| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Refactor amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl for Handling Last Fence Update and Timeline Management v4
This commit simplifies the amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl function, key updates
include:
- Moved the logic for managing the last update fence directly into
amdgpu_gem_va_update_vm.
- Introduced checks for the timeline point to enable conditional
replacement or addition of fences.
v2: Addressed review comments from Christian.
v3: Updated comments (Christian).
v4: The previous version selected the fence too early and did not manage its
reference correctly, which could lead to stale or freed fences being used.
This resulted in refcount underflows and could crash when updating GPU
timelines.
The fence is now chosen only after the VA mapping work is completed, and its
reference is taken safely. After exporting it to the VM timeline syncobj, the
driver always drops its local fence reference, ensuring balanced refcounting
and avoiding use-after-free on dma_fence.
Crash signature:
[ 205.828135] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 205.832963] WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 7274 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbe/0x110
...
[ 206.074014] Call Trace:
[ 206.076488] <TASK>
[ 206.078608] amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x6ea/0x740 [amdgpu]
[ 206.084040] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 206.089994] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x86/0xe0 [drm]
[ 206.094415] drm_ioctl+0x26e/0x520 [drm]
[ 206.098424] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 206.104402] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4b/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ 206.109387] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0
[ 206.113156] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0
...
[ 206.553351] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0dfde90
...
[ 206.553378] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0
...
[ 206.553405] Call Trace:
[ 206.553409] <IRQ>
[ 206.553415] ? __pfx_drm_sched_fence_free_rcu+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched]
[ 206.553424] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60
[ 206.553427] drm_sched_job_done.isra.0+0x123/0x150 [gpu_sched]
[ 206.553434] dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x6e/0xe0
[ 206.553437] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60
[ 206.553441] amdgpu_fence_process+0xd8/0x150 [amdgpu]
[ 206.553854] sdma_v4_0_process_trap_irq+0x97/0xb0 [amdgpu]
[ 206.554353] edac_mce_amd(E) ee1004(E)
[ 206.554270] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x150/0x230 [amdgpu]
[ 206.554702] amdgpu_ih_process+0x6a/0x180 [amdgpu]
[ 206.555101] amdgpu_irq_handler+0x23/0x60 [amdgpu]
[ 206.555500] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4a/0x1c0
[ 206.555506] handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
[ 206.555509] handle_edge_irq+0x92/0x1e0
[ 206.555513] __common_interrupt+0x3e/0xb0
[ 206.555519] common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0
[ 206.555525] </IRQ>
[ 206.555527] <TASK>
...
[ 206.555650] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0
...
[ 206.555667] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/atmel-hlcdc: fix use-after-free of drm_crtc_commit after release
The atmel_hlcdc_plane_atomic_duplicate_state() callback was copying
the atmel_hlcdc_plane state structure without properly duplicating the
drm_plane_state. In particular, state->commit remained set to the old
state commit, which can lead to a use-after-free in the next
drm_atomic_commit() call.
Fix this by calling
__drm_atomic_helper_duplicate_plane_state(), which correctly clones
the base drm_plane_state (including the ->commit pointer).
It has been seen when closing and re-opening the device node while
another DRM client (e.g. fbdev) is still attached:
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
0xc611b344-0xc611b344 @offset=836. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
FIX kmalloc-64: Restoring Poison 0xc611b344-0xc611b344=0x6b
Allocated in drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc age=178 cpu=0
pid=29
drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc
drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x3c/0x15c
drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4
drm_framebuffer_remove+0x4cc/0x5a8
drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn+0x6c/0x80
process_one_work+0x12c/0x2cc
worker_thread+0x2a8/0x400
kthread+0xc0/0xdc
ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
Freed in drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150 age=8 cpu=0
pid=169
drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150
drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x64/0x8c
commit_tail+0x168/0x18c
drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x138/0x15c
drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4
drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x84/0xb8
drm_mode_setcrtc+0x32c/0x810
drm_ioctl+0x20c/0x488
sys_ioctl+0x14c/0xc20
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54
Slab 0xef8bc360 objects=21 used=16 fp=0xc611b7c0
flags=0x200(workingset|zone=0)
Object 0xc611b340 @offset=832 fp=0xc611b7c0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_choice()
In decode_choice(), the boundary check before get_len() uses the
variable `len`, which is still 0 from its initialization at the top of
the function:
unsigned int type, ext, len = 0;
...
if (ext || (son->attr & OPEN)) {
BYTE_ALIGN(bs);
if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, len, 0)) /* len is 0 here */
return H323_ERROR_BOUND;
len = get_len(bs); /* OOB read */
When the bitstream is exactly consumed (bs->cur == bs->end), the check
nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, 0) evaluates to (bs->cur + 0 > bs->end),
which is false. The subsequent get_len() call then dereferences
*bs->cur++, reading 1 byte past the end of the buffer. If that byte
has bit 7 set, get_len() reads a second byte as well.
