| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_gate: snapshot parameters with RCU on replace
The gate action can be replaced while the hrtimer callback or dump path is
walking the schedule list.
Convert the parameters to an RCU-protected snapshot and swap updates under
tcf_lock, freeing the previous snapshot via call_rcu(). When REPLACE omits
the entry list, preserve the existing schedule so the effective state is
unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free
Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations
without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem.
For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this:
```
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
---- ---- ----
vidi_connection_ioctl()
if (vidi->connection) // true
drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid
...
ctx->raw_edid = drm_edid;
...
drm_mode_getconnector()
drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes()
vidi_get_modes()
if (ctx->raw_edid) // true
drm_edid_dup(ctx->raw_edid);
if (!drm_edid) // false
...
vidi_connection_ioctl()
if (vidi->connection) // false
drm_edid_free(ctx->raw_edid); // free drm_edid
...
drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid->edid)
kmemdup(edid); // UAF!!
...
```
To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related
to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx->lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix infinite loop caused by next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off reset in error paths
The problem occurs when a signed request fails smb2 signature verification
check. In __process_request(), if check_sign_req() returns an error,
set_smb2_rsp_status(work, STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) is called.
set_smb2_rsp_status() set work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off as zero. By resetting
next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off to zero, the pointer to the next command in the chain
is lost. Consequently, is_chained_smb2_message() continues to point to
the same request header instead of advancing. If the header's NextCommand
field is non-zero, the function returns true, causing __handle_ksmbd_work()
to repeatedly process the same failed request in an infinite loop.
This results in the kernel log being flooded with "bad smb2 signature"
messages and high CPU usage.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the return value from
SERVER_HANDLER_CONTINUE to SERVER_HANDLER_ABORT. This ensures that
the processing loop terminates immediately rather than attempting to
continue from an invalidated offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): unanchor URL on usb_submit_urb() error
In commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix
URB memory leak"), the URB was re-anchored before usb_submit_urb() in
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() to prevent a leak of this URB during
cleanup.
However, this patch did not take into account that usb_submit_urb() could
fail. The URB remains anchored and
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&parent->rx_submitted) in gs_can_close() loops
infinitely since the anchor list never becomes empty.
To fix the bug, unanchor the URB when an usb_submit_urb() error occurs,
also print an info message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/tctx: work around xa_store() allocation error issue
syzbot triggered the following WARN_ON:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at io_uring/tctx.c:51 __io_uring_free+0xfa/0x140 io_uring/tctx.c:51
which is the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!xa_empty(&tctx->xa));
sanity check in __io_uring_free() when a io_uring_task is going through
its final put. The syzbot test case includes injecting memory allocation
failures, and it very much looks like xa_store() can fail one of its
memory allocations and end up with ->head being non-NULL even though no
entries exist in the xarray.
Until this issue gets sorted out, work around it by attempting to
iterate entries in our xarray, and WARN_ON_ONCE() if one is found. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ad7923: Fix buffer overflow for tx_buf and ring_xfer
The AD7923 was updated to support devices with 8 channels, but the size
of tx_buf and ring_xfer was not increased accordingly, leading to a
potential buffer overflow in ad7923_update_scan_mode(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver: iio: add missing checks on iio_info's callback access
Some callbacks from iio_info structure are accessed without any check, so
if a driver doesn't implement them trying to access the corresponding
sysfs entries produce a kernel oops such as:
[ 2203.527791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 when execute
[...]
[ 2203.783416] Call trace:
[ 2203.783429] iio_read_channel_info_avail from dev_attr_show+0x18/0x48
[ 2203.789807] dev_attr_show from sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x90/0x120
[ 2203.794181] sysfs_kf_seq_show from seq_read_iter+0xd0/0x4e4
[ 2203.798555] seq_read_iter from vfs_read+0x238/0x2a0
[ 2203.802236] vfs_read from ksys_read+0xa4/0xd4
[ 2203.805385] ksys_read from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54
[ 2203.809135] Exception stack(0xe0badfa8 to 0xe0badff0)
[ 2203.812880] dfa0: 00000003 b6f10f80 00000003 b6eab000 00020000 00000000
[ 2203.819746] dfc0: 00000003 b6f10f80 7ff00000 00000003 00000003 00000000 00020000 00000000
[ 2203.826619] dfe0: b6e1bc88 bed80958 b6e1bc94 b6e1bcb0
[ 2203.830363] Code: bad PC value
[ 2203.832695] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: add nla be16/32 types to minlen array
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nla_validate_range_unsigned lib/nlattr.c:222 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nla_validate_int_range lib/nlattr.c:336 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:575 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nla_validate_parse+0x2e20/0x45c0 lib/nlattr.c:631
nla_validate_range_unsigned lib/nlattr.c:222 [inline]
nla_validate_int_range lib/nlattr.c:336 [inline]
validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:575 [inline]
...
