| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Mooncake Store master through 0.3.13.post1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to erase any object's disk replica via EvictDiskReplica and BatchEvictDiskReplica. Attackers reaching the coro_rpc master port can evict DISK replicas across all tenants, deleting objects whose only remaining replica is on disk. |
| Mooncake Store master through 0.3.13.post1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to create, steal, and falsely complete replication tasks via the coro_rpc port. Attackers can invoke CreateCopyTask, CreateMoveTask, FetchTasks, and MarkTaskToComplete with victim client UUIDs disclosed by QueryTask to hijack task queues and record replication that never occurred. |
| Mooncake Store master through 0.3.13.post1 contains a missing authentication vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to force-delete any object via Remove, RemoveByRegex, RemoveAll and BatchRemove on the coro_rpc port. Attackers can send forged requests with the force flag set to bypass lease checks, wipe keys matching any regex, or clear the entire store, causing cache loss and request failures. |
| Mooncake through 0.3.13.post1 contains a missing authentication vulnerability in the Store REST service, which binds to 0.0.0.0 without authentication on any route. Unauthenticated attackers can call routes such as /api/get, /api/put, /api/remove_all and /api/mount to read cached KV data with user prompts, inject or delete objects, and mount attacker-described segments. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: coredump: Quiesce dump work on unregister
hci_devcd_handle_pkt_init() arms dump_timeout and coredump producers
queue dump_rx without holding an hdev reference. Unregister leaves both
works live, so disconnecting during an active dump lets them access hdev
after hci_release_dev() frees it.
Shut down coredump processing during unregister. Close the producer gate
under dump_q.lock before disabling both works, then free the active buffer
and queued packets under hci_dev_lock. Serializing the gate with enqueue
prevents controller-specific workers from adding packets after the final
purge. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: do not let tcp_rmem be set below 4096
We can hit a division by zero crash in tcp_rcvbuf_grow()
and tcp_rcv_space_adjust():
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
RIP: 0010:tcp_rcvbuf_grow+0x187/0x450 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:939
...
grow = div_u64(((u64)rcvwin << 1) * (newval - oldval), oldval);
The division uses oldval = tp->rcvq_space.space as divisor.
When tp->rcvq_space.space is zero, this leads to a divide-by-zero
exception.
tp->rcvq_space.space is initialized in tcp_init_buffer_space():
tp->rcvq_space.space = min3(tp->rcv_ssthresh, tp->rcv_wnd,
(u32)TCP_INIT_CWND * tp->advmss);
If tcp_rmem[1] is configured to very small values (such as 1),
sk->sk_rcvbuf is initialized to 1. Then tcp_full_space(sk), which
computes (sk->sk_rcvbuf * scaling_ratio) >> 8, truncates to 0.
This sets tp->window_clamp = 0, tp->rcv_ssthresh = 0, and
tp->rcvq_space.space = 0. Later, when data arrives and DRS is invoked,
tcp_rcvbuf_grow() divides by oldval == 0.
Back in 2015, commit b1cb59cf2efe ("net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF
and RCVBUF for min length") ensured that net.core.rmem_default and
net.core.rmem_max cannot be set below SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF. Similarly,
SO_RCVBUF setsockopt enforces max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF).
However, net.ipv4.tcp_rmem still had .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, allowing
arbitrarily small values.
Because SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF depends on sizeof(struct sk_buff) and cacheline
alignment, its value varies across architectures and configuration options.
Using a fixed constant of 4096 ensures a predictable, architecture-
independent lower bound that is safely above SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF everywhere
and matches the documented 4K default.
Fix this by setting tcp_rmem.extra1 to 4096 and updating the documentation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: mst: move switchdev call outside rcu
This is a follow-up of one of sashiko's pre-existing bug reports.
br_mst_set_state() calls switchdev_port_attr_set() for nonzero MSTIs
while holding rcu_read_lock() which invokes the blocking switchdev
notifier chain and may sleep. Nonzero MSTI changes come from netlink
with rtnl held. Move the switchdev call before entering the rcu section and
assert that rtnl is held.
The call cannot be deferred because netlink needs its error and extack.
Also DSA reads the old bridge MST state during the callback and checks it.
A deferred callback will be late and will see the updated state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fddi: skfp: fix NULL deref when setting the MAC address while down
skfp_ctl_set_mac_address() calls ResetAdapter() unconditionally, without
checking netif_running(). ResetAdapter() first calls card_stop(), which
sets smc->hw.hw_state to STOPPED, and then mac_drv_clear_tx_queue(),
which walks the two transmit queues:
for (i = QUEUE_S; i <= QUEUE_A0; i++) {
queue = smc->hw.fp.tx[i] ;
...
t = queue->tx_curr_get ;
smc->hw.fp.tx[] is only populated by init_tx(), which is reached from
skfp_open() through init_smt() -> init_fddi_driver() -> init_fplus() ->
init_mac() -> init_tx(). The private area is allocated and zeroed by
alloc_fddidev(), so on an interface that has never been brought up both
queue pointers are still NULL. The hw_state test at the top of
mac_drv_clear_tx_queue() does not catch this, because card_stop() has
just set STOPPED; the function proceeds into the loop and dereferences
NULL. ResetAdapter() does call init_smt() itself, but only after the
queues have been cleared.
