| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Account users are allowed by default to register templates to be downloaded directly to the primary storage for deploying instances using the KVM hypervisor. Due to missing file name sanitization, an attacker can register malicious templates to execute arbitrary code on the KVM hosts. This can result in the compromise of resource integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service, and availability of the KVM-based infrastructure managed by CloudStack.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack versions 4.20.3.0 or 4.22.0.1, or later, which fixes this issue. |
| Prison Management System Using PHP v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the username on the Admin login page. |
| Instances deployed via the Proxmox extension allow unauthorized access to instances belonging to other tenants.
This issue affects Apache CloudStack: from 4.21.0.0 through 4.22.0.0.
The Proxmox extension for CloudStack improperly uses a user-editable instance setting, proxmox_vmid, to associate CloudStack instances with Proxmox virtual machines. Because this value is not restricted or validated against tenant ownership and Proxmox VM IDs are predictable, a non-privileged attacker can modify the setting to reference a VM belonging to another account. This allows unauthorized cross-tenant access and enables full control over the targeted VM, including starting, stopping, and destroying the virtual machine.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0.1, which fixes this issue.
As a workaround for the existing installations, editing of the proxmox_vmid instance detail by users can be prevented by adding this detail name to the global configuration parameter - user.vm.denied.details. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: verify the previous kernel's IMA buffer lies in addressable RAM
Patch series "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()", v3.
When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command
line such as "mem=<size>" we observe a pafe fault that happens.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000
RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a
#PF: error_code(0x0000) not-present page
This happens on x86_64 only, as this is already fixed in aarch64 in
commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds")
This patch (of 3):
When the second-stage kernel is booted with a limiting command line (e.g.
"mem=<size>"), the IMA measurement buffer handed over from the previous
kernel may fall outside the addressable RAM of the new kernel. Accessing
such a buffer can fault during early restore.
Introduce a small generic helper, ima_validate_range(), which verifies
that a physical [start, end] range for the previous-kernel IMA buffer lies
within addressable memory:
- On x86, use pfn_range_is_mapped().
- On OF based architectures, use page_is_ram(). |
| SOPlanning 1.52.00 is vulnerable to SQL Injection by an authenticated user via projets.php with statut[]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/smb/client: fix out-of-bounds read in cifs_sanitize_prepath
When cifs_sanitize_prepath is called with an empty string or a string
containing only delimiters (e.g., "/"), the current logic attempts to
check *(cursor2 - 1) before cursor2 has advanced. This results in an
out-of-bounds read.
This patch adds an early exit check after stripping prepended
delimiters. If no path content remains, the function returns NULL.
The bug was identified via manual audit and verified using a
standalone test case compiled with AddressSanitizer, which
triggered a SEGV on affected inputs. |
| The optional extension component TinkerpopClientService is missing the Restricted annotation with the Execute Code Required Permission in Apache NiFi 2.0.0-M1 through 2.8.0. The TinkerpopClientService supports configuration of ByteCode Submission for the Script Submission Type, enabling Groovy Script execution in the service prior to submitting the query. The missing Restricted annotation allows users without the Execute Code Permission to configure the Service in installations that use fine-grained authorization and have the optional TinkerpopClientService installed. Apache NiFi installations that do not have the nifi-other-graph-services-nar installed are not subject to this vulnerability. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.9.0 is the recommended mitigation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Flush dev-IOTLB only when PCIe device is accessible in scalable mode
Commit 4fc82cd907ac ("iommu/vt-d: Don't issue ATS Invalidation
request when device is disconnected") relies on
pci_dev_is_disconnected() to skip ATS invalidation for
safely-removed devices, but it does not cover link-down caused
by faults, which can still hard-lock the system.
For example, if a VM fails to connect to the PCIe device,
"virsh destroy" is executed to release resources and isolate
the fault, but a hard-lockup occurs while releasing the group fd.
Call Trace:
qi_submit_sync
qi_flush_dev_iotlb
intel_pasid_tear_down_entry
device_block_translation
blocking_domain_attach_dev
__iommu_attach_device
__iommu_device_set_domain
__iommu_group_set_domain_internal
iommu_detach_group
vfio_iommu_type1_detach_group
vfio_group_detach_container
vfio_group_fops_release
__fput
Although pci_device_is_present() is slower than
pci_dev_is_disconnected(), it still takes only ~70 µs on a
ConnectX-5 (8 GT/s, x2) and becomes even faster as PCIe speed
and width increase.
Besides, devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() is called only in the
paths below, which are far less frequent than memory map/unmap.
