| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Return proper address for non-zero offsets in insn array
The map_direct_value_addr() function of the instruction
array map incorrectly adds offset to the resulting address.
This is a bug, because later the resolve_pseudo_ldimm64()
function adds the offset. Fix it. Corresponding selftests
are added in a consequent commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Limit bpf program signature size
Practical BPF signatures are significantly smaller than
KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE
Allowing larger sizes opens the door for abuse by passing excessive
size values and forcing the kernel into expensive allocation paths (via
kmalloc_large or vmalloc). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix UMR hang in LAG error state unload
During firmware reset in LAG mode, a race condition causes the driver
to hang indefinitely while waiting for UMR completion during device
unload. See [1].
In LAG mode the bond device is only registered on the master, so it
never sees sys_error events from the slave.
During firmware reset this causes UMR waits to hang forever on unload
as the slave is dead but the master hasn't entered error state yet, so
UMR posts succeed but completions never arrive.
Fix this by adding a sys_error notifier that gets registered before
MLX5_IB_STAGE_IB_REG and stays alive until after ib_unregister_device().
This ensures error events reach the bond device throughout teardown.
[1]
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x2bd/0x760
schedule+0x37/0xa0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
__mutex_lock.isra.6+0x2b5/0x4a0
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x606/0x870 [mlx5_ib]
? __xa_erase+0x4a/0xa0
? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
? wait_for_completion+0x31/0x100
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x48/0xc0 [ib_core]
? rdmacg_uncharge_hierarchy+0xa0/0x100
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x20/0x50 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x37/0x150 [ib_uverbs]
__uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xda/0x140 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x3a/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xc3/0x140 [ib_uverbs]
remove_client_context+0x8b/0xd0 [ib_core]
disable_device+0x8c/0x130 [ib_core]
__ib_unregister_device+0x10d/0x180 [ib_core]
ib_unregister_device+0x21/0x30 [ib_core]
__mlx5_ib_remove+0x1e4/0x1f0 [mlx5_ib]
auxiliary_bus_remove+0x1e/0x30
device_release_driver_internal+0x103/0x1f0
bus_remove_device+0xf7/0x170
device_del+0x181/0x410
mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked.part.10+0xa9/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_disable_lag+0x253/0x260 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_disable_change+0x89/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_disable+0x67/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload+0x15/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload_one+0x71/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_sync_reset_reload_work+0x83/0x100 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix invalid leaf access in btrfs_quota_enable() if ref key not found
If btrfs_search_slot_for_read() returns 1, it means we did not find any
key greater than or equals to the key we asked for, meaning we have
reached the end of the tree and therefore the path is not valid. If
this happens we need to break out of the loop and stop, instead of
continuing and accessing an invalid path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memfd_luo: fix physical address conversion in put_folios cleanup
In memfd_luo_retrieve_folios()'s put_folios cleanup path:
1. kho_restore_folio() expects a phys_addr_t (physical address) but
receives a raw PFN (pfolio->pfn). This causes kho_restore_page() to
check the wrong physical address (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT instead of the
actual physical address).
2. This loop lacks the !pfolio->pfn check that exists in the main
retrieval loop and memfd_luo_discard_folios(), which could
incorrectly process sparse file holes where pfn=0.
Fix by converting PFN to physical address with PFN_PHYS() and adding
the !pfolio->pfn check, matching the pattern used elsewhere in this file.
This issue was identified by the AI review.
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260323110747.193569-1-duanchenghao@kylinos.cn |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: stop parsing UAC2 rates at MAX_NR_RATES
parse_uac2_sample_rate_range() caps the number of enumerated
rates at MAX_NR_RATES, but it only breaks out of the current
rate loop. A malformed UAC2 RANGE response with additional
triplets continues parsing the remaining triplets and repeatedly
prints "invalid uac2 rates" while probe still holds
register_mutex.
Stop the whole parse once the cap is reached and return the
number of rates collected so far. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creation
authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least
4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of
high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data.
While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit
non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create()
still copied auth->digestsize into inst->alg.maxauthsize without
validating it. The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default
authsize from that value.
