| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: aspeed: Add NULL check in aspeed_lpc_enable_snoop()
devm_kasprintf() returns NULL when memory allocation fails. Currently,
aspeed_lpc_enable_snoop() does not check for this case, which results in a
NULL pointer dereference.
Add NULL check after devm_kasprintf() to prevent this issue.
[arj: Fix Fixes: tag to use subject from 3772e5da4454] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
backlight: pm8941: Add NULL check in wled_configure()
devm_kasprintf() returns NULL when memory allocation fails. Currently,
wled_configure() does not check for this case, which results in a NULL
pointer dereference.
Add NULL check after devm_kasprintf() to prevent this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: fix MMIO write access to an invalid page in i40e_clear_hw
When the device sends a specific input, an integer underflow can occur, leading
to MMIO write access to an invalid page.
Prevent the integer underflow by changing the type of related variables. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (asus-ec-sensors) check sensor index in read_string()
Prevent a potential invalid memory access when the requested sensor
is not found.
find_ec_sensor_index() may return a negative value (e.g. -ENOENT),
but its result was used without checking, which could lead to
undefined behavior when passed to get_sensor_info().
Add a proper check to return -EINVAL if sensor_index is negative.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
[groeck: Return error code returned from find_ec_sensor_index] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: max20086: fix invalid memory access
max20086_parse_regulators_dt() calls of_regulator_match() using an
array of struct of_regulator_match allocated on the stack for the
matches argument.
of_regulator_match() calls devm_of_regulator_put_matches(), which calls
devres_alloc() to allocate a struct devm_of_regulator_matches which will
be de-allocated using devm_of_regulator_put_matches().
struct devm_of_regulator_matches is populated with the stack allocated
matches array.
If the device fails to probe, devm_of_regulator_put_matches() will be
called and will try to call of_node_put() on that stack pointer,
generating the following dmesg entries:
max20086 6-0028: Failed to read DEVICE_ID reg: -121
kobject: '\xc0$\xa5\x03' (000000002cebcb7a): is not initialized, yet
kobject_put() is being called.
Followed by a stack trace matching the call flow described above.
Switch to allocating the matches array using devm_kcalloc() to
avoid accessing the stack pointer long after it's out of scope.
This also has the advantage of allowing multiple max20086 to probe
without overriding the data stored inside the global of_regulator_match. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: Fix the dead loop of MPLS parse
The unexpected MPLS packet may not end with the bottom label stack.
When there are many stacks, The label count value has wrapped around.
A dead loop occurs, soft lockup/CPU stuck finally.
stack backtrace:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /build/linux-0Pa0xK/linux-5.15.0/net/openvswitch/flow.c:662:26
index -1 is out of range for type '__be32 [3]'
CPU: 34 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/34 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-121-generic #131-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge C6420/0JP9TF, BIOS 2.12.2 07/14/2021
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
show_stack+0x52/0x5c
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x36
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
key_extract_l3l4+0x82a/0x840 [openvswitch]
? kfree_skbmem+0x52/0xa0
key_extract+0x9c/0x2b0 [openvswitch]
ovs_flow_key_extract+0x124/0x350 [openvswitch]
ovs_vport_receive+0x61/0xd0 [openvswitch]
? kernel_init_free_pages.part.0+0x4a/0x70
? get_page_from_freelist+0x353/0x540
netdev_port_receive+0xc4/0x180 [openvswitch]
? netdev_port_receive+0x180/0x180 [openvswitch]
netdev_frame_hook+0x1f/0x40 [openvswitch]
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x23a/0xf00
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xfa/0x240
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x18e/0x2a0
napi_complete_done+0x7a/0x1c0
bnxt_poll+0x155/0x1c0 [bnxt_en]
__napi_poll+0x30/0x180
net_rx_action+0x126/0x280
? bnxt_msix+0x67/0x80 [bnxt_en]
handle_softirqs+0xda/0x2d0
irq_exit_rcu+0x96/0xc0
common_interrupt+0x8e/0xa0
</IRQ> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() in bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem()
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() helper is also available for sleepable bpf
program. When BPF JIT is disabled or under 32-bit host,
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() will not be inlined. Using it in a
sleepable bpf program will trigger the warning in
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem(), because the bpf program only holds
rcu_read_lock_trace lock. Therefore, add the missed check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race
huge_pmd_unshare() drops a reference on a page table that may have
previously been shared across processes, potentially turning it into a
normal page table used in another process in which unrelated VMAs can
afterwards be installed.
