| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| prompts.chat prior to commit 0f8d4c3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in skill file handling that allows attackers to write arbitrary files to the client system by crafting malicious ZIP archives with unsanitized filenames containing path traversal sequences. Attackers can exploit missing server-side filename validation to inject path traversal sequences ../ into skill file archives, which when extracted by vulnerable tools write files outside the intended directory and overwrite shell initialization files to achieve code execution. |
| prompts.chat prior to commit 1464475 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Wiro media generator that allows authenticated users to perform server-side fetches of user-controlled inputImageUrl parameters. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by sending POST requests to the /api/media-generate endpoint to probe internal networks, access internal services, and exfiltrate data through the upstream Wiro service without receiving direct response bodies. |
| prompts.chat prior to commit 7b81836 contains multiple authorization bypass vulnerabilities due to missing isPrivate checks across API endpoints and page metadata generation that allow unauthorized users to access sensitive data associated with private prompts. Attackers can exploit these missing authorization checks to retrieve private prompt version history, change requests, examples, current content, and metadata including titles and descriptions exposed via HTML meta tags. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: fix use-after-free on controller registration failure
Make sure to deregister from driver core also in the unlikely event that
per-cpu statistics allocation fails during controller registration to
avoid use-after-free (of driver resources) and unclocked register
accesses. |
| prompts.chat prior to commit 1464475 contains an identity confusion vulnerability due to inconsistent case-sensitive and case-insensitive handling of usernames across write and read paths, allowing attackers to create case-variant usernames that bypass uniqueness checks. Attackers can exploit non-deterministic username resolution to impersonate victim accounts, replace profile content on canonical URLs, and inject attacker-controlled metadata and content across the platform. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix OOM ->tfm_count leak
If memory allocation fails, decrement ->tfm_count to avoid blocking
future reads. |
| Development and test API endpoints are present that mirror production functionality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option
Customer reported that some of their krb5 mounts were failing against
a single server as the client was trying to mount the shares with
wrong credentials. It turned out the client was reusing SMB session
from first mount to try mounting the other shares, even though a
different username= option had been specified to the other mounts.
By using username mount option along with sec=krb5 to search for
principals from keytab is supported by cifs.upcall(8) since
cifs-utils-4.8. So fix this by matching username mount option in
match_session() even with Kerberos.
For example, the second mount below should fail with -ENOKEY as there
is no 'foobar' principal in keytab (/etc/krb5.keytab). The client
ends up reusing SMB session from first mount to perform the second
one, which is wrong.
```
$ ktutil
ktutil: add_entry -password -p testuser -k 1 -e aes256-cts
Password for testuser@ZELDA.TEST:
ktutil: write_kt /etc/krb5.keytab
ktutil: quit
$ klist -ke
Keytab name: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
KVNO Principal
---- ----------------------------------------------------------------
1 testuser@ZELDA.TEST (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
$ mount.cifs //w22-root2/scratch /mnt/1 -o sec=krb5,username=testuser
$ mount.cifs //w22-root2/scratch /mnt/2 -o sec=krb5,username=foobar
$ mount -t cifs | grep -Po 'username=\K\w+'
testuser
testuser
``` |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: log new dentries when logging parent dir of a conflicting inode
If we log the parent directory of a conflicting inode, we are not logging
the new dentries of the directory, so when we finish we have the parent
directory's inode marked as logged but we did not log its new dentries.
As a consequence if the parent directory is explicitly fsynced later and
it does not have any new changes since we logged it, the fsync is a no-op
and after a power failure the new dentries are missing.
Example scenario:
$ mkdir foo
$ sync
$rmdir foo
$ mkdir dir1
$ mkdir dir2
# A file with the same name and parent as the directory we just deleted
# and was persisted in a past transaction. So the deleted directory's
# inode is a conflicting inode of this new file's inode.
$ touch foo
$ ln foo dir2/link
# The fsync on dir2 will log the parent directory (".") because the
# conflicting inode (deleted directory) does not exists anymore, but it
# it does not log its new dentries (dir1).
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" dir2
# This fsync on the parent directory is no-op, since the previous fsync
# logged it (but without logging its new dentries).
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" .
<power failure>
# After log replay dir1 is missing.
Fix this by ensuring we log new dir dentries whenever we log the parent
directory of a no longer existing conflicting inode.
