| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: move quota_init qc iterator increment
Move qc++ from the loop body into the for-loop increment
expression in gfs2_quota_init().
This keeps iterator progression explicit and avoids mixing pointer
advance with duplicate-slot handling in the loop body. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: handle nogenerate/noverify properly in fs-integrity
Check the BIP_CHECK flags before generating or verifying PI information,
otherwise this can be incorrectly called for non-PI metadata and
cause generation of incorrect metadata and crashed in the verification
handler.
The new behavior matches that of the block layer auto-generated
metadata. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/irq: Fix missing r2 clobber in PCREL inline assembly
In CONFIG_PPC_KERNEL_PCREL mode, r2 is no longer reserved for the TOC
pointer and is available as a caller-saved register [0].
Both call_do_irq() and call_do_softirq() use inline assembly to call
functions with stack switching, but fail to list r2 in their clobber
lists. This causes the compiler to assume r2 is preserved across these
calls, leading to register corruption when the called functions
(__do_irq and __do_softirq) clobber r2.
As a result of this kernel crash during interrupt handling is seen and
the kernel fails to boot:
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc000000404697638
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000181ec
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
NIP [c0000000000181ec] __do_IRQ+0x6c/0xc0
With older GCC, the compiler would conservatively allocate
callee-saved registers (like r31) for values spanning function calls,
accidentally avoiding the bug:
<__do_IRQ>:
00 00 00 60 nop
a6 02 08 7c mflr r0
f8 ff e1 fb std r31,-8(r1)
f0 ff c1 fb std r30,-16(r1)
2d 03 10 06 pla r31,53297316
...
3d e8 ff 4b bl c0000000000165ac <__do_irq>
00 00 21 e8 ld r1,0(r1)
28 00 4d e9 ld r10,40(r13)
40 00 21 38 addi r1,r1,64
2a f9 aa 7f stdx r29,r10,r31
With newer GCC 14, the compiler uses r2 for such values, exposing the
missing clobber specification:
<__do_IRQ>:
00 00 00 60 nop
a6 02 08 7c mflr r0
f0 ff c1 fb std r30,-16(r1)
f8 ff e1 fb std r31,-8(r1)
29 02 10 06 pla r2,36252592 # c0000000022aadc0 <__irq_regs>
...
85 dc ff 4b bl c000000000015ee0 <__do_irq>
00 00 21 e8 ld r1,0(r1)
28 00 2d e9 ld r9,40(r13)
30 00 21 38 addi r1,r1,48
2a 11 c9 7f stdx r30,r9,r2
Fix this by adding r2 to the clobber list for both call_do_irq() and
call_do_softirq() when CONFIG_PPC_KERNEL_PCREL is enabled.
[0]: https://www.mail-archive.com/gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org/msg313226.html |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/pt: Fix stop/start with no update
If pt_event_stop() is called without PERF_EF_UPDATE flag, then
perf_aux_output_end() is not called. A subsequent call to pt_event_start()
will call perf_aux_output_begin() again which violates the rule against
nesting and triggers a WARNING in perf_aux_output_begin().
Originally, pt_event_stop() was never called without PERF_EF_UPDATE,
because the only code paths to do so are from event overflow, and Intel PT
does not do that.
However the introduction of group throttling by commit 9734e25fbf5ae
("perf: Fix the throttle logic for a group") meant that an Intel PT event
could be throttled if it was part of a group. Throttling calls PMU
->stop() / ->start() callbacks without flags.
An example is when AUX area sampling is used. The following commands
hit the issue:
echo 10000 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate
perf record -F32000 --aux-sample -e '{intel_pt//u,cycles:u}' \
-- bash -c 'for i in `seq 1 100000` ; do true ; done'
Use PERF_HES_UPTODATE to track whether perf_aux_output_begin() and
perf_aux_output_end() are balanced. A cleared PERF_HES_UPTODATE bit
indicates that an AUX output context is still open.
Amend pt_event_start() / pt_event_stop() accordingly so that begin/end
stay balanced:
- In non-snapshot mode, stop() always closes the buffer (the buffer may
have run out of space, and that accounting is done by the update), so
a following start() opens a fresh one as before.
- In snapshot/overwrite mode, stop() without PERF_EF_UPDATE leaves the
buffer open so that pt_event_snapshot_aux() can still copy from it,
and start() then only re-enables tracing instead of calling
perf_aux_output_begin() again.