If this happens in the middle of a concurrent gup_fast(), gup_fast() could
end up walking the page tables of another process. While I don't see any
way in which that immediately leads to kernel memory corruption, it is
really weird and unexpected.
Fix it with an explicit broadcast IPI through tlb_remove_table_sync_one(),
just like we do in khugepaged when removing page tables for a THP
collapse. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: unshare page tables during VMA split, not before
Currently, __split_vma() triggers hugetlb page table unsharing through
vm_ops->may_split(). This happens before the VMA lock and rmap locks are
taken - which is too early, it allows racing VMA-locked page faults in our
process and racing rmap walks from other processes to cause page tables to
be shared again before we actually perform the split.
Fix it by explicitly calling into the hugetlb unshare logic from
__split_vma() in the same place where THP splitting also happens. At that
point, both the VMA and the rmap(s) are write-locked.
An annoying detail is that we can now call into the helper
hugetlb_unshare_pmds() from two different locking contexts:
1. from hugetlb_split(), holding:
- mmap lock (exclusively)
- VMA lock
- file rmap lock (exclusively)
2. hugetlb_unshare_all_pmds(), which I think is designed to be able to
call us with only the mmap lock held (in shared mode), but currently
only runs while holding mmap lock (exclusively) and VMA lock
Backporting note:
This commit fixes a racy protection that was introduced in commit
b30c14cd6102 ("hugetlb: unshare some PMDs when splitting VMAs"); that
commit claimed to fix an issue introduced in 5.13, but it should actually
also go all the way back.
[jannh@google.com: v2] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim
[ Syzkaller Report ]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000087: 0000 [#1
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000438-0x000000000000043f]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 10614 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
6.13.0-rc6-gfbfd64d25c7a-dirty #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-30ms
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS: 00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x61/0xb0
? die_addr+0xb1/0xe0
? exc_general_protection+0x333/0x510
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
jfs_ioctl+0x3c8/0x4f0
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
__se_sys_ioctl+0x269/0x350
? __pfx___se_sys_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x210
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e0/0x330
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe51f4903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d
RSP: 002b:00007fe5202250c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe51f5cbf80 RCX: 00007fe51f4903ad
RDX: 0000000020000680 RSI: 00000000c0185879 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe520225640
R13: 000000000000000e R14: 00007fe51f44fca0 R15: 00007fe52021d000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS: 00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ Analysis ]
We believe that we have found a concurrency bug in the `fs/jfs` module
that results in a null pointer dereference. There is a closely related
issue which has been fixed:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d6c1b3599b2feb5c7291f5ac3a36e5fa7cedb234
... but, unfortunately, the accepted patch appears to still be
susceptible to a null pointer dereference under some interleavings.
To trigger the bug, we think that `JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap` is set
to NULL in `dbFreeBits` and then dereferenced in `jfs_ioc_trim`. This
bug manifests quite rarely under normal circumstances, but is
triggereable from a syz-program. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: fix array-index-out-of-bounds read in add_missing_indices
stbl is s8 but it must contain offsets into slot which can go from 0 to
127.
Added a bound check for that error and return -EIO if the check fails.
Also make jfs_readdir return with error if add_missing_indices returns
with an error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: fix double free in delayed_free
The double free could happen in the following path.
exfat_create_upcase_table()
exfat_create_upcase_table() : return error
exfat_free_upcase_table() : free ->vol_utbl
exfat_load_default_upcase_table : return error
exfat_kill_sb()
delayed_free()
exfat_free_upcase_table() <--------- double free
This patch set ->vol_util as NULL after freeing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/iwcm: Fix use-after-free of work objects after cm_id destruction
The commit 59c68ac31e15 ("iw_cm: free cm_id resources on the last
deref") simplified cm_id resource management by freeing cm_id once all
references to the cm_id were removed. The references are removed either
upon completion of iw_cm event handlers or when the application destroys
the cm_id. This commit introduced the use-after-free condition where
cm_id_private object could still be in use by event handler works during
the destruction of cm_id. The commit aee2424246f9 ("RDMA/iwcm: Fix a
use-after-free related to destroying CM IDs") addressed this use-after-
free by flushing all pending works at the cm_id destruction.
