory corruption.
Add bounds checking using KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD to avoid overflow. |
| FFmpeg through 8.1.2, fixed in commit aafb5c6, contains a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the MACE6 audio decoder that allows attackers to corrupt heap memory by supplying a crafted CAF file with a malicious bytes_per_packet value. Attackers can craft a CAF file with oversized bytes_per_packet and frames_per_packet values in the desc chunk to trigger an integer overflow in mace_decode_frame() during output sample count computation, resulting in an undersized buffer allocation and heap out-of-bounds write that could enable code execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication
The carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated
(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows.
The condition (r01.m_high < product.m_high) doesn't handle the case
where r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists
from lower-bit overflow.
When commit 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
introduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the
micro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers.
It seems the check got lost in translation.
Add proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry
from the lower addition. |
| Integer wraparound in IVFFlat index build in pgvector before 0.8.6 allows a database user to write data out-of-bounds, which could lead to arbitrary code execution. Only 32-bit systems are affected. |
| A flaw was found in HPLIP (HP Linux Imaging and Printing Software). This vulnerability, an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-8631, may allow a remote attacker to escalate privileges or achieve arbitrary code execution. This can occur through an integer overflow in the hpcups processing path when handling specially crafted print data. |
| A vulnerability was identified in radareorg radare2 up to 6.1.6. This vulnerability affects the function cmd_anal_opcode of the file libr/core/cmd_anal.inc.c of the component hexpairs Parser. Such manipulation leads to integer overflow. The attack needs to be performed locally. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The name of the patch is 84e773986e7e5bb30453a9384f498ec0ccc9d0a9. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue. |
| A vulnerability in the DMG file format parser of ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition, or possibly other expanded impacts, resulting from memory corruption on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to improper boundary checks for content in DMG files during scanning, which may result in an integer overflow on 32-bit platforms only. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted file that contains DMG content to be scanned by ClamAV on an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the ClamAV scanning process to terminate, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software. |
| Apache Traffic Server mishandles integers while decoding HPACK/XPACK headers, corrupting memory.
This issue affects Apache Traffic Server: from 8.0.0 through 8.1.9, from 9.0.0 through 9.2.14, from 10.0.0 through 10.1.3.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.2.15 or 10.1.4, which fix the issue. |
| A flaw was found in the file-sgi plugin in GIMP. When processing an RLE-compressed SGI image, the plugin allocates memory for a row table. The image header dimensions (ysize and zsize) are read as 16-bit unsigned integers. If a crafted file sets both dimensions to their maximum value (65535), the multiplication ysize * zsize overflows the standard 32-bit int boundary before being passed to calloc. This integer overflow issue results in undefined behavior, aborting the plugin and causing a denial of service. |
| In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, a remote unauthenticated client can trigger a libngtcp2 assertion (if compiled with assertions on) and terminate the entire Unbound process using a single DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) connection and one normal DNS query. This is caused by an erroneous error value passed to libngtcp2. When 'ngtcp2_conn_writev_stream()' returns 'NGTCP2_ERR_STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED', Unbound continues to call 'ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error()' with a '-1' error value. The 'int' literal '-1' is implicitly converted to the function's 'uint64_t error_code' parameter as '0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF'. The follow-on 'ngtcp2_conn_write_connection_close()' serialises that value as a QUIC variable-length integer; because '2^64-1' exceeds the 62-bit varint ceiling, 'ngtcp2_put_uvarintlen()' fails 'assert(n < 4611686018427387904ULL)' and the whole resolver process aborts. A remote, unauthenticated DoQ client can trigger this deterministically with a single QUIC connection by advertising 'initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local = 1' in its transport parameters and sending one DoQ query without ever reading the stream. |