Note that pt_event_del() calls pt_event_stop() with PERF_EF_UPDATE flag set
(as is required by the documentation), so a final call to
perf_aux_output_end() is assured. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: policy_int make sure list heads are initialized before fail path
If profile create fails before policy_init is complete the list heads
are not properly initialized causing profile_free() sanity checks to
trigger the following splat.
AppArmor WARN aa_policy_destroy: (((!list_empty(&policy->profiles) && (&policy->profiles)->prev != ((void *) 0x122 + (0xdead000000000000UL))))):
WARNING: security/apparmor/lib.c:509 at aa_policy_destroy+0x164/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5541
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5541 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:aa_policy_destroy+0x16b/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509
Code: 85 ed 7e 4d e8 96 bc 37 fd 5b 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 19 27 4e 07 cc e8 83 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d 0c f0 d3 0b 48 c7 c6 a4 eb 38 8e <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 04 ff ff ff e8 66 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d ff ef d3 0b
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000345eaa0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff848f530d RBX: ffff88803f734800 RCX: ffff88801af2a580
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e38eba4 RDI: ffffffff90634320
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000cc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d95913 R12: dead000000000122
R13: ffff88803f734800 R14: ffff88803f734828 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f5f6a1836c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c519000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055d02407b048 CR3: 0000000012aa9000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
aa_free_profile+0x9d/0x9f0 security/apparmor/policy.c:334
aa_alloc_profile+0x1e4/0x3e0 security/apparmor/policy.c:416
unpack_profile security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1153 [inline]
aa_unpack+0x17db/0x7430 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1748
aa_replace_profiles+0x226/0x2a20 security/apparmor/policy.c:1183
policy_update+0x234/0x4a0 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:505
profile_load+0x1cb/0x320 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:522
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_write+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5f6939e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f5f6a183028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5f69625fa0 RCX: 00007f5f6939e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000200000000400 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5f6a183090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007f5f69626038 R14: 00007f5f69625fa0 R15: 00007ffe23725c18 |
| When implementing the JavaScript interface, Foxit PDF Editor/Reader did not perform the attribute authorization checks required by the specification. As a result, a trusted malicious PDF could potentially access sensitive content from other documents within the same process and transmit it externally. |
| Dark Reader is an accessibility browser extension that makes web pages colors dark. Prior to 4.9.126, a website can cause the browser extension's image inversion pipeline to request an unauthenticated icon-like bitmap from a locally running web server when the resource uses a known public-like HTTPS URL and is detected as requiring inversion. This behavior can cross the website-to-local-network boundary and disclose limited information associated with the requested resource. The darkreader npm package used for website integration is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.9.126 for Firefox and version 4.9.128 for other browsers. |
| The Z80Ultra (NX741J) product contains a vulnerability where non-privileged programs can retrieve the Wi-Fi MAC address by querying the read-only field factory_mac_address in the Settings.Secure database. |
| In multiple locations, there is a possible use-after-free due to improper locking. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, s390: Clear fetch destination on faulting arena atomic
Same missing register clear as on riscv64. A RMW atomic on an arena pointer
is converted to BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC and gets an exception table entry, but
bpf_jit_probe_atomic_pre() only fills in the arena base and the probe
offset, leaving probe->reg at the -1 that bpf_jit_probe_init() set, which
bpf_jit_probe_post() writes into the entry and ex_handler_bpf() then reads
back as "there is nothing to clear".
That is right for a plain BPF_{ADD,AND,OR,XOR}, which only writes memory,
but an RMW carrying BPF_FETCH also reads the old value into a register:
src_reg for BPF_{ADD,AND,OR,XOR} | BPF_FETCH and BPF_XCHG, and r0 for
BPF_CMPXCHG. So on a fault over an unmapped arena page the program resumes
at the landing pad with whatever that register held before the atomic
instead of the 0 that every other BPF_PROBE_* access delivers.
Fill probe->reg in from bpf_atomic_load_reg(). Unlike x86-64 and arm64,
s390x does not report arena violations from its exception handler, so there
is no access direction to correct here, only the missing register clear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: avoid force-completing uninitialized UVD rings
uvd_v7_0_sw_init() does not initialize the UVD decode ring for an
SR-IOV VF. However, amdgpu_uvd_resume() unconditionally force-completes
the decode ring when restoring its fence sequence.
Skip fence completion when the fence driver is not initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: Drop tt->restore after successful restore
ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() can successfully complete the restore
process via ttm_pool_restore_commit(), but tt->restore is not dropped
afterward. As a result, subsequent backup/restore flows observe what
appears to be a completed restore, while in reality shmem handles are
still installed in tt->pages, leading to the stack trace below.