A test case for fstests will follow soon. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Open-code GGTT MMIO access protection
GGTT MMIO access is currently protected by hotplug (drm_dev_enter),
which works correctly when the driver loads successfully and is later
unbound or unloaded. However, if driver load fails, this protection is
insufficient because drm_dev_unplug() is never called.
Additionally, devm release functions cannot guarantee that all BOs with
GGTT mappings are destroyed before the GGTT MMIO region is removed, as
some BOs may be freed asynchronously by worker threads.
To address this, introduce an open-coded flag, protected by the GGTT
lock, that guards GGTT MMIO access. The flag is cleared during the
dev_fini_ggtt devm release function to ensure MMIO access is disabled
once teardown begins.
(cherry picked from commit 4f3a998a173b4325c2efd90bdadc6ccd3ad9a431) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate L2CAP_INFO_RSP payload length before access
l2cap_information_rsp() checks that cmd_len covers the fixed
l2cap_info_rsp header (type + result, 4 bytes) but then reads
rsp->data without verifying that the payload is present:
- L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK calls get_unaligned_le32(rsp->data), which reads
4 bytes past the header (needs cmd_len >= 8).
- L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN reads rsp->data[0], 1 byte past the header
(needs cmd_len >= 5).
A truncated L2CAP_INFO_RSP with result == L2CAP_IR_SUCCESS triggers an
out-of-bounds read of adjacent skb data.
Guard each data access with the required payload length check. If the
payload is too short, skip the read and let the state machine complete
with safe defaults (feat_mask and remote_fixed_chan remain zero from
kzalloc), so the info timer cleanup and l2cap_conn_start() still run
and the connection is not stalled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac80211: fix crash in ieee80211_chan_bw_change for AP_VLAN stations
ieee80211_chan_bw_change() iterates all stations and accesses
link->reserved.oper via sta->sdata->link[link_id]. For stations on
AP_VLAN interfaces (e.g. 4addr WDS clients), sta->sdata points to
the VLAN sdata, whose link never participates in chanctx reservations.
This leaves link->reserved.oper zero-initialized with chan == NULL,
causing a NULL pointer dereference in __ieee80211_sta_cap_rx_bw()
when accessing chandef->chan->band during CSA.
Resolve the VLAN sdata to its parent AP sdata using get_bss_sdata()
before accessing link data.
[also change sta->sdata in ARRAY_SIZE even if it doesn't matter] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: fix OOB access in DBG_BUF_PRODUCER async event handler
The ASYNC_EVENT_CMPL_EVENT_ID_DBG_BUF_PRODUCER handler in
bnxt_async_event_process() uses a firmware-supplied 'type' field
directly as an index into bp->bs_trace[] without bounds validation.
The 'type' field is a 16-bit value extracted from DMA-mapped completion
ring memory that the NIC writes directly to host RAM. A malicious or
compromised NIC can supply any value from 0 to 65535, causing an
out-of-bounds access into kernel heap memory.
The bnxt_bs_trace_check_wrap() call then dereferences bs_trace->magic_byte
and writes to bs_trace->last_offset and bs_trace->wrapped, leading to
kernel memory corruption or a crash.
Fix by adding a bounds check and defining BNXT_TRACE_MAX as
DBG_LOG_BUFFER_FLUSH_REQ_TYPE_ERR_QPC_TRACE + 1 to cover all currently
defined firmware trace types (0x0 through 0xc). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: fix use of NULL folio in move_pages_huge_pmd()
move_pages_huge_pmd() handles UFFDIO_MOVE for both normal THPs and huge
zero pages. For the huge zero page path, src_folio is explicitly set to
NULL, and is used as a sentinel to skip folio operations like lock and
rmap.
In the huge zero page branch, src_folio is NULL, so folio_mk_pmd(NULL,
pgprot) passes NULL through folio_pfn() and page_to_pfn(). With
SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP this silently produces a bogus PFN, installing a PMD
pointing to non-existent physical memory. On other memory models it is a
NULL dereference.
Use page_folio(src_page) to obtain the valid huge zero folio from the
page, which was obtained from pmd_page() and remains valid throughout.
