| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies
mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed
MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without
checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback
can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the
reply.
Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial
replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized
reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of
overwriting st->buf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: adis16260: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it
as a divisor. A user writing zero to the sampling_frequency sysfs
attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: nxp-sar-adc: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it
as a divisor. A user writing zero or a negative value to the
sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the
kernel.
Also prevent unsigned integer underflow when the computed cycle count is
smaller than NXP_SAR_ADC_CONV_TIME, which would wrap the u32 inpsamp to
a huge value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from PSC buffer
Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from the guest-accessible
Page State Change buffer to defend against TOCTOU bugs.
Don't bother with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for cases where KVM is writing
(and not consuming the result!), as the guest isn't supposed to touch the
buffer while it's being processed. I.e. using READ_ONCE() is all about
protecting against misbehaving guests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Check PSC request indices against the actual size of the buffer
When processing Page State Change (PSC) requests, validate the PSC buffer
against the effective size of the scratch area, which could be less than
the maximum size if the guest provided a pointer that isn't exactly at the
start of the GHCB shared buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor
ZCR_EL2 can be updated by a VHE guest hypervisor either using ZCR_EL2
(which traps) or ZCR_EL1 (which does not trap). KVM handles both in
different way:
- on ZCR_EL2 trap, ZCR_EL2.LEN is immediately capped at the VM's own
VL limit. This has the potential to break existing SW that relies
on the full LEN field to be stateful.
- on ZCR_EL1 access, we do absolutely nothing.
On restoring the SVE context for an L2 guest, we directly restore the
guest hypervisor's view of ZCR_EL2 into the physical ZCR_EL2. If the
guest's view of the register was updated using the ZCR_EL2 accessor,
the value has already been sanitised (with the caveat mentioned above).
But if the guest used ZCR_EL1, the raw value is written into the HW,
and the L2 guest can now access VLs that it shouldn't.
Fix all the above by moving the VL capping to the restore points,
ensuring that:
- the HW is always programmed with a capped value, irrespective of
the accessor being used,
- the ZCR_EL2.LEN field is always completely stateful, irrespective
of the accessor being used.
Additionally, move ZCR_EL2 to be a sanitised register, ensuring that
only the LEN field is actually stateful. This requires some creative
construction of the RES0 mask, as the sysreg generation script does
not yet generate RAZ/WI fields.
[maz: rewrote commit message, tidy up access_zcr_el2()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: fix UAF in iso_recv_frame
iso_recv_frame reads conn->sk under iso_conn_lock but releases the lock
before using sk, with no reference held. A concurrent iso_sock_kill()
can free sk in that window, causing use-after-free on sk->sk_state and
sock_queue_rcv_skb().
Fix by replacing the bare pointer read with iso_sock_hold(conn), which
calls sock_hold() while the spinlock is held, atomically elevating the
refcount before the lock drops. Add a drop_put label so sock_put() is
called on all exit paths where the hold succeeded. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE
When SEAL_EXEC is added, SEAL_WRITE is implied to make W^X. But the
implied seal is set after the check that makes sure the memfd can not have
any writable mappings. This means one can use SEAL_EXEC to apply
SEAL_WRITE while having writeable mappings.
This breaks the contract that SEAL_WRITE provides and can be used by an
attacker to pass a memfd that appears to be write sealed but can still be
modified arbitrarily.
Fix this by adding the implied seals before the call for
mapping_deny_writable() is done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm/tcpci_maxim: validate header NDO against RX_BYTE_CNT
A broken/malicious port can transmit a CRC-valid frame whose header
advertises up to seven data objects but whose body carries fewer than
that. Check for this, and rightfully reject the message, instead of
reading from uninitialized stack memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: wcove: don't write past struct pd_message in wcove_read_rx_buffer()
wcove_read_rx_buffer() copies the PD RX FIFO into the caller's
struct pd_message with
for (i = 0; i < USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES(info); i++)
regmap_read(wcove->regmap, USBC_RX_DATA + i, msg + i);
which has two problems:
USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES() is a 5-bit field (max 31) while struct pd_message
is 30 bytes (__le16 header + __le32 payload[PD_MAX_PAYLOAD], packed).
The byte count latched in RXINFO is the number of bytes the port partner
put on the wire, so a malicious partner that transmits a 31-byte frame
can drive the loop one byte past the destination if the WCOVE BMC
receiver does not enforce the PD object-count limit in hardware. The
existing FIXME flagged this as unverified.
Independently, regmap_read() takes an unsigned int * and stores a full
unsigned int at the destination. Passing the byte pointer msg + i means
each iteration writes four bytes; the high three are zero (val_bits is
8) and are normally overwritten by the next iteration, but the final
iteration's high bytes are not. With RXBYTES == 30 the i == 29 iteration
already writes three zero bytes past msg, which sits on the IRQ thread's
stack in wcove_typec_irq().
Clamp the loop to sizeof(struct pd_message) and read each register into
a local before storing only its low byte, so the copy can never exceed
the destination regardless of what RXINFO reports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: adis16550: fix stack leak in trigger handler
adis16550_trigger_handler() declares the scan data array on the stack
without initializing it. The memcpy() at the bottom fills only the
first 28 bytes (TEMP + 6 channels of GYRO/ACCEL data), and
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() writes the s64 timestamp at the
8-byte-aligned offset 32. Bytes 28-31 remain uninitialized stack data
which leaks to userspace on ever trigger.
Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix stack leak in tagged FIFO buffer
The tagged FIFO path declares iio_buff on the stack with __aligned(8)
but no initializer, but there is a hole in the structure, which will
then leak to userspace as ST_LSM6DSX_SAMPLE_SIZE bytes (6) will be
copied, but the space between that and the timestamp are not
initialized.
Commit c14edb4d0bdc ("iio:imu:st_lsm6dsx Fix alignment and data leak
issues") moved the untagged FIFO path to a kzalloc'd buffer in hw->scan,
but for the tagged path it only added the alignment qualifier and not
the initializer :(
Fix this by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_select_path()
Found while auditing the same pattern Sashiko reported in
rt6_fill_node() [1]. Apply the same fix as
commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()").
Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&first->fib6_siblings)
without waiting for RCU readers; first->fib6_siblings.next then
still points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never
reaches &first->fib6_siblings as its terminator. fib6_purge_rt()
always WRITE_ONCE()s first->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before
list_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in rt6_fill_node()
Sashiko reported this issue [1]. Apply the same fix as
commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()").
Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings)
without waiting for RCU readers; rt->fib6_siblings.next then still
points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches
&rt->fib6_siblings, causing a CPU stall. fib6_del_route() always
WRITE_ONCE()s rt->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an
inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: bind uarg before filling zerocopy skb
virtio_transport_send_pkt_info() allocates or reuses the zerocopy uarg
before entering the send loop, but virtio_transport_alloc_skb() still
fills the skb before it inherits that uarg. When fixed-buffer vectored
zerocopy hits MAX_SKB_FRAGS, io_sg_from_iter() may partially attach
managed frags and return -EMSGSIZE. The rollback path call kfree_skb()
to free an skb that carries SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS but no uarg, so
skb_release_data() falls through to ordinary frag unref.
Pass the uarg into virtio_transport_alloc_skb() and bind it immediately
before virtio_transport_fill_skb(). This keeps control or no-payload skbs
untouched while ensuring success and rollback share one lifetime rule. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff
sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while
waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this
window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via
getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After
re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns
success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses
the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user().
Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf()
already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while
we slept. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE during device close
Since hci_dev_close_sync() can now be called during the reset path, we
should also set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE. This avoids queuing timeouts
while the hdev workqueue is being drained. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan->ident on ECRED reconfiguration success
l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing
chan->ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp,
l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan->ident after a
successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent
responses with the recycled ident value.
A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can
replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to
match and destroy the already-established channel via
l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET).
Clear chan->ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the
failure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with
other L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_mirred: Fix blockcast recursion bypass leading to stack overflow
tcf_mirred_act() checks sched_mirred_nest against MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT (4)
to prevent deep recursion. However, when the action uses blockcast
(tcfm_blockid != 0), the function returns at the tcf_blockcast() call
BEFORE reaching the counter increment. As a result, the recursion
counter never advances and the limit check is entirely bypassed.
When two devices share a TC egress block with a mirred blockcast rule,
a packet egressing on device A is mirrored to device B via blockcast;
device B's egress TC re-enters tcf_mirred_act() via blockcast and
mirrors back to A, creating an unbounded recursion loop:
tcf_mirred_act -> tcf_blockcast -> tcf_mirred_to_dev -> dev_queue_xmit
-> sch_handle_egress -> tcf_classify -> tcf_mirred_act -> (repeat)
This recursion continues until the kernel stack overflows.
The bug is reachable from an unprivileged user via
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET): user namespaces grant
CAP_NET_ADMIN in the new network namespace, which is sufficient to
create dummy devices, attach clsact qdiscs with shared blocks, and
install mirred blockcast filters.
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc90000b7fff8
Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 2 UID: 1000 PID: 169 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-next-20260410
RIP: 0010:xas_find+0x17/0x480
Call Trace:
xa_find+0x17b/0x1d0
tcf_mirred_act+0x640/0x1060
tcf_action_exec+0x400/0x530
basic_classify+0x128/0x1d0
tcf_classify+0xd83/0x1150
tc_run+0x328/0x620
__dev_queue_xmit+0x797/0x3100
tcf_mirred_to_dev+0x7b1/0xf70
tcf_mirred_act+0x68a/0x1060
[repeating ~30+ times until stack overflow]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Fix this by incrementing sched_mirred_nest before calling
tcf_blockcast() and decrementing it on return, mirroring the
non-blockcast path. This ensures subsequent recursive entries see the
updated counter and are correctly limited by MIRRED_NEST_LIMIT. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix ethx:ingress -> ethy:egress -> ethx:ingress mirred loop
When mirred redirects to ingress (from either ingress or egress) the loop
state from sched_mirred_dev array dev is lost because of 1) the packet
deferral into the backlog and 2) the fact the sched_mirred_dev array is
cleared. In such cases, if there was a loop we won't discover it.
Here's a simple test to reproduce:
ip a add dev port0 10.10.10.11/24
tc qdisc add dev port0 clsact
tc filter add dev port0 egress protocol ip \
prio 10 matchall action mirred ingress redirect dev port1
tc qdisc add dev port1 clsact
tc filter add dev port1 ingress protocol ip \
prio 10 matchall action mirred egress redirect dev port0
ping -c 1 -W0.01 10.10.10.10 |