As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as
cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default
authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the
same value. AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a
too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access.
Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid
non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default
authsize. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: ns: Free the node during ctrl_cmd_bye()
A node sends the BYE packet when it is about to go down. So the nameserver
should advertise the removal of the node to all remote and local observers
and free the node finally. But currently, the nameserver doesn't free the
node memory even after processing the BYE packet. This causes the node
memory to leak.
Hence, remove the node from Xarray list and free the node memory during
both success and failure case of ctrl_cmd_bye(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inotify: fix watch count leak when fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails
When fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails in inotify_new_watch(),
the error path calls inotify_remove_from_idr() but does not call
dec_inotify_watches() to undo the preceding inc_inotify_watches().
This leaks a watch count, and repeated failures can exhaust the
max_user_watches limit with -ENOSPC even when no watches are active.
Prior to commit 1cce1eea0aff ("inotify: Convert to using per-namespace
limits"), the watch count was incremented after fsnotify_add_mark_locked()
succeeded, so this path was not affected. The conversion moved
inc_inotify_watches() before the mark insertion without adding the
corresponding rollback.
Add the missing dec_inotify_watches() call in the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: validate damos_quota_goal->nid for node_memcg_{used,free}_bp
Users can set damos_quota_goal->nid with arbitrary value for
node_memcg_{used,free}_bp. But DAMON core is using those for NODE-DATA()
without a validation of the value. This can result in out of bounds
memory access. The issue can actually triggered using DAMON user-space
tool (damo), like below.
$ sudo mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/foo
$ sudo ./damo start --damos_action stat --damos_quota_interval 1s \
--damos_quota_goal node_memcg_used_bp 50% -1 /foo
$ sudo dmseg
[...]
[ 524.181426] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000002c00
Fix this issue by adding the validation of the given node id. If an
invalid node id is given, it returns 0% for used memory ratio, and 100%
for free memory ratio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: fix resource leaks on device setup failure
Make sure to call controller cleanup() if spi_setup() fails while
registering a device to avoid leaking any resources allocated by
setup(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).
While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.
Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.
Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown
`caif_connect()` can tear down an existing client after remote shutdown by
calling `caif_disconnect_client()` followed by `caif_free_client()`.
`caif_free_client()` releases the service layer referenced by
`adap_layer->dn`, but leaves that pointer stale.
When the socket is later destroyed, `caif_sock_destructor()` calls
`caif_free_client()` again and dereferences the freed service pointer.
Clear the client/service links before releasing the service object so
repeated teardown becomes harmless. |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in Benbodhi SVG Support allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.
This issue affects SVG Support: from n/a through 2.5.14. |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in Prasad Kirpekar WP Meta and Date Remover allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.
This issue affects WP Meta and Date Remover: from n/a through 2.3.6. |
| go-git is an extensible git implementation library written in pure Go. Prior to 5.19.0 and 6.0.0-alpha.3, go-git may parse malformed Git objects in a way that differs from upstream Git. When commit or tag objects contain ambiguous or malformed headers, go-git’s decoded representation may expose values differently from how Git itself would interpret or reject the same object. Additionally, go-git’s commit signing and verification logic operates over commit data reconstructed from go-git’s parsed representation rather than the original raw object bytes. As a result, go-git may sign or verify a commit payload that is not byte-for-byte equivalent to the object stored in the repository. This can cause a signature to appear valid for a commit whose displayed or effective metadata differs from the object that was intended to be signed. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.19.0 and 6.0.0-alpha.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: fix usb_dev refcount leak on probe failure
create_card() takes a reference on the USB device with usb_get_dev()
and stores the matching usb_put_dev() in card_free(), which is
installed as the snd_card's ->private_free destructor.
However, ->private_free is only assigned near the end of init_card(),
after several failure points (usb_set_interface(), EP type checks,
usb_submit_urb(), the EP1_CMD_GET_DEVICE_INFO exchange, and its
timeout). When any of those fail, init_card() returns an error to
snd_probe(), which calls snd_card_free(card). Because ->private_free
is still NULL, card_free() never runs, the usb_get_dev() reference
is not dropped, and the struct usb_device leaks along with its
descriptor allocations and device_private.
syzbot reproduces this with a malformed UAC3 device whose only valid
altsetting is 0; init_card()'s usb_set_interface(usb_dev, 0, 1) call
fails with -EIO and triggers the leak.