| ProFTPD before 1.3.9c and 1.3.10rc3 contains a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the mod_sftp module's SCP size-record parser that allows authenticated low-privilege attackers to bypass ASLR by sending a crafted file size value of UINT64_MAX, which results in a negative off_t value. Attackers can exploit the subsequent conversion to uint32_t, causing an approximately 4 GB requested read length and forcing the server to read beyond the end of the SSH channel data and write overread process memory into the uploaded file. In tested configurations, the disclosed data contains libc, libcrypto, and PIE pointers sufficient to derive their randomized base addresses, thereby bypassing ASLR and enabling reliable exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in the same process. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and prior, the inline mask parsing code in `libheif/region.cc` contains an integer overflow. Both `width` and `height` are `unsigned int` (32-bit) values parsed from the HEIF file. Their product can exceed `UINT32_MAX`, wrapping to a small value before the division by 8. This causes an undersized buffer allocation, leading to out-of-bounds memory access when the mask data is later interpreted as a `width x height` bitmap. Version 1.22.0 patches the issue. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. The fix for CVE-2026-3949 (commit `b97c8b5`, PR #1712) introduced an integer overflow in the very security check it added. The check itself can be bypassed, allowing a crafted HEIF file with a VVC track to trigger the same out-of-bounds heap read that CVE-2026-3949 was meant to prevent. This is a separate, currently-unpatched vulnerability. Issue #1712 was closed as fixed without testing the edge case where `size` is near `UINT32_MAX`. Version 1.22.0 patches the issue. |
| A signed integer overflow vulnerability was found in libarchive's ZIP writer. In the archive_write_zip_header function in archive_write_set_format_zip.c, when ZIP encryption is enabled and the entry file size is close to INT64_MAX, the addition of the encryption overhead to the entry size overflows int64_t, resulting in undefined behavior. This could lead to incorrect Zip64 extension decisions or potential memory corruption. |
| Integer overflow in the Audio/Video component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 153 and Thunderbird 153. |
| Integer overflow in the Audio/Video: Playback component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 153 and Thunderbird 153. |
| An integer overflow when calculating physical offsets for sparse PMRs may result in 32-bit truncation of address computations for PMRs larger than 4 GB. This can lead to incorrect GPU MMU mappings and may allow a non-privileged user to trigger access to unintended physical memory, resulting in memory corruption or information disclosure. |
| Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in Apache Thrift C++, c_glib, Go, netstd, Delphi and Haxe bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.24.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.24.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Storable versions before 3.41 for Perl have a signed integer overflow when deserializing a crafted SX_HOOK record.
retrieve_hook_common reads a signed 32-bit item count from an SX_HOOK record and calls av_extend with that count plus one. A count of I32_MAX wraps the addition to a negative value.
A crafted blob passed to thaw or retrieve triggers the overflow; av_extend receives the negative count and dies with a panic, terminating the deserialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nexthop: Increase weight to u16
In CLOS networks, as link failures occur at various points in the network,
ECMP weights of the involved nodes are adjusted to compensate. With high
fan-out of the involved nodes, and overall high number of nodes,
a (non-)ECMP weight ratio that we would like to configure does not fit into
8 bits. Instead of, say, 255:254, we might like to configure something like
1000:999. For these deployments, the 8-bit weight may not be enough.
To that end, in this patch increase the next hop weight from u8 to u16.
Increasing the width of an integral type can be tricky, because while the
code still compiles, the types may not check out anymore, and numerical
errors come up. To prevent this, the conversion was done in two steps.
First the type was changed from u8 to a single-member structure, which
invalidated all uses of the field. This allowed going through them one by
one and audit for type correctness. Then the structure was replaced with a
vanilla u16 again. This should ensure that no place was missed.
The UAPI for configuring nexthop group members is that an attribute
NHA_GROUP carries an array of struct nexthop_grp entries:
struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 resvd1;
__u16 resvd2;
};
The field resvd1 is currently validated and required to be zero. We can
lift this requirement and carry high-order bits of the weight in the
reserved field:
struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 weight_high;
__u16 resvd2;
};
Keeping the fields split this way was chosen in case an existing userspace
makes assumptions about the width of the weight field, and to sidestep any
endianness issues.
The weight field is currently encoded as the weight value minus one,
because weight of 0 is invalid. This same trick is impossible for the new
weight_high field, because zero must mean actual zero. With this in place:
- Old userspace is guaranteed to carry weight_high of 0, therefore
configuring 8-bit weights as appropriate. When dumping nexthops with
16-bit weight, it would only show the lower 8 bits. But configuring such
nexthops implies existence of userspace aware of the extension in the
first place.
- New userspace talking to an old kernel will work as long as it only
attempts to configure 8-bit weights, where the high-order bits are zero.
Old kernel will bounce attempts at configuring >8-bit weights.
Renaming reserved fields as they are allocated for some purpose is commonly
done in Linux. Whoever touches a reserved field is doing so at their own
risk. nexthop_grp::resvd1 in particular is currently used by at least
strace, however they carry an own copy of UAPI headers, and the conversion
should be trivial. A helper is provided for decoding the weight out of the
two fields. Forcing a conversion seems preferable to bending backwards and
introducing anonymous unions or whatever. |