Fix this by freeing and dropping tt->restore in
ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() upon successful completion of the restore.
20545 [ 309.784531] RIP: 0010:sg_alloc_append_table_from_pages+0x38c/0x490
20547 [ 309.809570] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000623b838 EFLAGS: 00010206
20548 [ 309.814827] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: ffff88816e42a160 RCX: 0000000000000000
20549 [ 309.821986] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000001000
20550 [ 309.829147] RBP: ffff88816e42a168 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000007ffff000
20551 [ 309.836310] R10: ffffc9000623b928 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000007ffff000
20552 [ 309.843471] R13: ffff88815ba5a100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
20553 [ 309.850634] FS: 00007f9ff305e700(0000) GS:ffff888276c94000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
20554 [ 309.858749] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
20555 [ 309.864519] CR2: 00007f9fca701000 CR3: 00000001565e2005 CR4: 0000000008f70ef0
20556 [ 309.871678] PKRU: 55555558
20557 [ 309.874403] Call Trace:
20558 [ 309.876866] <TASK>
20559 [ 309.878988] sg_alloc_table_from_pages_segment+0x60/0x100
20560 [ 309.884415] ? ttm_resource_manager_usage+0x36/0x60 [ttm]
20561 [ 309.889845] ? xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe]
20562 [ 309.894045] xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe]
20563 [ 309.898037] xe_bo_move+0x927/0xaa0 [xe]
20564 [ 309.902029] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xba/0x170 [ttm]
20565 [ 309.907022] ttm_bo_validate+0xbe/0x190 [ttm]
20566 [ 309.911405] xe_bo_validate+0x9a/0x120 [xe]
20567 [ 309.915663] xe_gpuvm_validate+0xd9/0x140 [xe]
20568 [ 309.920206] drm_gpuvm_validate+0x2f0/0x5b0 [drm_gpuvm]
20569 [ 309.925459] ? drm_exec_lock_obj+0x63/0x210 [drm_exec]
20570 [ 309.930627] xe_vm_validate_rebind+0x46/0xb0 [xe]
20571 [ 309.935428] xe_exec_fn+0x20/0x40 [xe]
20572 [ 309.939249] drm_gpuvm_exec_lock+0x78/0xc0 [drm_gpuvm]
20573 [ 309.944410] xe_validation_exec_lock+0x5a/0xa0 [xe]
20574 [ 309.949385] xe_exec_ioctl+0x806/0xc30 [xe]
20575 [ 309.953639] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xd9/0xf0
20576 [ 309.957935] ? __pfx_xe_exec_fn+0x10/0x10 [xe]
20577 [ 309.962449] ? __wake_up_common+0x73/0xa0
20578 [ 309.966482] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe]
20579 [ 309.971263] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa3/0x100
20580 [ 309.975209] drm_ioctl+0x213/0x440
20581 [ 309.978637] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe]
20582 [ 309.983415] xe_drm_ioctl+0x67/0xd0 [xe]
20583 [ 309.987408] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci: bail out of setup if the controller is inaccessible
xhci_gen_setup() locates the operational registers using the capability
length read from the very first register:
xhci->op_regs = hcd->regs +
HC_LENGTH(readl(&xhci->cap_regs->hc_capbase));
If the controller is dead or has dropped off the bus, that read returns
~0, HC_LENGTH() truncates it to 0xff, and op_regs ends up 0xff bytes
past the page-aligned MMIO base, i.e. unaligned. The first access
through it, xhci_halt() -> xhci_handshake() reading op_regs->status, is
then an unaligned readl() on device memory. arm64 faults on unaligned
device accesses, so instead of xhci_handshake() catching the all-ones
value and returning -ENODEV, setup oopses:
xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: Unable to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible
xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: xHCI Host Controller
xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80030a770103
ESR = 0x0000000096000021
FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP
pc : xhci_halt [xhci_hcd]
Call trace:
xhci_halt
xhci_gen_setup
xhci_pci_setup
usb_add_hcd
usb_hcd_pci_probe
xhci_pci_common_probe
xhci_pci_renesas_probe
This was hit with a Renesas uPD720201 that failed to power up ("Unable
to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible") yet still
reached the HCD probe path.
Read the capability register once, and if it reads back the all-ones
value (as xhci_handshake() and xhci_reset() already test for), abort
setup with -ENODEV before op_regs is derived from it. Reading it once
also avoids re-reading a register that may change under a concurrent
hot-removal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fec: only stop PTP if it was initialized
fec_ptp_init() is only called when fep->bufdesc_ex is available.