This can be triggered remotely by sending a crafted Q.931 SETUP message
with a User-User Information Element containing exactly 2 bytes of
PER-encoded data ({0x08, 0x00}) to port 1720 through a firewall with
the nf_conntrack_h323 helper active. The decoder fully consumes the
PER buffer before reaching this code path, resulting in a 1-2 byte
heap-buffer-overflow read confirmed by AddressSanitizer.
Fix this by checking for 2 bytes (the maximum that get_len() may read)
instead of the uninitialized `len`. This matches the pattern used at
every other get_len() call site in the same file, where the caller
checks for 2 bytes of available data before calling get_len(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wan: farsync: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by unfinished tasklets
When the FarSync T-series card is being detached, the fst_card_info is
deallocated in fst_remove_one(). However, the fst_tx_task or fst_int_task
may still be running or pending, leading to use-after-free bugs when the
already freed fst_card_info is accessed in fst_process_tx_work_q() or
fst_process_int_work_q().
A typical race condition is depicted below:
CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (tasklet)
| fst_start_xmit()
fst_remove_one() | tasklet_schedule()
unregister_hdlc_device()|
| fst_process_tx_work_q() //handler
kfree(card) //free | do_bottom_half_tx()
| card-> //use
The following KASAN trace was captured:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800aad101c by task ksoftirqd/3/32
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcb/0x5d0
? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___hrtimer_run_queues+0x10/0x10
fst_process_tx_work_q+0x67/0x90
tasklet_action_common+0x1fa/0x720
? hrtimer_interrupt+0x31f/0x780
handle_softirqs+0x176/0x530
__irq_exit_rcu+0xab/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
...
Allocated by task 41 on cpu 3 at 72.330843s:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
fst_add_one+0x1a5/0x1cd0
local_pci_probe+0xdd/0x190
pci_device_probe+0x341/0x480
really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210
__device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320
bus_for_each_drv+0x101/0x190
__device_attach+0x198/0x3a0
device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0
pci_bus_add_device+0x81/0xc0
pci_bus_add_devices+0x7e/0x190
enable_slot+0x9b9/0x1130
acpiphp_check_bridge.part.0+0x2e1/0x460
acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x36c/0x3c0
acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10
acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80
...
Freed by task 41 on cpu 1 at 75.138639s:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0x135/0x410
fst_remove_one+0x2ca/0x540
pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0
device_release_driver_internal+0x364/0x530
pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xd/0x20
disable_slot+0x116/0x260
acpiphp_disable_and_eject_slot+0x4b/0x190
acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x230/0x3c0
acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10
acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800aad1000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
freed 1024-byte region
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xaad0
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x100000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0100000000000003 ffffea00002ab401 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88800aad0f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88800aad0f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88800aad1000: fa fb
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: Clear reconnect pending bit
When canceling the reconnect worker, care must be taken to reset the
reconnect-pending bit. If the reconnect worker has not yet been
scheduled before it is canceled, the reconnect-pending bit will stay
on forever. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: No shortcut out of RDS_CONN_ERROR
RDS connections carry a state "rds_conn_path::cp_state"
and transitions from one state to another and are conditional
upon an expected state: "rds_conn_path_transition."
There is one exception to this conditionality, which is
"RDS_CONN_ERROR" that can be enforced by "rds_conn_path_drop"
regardless of what state the condition is currently in.
But as soon as a connection enters state "RDS_CONN_ERROR",
the connection handling code expects it to go through the
shutdown-path.
The RDS/TCP multipath changes added a shortcut out of
"RDS_CONN_ERROR" straight back to "RDS_CONN_CONNECTING"
via "rds_tcp_accept_one_path" (e.g. after "rds_tcp_state_change").
A subsequent "rds_tcp_reset_callbacks" can then transition
the state to "RDS_CONN_RESETTING" with a shutdown-worker queued.
That'll trip up "rds_conn_init_shutdown", which was
never adjusted to handle "RDS_CONN_RESETTING" and subsequently
drops the connection with the dreaded "DR_INV_CONN_STATE",
which leaves "RDS_SHUTDOWN_WORK_QUEUED" on forever.
