| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mips: bmips: BCM6358: disable RAC flush for TP1
RAC flush causes kernel panics on BCM6358 with EHCI/OHCI when booting from TP1:
[ 3.881739] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using ehci-platform
[ 3.895011] Reserved instruction in kernel code[#1]:
[ 3.900113] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.10.16 #0
[ 3.905829] $ 0 : 00000000 10008700 00000000 77d94060
[ 3.911238] $ 4 : 7fd1f088 00000000 81431cac 81431ca0
[ 3.916641] $ 8 : 00000000 ffffefff 8075cd34 00000000
[ 3.922043] $12 : 806f8d40 f3e812b7 00000000 000d9aaa
[ 3.927446] $16 : 7fd1f068 7fd1f080 7ff559b8 81428470
[ 3.932848] $20 : 00000000 00000000 55590000 77d70000
[ 3.938251] $24 : 00000018 00000010
[ 3.943655] $28 : 81430000 81431e60 81431f28 800157fc
[ 3.949058] Hi : 00000000
[ 3.952013] Lo : 00000000
[ 3.955019] epc : 80015808 setup_sigcontext+0x54/0x24c
[ 3.960464] ra : 800157fc setup_sigcontext+0x48/0x24c
[ 3.965913] Status: 10008703 KERNEL EXL IE
[ 3.970216] Cause : 00800028 (ExcCode 0a)
[ 3.974340] PrId : 0002a010 (Broadcom BMIPS4350)
[ 3.979170] Modules linked in: ohci_platform ohci_hcd fsl_mph_dr_of ehci_platform ehci_fsl ehci_hcd gpio_button_hotplug usbcore nls_base usb_common
[ 3.992907] Process init (pid: 1, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=77e22ec8)
[ 4.000776] Stack : 81431ef4 7fd1f080 81431f28 81428470 7fd1f068 81431edc 7ff559b8 81428470
[ 4.009467] 81431f28 7fd1f080 55590000 77d70000 77d5498c 80015c70 806f0000 8063ae74
[ 4.018149] 08100002 81431f28 0000000a 08100002 81431f28 0000000a 77d6b418 00000003
[ 4.026831] ffffffff 80016414 80080734 81431ecc 81431ecc 00000001 00000000 04000000
[ 4.035512] 77d54874 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000012 00000002 00000000
[ 4.044196] ...
[ 4.046706] Call Trace:
[ 4.049238] [<80015808>] setup_sigcontext+0x54/0x24c
[ 4.054356] [<80015c70>] setup_frame+0xdc/0x124
[ 4.059015] [<80016414>] do_notify_resume+0x1dc/0x288
[ 4.064207] [<80011b50>] work_notifysig+0x10/0x18
[ 4.069036]
[ 4.070538] Code: 8fc300b4 00001025 26240008 <ac820000> ac830004 3c048063 0c0228aa 24846a00 26240010
[ 4.080686]
[ 4.082517] ---[ end trace 22a8edb41f5f983b ]---
[ 4.087374] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 4.092753] Rebooting in 1 seconds..
Because the bootloader (CFE) is not initializing the Read-ahead cache properly
on the second thread (TP1). Since the RAC was not initialized properly, we
should avoid flushing it at the risk of corrupting the instruction stream as
seen in the trace above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix potential use-after-free bug when trimming caps
When trimming the caps and just after the 'session->s_cap_lock' is
released in ceph_iterate_session_caps() the cap maybe removed by
another thread, and when using the stale cap memory in the callbacks
it will trigger use-after-free crash.
We need to check the existence of the cap just after the 'ci->i_ceph_lock'
being acquired. And do nothing if it's already removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: soc-compress: Reposition and add pcm_mutex
If panic_on_warn is set and compress stream(DPCM) is started,
then kernel panic occurred because card->pcm_mutex isn't held appropriately.
In the following functions, warning were issued at this line
"snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held".
static int dpcm_be_connect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe,
struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *be, int stream)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe);
...
}
void dpcm_be_disconnect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe);
...