1. mm-struct release
2. {attach,release}_dev
3. set/remove PASID
4. dirty-tracking setup
The gain in system stability far outweighs the negligible cost
of using pci_device_is_present() instead of pci_dev_is_disconnected()
to decide when to skip ATS invalidation, especially under GDR
high-load conditions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: tracepoints: get correct superblock from dentry in event btrfs_sync_file()
If overlay is used on top of btrfs, dentry->d_sb translates to overlay's
super block and fsid assignment will lead to a crash.
Use file_inode(file)->i_sb to always get btrfs_sb. |
| A Command Injection issue in the payload build page in BYOB (Build Your Own Botnet) 2.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the server via a crafted build parameter. This occurs in freeze in core/generators.py. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Fix null pointer dereference issue
If SMU is disabled, during RAS initialization,
there will be null pointer dereference issue here. |
| A SSTI (server side template injection) vulnerability in the custom template export function in yeti-platform yeti before 2.1.12 allows attackers to execute code on the application server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix zero size inode with non-zero size after log replay
When logging that an inode exists, as part of logging a new name or
logging new dir entries for a directory, we always set the generation of
the logged inode item to 0. This is to signal during log replay (in
overwrite_item()), that we should not set the i_size since we only logged
that an inode exists, so the i_size of the inode in the subvolume tree
must be preserved (as when we log new names or that an inode exists, we
don't log extents).
This works fine except when we have already logged an inode in full mode
or it's the first time we are logging an inode created in a past
transaction, that inode has a new i_size of 0 and then we log a new name
for the inode (due to a new hardlink or a rename), in which case we log
an i_size of 0 for the inode and a generation of 0, which causes the log
replay code to not update the inode's i_size to 0 (in overwrite_item()).
An example scenario:
mkdir /mnt/dir
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 64K" /mnt/dir/foo
sync
xfs_io -c "truncate 0" -c "fsync" /mnt/dir/foo
ln /mnt/dir/foo /mnt/dir/bar
xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/dir
<power fail>
After log replay the file remains with a size of 64K. This is because when
we first log the inode, when we fsync file foo, we log its current i_size
of 0, and then when we create a hard link we log again the inode in exists
mode (LOG_INODE_EXISTS) but we set a generation of 0 for the inode item we
add to the log tree, so during log replay overwrite_item() sees that the
generation is 0 and i_size is 0 so we skip updating the inode's i_size
from 64K to 0.
Fix this by making sure at fill_inode_item() we always log the real
generation of the inode if it was logged in the current transaction with
the i_size we logged before. Also if an inode created in a previous
transaction is logged in exists mode only, make sure we log the i_size
stored in the inode item located from the commit root, so that if we log
multiple times that the inode exists we get the correct i_size.
A test case for fstests will follow soon. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: renesas: rz-du: mipi_dsi: fix kernel panic when rebooting for some panels
Since commit 56de5e305d4b ("clk: renesas: r9a07g044: Add MSTOP for RZ/G2L")
we may get the following kernel panic, for some panels, when rebooting:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
Call trace:
...
do_serror+0x28/0x68
el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x50
el1h_64_error+0x6c/0x70
rzg2l_mipi_dsi_host_transfer+0x114/0x458 (P)
mipi_dsi_device_transfer+0x44/0x58
mipi_dsi_dcs_set_display_off_multi+0x9c/0xc4
ili9881c_unprepare+0x38/0x88
drm_panel_unprepare+0xbc/0x108
This happens for panels that need to send MIPI-DSI commands in their
unprepare() callback. Since the MIPI-DSI interface is stopped at that
point, rzg2l_mipi_dsi_host_transfer() triggers the kernel panic.
Fix by moving rzg2l_mipi_dsi_stop() to new callback function
rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_post_disable().
With this change we now have the correct power-down/stop sequence:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
rzg2l-mipi-dsi 10850000.dsi: rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_disable(): entry
ili9881c-dsi 10850000.dsi.0: ili9881c_unprepare(): entry
rzg2l-mipi-dsi 10850000.dsi: rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_post_disable(): entry
reboot: Restarting system |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: mpu3050-core: fix pm_runtime error handling
The return value of pm_runtime_get_sync() is not checked, allowing
the driver to access hardware that may fail to resume. The device
usage count is also unconditionally incremented. Use
pm_runtime_resume_and_get() which propagates errors and avoids
incrementing the usage count on failure.
In preenable, add pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() on set_8khz_samplerate()
failure since postdisable does not run when preenable fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction abort on set received ioctl due to item overflow
If the set received ioctl fails due to an item overflow when attempting to
add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL we have to abort the transaction
since we did some metadata updates before.
This means that if a user calls this ioctl with the same received UUID
field for a lot of subvolumes, we will hit the overflow, trigger the
transaction abort and turn the filesystem into RO mode. A malicious user
could exploit this, and this ioctl does not even requires that a user
has admin privileges (CAP_SYS_ADMIN), only that he/she owns the subvolume.
