| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in create_big_sync
Add hci_conn_valid() check in create_big_sync() to detect stale
connections before proceeding with BIG creation. Handle the
resulting -ECANCELED in create_big_complete() and re-validate the
connection under hci_dev_lock() before dereferencing, matching the
pattern used by create_le_conn_complete() and create_pa_complete().
Keep the hci_conn object alive across the async boundary by taking
a reference via hci_conn_get() when queueing create_big_sync(), and
dropping it in the completion callback. The refcount and the lock
are complementary: the refcount keeps the object allocated, while
hci_dev_lock() serializes hci_conn_hash_del()'s list_del_rcu() on
hdev->conn_hash, as required by hci_conn_del().
hci_conn_put() is called outside hci_dev_unlock() so the final put
(which resolves to kfree() via bt_link_release) does not run under
hdev->lock, though the release path would be safe either way.
Without this, create_big_complete() would unconditionally
dereference the conn pointer on error, causing a use-after-free
via hci_connect_cfm() and hci_conn_del(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: ns: Limit the maximum server registration per node
Current code does no bound checking on the number of servers added per
node. A malicious client can flood NEW_SERVER messages and exhaust memory.
Fix this issue by limiting the maximum number of server registrations to
256 per node. If the NEW_SERVER message is received for an old port, then
don't restrict it as it will get replaced. While at it, also rate limit
the error messages in the failure path of qrtr_ns_worker().
Note that the limit of 256 is chosen based on the current platform
requirements. If requirement changes in the future, this limit can be
increased. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SCO: Fix use-after-free in sco_recv_frame() due to missing sock_hold
sco_recv_frame() reads conn->sk under sco_conn_lock() but immediately
releases the lock without holding a reference to the socket. A concurrent
close() can free the socket between the lock release and the subsequent
sk->sk_state access, resulting in a use-after-free.
Other functions in the same file (sco_sock_timeout(), sco_conn_del())
correctly use sco_sock_hold() to safely hold a reference under the lock.
Fix by using sco_sock_hold() to take a reference before releasing the
lock, and adding sock_put() on all exit paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.
Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of
an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.
This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit
cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").
After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited
commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and
reintroduced the same issue.
The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without
interacting with GC.
Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is
close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.
The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from
sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead()
for sk-A and sk-B.
GC thread User thread
--------- -----------
unix_vertex_dead(sk-A)
-> true <------.
\
`------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK)
invalidate !! -> sk-A's file refcount : 1 -> 2
close(sk-B)
-> sk-B's file refcount : 2 -> 1
unix_vertex_dead(sk-B)
-> true
Initially, sk-A's file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B
recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the
same as the number of its inflight fds.
However, sk-A's file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK,
which invalidates the previous evaluation.
At this moment, sk-B's file refcount is 2; one by the open fd,
and one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close()
releases one refcount by the former.
Finally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead.
One option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(),
but we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm.
The point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent
close() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with
the dead SCC detection.
When the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount.
If GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just
give up garbage-collecting the SCC.
Therefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with
a proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC.
Let's use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let
it defer the SCC to the next run.
This way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can
avoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily.
Note that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is
detected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from
abusive MSG_PEEK calls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: validate cluster allocation bits of the allocation bitmap
syzbot created an exfat image with cluster bits not set for the allocation
bitmap. exfat-fs reads and uses the allocation bitmap without checking
this. The problem is that if the start cluster of the allocation bitmap
is 6, cluster 6 can be allocated when creating a directory with mkdir.
exfat zeros out this cluster in exfat_mkdir, which can delete existing
entries. This can reallocate the allocated entries. In addition,
the allocation bitmap is also zeroed out, so cluster 6 can be reallocated.
This patch adds exfat_test_bitmap_range to validate that clusters used for
the allocation bitmap are correctly marked as in-use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: remove read access to debugfs files
The 'command' and 'netdev_ops' debugfs files are a legacy debugging
interface supported by the i40e driver since its early days by commit
02e9c290814c ("i40e: debugfs interface").