The message in question matches this policy:
[NFTA_TARGET_REV] = NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_BE32, 255),
but because NLA_BE32 size in minlen array is 0, the validation
code will read past the malformed (too small) attribute.
Note: Other attributes, e.g. BITFIELD32, SINT, UINT.. are also missing:
those likely should be added too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
device property: fix of node refcount leak in fwnode_graph_get_next_endpoint()
The 'parent' returned by fwnode_graph_get_port_parent()
with refcount incremented when 'prev' is not NULL, it
needs be put when finish using it.
Because the parent is const, introduce a new variable to
store the returned fwnode, then put it before returning
from fwnode_graph_get_next_endpoint(). |
| Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 144.0.7559.59 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit object corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 144.0.7559.59 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Inappropriate implementation in Downloads in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 144.0.7559.59 allowed a remote attacker to bypass dangerous file type protections via a malicious file. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Incorrect security UI in Google Chrome on Android prior to 144.0.7559.59 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Incorrect security UI in Split View in Google Chrome prior to 144.0.7559.59 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Use after free in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 144.0.7559.59 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix NULL deref when deactivating inactive aggregate in qfq_reset
`qfq_class->leaf_qdisc->q.qlen > 0` does not imply that the class
itself is active.
Two qfq_class objects may point to the same leaf_qdisc. This happens
when:
1. one QFQ qdisc is attached to the dev as the root qdisc, and
2. another QFQ qdisc is temporarily referenced (e.g., via qdisc_get()
/ qdisc_put()) and is pending to be destroyed, as in function
tc_new_tfilter.
When packets are enqueued through the root QFQ qdisc, the shared
leaf_qdisc->q.qlen increases. At the same time, the second QFQ
qdisc triggers qdisc_put and qdisc_destroy: the qdisc enters
qfq_reset() with its own q->q.qlen == 0, but its class's leaf
qdisc->q.qlen > 0. Therefore, the qfq_reset would wrongly deactivate
an inactive aggregate and trigger a null-deref in qfq_deactivate_agg:
[ 0.903172] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 0.903571] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 0.903860] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 0.904177] PGD 10299b067 P4D 10299b067 PUD 10299c067 PMD 0
[ 0.904502] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 0.904737] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 135 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #2 NONE
[ 0.905157] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 0.905754] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2))
[ 0.906046] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 je 0x153
6: 48 89 70 18 mov %rsi,0x18(%rax)
a: 8b 4b 10 mov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx
d: 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx
14: 48 8b 78 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%rdi
18: 48 d3 e2 shl %cl,%rdx
1b: 48 21 f2 and %rsi,%rdx
1e: 48 2b 13 sub (%rbx),%rdx
21: 48 8b 30 mov (%rax),%rsi
24: 48 d3 ea shr %cl,%rdx
27: 8b 4b 18 mov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx
...
[ 0.907095] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 0.907368] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 0.907723] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 0.908100] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 0.908451] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000
[ 0.908804] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880
[ 0.909179] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 0.909572] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 0.909857] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[ 0.910247] PKRU: 55555554
[ 0.910391] Call Trace:
[ 0.910527] <TASK>
[ 0.910638] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1485)
[ 0.910826] qdisc_reset (include/linux/skbuff.h:2195 include/linux/skbuff.h:2501 include/linux/skbuff.h:3424 include/linux/skbuff.h:3430 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036)
[ 0.911040] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1076)
[ 0.911236] tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2447)
[ 0.911447] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958)
[ 0.911663] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6861)
[ 0.911894] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
[ 0.912100] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
[ 0.912296] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:706)
[ 0.912484] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue
skbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region,
[1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field.
[2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is
enabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace
via sock_recv_errqueue() -> put_cmsg().
The crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone()
(from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1]
2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone
[3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp
reporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr->ee from skb->cb
[4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no
usercopy whitelist [5]
When cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the
socket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb->cb
via put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation:
[ 5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_fclone_cache' (offset 296, size 16)!