}
void snd_soc_runtime_action(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd,
int stream, int action)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(rtd);
...
}
int dpcm_dapm_stream_event(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int dir,
int event)
{
...
snd_soc_dpcm_mutex_assert_held(fe);
...
}
These functions are called by soc_compr_set_params_fe, soc_compr_open_fe
and soc_compr_free_fe
without pcm_mutex locking. And this is call stack.
[ 414.527841][ T2179] pc : dpcm_process_paths+0x5a4/0x750
[ 414.527848][ T2179] lr : dpcm_process_paths+0x37c/0x750
[ 414.527945][ T2179] Call trace:
[ 414.527949][ T2179] dpcm_process_paths+0x5a4/0x750
[ 414.527955][ T2179] soc_compr_open_fe+0xb0/0x2cc
[ 414.527972][ T2179] snd_compr_open+0x180/0x248
[ 414.527981][ T2179] snd_open+0x15c/0x194
[ 414.528003][ T2179] chrdev_open+0x1b0/0x220
[ 414.528023][ T2179] do_dentry_open+0x30c/0x594
[ 414.528045][ T2179] vfs_open+0x34/0x44
[ 414.528053][ T2179] path_openat+0x914/0xb08
[ 414.528062][ T2179] do_filp_open+0xc0/0x170
[ 414.528068][ T2179] do_sys_openat2+0x94/0x18c
[ 414.528076][ T2179] __arm64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa4
[ 414.528084][ T2179] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c
[ 414.528094][ T2179] el0_svc_common+0xbc/0x104
[ 414.528099][ T2179] do_el0_svc+0x34/0xd8
[ 414.528103][ T2179] el0_svc+0x34/0xc4
[ 414.528125][ T2179] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x8c/0xfc
[ 414.528133][ T2179] el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
[ 414.528142][ T2179] Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
So, I reposition and add pcm_mutex to resolve lockdep error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfs: fix missing hfs_bnode_get() in __hfs_bnode_create
Syzbot found a kernel BUG in hfs_bnode_put():
kernel BUG at fs/hfs/bnode.c:466!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 3634 Comm: kworker/u4:5 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00190-g97ee9d1c1696 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
RIP: 0010:hfs_bnode_put+0x46f/0x480 fs/hfs/bnode.c:466
Code: 8a 80 ff e9 73 fe ff ff 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c a0 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 db 8a 80 ff e9 93 fe ff ff e8 a1 68 2c ff <0f> 0b e8 9a 68 2c ff 0f 0b 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 41 57 41 56
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003b4f258 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff825e318f RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8880739dd7c0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003b4f430 R08: ffffffff825e2d9b R09: ffffed10045157d1
R10: ffffed10045157d1 R11: 1ffff110045157d0 R12: ffff8880228abe80
R13: ffff88807016c000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880228abe00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa6ebe88718 CR3: 000000001e93d000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
hfs_write_inode+0x1bc/0xb40
write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]
__writeback_single_inode+0x4d6/0x670 fs/fs-writeback.c:1652
writeback_sb_inodes+0xb3b/0x18f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1878
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x125/0x420 fs/fs-writeback.c:1949
wb_writeback+0x440/0x7b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2054
wb_check_start_all fs/fs-writeback.c:2176 [inline]
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2202 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x827/0xef0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2235
process_one_work+0x877/0xdb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
</TASK>
The BUG_ON() is triggered at here:
/* Dispose of resources used by a node */
void hfs_bnode_put(struct hfs_bnode *node)
{
if (node) {
<skipped>
BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&node->refcnt)); <- we have issue here!!!!