However, fec_probe() unconditionally calls fec_ptp_stop() on the
failed_init path, and fec_drv_remove() unconditionally calls
fec_ptp_stop() during device removal.
Check fep->bufdesc_ex before calling fec_ptp_stop() in both paths
to avoid stopping PTP when it was not initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: skip double clone set expressions on element insert
Both the dynset and newsetelem path clone the existing set expressions
when setting set element expressions if no override expressions are
provided. This results in a double clone, once to clone the template set
expressions then another clone on the new element. Add a flag to
annotate if userspace provides a override expression (ie. expression of
the same type of the set but different configuration), otherwise borrow
the existing expression from the set. Add conditionals to release
expression iif they represent an override. Use this new override_exprs
flag to dump the dynset expression override to userspace.
This simplifies the existing logic and it also fixes a bug with the
connlimit expression which results in a module refcount imbalance
WARNING splat when resorting on the default set expressions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: atm: usbatm: fix invalid ci_range initialization
syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds in __vcc_connect():
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/atm/common.c:382:32
shift exponent -1 is negative
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5987 Comm: syz.0.18 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/05/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:233
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x36d/0x400 lib/ubsan.c:494
__vcc_connect+0x14b4/0x19c0 net/atm/common.c:382
vcc_connect+0x328/0x8f0 net/atm/common.c:498
pvc_bind+0x272/0x380 net/atm/pvc.c:52
__sys_bind+0x2e3/0x410 net/socket.c:1976
__x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1979
...
ATM device ci_range fields (vpi_bits and vci_bits) represent the
number of bits supported for VPI and VCI addressing on the device.
net/atm/common.c directly uses these fields as bit shift counts:
vpi >> dev->ci_range.vpi_bits
vci >> dev->ci_range.vci_bits
1 << vcc->dev->ci_range.vpi_bits
1 << vcc->dev->ci_range.vci_bits
usbatm_atm_init() sets ci_range.vpi_bits and ci_range.vci_bits to
ATM_CI_MAX (-1), which is defined in <uapi/linux/atmdev.h> as a
sentinel value for userspace ATM_SETCIRANGE requests, not a valid bit
count. Shifting by -1 is undefined behavior and triggers UBSAN
warnings.
ATM UNI cell headers allow up to 8 bits for VPI (0..255) and 16 bits
for VCI (0..65535). Initialize vpi_bits to 8 and vci_bits to 16, as
done by solos-pci. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: move hardware offload step after building the chain blob
Allocate the chain blob before the ruleset offload to reduce chances of
entering an inconsistent state where the offloaded ruleset in the nic
and the software ruleset differ. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: st33zp24: Return zero on status read failure
st33zp24_status() ignores the result of the transport read and returns
data even when no byte was received. The I2C transport, for example,
skips i2c_master_recv() when the register-select write is short or fails,
leaving data uninitialized. The resulting stack value can be interpreted
as TPM_STS flags and let status checks complete spuriously.
The status callback cannot propagate a transport error. Return zero
unless recv() reports exactly one byte. With no status bits set, callers
retry or take their existing timeout or error path instead of acting on
an invalid status value.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual
source review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring
The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid
disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing
was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the
connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT
reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in
fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and
cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and
queue->lock).
The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change,
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers
to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only
non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it.
Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.
Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a
fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT
is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.
Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.
If there should be a report from any library or application we
probably need to revert this commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops
htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching
to cl->filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on
an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that
points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification
path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic
from a single packet.
Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a
rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is
incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the
TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal
TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr
to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this
qdisc or its parent.
The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than
from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to
TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can
take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane
configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced:
htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a
filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal
root -> inner -> leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not
affect legitimate classification.
htb_classify() can now return NULL irrespective of CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT,
whereas previously every NULL return sat inside that ifdef. The NULL
handler in htb_enqueue() therefore cannot stay conditional either, so
drop the ifdef around it. This matches hfsc_enqueue(), which has always
handled a NULL class unconditionally. Without it, a kernel built
without actions would dereference a NULL class instead of dropping.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_SCH_HTB, CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32,
CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR.
- Create an HTB qdisc on a device (e.g. lo), add an inner class
1:1 with a leaf child 1:10, install a root u32 filter selecting
1:1, and an inner-class u32 filter on 1:1 also selecting 1:1.
- Send one packet (ping). On the unfixed kernel the classify loop
spins with the qdisc lock held; with softlockup_panic=1 it panics.
- Reachable from unprivileged user via unshare -Urn (CAP_NET_ADMIN). |