Fix this by doing an early check for item overflow before starting a
transaction. This is also race safe because we are holding the subvol_sem
semaphore in exclusive (write) mode.
A test case for fstests will follow soon. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction abort on file creation due to name hash collision
If we attempt to create several files with names that result in the same
hash, we have to pack them in same dir item and that has a limit inherent
to the leaf size. However if we reach that limit, we trigger a transaction
abort and turns the filesystem into RO mode. This allows for a malicious
user to disrupt a system, without the need to have administration
privileges/capabilities.
Reproducer:
$ cat exploit-hash-collisions.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster and require fewer file
# names that result in hash collision.
mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
# List of names that result in the same crc32c hash for btrfs.
declare -a names=(
'foobar'
'%a8tYkxfGMLWRGr55QSeQc4PBNH9PCLIvR6jZnkDtUUru1t@RouaUe_L:@xGkbO3nCwvLNYeK9vhE628gss:T$yZjZ5l-Nbd6CbC$M=hqE-ujhJICXyIxBvYrIU9-TDC'
'AQci3EUB%shMsg-N%frgU:02ByLs=IPJU0OpgiWit5nexSyxZDncY6WB:=zKZuk5Zy0DD$Ua78%MelgBuMqaHGyKsJUFf9s=UW80PcJmKctb46KveLSiUtNmqrMiL9-Y0I_l5Fnam04CGIg=8@U:Z'
'CvVqJpJzueKcuA$wqwePfyu7VxuWNN3ho$p0zi2H8QFYK$7YlEqOhhb%:hHgjhIjW5vnqWHKNP4'
'ET:vk@rFU4tsvMB0$C_p=xQHaYZjvoF%-BTc%wkFW8yaDAPcCYoR%x$FH5O:'
'HwTon%v7SGSP4FE08jBwwiu5aot2CFKXHTeEAa@38fUcNGOWvE@Mz6WBeDH_VooaZ6AgsXPkVGwy9l@@ZbNXabUU9csiWrrOp0MWUdfi$EZ3w9GkIqtz7I_eOsByOkBOO'
'Ij%2VlFGXSuPvxJGf5UWy6O@1svxGha%b@=%wjkq:CIgE6u7eJOjmQY5qTtxE2Rjbis9@us'
'KBkjG5%9R8K9sOG8UTnAYjxLNAvBmvV5vz3IiZaPmKuLYO03-6asI9lJ_j4@6Xo$KZicaLWJ3Pv8XEwVeUPMwbHYWwbx0pYvNlGMO9F:ZhHAwyctnGy%_eujl%WPd4U2BI7qooOSr85J-C2V$LfY'
'NcRfDfuUQ2=zP8K3CCF5dFcpfiOm6mwenShsAb_F%n6GAGC7fT2JFFn:c35X-3aYwoq7jNX5$ZJ6hI3wnZs$7KgGi7wjulffhHNUxAT0fRRLF39vJ@NvaEMxsMO'
'Oj42AQAEzRoTxa5OuSKIr=A_lwGMy132v4g3Pdq1GvUG9874YseIFQ6QU'
'Ono7avN5GjC:_6dBJ_'
'WHmN2gnmaN-9dVDy4aWo:yNGFzz8qsJyJhWEWcud7$QzN2D9R0efIWWEdu5kwWr73NZm4=@CoCDxrrZnRITr-kGtU_cfW2:%2_am'
'WiFnuTEhAG9FEC6zopQmj-A-$LDQ0T3WULz%ox3UZAPybSV6v1Z$b4L_XBi4M4BMBtJZpz93r9xafpB77r:lbwvitWRyo$odnAUYlYMmU4RvgnNd--e=I5hiEjGLETTtaScWlQp8mYsBovZwM2k'
'XKyH=OsOAF3p%uziGF_ZVr$ivrvhVgD@1u%5RtrV-gl_vqAwHkK@x7YwlxX3qT6WKKQ%PR56NrUBU2dOAOAdzr2=5nJuKPM-T-$ZpQfCL7phxQbUcb:BZOTPaFExc-qK-gDRCDW2'
'd3uUR6OFEwZr%ns1XH_@tbxA@cCPmbBRLdyh7p6V45H$P2$F%w0RqrD3M0g8aGvWpoTFMiBdOTJXjD:JF7=h9a_43xBywYAP%r$SPZi%zDg%ql-KvkdUCtF9OLaQlxmd'
'ePTpbnit%hyNm@WELlpKzNZYOzOTf8EQ$sEfkMy1VOfIUu3coyvIr13-Y7Sv5v-Ivax2Go_GQRFMU1b3362nktT9WOJf3SpT%z8sZmM3gvYQBDgmKI%%RM-G7hyrhgYflOw%z::ZRcv5O:lDCFm'