<skipped>
}
}
By tracing the refcnt, I found the node is created by hfs_bmap_alloc()
with refcnt 1. Then the node is used by hfs_btree_write(). There is a
missing of hfs_bnode_get() after find the node. The issue happened in
following path:
<alloc>
hfs_bmap_alloc
hfs_bnode_find
__hfs_bnode_create <- allocate a new node with refcnt 1.
hfs_bnode_put <- decrease the refcnt
<write>
hfs_btree_write
hfs_bnode_find
__hfs_bnode_create
hfs_bnode_findhash <- find the node without refcnt increased.
hfs_bnode_put <- trigger the BUG_ON() since refcnt is 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: don't attempt to queue IO under RCU protection
dm looks up the table for IO based on the request type, with an
assumption that if the request is marked REQ_NOWAIT, it's fine to
attempt to submit that IO while under RCU read lock protection. This
is not OK, as REQ_NOWAIT just means that we should not be sleeping
waiting on other IO, it does not mean that we can't potentially
schedule.
A simple test case demonstrates this quite nicely:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct iovec iov;
int fd;
fd = open("/dev/dm-0", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
posix_memalign(&iov.iov_base, 4096, 4096);
iov.iov_len = 4096;
preadv2(fd, &iov, 1, 0, RWF_NOWAIT);
return 0;
}
which will instantly spew:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:306
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5580, name: dm-nowait
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 7 PID: 5580 Comm: dm-nowait Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-g39956d2dcd81 #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x11d/0x1b0
__might_resched+0x3c3/0x5e0
? preempt_count_sub+0x150/0x150
mempool_alloc+0x1e2/0x390
? mempool_resize+0x7d0/0x7d0
? lock_sync+0x190/0x190
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x868/0x2d40
bio_alloc_bioset+0x417/0x8c0
? bvec_alloc+0x200/0x200
? internal_get_user_pages_fast+0xb8c/0x2d40
bio_alloc_clone+0x53/0x100
dm_submit_bio+0x27f/0x1a20
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? blk_try_enter_queue+0x1a0/0x4d0
? dm_dax_direct_access+0x260/0x260
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? blk_try_enter_queue+0x1cc/0x4d0
__submit_bio+0x239/0x310
? __bio_queue_enter+0x700/0x700
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x40/0x60
? ktime_get+0x285/0x470
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x4d9/0xb80
? should_fail_request+0x80/0x80
? preempt_count_sub+0x150/0x150
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? __bio_add_page+0x143/0x2d0
? iov_iter_revert+0x27/0x360
submit_bio_noacct+0x53e/0x1b30
submit_bio_wait+0x10a/0x230
? submit_bio_wait_endio+0x40/0x40
__blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x4f8/0x780
? blkdev_bio_end_io+0x4c0/0x4c0
? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xc0
? __bio_clone+0x3c0/0x3c0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? lock_sync+0x190/0x190
? atime_needs_update+0x3bf/0x7e0
? timestamp_truncate+0x21b/0x2d0
? inode_owner_or_capable+0x240/0x240
blkdev_direct_IO.part.0+0x84a/0x1810
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? blkdev_read_iter+0x40d/0x530
? reacquire_held_locks+0x4e0/0x4e0
? __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x780/0x780
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? __mark_inode_dirty+0x297/0xd50
? preempt_count_add+0x72/0x140
blkdev_read_iter+0x2a4/0x530
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2f2/0x3c0
? generic_copy_file_range+0x1d0/0x1d0
? fsnotify_perm.part.0+0x25d/0x630
? security_file_permission+0xd8/0x100
do_iter_read+0x31b/0x880
? import_iovec+0x10b/0x140
vfs_readv+0x12d/0x1a0
? vfs_iter_read+0xb0/0xb0
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
do_preadv+0x1b3/0x260
? do_readv+0x370/0x370
__x64_sys_preadv2+0xef/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5af41ad806
Code: 41 54 41 89 fc 55 44 89 c5 53 48 89 cb 48 83 ec 18 80 3d e4 dd 0d 00 00 74 7a 45 89 c1 49 89 ca 45 31 c0 b8 47 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 be 00 00 00 48 85 c0 79 4a 48 8b 0d da 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3145c7f0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000147
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5af41ad806
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffd3145c850 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007ffd3145c850 R14: 000055f5f0431dd8 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
where in fact it is
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dp: Drop aux devices together with DP controller
Using devres to depopulate the aux bus made sure that upon a probe
deferral the EDP panel device would be destroyed and recreated upon next
attempt.