So we do two things here:
a) Don't shortcut "RDS_CONN_ERROR", but take the longer
path through the shutdown code.
b) Add "RDS_CONN_RESETTING" to the expected states in
"rds_conn_init_shutdown" so that we won't error out
and get stuck, if we ever hit weird state transitions
like this again." |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: AV1: Fix tile info buffer size
Each tile info is composed of: row_sb, col_sb, start_pos
and end_pos (4 bytes each). So the total required memory
is AV1_MAX_TILES * 16 bytes.
Use the correct #define to allocate the buffer and avoid
writing tile info in non-allocated memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields
We used to use the cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of objects
that are not just the server, ses or tcon lists. We later introduced
srv_lock, ses_lock and tc_lock to protect fields within the
corresponding structs. This was done to provide a more granular
protection and avoid unnecessary serialization.
There were still a couple of uses of cifs_tcp_ses_lock to provide
tcon fields. In this patch, I've replaced them with tc_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Add SRCU protection for reading PDPTRs in __get_sregs2()
Add SRCU read-side protection when reading PDPTR registers in
__get_sregs2().
Reading PDPTRs may trigger access to guest memory:
kvm_pdptr_read() -> svm_cache_reg() -> load_pdptrs() ->
kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page() -> kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot()
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot() dereferences memslots via __kvm_memslots(),
which uses srcu_dereference_check() and requires either kvm->srcu or
kvm->slots_lock to be held. Currently only vcpu->mutex is held,
triggering lockdep warning:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot
6.12.59+ #3 Not tainted
include/linux/kvm_host.h:1062 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by syz.5.1717/15100:
#0: ff1100002f4b00b0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x1d5/0x1590
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xf0/0x120 lib/dump_stack.c:120
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x1e3/0x270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6824
__kvm_memslots include/linux/kvm_host.h:1062 [inline]
__kvm_memslots include/linux/kvm_host.h:1059 [inline]
kvm_vcpu_memslots include/linux/kvm_host.h:1076 [inline]
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x518/0x5e0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2617
kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page+0x27/0x50 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3302
load_pdptrs+0xff/0x4b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:1065
svm_cache_reg+0x1c9/0x230 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1688
kvm_pdptr_read arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h:141 [inline]
__get_sregs2 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11784 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x3e20/0x4aa0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6279
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x856/0x1590 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4663
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18b/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: pci: validate sequence number of TX release report
Hardware rarely reports abnormal sequence number in TX release report,
which will access out-of-bounds of wd_ring->pages array, causing NULL
pointer dereference.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 1085 Comm: irq/129-rtw89_p Tainted: G S U
6.1.145-17510-g2f3369c91536 #1 (HASH:69e8 1)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
rtw89_pci_release_tx+0x18f/0x300 [rtw89_pci (HASH:4c83 2)]
rtw89_pci_napi_poll+0xc2/0x190 [rtw89_pci (HASH:4c83 2)]
net_rx_action+0xfc/0x460 net/core/dev.c:6578 net/core/dev.c:6645 net/core/dev.c:6759
handle_softirqs+0xbe/0x290 kernel/softirq.c:601
? rtw89_pci_interrupt_threadfn+0xc5/0x350 [rtw89_pci (HASH:4c83 2)]
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xeb/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:499 kernel/softirq.c:423
</IRQ>
<TASK>
rtw89_pci_interrupt_threadfn+0xf8/0x350 [rtw89_pci (HASH:4c83 2)]
? irq_thread+0xa7/0x340 kernel/irq/manage.c:0
irq_thread+0x177/0x340 kernel/irq/manage.c:1205 kernel/irq/manage.c:1314
? thaw_kernel_threads+0xb0/0xb0 kernel/irq/manage.c:1202
? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x80/0x80 kernel/irq/manage.c:1220
kthread+0xea/0x110 kernel/kthread.c:376
? synchronize_irq+0x1a0/0x1a0 kernel/irq/manage.c:1287
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x80/0x80 kernel/kthread.c:331
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
</TASK>
To prevent crash, validate rpp_info.seq before using. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Make cpumask_of_node() robust against NUMA_NO_NODE
The arch definition of cpumask_of_node() cannot handle NUMA_NO_NODE -
which is a valid index - so add a check for this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Fix pci_slot_trylock() error handling
Commit a4e772898f8b ("PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()")
delegates the bridge device's pci_dev_trylock() to pci_bus_trylock() in
pci_slot_trylock(), but it forgets to remove the corresponding
pci_dev_unlock() when pci_bus_trylock() fails.