[ 5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
[ 5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7
[ 5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80
[ 5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff <0f> 0b 490
[ 5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74
[ 5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0
[ 5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74
[ 5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00
[ 5.384903] FS: 0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5.384903] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 5.384903] PKRU: 55555554
[ 5.384903] Call Trace:
[ 5.384903] <TASK>
[ 5.384903] __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0
[ 5.384903] __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690
[ 5.384903] put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0
[ 5.384903] sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380
[ 5.384903] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960
[ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5.384903] ? schedule+0x6d/0x270
[ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5.384903] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[ 5.384903] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ 5.384903] ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10
[ 5.384903] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0
[ 5.384903] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40
[ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
The crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2->cb within skbuff_fclones:
- sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 -
offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 =
272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee)
This patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure.
[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491
[5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: do not write to msg_get_inq in callee
NULL pointer dereference fix.
msg_get_inq is an input field from caller to callee. Don't set it in
the callee, as the caller may not clear it on struct reuse.
This is a kernel-internal variant of msghdr only, and the only user
does reinitialize the field. So this is not critical for that reason.
But it is more robust to avoid the write, and slightly simpler code.
And it fixes a bug, see below.
Callers set msg_get_inq to request the input queue length to be
returned in msg_inq. This is equivalent to but independent from the
SO_INQ request to return that same info as a cmsg (tp->recvmsg_inq).
To reduce branching in the hot path the second also sets the msg_inq.
That is WAI.
This is a fix to commit 4d1442979e4a ("af_unix: don't post cmsg for
SO_INQ unless explicitly asked for"), which fixed the inverse.
Also avoid NULL pointer dereference in unix_stream_read_generic if
state->msg is NULL and msg->msg_get_inq is written. A NULL state->msg
can happen when splicing as of commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix:
implement splice for stream af_unix sockets").
Also collapse two branches using a bitwise or. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec
Commit efa56305908b ("nvmet-tcp: Fix a kernel panic when host sends an invalid H2C PDU length")
added ttag bounds checking and data_offset
validation in nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(), but it did not validate
whether the command's data structures (cmd->req.sg and cmd->iov) have
been properly initialized before processing H2C_DATA PDUs.
The nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() function dereferences these pointers
without NULL checks. This can be triggered by sending H2C_DATA PDU
immediately after the ICREQ/ICRESP handshake, before
sending a CONNECT command or NVMe write command.
Attack vectors that trigger NULL pointer dereferences:
1. H2C_DATA PDU sent before CONNECT → both pointers NULL
2. H2C_DATA PDU for READ command → cmd->req.sg allocated, cmd->iov NULL
3. H2C_DATA PDU for uninitialized command slot → both pointers NULL
The fix validates both cmd->req.sg and cmd->iov before calling
nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(). Both checks are required because:
- Uninitialized commands: both NULL
- READ commands: cmd->req.sg allocated, cmd->iov NULL
- WRITE commands: both allocated |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix crash on profile change rollback failure
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile can fail to attach a new profile and can
fail to rollback to old profile, in such case, we could end up with a
dangling netdev with a fully reset netdev_priv. A retry to change
profile, e.g. another attempt to call mlx5e_netdev_change_profile via
switchdev mode change, will crash trying to access the now NULL
priv->mdev.
This fix allows mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() to handle previous
failures and an empty priv, by not assuming priv is valid.
Pass netdev and mdev to all flows requiring
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() and avoid passing priv.
In mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() check if current priv is valid, and if
not, just attach the new profile without trying to access the old one.
This fixes the following oops, when enabling switchdev mode for the 2nd
time after first time failure:
## Enabling switchdev mode first time:
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
^^^^^^^^
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
## retry: Enabling switchdev mode 2nd time:
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #91 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x3c/0x90
Code: 50 00 00 f0 80 4f 78 02 48 8b bf e8 07 00 00 48 85 ff 74 16 48 8b 73 78 48 d1 ee 83 e6 01 83 f6 01 40 0f b6 f6 e8 c4 42 00 00 <48> 8b 45 38 48 85 c0 74 08 48 89 df e8 cc 47 40 1e 48 8b bb f0 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000673890 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881036a89c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888113f63800 RSI: ffffffff822fe720 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000002dcd R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900006738e8 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881036a89c0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fdfb8384740(0000) GS:ffff88856a9d6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000112ae0005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x45/0xb0
mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x27b/0x2d0
mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x72/0xf0
esw_offloads_enable+0x5d0/0x970
mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x349/0x430
? is_mp_supported+0x57/0xb0
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x26b/0x430
devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x6f/0xf0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140
genl_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x290
? __pfx_devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_devlink_nl_post_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x52/0x100
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x282/0x3e0
? __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x190
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
__sys_sendto+0x213/0x220
? __sys_recvmsg+0x6a/0xd0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfb8495047 |