But the struct device which the devres is tied to is the DPUs
(drm_dev->dev), which may be happen after the DP controller is torn
down.
Indications of this can be seen in the commonly seen EDID-hexdump full
of zeros in the log, or the occasional/rare KASAN fault where the
panel's attempt to read the EDID information causes a use after free on
DP resources.
It's tempting to move the devres to the DP controller's struct device,
but the resources used by the device(s) on the aux bus are explicitly
torn down in the error path. The KASAN-reported use-after-free also
remains, as the DP aux "module" explicitly frees its devres-allocated
memory in this code path.
As such, explicitly depopulate the aux bus in the error path, and in the
component unbind path, to avoid these issues.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/542163/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on direct node in truncate_dnode()
syzbot reports below bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802a25c000 by task syz-executor148/5000
CPU: 1 PID: 5000 Comm: syz-executor148 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00041-ge660abd551f1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
truncate_dnode+0x229/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/node.c:944
f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x64b/0xde0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1154
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x4ac/0xf30 fs/f2fs/file.c:721
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x7b/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:749
f2fs_truncate.part.0+0x4a5/0x630 fs/f2fs/file.c:799
f2fs_truncate include/linux/fs.h:825 [inline]
f2fs_setattr+0x1738/0x2090 fs/f2fs/file.c:1006
notify_change+0xb2c/0x1180 fs/attr.c:483
do_truncate+0x143/0x200 fs/open.c:66
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3295 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3640 [inline]
path_openat+0x2083/0x2750 fs/namei.c:3791
do_filp_open+0x1ba/0x410 fs/namei.c:3818
do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x4c0 fs/open.c:1356
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1372 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1448 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1442 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0xcd/0x120 fs/open.c:1442
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause is, inodeA references inodeB via inodeB's ino, once inodeA
is truncated, it calls truncate_dnode() to truncate data blocks in inodeB's
node page, it traverse mapping data from node->i.i_addr[0] to
node->i.i_addr[ADDRS_PER_BLOCK() - 1], result in out-of-boundary access.
This patch fixes to add sanity check on dnode page in truncate_dnode(),
so that, it can help to avoid triggering such issue, and once it encounters
such issue, it will record newly introduced ERROR_INVALID_NODE_REFERENCE
error into superblock, later fsck can detect such issue and try repairing.
Also, it removes f2fs_truncate_data_blocks() for cleanup due to the
function has only one caller, and uses f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range()
instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: Don't leak a resource on swapout move error
If moving the bo to system for swapout failed, we were leaking
a resource. Fix. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: synchronize atomic write aborts
To fix a race condition between atomic write aborts, I use the inode
lock and make COW inode to be re-usable thoroughout the whole
atomic file inode lifetime. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix skb refcnt race after locking changes
There is a race where skb's from the sk_psock_backlog can be referenced
after userspace side has already skb_consumed() the sk_buff and its refcnt
dropped to zer0 causing use after free.
The flow is the following:
while ((skb = skb_peek(&psock->ingress_skb))
sk_psock_handle_Skb(psock, skb, ..., ingress)
if (!ingress) ...
sk_psock_skb_ingress
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb)
msg->skb = skb
sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg)
skb_dequeue(&psock->ingress_skb)
The sk_psock_queue_msg() puts the msg on the ingress_msg queue. This is
what the application reads when recvmsg() is called. An application can
read this anytime after the msg is placed on the queue. The recvmsg hook
will also read msg->skb and then after user space reads the msg will call
consume_skb(skb) on it effectively free'ing it.
But, the race is in above where backlog queue still has a reference to
the skb and calls skb_dequeue(). If the skb_dequeue happens after the
user reads and free's the skb we have a use after free.
The !ingress case does not suffer from this problem because it uses
sendmsg_*(sk, msg) which does not pass the sk_buff further down the
stack.
