| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Origin validation error in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform tampering over a network. |
| Origin validation error in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. |
| A vulnerability was found in OIDC-Client. When using the RH SSO OIDC adapter with EAP 7.x or when using the elytron-oidc-client subsystem with EAP 8.x, authorization code injection attacks can occur, allowing an attacker to inject a stolen authorization code into the attacker's own session with the client with a victim's identity. This is usually done with a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) or phishing attack. |
| Inappropriate implementation in Chrome for iOS in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Inappropriate implementation in Chrome for iOS in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Insufficient policy enforcement in Chrome for iOS in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Inappropriate implementation in NFC in Google Chrome on Android prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Insufficient policy enforcement in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Knot DNS before 3.4.10 and 3.5.x before 3.5.4 contains a vulnerability in mod-onlinesign where the next NSEC owner name can be computed incorrectly. This can create an overly broad authenticated denial interval, allowing downstream validating resolvers using aggressive negative caching to synthesize negative answers for legitimate names and causing resolver-side denial of service. |
| Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.
new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes.
Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user. |
| XML::Sig versions before 0.71 for Perl allow signature wrapping via duplicate ID.
_get_signed_xml() in lib/XML/Sig.pm, called from verify(), resolves the SignedInfo Reference/@URI to a node with the XPath expression "//*[@ID='$id']" and returns the first node of the resulting node set. A document in which two elements share that ID value is accepted: the digest and signature are checked against whichever element comes first in document order, and the duplicate is not detected.
Such a document verifies successfully while an application that resolves the same ID independently can read the second, attacker supplied element; in a SAML2 context this places the contents of an Assertion under attacker control. |
| Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature.
_verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service.
Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected. |
| Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured.
verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors && !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;".
Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion. |
| better-auth versions greater than 1.3.34 and before 1.4.0 contain a vulnerability in the multi-session plugin's /sign-out after-hook, which trusts raw multi-session cookies and forwards extracted values to internalAdapter.deleteSessions without verifying the cookie signature (e.g., via getSignedCookie). An attacker can supply a forged _multi-* cookie to trigger deletion of arbitrary session tokens. |
| Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ueberauth guardian allows an unauthenticated attacker to revoke a victim's session with a forged token.
Guardian.revoke/3 in lib/guardian.ex decodes the supplied token with peek/1, which performs no signature verification (it only base64-decodes the JWT header and payload). The resulting unverified claims are forwarded directly to the configured token module's revoke callback and the implementation's on_revoke callback, a state-mutating sink. The sibling operations refresh/2 and exchange/4 both call decode_and_verify first, so the signature is checked before anything acts on the claims; revoke/3 is the only state-mutating path that acts on claims without verifying the signature.
An attacker who knows or guesses a victim's identifying claim values (jti, sub) can forge a JWT carrying those claims, sign it with an arbitrary key, and submit it to any endpoint that funnels a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (the standard logout / session-revocation pattern). When the token module mutates state keyed by the claims (whitelist deletion or blacklist insertion, for example a GuardianDb-style store), the victim's legitimate session is evicted. This is an unauthenticated session-revocation denial of service; the attacker never needs the signing secret.
This issue affects guardian: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.1. |
| Wazuh 5.0.0-beta1 (fixed in 5.0.0-beta3) does not validate or override the cluster_name and cluster_node fields in inventory-sync Start FlatBuffer messages, while validating only the agentid against the authenticated agent identity. This allows a low-privileged enrolled agent to spoof cluster attribution in indexed inventory and vulnerability documents by forging wazuh.cluster.name values and influencing the document _id prefix, potentially tampering with inventory records or, in shared-indexer multi-cluster deployments, poisoning another cluster's records when numeric agent IDs collide. |
| Insufficient policy enforcement in ControlledFrame in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Inappropriate implementation in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Inappropriate implementation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Inappropriate implementation in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