Setting the MAC address on a down interface therefore oopses:
ip link set dev fddi0 address 02:00:00:00:00:01
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mac_drv_clear_tx_queue+0x68/0x2c0 [skfp]
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000010 by task ip/302
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mac_drv_clear_tx_queue+0x68/0x2c0 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b]
ResetAdapter+0x29/0x100 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b]
skfp_ctl_set_mac_address+0x57/0x80 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b]
netif_set_mac_address+0x1e4/0x2c0
do_setlink+0x684/0x2680
</TASK>
Address 0x10 is the offset of tx_curr_get, the third pointer in
struct s_smt_tx_queue, on 64-bit. mac_drv_clear_rx_queue(), which
ResetAdapter() calls immediately afterwards, dereferences
smc->hw.fp.rx[QUEUE_R1] in the same way behind the same ineffective
hw_state test; the transmit queue merely crashes first. Both are
covered by the guard below.
Skip the adapter reset when the interface is down. dev_addr_set() is
left unconditional, so the new address is still recorded in
dev->dev_addr. Nothing is lost by not resetting the adapter here:
skfp_open() deliberately re-reads the factory address on every open,
read_address(smc, NULL);
eth_hw_addr_set(dev, smc->hw.fddi_canon_addr.a);
and the comment above it states this is done to discard exactly such an
address override across a close/open cycle. An address set while the
interface is down could not have survived the following open even
before this change, so the guard removes no working behaviour. Guarding
the hardware side of ndo_set_mac_address() with netif_running() is
established practice; skge_set_mac_address() has done so since commit
2eb3e621c4e0 ("skge: set mac address bonding fix").
Guarding the reset as a whole, rather than NULL-checking the queues, is
also what the rest of the driver expects. After a previous open/close
the queue pointers are stale but non-NULL, so there is no crash, yet
ResetAdapter() goes on to call smt_online() and STI_FBI() ("Enable
Board Interrupts") while skfp_close() has already called free_irq() -
the adapter would be brought back online with no handler installed. The
only other ResetAdapter() caller is skfp_interrupt(), which by
construction runs only while the device is open.
Found by automated driver testing against an emulated SysKonnect FDDI
adapter under a KASAN-enabled 7.0.0 kernel. Triggering it requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: icmp: reject RTN_UNREACHABLE input routes in icmp_route_lookup
When the forward output route cannot be used in icmp_route_lookup(),
it enters the "reverse path" and calls ip_route_input() on fl4_dec.daddr,
the original packet's source address.
ip_route_input() only returns an error for truly invalid packets. For
unreachable addresses it will succeed and return an input route whose
dst.output is set to ip_rt_bug(). The existing check only rejects
RTN_LOCAL routes, so the RTN_UNREACHABLE route types can still be returned
and later used for output, syzkaller triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE()
in ip_rt_bug() as bellow:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: net/ipv4/route.c:1273 at ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20
RIP: 0010:ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20
Call Trace:
ip_push_pending_frames+0xfa/0x100
__icmp_send+0x905/0xf10
ip_options_compile+0xc0/0xd0
ip_rcv_finish_core+0x321/0xae0
ip_rcv+0x1de/0x260
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x11a/0x130
netif_receive_skb+0x7b/0x260
tun_get_user+0x11bf/0x1c10
------------[ cut here ]------------
Reject input route that is RTN_UNREACHABLE to fix it. The net warning
is only printed for RTN_LOCAL, as RTN_UNREACHABLE is not the result of
a race condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmgenet: restore the hardware filters on open
bcmgenet_hfb_init() runs INIT_LIST_HEAD() on priv->rxnfc_list, which drops
every rule off the list, and bcmgenet_open() calls it on each ifup. Every
rule the user configured is silently lost:
# ethtool -N eth0 flow-type ether dst $MAC action 0
Added rule with ID 0
# ethtool -n eth0 | grep -c Filter:
1
# ip link set eth0 down && ip link set eth0 up
# ethtool -n eth0 | grep -c Filter:
0
Initialise the lists once at probe and restore the rules on open, as
bcmgenet_resume() already does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: mxl862xx: disable the stats poll on teardown
mxl862xx_setup() arms the stats poll before mxl862xx_setup_mdio(), and
nothing stops it until dsa_register_switch() has returned an error to
mxl862xx_probe(). DSA frees the dsa_port list before it returns, so a
poll that fires once .setup or a later step of dsa_tree_setup() has
failed walks freed ports. On shutdown the user ports stay registered,
and the WORK_STOPPED flag test in mxl862xx_get_stats64() is not atomic
with the cancel in mxl862xx_shutdown(), so a re-arm that read the flag
before it was set queues the poll after cancel_delayed_work_sync() has
returned.