The following splat was observed with 'test_progs -t sockmap_listen':
[ 1022.710250][ T2556] general protection fault, ...
[...]
[ 1022.712830][ T2556] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
[ 1022.713262][ T2556] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
[ 1022.713653][ T2556] Code: ...
[...]
[ 1022.720699][ T2556] Call Trace:
[ 1022.720984][ T2556] <TASK>
[ 1022.721254][ T2556] ? die_addr+0x32/0x80^M
[ 1022.721589][ T2556] ? exc_general_protection+0x25a/0x4b0
[ 1022.722026][ T2556] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
[ 1022.722489][ T2556] ? skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
[ 1022.722854][ T2556] sk_psock_backlog+0x27a/0x300
[ 1022.723243][ T2556] process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5b0
[ 1022.723633][ T2556] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3a0
[ 1022.723998][ T2556] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.724386][ T2556] kthread+0xfd/0x130
[ 1022.724709][ T2556] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.725066][ T2556] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ 1022.725409][ T2556] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.725799][ T2556] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ 1022.726201][ T2556] </TASK>
To fix we add an skb_get() before passing the skb to be enqueued in the
engress queue. This bumps the skb->users refcnt so that consume_skb()
and kfree_skb will not immediately free the sk_buff. With this we can
be sure the skb is still around when we do the dequeue. Then we just
need to decrement the refcnt or free the skb in the backlog case which
we do by calling kfree_skb() on the ingress case as well as the sendmsg
case.
Before locking change from fixes tag we had the sock locked so we
couldn't race with user and there was no issue here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: flush inode if atomic file is aborted
Let's flush the inode being aborted atomic operation to avoid stale dirty
inode during eviction in this call stack:
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x22/0x40 [f2fs]
f2fs_abort_atomic_write+0xc4/0xf0 [f2fs]
f2fs_evict_inode+0x3f/0x690 [f2fs]
? sugov_start+0x140/0x140
evict+0xc3/0x1c0
evict_inodes+0x17b/0x210
generic_shutdown_super+0x32/0x120
kill_block_super+0x21/0x50
deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x90
cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160
task_work_run+0x59/0x90
do_exit+0x33b/0xa50
do_group_exit+0x2d/0x80
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
This triggers f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_evict_inode:
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE));
This fixes the syzbot report:
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:869!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 5014 Comm: syz-executor220 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11479-g6cd06ab12d1a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:665
dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:698
evict_inodes+0x345/0x440 fs/inode.c:748
generic_shutdown_super+0xaf/0x480 fs/super.c:478
kill_block_super+0x64/0xb0 fs/super.c:1417
kill_f2fs_super+0x2af/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4704
deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x160 fs/super.c:330
deactivate_super+0xb1/0xd0 fs/super.c:361
cleanup_mnt+0x2ae/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254
task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0xa9a/0x29a0 kernel/exit.c:874
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f309be71a09
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f309be719df.
RSP: 002b:00007fff171df518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f309bef7330 RCX: 00007f309be71a09
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 00007f309bef1e40
R10: 0000000000010600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f309bef7330
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Avoid use-after-free in dbg for hci_add_adv_monitor()
KSAN reports use-after-free in hci_add_adv_monitor().
While adding an adv monitor,
hci_add_adv_monitor() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_pattern() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_sync() calls ->
msft_le_monitor_advertisement_cb() calls in an error case ->
hci_free_adv_monitor() which frees the *moniter.
This is referenced by bt_dev_dbg() in hci_add_adv_monitor().
Fix the bt_dev_dbg() by using handle instead of monitor->handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_disconnect_{req,rsp}
Similar to commit d0be8347c623 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free
caused by l2cap_chan_put"), just use l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero to
prevent referencing a channel that is about to be destroyed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_len
syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1]
Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently,
and netlink_dump() also needs protection.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg
read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0:
netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
__sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1:
netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block/rq_qos: protect rq_qos apis with a new lock
commit 50e34d78815e ("block: disable the elevator int del_gendisk")
move rq_qos_exit() from disk_release() to del_gendisk(), this will
introduce some problems:
1) If rq_qos_add() is triggered by enabling iocost/iolatency through
cgroupfs, then it can concurrent with del_gendisk(), it's not safe to
write 'q->rq_qos' concurrently.