Both of these debugfs files provide a read handler which is mostly useless,
and which is implemented with questionable logic. They both use a static
256 byte buffer which is initialized to the empty string. In the case of
the 'command' file this buffer is literally never used and simply wastes
space. In the case of the 'netdev_ops' file, the last command written is
saved here.
On read, the files contents are presented as the name of the device
followed by a colon and then the contents of their respective static
buffer. For 'command' this will always be "<device>: ". For 'netdev_ops',
this will be "<device>: <last command written>". But note the buffer is
shared between all devices operated by this module. At best, it is mostly
meaningless information, and at worse it could be accessed simultaneously
as there doesn't appear to be any locking mechanism.
We have also recently received multiple reports for both read functions
about their use of snprintf and potential overflow that could result in
reading arbitrary kernel memory. For the 'command' file, this is definitely
impossible, since the static buffer is always zero and never written to.
For the 'netdev_ops' file, it does appear to be possible, if the user
carefully crafts the command input, it will be copied into the buffer,
which could be large enough to cause snprintf to truncate, which then
causes the copy_to_user to read beyond the length of the buffer allocated
by kzalloc.
A minimal fix would be to replace snprintf() with scnprintf() which would
cap the return to the number of bytes written, preventing an overflow. A
more involved fix would be to drop the mostly useless static buffers,
saving 512 bytes and modifying the read functions to stop needing those as
input.
Instead, lets just completely drop the read access to these files. These
are debug interfaces exposed as part of debugfs, and I don't believe that
dropping read access will break any script, as the provided output is
pretty useless. You can find the netdev name through other more standard
interfaces, and the 'netdev_ops' interface can easily result in garbage if
you issue simultaneous writes to multiple devices at once.
In order to properly remove the i40e_dbg_netdev_ops_buf, we need to
refactor its write function to avoid using the static buffer. Instead, use
the same logic as the i40e_dbg_command_write, with an allocated buffer.
Update the code to use this instead of the static buffer, and ensure we
free the buffer on exit. This fixes simultaneous writes to 'netdev_ops' on
multiple devices, and allows us to remove the now unused static buffer
along with removing the read access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: separate no-async decryption request handling from async
If we're not doing async, the handling is much simpler. There's no
reference counting, we just need to wait for the completion to wake us
up and return its result.
We should preferably also use a separate crypto_wait. I'm not seeing a
UAF as I did in the past, I think aec7961916f3 ("tls: fix race between
async notify and socket close") took care of it.
This will make the next fix easier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SCO: Fix UAF on sco_sock_timeout
conn->sk maybe have been unlinked/freed while waiting for sco_conn_lock
so this checks if the conn->sk is still valid by checking if it part of
sco_sk_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775) Fix access to temperature configuration registers
The number of temperature configuration registers does
not always match the total number of temperature registers.
This can result in access errors reported if KASAN is enabled.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nct6775_probe+0x5654/0x6fe9 nct6775_core |
| A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability exists when Power BI Report Server Template file (pbix) containing HTML files is uploaded to the server and HTML files are accessed directly by the victim.
Combining these 2 vulnerabilities together, an attacker is able to upload malicious Power BI templates files to the server using the victim's session and run scripts in the security context of the user and perform privilege escalation in case the victim has admin privileges when the victim access one of the HTML files present in the malicious Power BI template uploaded.
The security update addresses the vulnerability by helping to ensure that Power BI Report Server properly sanitize file uploads. |
| An information disclosure vulnerability manifests when a user or an application uploads unprotected private key data as part of an authentication certificate keyCredential on an Azure AD Application or Service Principal (which is not recommended). This vulnerability allows a user or service in the tenant with application read access to read the private key data that was added to the application.
Azure AD addressed this vulnerability by preventing disclosure of any private key values added to the application.
Microsoft has identified services that could manifest this vulnerability, and steps that customers should take to be protected. Refer to the FAQ section for more information.
For more details on this issue, please refer to the MSRC Blog Entry. |
| Azure RTOS Information Disclosure Vulnerability |
| Azure RTOS Information Disclosure Vulnerability |
| Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows Denial of Service Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows Hello Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability |
