| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm/tcpci_maxim: validate header NDO against RX_BYTE_CNT
A broken/malicious port can transmit a CRC-valid frame whose header
advertises up to seven data objects but whose body carries fewer than
that. Check for this, and rightfully reject the message, instead of
reading from uninitialized stack memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: validate connector number in ucsi_connector_change()
The connector number in a UCSI CCI notification is a 7-bit field
supplied by the PPM. ucsi_connector_change() uses it to index the
ucsi->connector[] array without checking it against the number of
connectors the PPM reported at init time, so a buggy or malicious PPM
(EC firmware, or an I2C-attached UCSI controller on the ccg / stm32g0 /
glink transports) can drive schedule_work() on memory past the end of
the array.
Reject connector numbers that are zero or exceed cap.num_connectors
before dereferencing the array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: safe_serial: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the bulk-out buffer size is at least eight bytes to avoid
user-controlled slab corruption in "safe" mode should a malicious device
report a smaller size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least
eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer
dereference should a malicious device report a smaller size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/migrate_device: fix pgtable leak in migrate_vma_insert_huge_pmd_page
When migrate_vma_insert_huge_pmd_page() jumps to unlock_abort due
to a PMD check failure, the pgtable allocated earlier via
pte_alloc_one() is never freed, causing a memory leak.
Added free_abort label to release the pgtable in error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store()
linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before
checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the
message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]:
write(fd, "", 0);
-> message_store(..., buf, count=0)
-> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0)
-> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read
The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation
(kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0),
so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a
KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and
panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data
and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count--
wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul().
linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs
callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attribute,
mode 0644) and from the in-tree initial-message setup with
count == -1, so the OOB path is only userspace-triggerable via
zero-byte writes; vfs_write() does not short-circuit on
count == 0 and kernfs_fop_write_iter() dispatches the store
callback regardless.
Guard the trailing-newline trim with a count check. The
existing if (!count) block then takes the clear-display path
unchanged.
Affects every auxdisplay driver that registers via
linedisp_register() / linedisp_attach(): ht16k33, max6959,
img-ascii-lcd, seg-led-gpio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn
__set_chan_timer() takes a l2cap_chan reference via l2cap_chan_hold()
before scheduling the delayed work. The normal path in
l2cap_chan_timeout() drops this reference with l2cap_chan_put() at the
end, but the early return when chan->conn is NULL skips the put,
leaking the reference.
Add the missing l2cap_chan_put() before the early return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button
xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length
and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or
data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's
control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with
actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing
accesses beyond the actual array.
Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the
packet length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp
In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read()
but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains
uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported
as a measurement result.
Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported
in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage.
This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the
variable as used uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: nxp-sar-adc: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it
as a divisor. A user writing zero or a negative value to the
sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the
kernel.
Also prevent unsigned integer underflow when the computed cycle count is
smaller than NXP_SAR_ADC_CONV_TIME, which would wrap the u32 inpsamp to
a huge value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location
itg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf' as a parameter and
fills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)&buf'. Since `buf' is the
parameter (a pointer), `&buf' is the address of the local pointer
slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address
of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type
mismatch.
i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16)
= 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when
the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in
itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack
contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a
functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is
delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak.
The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through
itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value,
where that is correct.
Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's
buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: adis16260: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it
as a divisor. A user writing zero to the sampling_frequency sysfs
attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies
mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed
MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without
checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback
can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the
reply.
Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial
replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized
reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of
overwriting st->buf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: scd30: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a zero check for val2 before using it as a divisor when setting the
sampling frequency. A user writing a zero fractional part to the
sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the
kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: buffer: Fix DMA fence leak in iio_buffer_enqueue_dmabuf()
iio_buffer_enqueue_dmabuf() allocates a struct iio_dma_fence (104 bytes,
kmalloc-128) via kmalloc_obj()+dma_fence_init(), which sets the initial
kref to 1. It then calls dma_resv_add_fence() which takes a second
reference (kref=2), and stores a raw pointer in block->fence.