'evqk743Y@dvZAiG5J05L_ROFV@$2%rVWJ2%3nxV72-W7$e$-SK3tuSHA2mBt$qloC5jwNx33GmQUjD%akhBPu=VJ5g$xhlZiaFtTrjeeM5x7dt4cHpX0cZkmfImndYzGmvwQG:$euFYmXn$_2rA9mKZ'
'gkgUtnihWXsZQTEkrMAWIxir09k3t7jk_IK25t1:cy1XWN0GGqC%FrySdcmU7M8MuPO_ppkLw3=Dfr0UuBAL4%GFk2$Ma10V1jDRGJje%Xx9EV2ERaWKtjpwiZwh0gCSJsj5UL7CR8RtW5opCVFKGGy8Cky'
'hNgsG_8lNRik3PvphqPm0yEH3P%%fYG:kQLY=6O-61Wa6nrV_WVGR6TLB09vHOv%g4VQRP8Gzx7VXUY1qvZyS'
'isA7JVzN12xCxVPJZ_qoLm-pTBuhjjHMvV7o=F:EaClfYNyFGlsfw-Kf%uxdqW-kwk1sPl2vhbjyHU1A6$hz'
'kiJ_fgcdZFDiOptjgH5PN9-PSyLO4fbk_:u5_2tz35lV_iXiJ6cx7pwjTtKy-XGaQ5IefmpJ4N_ZqGsqCsKuqOOBgf9LkUdffHet@Wu'
'lvwtxyhE9:%Q3UxeHiViUyNzJsy:fm38pg_b6s25JvdhOAT=1s0$pG25x=LZ2rlHTszj=gN6M4zHZYr_qrB49i=pA--@WqWLIuX7o1S_SfS@2FSiUZN'
'rC24cw3UBDZ=5qJBUMs9e$=S4Y94ni%Z8639vnrGp=0Hv4z3dNFL0fBLmQ40=EYIY:Z=SLc@QLMSt2zsss2ZXrP7j4='
'uwGl2s-fFrf@GqS=DQqq2I0LJSsOmM%xzTjS:lzXguE3wChdMoHYtLRKPvfaPOZF2fER@j53evbKa7R%A7r4%YEkD=kicJe@SFiGtXHbKe4gCgPAYbnVn'
'UG37U6KKua2bgc:IHzRs7BnB6FD:2Mt5Cc5NdlsW%$1tyvnfz7S27FvNkroXwAW:mBZLA1@qa9WnDbHCDmQmfPMC9z-Eq6QT0jhhPpqyymaD:R02ghwYo%yx7SAaaq-:x33LYpei$5g8DMl3C'
'y2vjek0FE1PDJC0qpfnN:x8k2wCFZ9xiUF2ege=JnP98R%wxjKkdfEiLWvQzmnW'
'8-HCSgH5B%K7P8_jaVtQhBXpBk:pE-$P7ts58U0J@iR9YZntMPl7j$s62yAJO@_9eanFPS54b=UTw$94C-t=HLxT8n6o9P=QnIxq-f1=Ne2dvhe6WbjEQtc'
'YPPh:IFt2mtR6XWSmjHptXL_hbSYu8bMw-JP8@PNyaFkdNFsk$M=xfL6LDKCDM-mSyGA_2MBwZ8Dr4=R1D%7-mC
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Don't log keys in SMB3 signing and encryption key generation
When KSMBD_DEBUG_AUTH logging is enabled, generate_smb3signingkey() and
generate_smb3encryptionkey() log the session, signing, encryption, and
decryption key bytes. Remove the logs to avoid exposing credentials. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nouveau/dpcd: return EBUSY for aux xfer if the device is asleep
If we have runtime suspended, and userspace wants to use /dev/drm_dp_*
then just tell it the device is busy instead of crashing in the GSP
code.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 565741 at drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/gsp/rm/r535/rpc.c:164 r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0x9a/0xb0 [nouveau]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 565741 Comm: fwupd Not tainted 6.18.10-200.fc43.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: LENOVO 20QTS0PQ00/20QTS0PQ00, BIOS N2OET65W (1.52 ) 08/05/2024
RIP: 0010:r535_gsp_msgq_wait+0x9a/0xb0 [nouveau]
This is a simple fix to get backported. We should probably engineer a
proper power domain solution to wake up devices and keep them awake
while fw updates are happening. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tcp-md5: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time
To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant
time. Use the appropriate helper function for this. |