| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the migration helper functions `DownloadFile` and `DownloadFileWithHeaders` in `pkg/modules/migration/helpers.go` make arbitrary HTTP GET requests without any SSRF protection. When a user triggers a Todoist or Trello migration, file attachment URLs from the third-party API response are passed directly to these functions, allowing an attacker to force the Vikunja server to fetch internal network resources and return the response as a downloadable task attachment. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, when the Vikunja API returns tasks, it populates the `related_tasks` field with full task objects for all related tasks without checking whether the requesting user has read permission on those tasks' projects. An authenticated user who can read a task that has cross-project relations will receive full details (title, description, due dates, priority, percent completion, project ID, etc.) of tasks in projects they have no access to. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `GET /api/v1/projects/:project/webhooks` endpoint returns webhook BasicAuth credentials (`basic_auth_user` and `basic_auth_password`) in plaintext to any user with read access to the project. While the existing code correctly masks the HMAC `secret` field, the BasicAuth fields added in a later migration were not given the same treatment. This allows read-only collaborators to steal credentials intended for authenticating against external webhook receivers. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, `TaskAttachment.ReadOne()` queries attachments by ID only (`WHERE id = ?`), ignoring the task ID from the URL path. The permission check in `CanRead()` validates access to the task specified in the URL, but `ReadOne()` loads a different attachment that may belong to a task in another project. This allows any authenticated user to download or delete any attachment in the system by providing their own accessible task ID with a target attachment ID. Attachment IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.2, the `LinkSharing.ReadAll()` method allows link share authenticated users to list all link shares for a project, including their secret hashes. While `LinkSharing.CanRead()` correctly blocks link share users from reading individual shares via `ReadOne`, the `ReadAllWeb` handler bypasses this check by never calling `CanRead()`. An attacker with a read-only link share can retrieve hashes for write or admin link shares on the same project and authenticate with them, escalating to full admin access. Version 2.2.2 patches the issue. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/shares/:share` endpoint does not verify that the link share belongs to the project specified in the URL. An attacker with admin access to any project can delete link shares from other projects by providing their own project ID combined with the target share ID. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue. |
| LoLLMs WEBUI provides the Web user interface for Lord of Large Language and Multi modal Systems. A critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in all known existing versions of `lollms-webui`. The `@router.post("/api/proxy")` endpoint allows unauthenticated attackers to force the server into making arbitrary GET requests. This can be exploited to access internal services, scan local networks, or exfiltrate sensitive cloud metadata (e.g., AWS/GCP IAM tokens). As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available. |
| Vulnerable endpoints accept user-controlled input through a URL in JSON format which enables command execution. The commands allowed to execute can open executables. However, the commands cannot pass parameters or arguments.
To successfully execute this attack, the attacker needs to be on the same network. |
| Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). From version 5.3.0 to before version 5.9.14, an authenticated control panel user with only accessCp can move entries across sections via POST /actions/entries/move-to-section, even when they do not have saveEntries:{sectionUid} permission for either source or destination section. This issue has been patched in version 5.9.14. |
| Wallos is an open-source, self-hostable personal subscription tracker. Prior to version 4.7.0, Wallos endpoints/logos/search.php accepts HTTP_PROXY and HTTPS_PROXY environment variables without validation, enabling SSRF via proxy hijacking. The server performs DNS resolution on user-supplied search terms, which can be controlled by attackers to trigger outbound requests to arbitrary domains. This issue has been patched in version 4.7.0. |
| Wallos is an open-source, self-hostable personal subscription tracker. Prior to version 4.7.0, the SSRF fix applied in version 4.6.2 for CVE-2026-30839 and CVE-2026-30840 is incomplete. The validate_webhook_url_for_ssrf() protection was added to the test* notification endpoints but not to the corresponding save* endpoints. An authenticated user can save an internal/private IP address as a notification URL, and when the cron job sendnotifications.php executes, the request is sent to the internal IP without any SSRF validation. This issue has been patched in version 4.7.0. |
| Wallos is an open-source, self-hostable personal subscription tracker. Prior to version 4.7.0, a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the payment method rename endpoint allows any authenticated user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when any user visits the Settings, Subscriptions, or Statistics pages. Combined with the wallos_login authentication cookie lacking the HttpOnly flag, this enables full session hijacking. This issue has been patched in version 4.7.0. |
| Wallos is an open-source, self-hostable personal subscription tracker. Prior to version 4.7.0, the patch introduced in commit e8a513591 (CVE-2026-30840) added SSRF protection to notification test endpoints but left three additional attack surfaces unprotected: the AI Ollama host parameter, the AI recommendations endpoint, and the notification cron job. An authenticated user can reach internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure IMDS), or localhost-bound services by supplying a crafted URL to any of these endpoints. This issue has been patched in version 4.7.0. |