Move the ->private_free assignment into create_card(), immediately
after usb_get_dev(), so that every error path reaching snd_card_free()
balances the reference. card_free()'s callees (snd_usb_caiaq_input_free,
free_urbs, kfree) already tolerate the partially-initialized state
because the chip private area is zero-initialized by snd_card_new(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ctxfi: Add fallback to default RSR for S/PDIF
spdif_passthru_playback_get_resources() uses atc->pll_rate as the RSR
for the MSR calculation loop. However, pll_rate is only updated in
atc_pll_init() and not in hw_pll_init(), so it remains 0 after the
card init.
When spdif_passthru_playback_setup() skips atc_pll_init() for
32000 Hz, (rsr * desc.msr) always becomes 0, causing the loop to spin
indefinitely.
Add fallback to use atc->rsr when atc->pll_rate is 0. This reflects
the hardware state, since hw_card_init() already configures the PLL
to the default RSR. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests
When an array check is running it will raise the barrier at which point
normal requests will become blocked and increment the nr_pending value to
signal there is work pending inside of wait_barrier(). NOWAIT requests
do not block and so will return immediately with an error, and additionally
do not increment nr_pending in wait_barrier(). Upstream change commit
43806c3d5b9b ("raid10: cleanup memleak at raid10_make_request") added a
call to raid_end_bio_io() to fix a memory leak when NOWAIT requests hit
this condition. raid_end_bio_io() eventually calls allow_barrier() and
it will unconditionally do an atomic_dec_and_test(&conf->nr_pending) even
though the corresponding increment on nr_pending didn't happen in the
NOWAIT case.
This can be easily seen by starting a check operation while an application
is doing nowait IO on the same array. This results in a deadlocked state
due to nr_pending value underflowing and so the md resync thread gets stuck
waiting for nr_pending to == 0.
Output of r10conf state of the array when we hit this condition:
crash> struct r10conf
barrier = 1,
nr_pending = {
counter = -41
},
nr_waiting = 15,
nr_queued = 0,
Example of md_sync thread stuck waiting on raise_barrier() and other
requests stuck in wait_barrier():
md1_resync
[<0>] raise_barrier+0xce/0x1c0
[<0>] raid10_sync_request+0x1ca/0x1ed0
[<0>] md_do_sync+0x779/0x1110
[<0>] md_thread+0x90/0x160
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
kworker/u1040:2+flush-253:4
[<0>] wait_barrier+0x1de/0x220
[<0>] regular_request_wait+0x30/0x180
[<0>] raid10_make_request+0x261/0x1000
[<0>] md_handle_request+0x13b/0x230
[<0>] __submit_bio+0x107/0x1f0
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x16f/0x390
[<0>] ext4_io_submit+0x24/0x40
[<0>] ext4_do_writepages+0x254/0xc80
[<0>] ext4_writepages+0x84/0x120
[<0>] do_writepages+0x7a/0x260
[<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x300
[<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1dd/0x470
[<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0
[<0>] wb_writeback+0x18b/0x2d0
[<0>] wb_workfn+0x2a1/0x400
[<0>] process_one_work+0x149/0x330
[<0>] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x410
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
landlock: Fix LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF inheritance across fork()
hook_cred_transfer() only copies the Landlock security blob when the
source credential has a domain. This is inconsistent with
landlock_restrict_self() which can set LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF on a
credential without creating a domain (via the ruleset_fd=-1 path): the
field is committed but not preserved across fork() because the child's
prepare_creds() calls hook_cred_transfer() which skips the copy when
domain is NULL.
This breaks the documented use case where a process mutes subdomain logs
before forking sandboxed children: the children lose the muting and
their domains produce unexpected audit records.
Fix this by unconditionally copying the Landlock credential blob. |