However, still another use-after-free possibility remained. It happens
with the work objects allocated for each cm_id_priv within
alloc_work_entries() during cm_id creation, and subsequently freed in
dealloc_work_entries() once all references to the cm_id are removed.
If the cm_id's last reference is decremented in the event handler work,
the work object for the work itself gets removed, and causes the use-
after-free BUG below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811f9cf800 by task kworker/u16:1/147091
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 147091 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2+ #27 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
Workqueue: 0x0 (iw_cm_wq)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90
print_report+0x174/0x554
? __virt_addr_valid+0x208/0x430
? __pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
kasan_report+0xae/0x170
? __pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
__pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x8c5/0xfb0
process_one_work+0xc11/0x1460
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? assign_work+0x16c/0x240
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 147416:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xb0
alloc_work_entries+0xa9/0x260 [iw_cm]
iw_cm_connect+0x23/0x4a0 [iw_cm]
rdma_connect_locked+0xbfd/0x1920 [rdma_cm]
nvme_rdma_cm_handler+0x8e5/0x1b60 [nvme_rdma]
cma_cm_event_handler+0xae/0x320 [rdma_cm]
cma_work_handler+0x106/0x1b0 [rdma_cm]
process_one_work+0x84f/0x1460
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 147091:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
kfree+0x13a/0x4b0
dealloc_work_entries+0x125/0x1f0 [iw_cm]
iwcm_deref_id+0x6f/0xa0 [iw_cm]
cm_work_handler+0x136/0x1ba0 [iw_cm]
process_one_work+0x84f/0x1460
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0
__queue_work+0x2ff/0x1390
queue_work_on+0x67/0xc0
cm_event_handler+0x46a/0x820 [iw_cm]
siw_cm_upcall+0x330/0x650 [siw]
siw_cm_work_handler+0x6b9/0x2b20 [siw]
process_one_work+0x84f/0x1460
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
This BUG is reproducible by repeating the blktests test case nvme/061
for the rdma transport and the siw driver.
To avoid the use-after-free of cm_id_private work objects, ensure that
the last reference to the cm_id is decremented not in the event handler
works, but in the cm_id destruction context. For that purpose, mo
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc: fix to protect IPCS lookups using RCU
syzbot reported that it discovered a use-after-free vulnerability, [0]
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67af13f8.050a0220.21dd3.0038.GAE@google.com/
idr_for_each() is protected by rwsem, but this is not enough. If it is
not protected by RCU read-critical region, when idr_for_each() calls
radix_tree_node_free() through call_rcu() to free the radix_tree_node
structure, the node will be freed immediately, and when reading the next
node in radix_tree_for_each_slot(), the already freed memory may be read.
Therefore, we need to add code to make sure that idr_for_each() is
protected within the RCU read-critical region when we call it in
shm_destroy_orphaned(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: Fix fb_set_var to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var
If fb_add_videomode() in fb_set_var() fails to allocate memory for
fb_videomode, later it may lead to a null-ptr dereference in
fb_videomode_to_var(), as the fb_info is registered while not having the
mode in modelist that is expected to be there, i.e. the one that is
described in fb_info->var.
================================================================
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 1 PID: 30371 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.10.226-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:fb_videomode_to_var+0x24/0x610 drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:901
Call Trace:
display_to_var+0x3a/0x7c0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:929
fbcon_resize+0x3e2/0x8f0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2071
resize_screen drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1176 [inline]
vc_do_resize+0x53a/0x1170 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1263
fbcon_modechanged+0x3ac/0x6e0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2720
fbcon_update_vcs+0x43/0x60 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2776
do_fb_ioctl+0x6d2/0x740 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1128
fb_ioctl+0xe7/0x150 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1203
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x19a/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:739
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
================================================================
The reason is that fb_info->var is being modified in fb_set_var(), and
then fb_videomode_to_var() is called. If it fails to add the mode to
fb_info->modelist, fb_set_var() returns error, but does not restore the
old value of fb_info->var. Restore fb_info->var on failure the same way
it is done earlier in the function.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k_htc: Abort software beacon handling if disabled
A malicious USB device can send a WMI_SWBA_EVENTID event from an
ath9k_htc-managed device before beaconing has been enabled. This causes
a device-by-zero error in the driver, leading to either a crash or an
out of bounds read.