Before a4e772898f8b, the code did:
if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) /* <- lock bridge device */
goto unlock;
if (dev->subordinate) {
if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) {
pci_dev_unlock(dev); /* <- unlock bridge device */
goto unlock;
}
}
After a4e772898f8b the bridge-device lock is no longer taken, but the
pci_dev_unlock(dev) on the failure path was left in place, leading to the
bug.
This yields one of two errors:
1. A warning that the lock is being unlocked when no one holds it.
2. An incorrect unlock of a lock that belongs to another thread.
Fix it by removing the now-redundant pci_dev_unlock(dev) on the failure
path.
[Same patch later posted by Keith at
https://patch.msgid.link/20260116184150.3013258-1-kbusch@meta.com] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: do not pass flow_id to set_rps_cpu()
Blamed commit made the assumption that the RPS table for each receive
queue would have the same size, and that it would not change.
Compute flow_id in set_rps_cpu(), do not assume we can use the value
computed by get_rps_cpu(). Otherwise we risk out-of-bound access
and/or crashes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Fix out-of-bounds write in kfd_event_page_set()
The kfd_event_page_set() function writes KFD_SIGNAL_EVENT_LIMIT * 8
bytes via memset without checking the buffer size parameter. This allows
unprivileged userspace to trigger an out-of bounds kernel memory write
by passing a small buffer, leading to potential privilege
escalation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: fore200e: fix use-after-free in tasklets during device removal
When the PCA-200E or SBA-200E adapter is being detached, the fore200e
is deallocated. However, the tx_tasklet or rx_tasklet may still be running
or pending, leading to use-after-free bug when the already freed fore200e
is accessed again in fore200e_tx_tasklet() or fore200e_rx_tasklet().
One of the race conditions can occur as follows:
CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (tasklet)
fore200e_pca_remove_one() | fore200e_interrupt()
fore200e_shutdown() | tasklet_schedule()
kfree(fore200e) | fore200e_tx_tasklet()
| fore200e-> // UAF
Fix this by ensuring tx_tasklet or rx_tasklet is properly canceled before
the fore200e is released. Add tasklet_kill() in fore200e_shutdown() to
synchronize with any pending or running tasklets. Moreover, since
fore200e_reset() could prevent further interrupts or data transfers,
the tasklet_kill() should be placed after fore200e_reset() to prevent
the tasklet from being rescheduled in fore200e_interrupt(). Finally,
it only needs to do tasklet_kill() when the fore200e state is greater
than or equal to FORE200E_STATE_IRQ, since tasklets are uninitialized
in earlier states. In a word, the tasklet_kill() should be placed in
the FORE200E_STATE_IRQ branch within the switch...case structure.
This bug was identified through static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix "scheduling while atomic" in IPsec MAC address query
Fix a "scheduling while atomic" bug in mlx5e_ipsec_init_macs() by
replacing mlx5_query_mac_address() with ether_addr_copy() to get the
local MAC address directly from netdev->dev_addr.
The issue occurs because mlx5_query_mac_address() queries the hardware
which involves mlx5_cmd_exec() that can sleep, but it is called from
the mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event workqueue which runs in atomic context.
The MAC address is already available in netdev->dev_addr, so no need
to query hardware. This avoids the sleeping call and resolves the bug.
Call trace:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u112:2/69344/0x00000200
__schedule+0x7ab/0xa20
schedule+0x1c/0xb0
schedule_timeout+0x6e/0xf0
__wait_for_common+0x91/0x1b0
cmd_exec+0xa85/0xff0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_exec+0x1f/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_address+0x7b/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_mac_address+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_init_macs+0xc1/0x720 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_build_accel_xfrm_attrs+0x422/0x670 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event+0x2b9/0x460 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x178/0x2e0
worker_thread+0x2ea/0x430 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix potential race in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
Code in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() after the call to tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock()
is done too late.
After tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(), the child socket is already visible
from TCP ehash table and other cpus might use it.
Since newinet->pinet6 is still pointing to the listener ipv6_pinfo
bad things can happen as syzbot found.
Move the problematic code in tcp_v6_mapped_child_init()
and call this new helper from tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() before
the ehash insertion.