2) Activate cgroup policy that is relied on rq_qos will call
rq_qos_add() and blkcg_activate_policy(), and if rq_qos_exit() is
called in the middle, null-ptr-dereference will be triggered in
blkcg_activate_policy().
3) blkg_conf_open_bdev() can call blkdev_get_no_open() first to find the
disk, then if rq_qos_exit() from del_gendisk() is done before
rq_qos_add(), then memory will be leaked.
This patch add a new disk level mutex 'rq_qos_mutex':
1) The lock will protect rq_qos_exit() directly.
2) For wbt that doesn't relied on blk-cgroup, rq_qos_add() can only be
called from disk initialization for now because wbt can't be
destructed until rq_qos_exit(), so it's safe not to protect wbt for
now. Hoever, in case that rq_qos dynamically destruction is supported
in the furture, this patch also protect rq_qos_add() from wbt_init()
directly, this is enough because blk-sysfs already synchronize
writers with disk removal.
3) For iocost and iolatency, in order to synchronize disk removal and
cgroup configuration, the lock is held after blkdev_get_no_open()
from blkg_conf_open_bdev(), and is released in blkg_conf_exit().
In order to fix the above memory leak, disk_live() is checked after
holding the new lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: Ignore frags from uninitialized peer in dp.
When max virtual ap interfaces are configured in all the bands with
ACS and hostapd restart is done every 60s, a crash is observed at
random times.
In this certain scenario, a fragmented packet is received for
self peer, for which rx_tid and rx_frags are not initialized in
datapath. While handling this fragment, crash is observed as the
rx_frag list is uninitialised and when we walk in
ath11k_dp_rx_h_sort_frags, skb null leads to exception.
To address this, before processing received fragments we check
dp_setup_done flag is set to ensure that peer has completed its
dp peer setup for fragment queue, else ignore processing the
fragments.
Call trace:
ath11k_dp_process_rx_err+0x550/0x1084 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x70/0x370 [ath11k]
0xffffffc009693a04
__napi_poll+0x30/0xa4
net_rx_action+0x118/0x270
__do_softirq+0x10c/0x244
irq_exit+0x64/0xb4
__handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xac
gic_handle_irq+0x74/0xbc
el1_irq+0xf0/0x1c0
arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x18
do_idle+0x104/0x248
cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x64
rest_init+0xd0/0xdc
arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
start_kernel+0x480/0x4b8
Code: f9400281 f94066a2 91405021 b94a0023 (f9406401)
Tested-on: IPQ8074 hw2.0 AHB WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
amdgpu: validate offset_in_bo of drm_amdgpu_gem_va
This is motivated by OOB access in amdgpu_vm_update_range when
offset_in_bo+map_size overflows.
v2: keep the validations in amdgpu_vm_bo_map
v3: add the validations to amdgpu_vm_bo_map/amdgpu_vm_bo_replace_map
rather than to amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: lib/mpi - avoid null pointer deref in mpi_cmp_ui()
During NVMeTCP Authentication a controller can trigger a kernel
oops by specifying the 8192 bit Diffie Hellman group and passing
a correctly sized, but zeroed Diffie Hellamn value.
mpi_cmp_ui() was detecting this if the second parameter was 0,
but 1 is passed from dh_is_pubkey_valid(). This causes the null
pointer u->d to be dereferenced towards the end of mpi_cmp_ui() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix potential kgd_mem UAFs
kgd_mem pointers returned by kfd_process_device_translate_handle are
only guaranteed to be valid while p->mutex is held. As soon as the mutex
is unlocked, another thread can free the BO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete
Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call
blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call
blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens
after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has
completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key()
can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug.
This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the
'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without
doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in
blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only
been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.)
There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before
bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make
__blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first
solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via
WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use. |