After commit d82d09e48219 ("mm/huge_memory: mark PMD mappings of the huge
zero folio special"), moved huge zero PMDs must remain special so
vm_normal_page_pmd() continues to treat them as special mappings.
move_pages_huge_pmd() currently reconstructs the destination PMD in the
huge zero page branch, which drops PMD state such as pmd_special() on
architectures with CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL. As a result,
vm_normal_page_pmd() can treat the moved huge zero PMD as a normal page
and corrupt its refcount.
Instead of reconstructing the PMD from the folio, derive the destination
entry from src_pmdval after pmdp_huge_clear_flush(), then handle the PMD
metadata the same way move_huge_pmd() does for moved entries by marking it
soft-dirty and clearing uffd-wp. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvdimm/bus: Fix potential use after free in asynchronous initialization
Dingisoul with KASAN reports a use after free if device_add() fails in
nd_async_device_register().
Commit b6eae0f61db2 ("libnvdimm: Hold reference on parent while
scheduling async init") correctly added a reference on the parent device
to be held until asynchronous initialization was complete. However, if
device_add() results in an allocation failure the ref count of the
device drops to 0 prior to the parent pointer being accessed. Thus
resulting in use after free.
The bug bot AI correctly identified the fix. Save a reference to the
parent pointer to be used to drop the parent reference regardless of the
outcome of device_add(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: fix cache_request leak in cache_release
When a reader's file descriptor is closed while in the middle of reading
a cache_request (rp->offset != 0), cache_release() decrements the
request's readers count but never checks whether it should free the
request.
In cache_read(), when readers drops to 0 and CACHE_PENDING is clear, the
cache_request is removed from the queue and freed along with its buffer
and cache_head reference. cache_release() lacks this cleanup.
The only other path that frees requests with readers == 0 is
cache_dequeue(), but it runs only when CACHE_PENDING transitions from
set to clear. If that transition already happened while readers was
still non-zero, cache_dequeue() will have skipped the request, and no
subsequent call will clean it up.
Add the same cleanup logic from cache_read() to cache_release(): after
decrementing readers, check if it reached 0 with CACHE_PENDING clear,
and if so, dequeue and free the cache_request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: bpf: prevent buffer overflow in hid_hw_request
right now the returned value is considered to be always valid. However,
when playing with HID-BPF, the return value can be arbitrary big,
because it's the return value of dispatch_hid_bpf_raw_requests(), which
calls the struct_ops and we have no guarantees that the value makes
sense. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dmc: Fix an unlikely NULL pointer deference at probe
intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count() oopses when DMC hasn't been
initialized, and dmc is thus NULL.
That would be the case when the call path is
intel_power_domains_init_hw() -> {skl,bxt,icl}_display_core_init() ->
gen9_set_dc_state() -> intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count(), as
intel_power_domains_init_hw() is called *before* intel_dmc_init().
However, gen9_set_dc_state() calls intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count()
conditionally, depending on the current and target DC states. At probe,
the target is disabled, but if DC6 is enabled, the function is called,
and an oops follows. Apparently it's quite unlikely that DC6 is enabled
at probe, as we haven't seen this failure mode before.
It is also strange to have DC6 enabled at boot, since that would require
the DMC firmware (loaded by BIOS); the BIOS loading the DMC firmware and
the driver stopping / reprogramming the firmware is a poorly specified
sequence and as such unlikely an intentional BIOS behaviour. It's more
likely that BIOS is leaving an unintentionally enabled DC6 HW state
behind (without actually loading the required DMC firmware for this).
The tracking of the DC6 allowed counter only works if starting /
stopping the counter depends on the _SW_ DC6 state vs. the current _HW_
DC6 state (since stopping the counter requires the DC5 counter captured
when the counter was started). Thus, using the HW DC6 state is incorrect
and it also leads to the above oops. Fix both issues by using the SW DC6
state for the tracking.
This is v2 of the fix originally sent by Jani, updated based on the
first Link: discussion below.
(cherry picked from commit 2344b93af8eb5da5d496b4e0529d35f0f559eaf0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: Fix deadlock in soft reset sequence
The soft reset sequence is currently executed from the threaded IRQ
handler, hence it cannot call disable_irq() which internally waits
for IRQ handlers, i.e. itself, to complete.
Use disable_irq_nosync() during a soft reset instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: Fix use-after-free on framebuffers and property blobs when calling drm_dev_unplug
When trying to do a rather aggressive test of igt's "xe_module_load
--r reload" with a full desktop environment and game running I noticed
a few OOPSes when dereferencing freed pointers, related to
framebuffers and property blobs after the compositor exits.