Arm the poll once .setup has succeeded and stop it from a .teardown op,
which DSA calls on unregister and after a failed registration, in both
cases before it frees the ports. Use disable_delayed_work_sync() there
and in shutdown(): it drains a running poll as the cancel did and turns
every later attempt to queue the work into a no-op, so the re-arm
cannot bring the poll back. remove() and the probe error path only set
WORK_STOPPED, which crc_err_work tests before it walks the ports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/shrinker: Take a runtime PM ref before shrinking non-system memory
__xe_shrinker_walk() walks the SYSTEM and TT LRUs without a runtime PM
reference. Shrinking a bo outside system memory invalidates its GPU
mappings, which needs the device resumed, so while it is runtime
suspended the page table zap trips an assert and the TLB invalidation
returns -ENODEV:
WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c:770 at xe_bo_move_notify+0x1fc/0x450 [xe]
xe_bo_shrink+0x20f/0x2b0 [xe]
__xe_shrinker_walk+0x174/0x410 [xe]
xe_shrinker_scan+0x10c/0x1e0 [xe]
do_shrink_slab+0x176/0x7e0
drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0x9c/0xf0
Take a reference before walking a memory type other than XE_PL_SYSTEM
and stop there if it cannot be acquired. Reuse the shrinker's existing
acquire path, which resumes the device directly where reclaim allows
that and otherwise queues the PM worker for a later scan. Stop the walk
once the scan target is met, so a satisfied scan does not wake the
device. System memory is still reclaimed while the device is suspended.
Gate this on xe_device_is_l2_flush_optimized(), the same condition under
which xe_bo_trigger_rebind() issues the invalidation for a non-fault-mode
vm, so reclaim is unaffected elsewhere. The System CCS copy already has
its own reference in xe_bo_shrink().
Only a non-fault-mode vm can reach this, since a fault-mode vm requires
LR mode and that holds a runtime PM reference for the vm's lifetime.
Reproduced with igt@xe_madvise@dontneed-before-exec while the GPU is
runtime suspended.
v2: simplify needs_rpm check. (Matt)
retarget Fixes tag since the issue occurs with the non-fault-mode
path added by 4e7ebff69aed.
v3: handle this in xe_shrinker.c instead of xe_bo.c (Thomas)
v4: stop the walk once the scan target is met. (Sashiko)
v5: rebase on the freed page accounting fix. (Sashiko)
v6: reuse the shrinker acquire path so runtime pm can be resumed
directly instead of always queueing a worker. (Thomas)
v7: replace xe_pm_runtime_put() with xe_shrinker_runtime_pm_put(). (Thomas)
(cherry picked from commit 628f92b28bf4c371c10207daf6fc4caee0c0db2e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: set timer->private_data before registering the PCM timer
snd_pcm_timer_init() calls snd_device_register() to link the new
struct snd_timer into the global timer list while it still carries
hw.c_resolution = snd_pcm_timer_resolution (and hw.start/hw.stop),
and only afterwards sets timer->private_data = substream.
Once the timer is on the list under register_mutex, a concurrent
reader can already reach it through the same mutex and invoke these
callbacks. /proc/asound/timers does this via c_resolution(), and
snd_timer_open()+snd_timer_start() reach start()/stop() the same way.
All three dereference timer->private_data, which for this brief
window is NULL, giving a NULL-pointer dereference:
substream = timer->private_data;
return substream->runtime ? ... // substream is NULL
Move the private_data/private_free assignment before
snd_device_register() so the timer is never visible on the list
without its private_data set. On the snd_device_register() failure
path, private_free() (snd_pcm_timer_free()) can now run, but it only
does substream->timer = NULL, which is already NULL at that point
since substream->timer is set to the new timer just once, after a
successful registration -- so the failure path stays safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rtrs: guard against null kobj name
In the client, if `init_path()` errors, the callee tries to clean up
with `rtrs_clt_close_conns()`. However, this can lead to calling the
event tracing code with `clt_path->kobj->name` being `NULL` and thus
causing a null pointer dereference when trying to copy from it.