Prevent this by aborting the handling in ath9k_htc_swba() if beacons are
not enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending
The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced in backlog thread, and
during the call to skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with
the release of sk_socket. All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock)
will be affected.
Race conditions:
'''
CPU0 CPU1
backlog::skb_send_sock
sendmsg_unlocked
sock_sendmsg
sock_sendmsg_nosec
close(fd):
...
ops->release() -> sock_map_close()
sk_socket->ops = NULL
free(socket)
sock->ops->sendmsg
^
panic here
'''
The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed.
'''
void sock_map_close()
{
...
if (likely(psock)) {
...
// !! here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0
sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock)
psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
if (unlikely(!psock))
goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto
...
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed
sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
...
}
'''
Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in
sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock
reference count to avoid race conditions.
With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will
wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work.
If no backlog running, any pending work that hasn't started by then will
fail when invoked by sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have
been zeroed, and sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via
cancel_delayed_work_sync().
In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread
and close() thread.
The panic I catched:
'''
Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000521fad8 RCX: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
? sock_sendmsg+0x3e0/0x440
? __pfx_sock_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
__skb_send_sock+0x543/0xb70
sk_psock_backlog+0x247/0xb80
...
''' |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: aqc111: fix error handling of usbnet read calls
Syzkaller, courtesy of syzbot, identified an error (see report [1]) in
aqc111 driver, caused by incomplete sanitation of usb read calls'
results. This problem is quite similar to the one fixed in commit
920a9fa27e78 ("net: asix: add proper error handling of usb read errors").
For instance, usbnet_read_cmd() may read fewer than 'size' bytes,
even if the caller expected the full amount, and aqc111_read_cmd()
will not check its result properly. As [1] shows, this may lead
to MAC address in aqc111_bind() being only partly initialized,
triggering KMSAN warnings.
Fix the issue by verifying that the number of bytes read is
as expected and not less.
[1] Partial syzbot report:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:208 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in usbnet_probe+0x2e57/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1830
is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:208 [inline]
usbnet_probe+0x2e57/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1830
usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:-1 [inline]
really_probe+0x4d1/0xd90 drivers/base/dd.c:658
__driver_probe_device+0x268/0x380 drivers/base/dd.c:800
...
Uninit was stored to memory at:
dev_addr_mod+0xb0/0x550 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:582
__dev_addr_set include/linux/netdevice.h:4874 [inline]
eth_hw_addr_set include/linux/etherdevice.h:325 [inline]
aqc111_bind+0x35f/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:717
usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772
usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
...
Uninit was stored to memory at:
ether_addr_copy include/linux/etherdevice.h:305 [inline]
aqc111_read_perm_mac drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:663 [inline]
aqc111_bind+0x794/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:713
usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772
usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:-1 [inline]
...
Local variable buf.i created at:
aqc111_read_perm_mac drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:656 [inline]
aqc111_bind+0x221/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:713
usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cma: Fix hang when cma_netevent_callback fails to queue_work
The cited commit fixed a crash when cma_netevent_callback was called for
a cma_id while work on that id from a previous call had not yet started.
The work item was re-initialized in the second call, which corrupted the
work item currently in the work queue.
However, it left a problem when queue_work fails (because the item is
still pending in the work queue from a previous call). In this case,
cma_id_put (which is called in the work handler) is therefore not
called. This results in a userspace process hang (zombie process).
Fix this by calling cma_id_put() if queue_work fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: mscc: Fix memory leak when using one step timestamping
Fix memory leak when running one-step timestamping. When running
one-step sync timestamping, the HW is configured to insert the TX time
into the frame, so there is no reason to keep the skb anymore. As in
this case the HW will never generate an interrupt to say that the frame
was timestamped, then the frame will never released.
Fix this by freeing the frame in case of one-step timestamping. |