Solve this by guarding the freeing in drm_file with drm_dev_enter/exit,
and immediately put the references from struct drm_file objects during
drm_dev_unplug().
Related warnings for framebuffers on the subtest:
[ 739.713076] ------------[ cut here ]------------
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&dev->mode_config.fb_list))
[ 739.713079] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c:584 at drm_mode_config_cleanup+0x30b/0x320 [drm], CPU#12: xe_module_load/13145
....
[ 739.713328] Call Trace:
[ 739.713330] <TASK>
[ 739.713335] ? intel_pmdemand_destroy_state+0x11/0x20 [xe]
[ 739.713574] ? intel_atomic_global_obj_cleanup+0xe4/0x1a0 [xe]
[ 739.713794] intel_display_driver_remove_noirq+0x51/0xb0 [xe]
[ 739.714041] xe_display_fini_early+0x33/0x50 [xe]
[ 739.714284] devm_action_release+0xf/0x20
[ 739.714294] devres_release_all+0xad/0xf0
[ 739.714301] device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0xa0
[ 739.714305] device_release_driver_internal+0x1b7/0x210
[ 739.714311] device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
[ 739.714315] unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0
[ 739.714319] drv_attr_store+0x21/0x30
[ 739.714322] sysfs_kf_write+0x48/0x60
[ 739.714328] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x16b/0x240
[ 739.714333] vfs_write+0x266/0x520
[ 739.714341] ksys_write+0x72/0xe0
[ 739.714345] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20
[ 739.714347] x64_sys_call+0xa15/0xa30
[ 739.714355] do_syscall_64+0xd8/0xab0
[ 739.714361] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
and
[ 739.714459] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 739.714461] xe 0000:67:00.0: [drm] drm_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fb->filp_head))
[ 739.714464] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_framebuffer.c:833 at drm_framebuffer_free+0x6c/0x90 [drm], CPU#12: xe_module_load/13145
[ 739.714715] RIP: 0010:drm_framebuffer_free+0x7a/0x90 [drm]
...
[ 739.714869] Call Trace:
[ 739.714871] <TASK>
[ 739.714876] drm_mode_config_cleanup+0x26a/0x320 [drm]
[ 739.714998] ? __drm_printfn_seq_file+0x20/0x20 [drm]
[ 739.715115] ? drm_mode_config_cleanup+0x207/0x320 [drm]
[ 739.715235] intel_display_driver_remove_noirq+0x51/0xb0 [xe]
[ 739.715576] xe_display_fini_early+0x33/0x50 [xe]
[ 739.715821] devm_action_release+0xf/0x20
[ 739.715828] devres_release_all+0xad/0xf0
[ 739.715843] device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0xa0
[ 739.715850] device_release_driver_internal+0x1b7/0x210
[ 739.715856] device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
[ 739.715860] unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0
[ 739.715865] drv_attr_store+0x21/0x30
[ 739.715868] sysfs_kf_write+0x48/0x60
[ 739.715873] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x16b/0x240
[ 739.715878] vfs_write+0x266/0x520
[ 739.715886] ksys_write+0x72/0xe0
[ 739.715890] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20
[ 739.715893] x64_sys_call+0xa15/0xa30
[ 739.715900] do_syscall_64+0xd8/0xab0
[ 739.715905] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
and then finally file close blows up:
[ 743.186530] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 743.186535] CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 3453 Comm: kwin_wayland Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc1-valkyria+ #110 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)}
[ 743.186537] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 743.186538] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X299 AORUS Gaming 3/X299 AORUS Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F8n 12/06/2021
[ 743.186539] RIP: 0010:drm_framebuffer_cleanup+0x55/0xc0 [drm]
[ 743.186588] Code: d8 72 73 0f b6 42 05 ff c3 39 c3 72 e8 49 8d bd 50 07 00 00 31 f6 e8 3a 80 d3 e1 49 8b 44 24 10 49 8d 7c 24 08 49 8b 54 24 08 <48> 3b 38 0f 85 95 7f 02 00 48 3b 7a 08 0f 85 8b 7f 02 00 48 89 42
[ 743.186589] RSP: 0018:ffffc900085e3cf8 EFLAGS: 00
---truncated--- |