This just adds a guard to check that the name is not `NULL` before
copying from it. The server appears to have a similar pattern. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: check create_singlethread_workqueue() in DCB setup
bnxt_re_init_dcb_wq() ignores a failed allocation. The async DCB
handler later calls queue_work() on the NULL pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Restore HMM_PFN_WRITE check in ODP write paths
Commit 0b261d7c1cd3 ("RDMA/rxe: Break endless pagefault loop for RO
pages") dropped the access permission test from rxe_check_pagefault()
and left only HMM_PFN_VALID. A page faulted in read-only, for example
a page-cache folio behind a PROT_READ file mapping, then satisfies the
check and ODP write operations (RDMA WRITE, RDMA READ response, SEND
payload, atomics) modify it through kmap without ever breaking CoW.
An unprivileged user can register an ODP MR over such a mapping and
have incoming RDMA traffic overwrite the page cache of a file it only
holds O_RDONLY, including /etc/passwd or setuid binaries. This is the
same primitive class as Dirty COW and CVE-2022-2590.
mlx5 has the missing invariant: its ODP path sets the device write bit
only for pfns that carry HMM_PFN_WRITE. Restore it in rxe by requiring
HMM_PFN_WRITE in rxe_check_pagefault() for every operation except
RXE_PAGEFAULT_RDONLY. A write to a non-writable VMA now fails the one
fault attempt with -EPERM from hmm_vma_fault() instead of re-faulting
forever. For a writable VMA the fault breaks CoW and the write lands
in the private page.
Keep pmem flushes on the read-only check. arch_wb_cache_pmem() never
modifies memory, and the FLUSH access bits do not make the umem
writable, so classifying flushes as writes would make every flush
against a flush-only MR fail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: scpi: bound-check DVFS index in scpi_dvfs_recalc_rate
dvfs_get_idx() may return an out-of-range index if the SCP firmware is
buggy or returns a stale value. Only negative indexes were rejected, so a
large index walked past info->opps and could treat garbage as a clock rate
(KASAN OOB / wrong frequency to consumers). The missing upper bound dates
back to the original SCPI clock driver.
Treat indexes >= opp count as invalid and return 0, same as idx < 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access
mr_check_range() validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the
registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length)
A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length
wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the
check. rxe_mr_iova_to_index() then computes a huge index (int idx, only
guarded by WARN_ON) and rxe_mr_copy_xarray() dereferences
mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel
oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer.
Rewrite the check in overflow-safe form; the first two clauses guarantee
that the subsequent subtractions do not underflow:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
length > mr->ibmr.length ||
iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length)
With the fix, mr_check_range() returns -EINVAL for the crafted iova and
the responder reports REMOTE_ACCESS_ERROR instead of triggering the OOB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Clear association under lock if siw_qp_modify fails in siw_accept
We need to clear cep before release state_lock as siw_qp_llp_close and
siw_qp_modify->siw_qp_llp_close did.
Otherwise if siw_qp_modify() fails in siw_accept(), the QP's state_lock
is released before the error path cleanup. A concurrent ibv_modify_qp()
transitioning the QP to ERROR can race in this window:
siw_accept() ibv_modify_qp(ERROR)
---------------------- ----------------------
siw_qp_modify() fails
up_write(&qp->state_lock)
down_write(&qp->state_lock)
nextstate_from_idle():
if (qp->cep)
siw_cep_put(qp->cep) <- frees cep
qp->cep = NULL
goto error
cep->qp = NULL <- UAF
Clear qp->cep and drop the association reference taken by siw_cep_get(),
all under the write lock held from the initial down_write(&qp->state_lock).
Thread B therefore sees qp->cep == NULL, skips its own put, and cannot free
the cep before siw_accept() is done with it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: downgrade zerocopy managed frags before mutating skb frags
On the out-of-place output path (esp->inplace == false) ESP rewrites the
skb frag array: esp_output_head() appends a trailer frag and
esp_output_tail() replaces the frags with a destination page, both
referenced with get_page().
When the skb carries zerocopy managed frags (SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS) the
payload frags are owned by the ubuf and must not be referenced or
unreferenced individually, but ESP mutates the frag array without ever
downgrading the skb. This breaks the managed-frag invariant two ways:
- esp_ssg_unref() walks the source scatterlist and drops a page
reference for every frag, including the ubuf-owned payload frags,
pushing their refcount below the GUP pin bias while the pages are
still pinned, i.e. a use-after-free of the zerocopy pages;
- esp_output_tail() installs its destination page as frag 0 with
get_page() but leaves SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS set, so
skb_release_data() takes the skip_unref branch and never drops that
reference, leaking the x->xfrag page at packet rate.
Fix this the way every other frag-mutating site does (__ip_append_data(),
__ip6_append_data(), tcp_sendmsg_locked()) and call
skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() before ESP touches the frag array: it takes
a real reference on each existing frag and clears SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS,
so the per-frag unref in esp_ssg_unref() and the frag release in
skb_release_data() are both balanced and no mixed-ownership frag array is
left behind. |