| IDrive’s id_service.exe process runs with elevated privileges and regularly reads from several files under the C:\ProgramData\IDrive\ directory. The UTF16-LE encoded contents of these files are used as arguments for starting a process, but they can be edited by any standard user logged into the system. An attacker can overwrite or edit the files to specify a path to an arbitrary executable, which will then be executed by the id_service.exe process with SYSTEM privileges. |
| Wallos is an open-source, self-hostable personal subscription tracker. Prior to version 4.7.2, password reset tokens in Wallos never expire. The password_resets table includes a created_at timestamp column, but the token validation logic never checks it. A password reset token remains valid indefinitely until it is used, allowing an attacker who intercepts a reset link at any point to use it days, weeks, or months later. This issue has been patched in version 4.7.2. |
| A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Pharos Controls Mosaic Show Controller firmware version 2.15.3 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. |
| For performance reasons Zabbix Server/Proxy reuses JavaScript (Duktape) contexts (used in script items, JavaScript reprocessing, Webhooks). This can lead to confidentiality loss where a regular (non-super) Zabbix administrator leaks data for hosts they do not have access to. A fix has been released that makes the built in Zabbix JavaScript objects read-only, but please be advised that usage of global JavaScript variables is not recommended because their content could be leaked. More information <a href='https://www.zabbix.com/documentation/7.4/en/manual/installation/known_issues#preprocessing-global-variables-are-unsafe'>in Zabbix documentation</a>. |
| Graphiti is a framework that sits on top of models and exposes them via a JSON:API-compliant interface. Versions prior to 1.10.2 have an arbitrary method execution vulnerability that affects Graphiti's JSONAPI write functionality. An attacker can craft a malicious JSONAPI payload with arbitrary relationship names to invoke any public method on the underlying model instance, class or its associations. Any application exposing Graphiti write endpoints (create/update/delete) to untrusted users is affected. The `Graphiti::Util::ValidationResponse#all_valid?` method recursively calls `model.send(name)` using relationship names taken directly from user-supplied JSONAPI payloads, without validating them against the resource's configured sideloads. This allows an attacker to potentially run any public method on a given model instance, on the instance class or associated instances or classes, including destructive operations. This is patched in Graphiti v1.10.2. Users should upgrade as soon as possible. Some workarounds are available. Ensure Graphiti write endpoints (create/update) are not accessible to untrusted users and/or apply strong authentication and authorization checks before any write operation is processed, for example use Rails strong parameters to ensure only valid parameters are processed. |
| WPGraphQL provides a GraphQL API for WordPress sites. Prior to version 2.10.0, an authorization flaw in updateComment allows an authenticated low-privileged user (including a custom role with zero capabilities) to change moderation status of their own comment (for example to APPROVE) without the moderate_comments capability. This can bypass moderation workflows and let untrusted users self-approve content. Version 2.10.0 contains a patch.
### Details
In WPGraphQL 2.9.1 (tested), authorization for updateComment is owner-based, not field-based:
- plugins/wp-graphql/src/Mutation/CommentUpdate.php:92 allows moderators.
- plugins/wp-graphql/src/Mutation/CommentUpdate.php:99:99 also allows the comment owner, even if they lack moderation capability.
- plugins/wp-graphql/src/Data/CommentMutation.php:94:94 maps GraphQL input status directly to WordPress comment_approved.
- plugins/wp-graphql/src/Mutation/CommentUpdate.php:120:120 persists that value via wp_update_comment.
- plugins/wp-graphql/src/Type/Enum/CommentStatusEnum.php:22:22 exposes moderation states (APPROVE, HOLD, SPAM, TRASH).
This means a non-moderator owner can submit status during update and transition moderation state.
### PoC
Tested in local wp-env (Docker) with WPGraphQL 2.9.1.
1. Start environment:
npm install
npm run wp-env start
2. Run this PoC:
```
npm run wp-env run cli -- wp eval '
add_role("no_caps","No Caps",[]);
$user_id = username_exists("poc_nocaps");
if ( ! $user_id ) {
$user_id = wp_create_user("poc_nocaps","Passw0rd!","poc_nocaps@example.com");
}
$user = get_user_by("id",$user_id);
$user->set_role("no_caps");
$post_id = wp_insert_post([
"post_title" => "PoC post",
"post_status" => "publish",
"post_type" => "post",
"comment_status" => "open",
]);
$comment_id = wp_insert_comment([
"comment_post_ID" => $post_id,
"comment_content" => "pending comment",
"user_id" => $user_id,
"comment_author" => $user->display_name,
"comment_author_email" => $user->user_email,
"comment_approved" => "0",
]);
wp_set_current_user($user_id);
$result = graphql([
"query" => "mutation U(\$id:ID!){ updateComment(input:{id:\$id,status:APPROVE}){ success comment{ databaseId status } } }",
"variables" => [ "id" => (string)$comment_id ],
]);
echo wp_json_encode([
"role_caps" => array_keys(array_filter((array)$user->allcaps)),
"status" => $result["data"]["updateComment"]["comment"]["status"] ?? null,
"db_comment_approved" => get_comment($comment_id)->comment_approved ?? null,
"comment_id" => $comment_id
]);
'
```
3. Observe result:
- role_caps is empty (or no moderate_comments)
- mutation returns status: APPROVE
- DB value becomes comment_approved = 1
### Impact
This is an authorization bypass / broken access control issue in comment moderation state transitions. Any deployment using WPGraphQL comment mutations where low-privileged users can make comments is impacted. Moderation policy can be bypassed by self-approving content. |