This allows the removal of one tcp_sync_mss(), since
tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() will call it with the correct
context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netconsole: avoid OOB reads, msg is not nul-terminated
msg passed to netconsole from the console subsystem is not guaranteed
to be nul-terminated. Before recent
commit 7eab73b18630 ("netconsole: convert to NBCON console infrastructure")
the message would be placed in printk_shared_pbufs, a static global
buffer, so KASAN had harder time catching OOB accesses. Now we see:
printk: console [netcon_ext0] enabled
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x1f7/0x240
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88813b6d4c00 by task pr/netcon_ext0/594
CPU: 65 UID: 0 PID: 594 Comm: pr/netcon_ext0 Not tainted 6.19.0-11754-g4246fd6547c9
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120
string+0x1f7/0x240
vsnprintf+0x655/0xba0
scnprintf+0xba/0x120
netconsole_write+0x3fe/0xa10
nbcon_emit_next_record+0x46e/0x860
nbcon_kthread_func+0x623/0x750
Allocated by task 1:
nbcon_alloc+0x1ea/0x450
register_console+0x26b/0xe10
init_netconsole+0xbb0/0xda0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813b6d4000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 3072-byte region [ffff88813b6d4000, ffff88813b6d4c00) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: consume xmit errors of GSO frames
udpgro_frglist.sh and udpgro_bench.sh are the flakiest tests
currently in NIPA. They fail in the same exact way, TCP GRO
test stalls occasionally and the test gets killed after 10min.
These tests use veth to simulate GRO. They attach a trivial
("return XDP_PASS;") XDP program to the veth to force TSO off
and NAPI on.
Digging into the failure mode we can see that the connection
is completely stuck after a burst of drops. The sender's snd_nxt
is at sequence number N [1], but the receiver claims to have
received (rcv_nxt) up to N + 3 * MSS [2]. Last piece of the puzzle
is that senders rtx queue is not empty (let's say the block in
the rtx queue is at sequence number N - 4 * MSS [3]).
In this state, sender sends a retransmission from the rtx queue
with a single segment, and sequence numbers N-4*MSS:N-3*MSS [3].
Receiver sees it and responds with an ACK all the way up to
N + 3 * MSS [2]. But sender will reject this ack as TCP_ACK_UNSENT_DATA
because it has no recollection of ever sending data that far out [1].
And we are stuck.
The root cause is the mess of the xmit return codes. veth returns
an error when it can't xmit a frame. We end up with a loss event
like this:
-------------------------------------------------
| GSO super frame 1 | GSO super frame 2 |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
-------------------------------------------------
x ok ok <ok>| ok ok ok <x>
\\
snd_nxt
"x" means packet lost by veth, and "ok" means it went thru.
Since veth has TSO disabled in this test it sees individual segments.
Segment 1 is on the retransmit queue and will be resent.
So why did the sender not advance snd_nxt even tho it clearly did
send up to seg 8? tcp_write_xmit() interprets the return code
from the core to mean that data has not been sent at all. Since
TCP deals with GSO super frames, not individual segment the crux
of the problem is that loss of a single segment can be interpreted
as loss of all. TCP only sees the last return code for the last
segment of the GSO frame (in <> brackets in the diagram above).
Of course for the problem to occur we need a setup or a device
without a Qdisc. Otherwise Qdisc layer disconnects the protocol
layer from the device errors completely.
We have multiple ways to fix this.
1) make veth not return an error when it lost a packet.
While this is what I think we did in the past, the issue keeps
reappearing and it's annoying to debug. The game of whack
a mole is not great.
2) fix the damn return codes
We only talk about NETDEV_TX_OK and NETDEV_TX_BUSY in the
documentation, so maybe we should make the return code from
ndo_start_xmit() a boolean. I like that the most, but perhaps
some ancient, not-really-networking protocol would suffer.
3) make TCP ignore the errors
It is not entirely clear to me what benefit TCP gets from
interpreting the result of ip_queue_xmit()? Specifically once
the connection is established and we're pushing data - packet
loss is just packet loss?
4) this fix
Ignore the rc in the Qdisc-less+GSO case, since it's unreliable.
We already always return OK in the TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS case.
In the Qdisc-less case let's be a bit more conservative and only
mask the GSO errors. This path is taken by non-IP-"networks"
like CAN, MCTP etc, so we could regress some ancient thing.
This is the simplest, but also maybe the hackiest fix?
Similar fix has been proposed by Eric in the past but never committed
because original reporter was working with an OOT driver and wasn't
providing feedback (see Link). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: xt_tcpmss: check remaining length before reading optlen
Quoting reporter:
In net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c (lines 53-68), the TCP option parser reads
op[i+1] directly without validating the remaining option length.
If the last byte of the option field is not EOL/NOP (0/1), the code attempts
to index op[i+1]. In the case where i + 1 == optlen, this causes an
out-of-bounds read, accessing memory past the optlen boundary
(either reading beyond the stack buffer _opt or the
following payload). |