On the success path the function returns without calling dma_fence_put()
to release the initial reference, so every buffer enqueue permanently
leaks one kmalloc-128 allocation.
The iio_buffer_cleanup() work item only releases the temporary reference
taken during completion signalling by iio_buffer_signal_dmabuf_done();
the initial reference from dma_fence_init() is never released.
With four iio_rwdev instances at 240kHz and 512 samples per buffer,
this produces ~1875 kmalloc-128 allocations per second matching the
observed slab growth exactly. A test with ftrace confirmed that the
dma_fence_destroy event was never triggered.
Fix by calling dma_fence_put() after dma_resv_add_fence(), transferring
ownership of the fence to the DMA reservation object. The DMA fence then
gets properly discarded after being signalled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: omninet: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the bulk-out buffers are at least as large as the
hardcoded transfer size to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should
a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than
expected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem
When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the
driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the
extra bytes.
The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the
condition to skip processing extra bytes is:
if (i > mxt_obj_size(object))
continue;
Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through
mxt_obj_size(object) - 1.
When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the
code processes the byte instead of discarding it.
This causes the code to calculate byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs
and writes the byte there, overwriting exactly one byte of the adjacent
instance or object.
Update the boundary check to skip extra bytes correctly by using >=. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uio: uio_pci_generic_sva: fix double free of devm_kzalloc() memory
uio_pci_sva allocates struct uio_pci_sva_dev with devm_kzalloc() in
probe(), but then calls kfree(udev) both on the probe() error path
(label out_free) and again in remove().
Because devm_kzalloc() allocations are devres-managed and are freed
automatically when the device is detached (including after a failing
probe() and during driver unbind), the explicit kfree() can lead to a
double free.
If probe() fails after devm_kzalloc(), the error path frees udev and
devres cleanup will free it again when the core unwinds the partially
bound device. On normal driver removal, remove() frees udev and devres
will free it again when the device is detached.
This issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and
confirmed by manual review. Fix by removing the manual kfree() calls
and dropping the now-unused label. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbip: vudc: Fix use after free bug in vudc_remove due to race condition
This patch follows up Zheng Wang's 2023 report of a use-after-free in
vudc_remove(). The original thread stalled on Shuah Khan's request for
runtime testing of the unplug/unbind path. This patch supplies that
testing and keeps Zheng's original fix shape.
In vudc_probe(), v_init_timer() binds udc->tr_timer.timer to v_timer().
usbip_sockfd_store() starts the timer via v_start_timer()/v_kick_timer().
vudc_remove() can then free the containing struct vudc while the timer is
still pending or executing.
KASAN confirms the race on an unpatched x86_64 QEMU guest with
CONFIG_KASAN=y, CONFIG_USBIP_VUDC=y, CONFIG_USB_ZERO=y, and a tight loop
that repeatedly writes a socket fd to usbip_sockfd, closes the socket
pair, and unbinds/rebinds usbip-vudc.0:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x8ba/0x8e0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888001b80740 by task trigger_and_unb/239
Allocated by task 239:
vudc_probe+0x4d/0xaa0
Freed by task 239:
kfree+0x18f/0x520
device_release_driver_internal+0x388/0x540
unbind_store+0xd9/0x100
This lands in the timer core rather than v_timer() itself because the
embedded timer_list is being walked after its containing struct vudc has
already been freed. The underlying lifetime bug is the same one Zheng
reported.
With v_stop_timer() called from vudc_remove() and the timer deleted
synchronously, the same harness completed 5000 bind/unbind iterations
with no KASAN report. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications
USBTMC devices can use an optional interrupt endpoint for notification
messages. These typically contain two-byte headers indicating the
payload format, but the driver does not check if these headers are
present before accessing the data buffers. In cases where the URB
actual_length is not enough to fit these headers, the driver will either
cause an out-of-bounds read, or consume stale leftover data from a
previous notification.
Fix by checking if actual_data contains enough bytes for the headers,
otherwise resubmit URB to the interrupt endpoint. |
