| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix locking in rxrpc's sendmsg
Fix three bugs in the rxrpc's sendmsg implementation:
(1) rxrpc_new_client_call() should release the socket lock when returning
an error from rxrpc_get_call_slot().
(2) rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window_intr() will return without the call mutex
held in the event that we're interrupted by a signal whilst waiting
for tx space on the socket or relocking the call mutex afterwards.
Fix this by: (a) moving the unlock/lock of the call mutex up to
rxrpc_send_data() such that the lock is not held around all of
rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window*() and (b) indicating to higher callers
whether we're return with the lock dropped. Note that this means
recvmsg() will not block on this call whilst we're waiting.
(3) After dropping and regaining the call mutex, rxrpc_send_data() needs
to go and recheck the state of the tx_pending buffer and the
tx_total_len check in case we raced with another sendmsg() on the same
call.
Thinking on this some more, it might make sense to have different locks for
sendmsg() and recvmsg(). There's probably no need to make recvmsg() wait
for sendmsg(). It does mean that recvmsg() can return MSG_EOR indicating
that a call is dead before a sendmsg() to that call returns - but that can
currently happen anyway.
Without fix (2), something like the following can be induced:
WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
5.16.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-------------------------------------
syz-executor011/3597 is trying to release lock (&call->user_mutex) at:
[<ffffffff885163a3>] rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0xc13/0x1350 net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c:748
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
no locks held by syz-executor011/3597.
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_unlock_imbalance_bug include/trace/events/lock.h:58 [inline]
__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5306 [inline]
lock_release.cold+0x49/0x4e kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5657
__mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x99/0x5e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:900
rxrpc_do_sendmsg+0xc13/0x1350 net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c:748
rxrpc_sendmsg+0x420/0x630 net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c:561
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[Thanks to Hawkins Jiawei and Khalid Masum for their attempts to fix this] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: fix null pointer dereference
Asus chromebook CX550 crashes during boot on v5.17-rc1 kernel.
The root cause is null pointer defeference of bi_next
in tgl_get_bw_info() in drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_bw.c.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002e
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G U 5.17.0-rc1
Hardware name: Google Delbin/Delbin, BIOS Google_Delbin.13672.156.3 05/14/2021
RIP: 0010:tgl_get_bw_info+0x2de/0x510
...
[ 2.554467] Call Trace:
[ 2.554467] <TASK>
[ 2.554467] intel_bw_init_hw+0x14a/0x434
[ 2.554467] ? _printk+0x59/0x73
[ 2.554467] ? _dev_err+0x77/0x91
[ 2.554467] i915_driver_hw_probe+0x329/0x33e
[ 2.554467] i915_driver_probe+0x4c8/0x638
[ 2.554467] i915_pci_probe+0xf8/0x14e
[ 2.554467] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x12/0x2c
[ 2.554467] pci_device_probe+0xaa/0x142
[ 2.554467] really_probe+0x13f/0x2f4
[ 2.554467] __driver_probe_device+0x9e/0xd3
[ 2.554467] driver_probe_device+0x24/0x7c
[ 2.554467] __driver_attach+0xba/0xcf
[ 2.554467] ? driver_attach+0x1f/0x1f
[ 2.554467] bus_for_each_dev+0x8c/0xc0
[ 2.554467] bus_add_driver+0x11b/0x1f7
[ 2.554467] driver_register+0x60/0xea
[ 2.554467] ? mipi_dsi_bus_init+0x16/0x16
[ 2.554467] i915_init+0x2c/0xb9
[ 2.554467] ? mipi_dsi_bus_init+0x16/0x16
[ 2.554467] do_one_initcall+0x12e/0x2b3
[ 2.554467] do_initcall_level+0xd6/0xf3
[ 2.554467] do_initcalls+0x4e/0x79
[ 2.554467] kernel_init_freeable+0xed/0x14d
[ 2.554467] ? rest_init+0xc1/0xc1
[ 2.554467] kernel_init+0x1a/0x120
[ 2.554467] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 2.554467] </TASK>
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
(cherry picked from commit c247cd03898c4c43c3bce6d4014730403bc13032) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do mark_chain_precision for ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO
Precision markers need to be propagated whenever we have an ARG_CONST_*
style argument, as the verifier cannot consider imprecise scalars to be
equivalent for the purposes of states_equal check when such arguments
refine the return value (in this case, set mem_size for PTR_TO_MEM). The
resultant mem_size for the R0 is derived from the constant value, and if
the verifier incorrectly prunes states considering them equivalent where
such arguments exist (by seeing that both registers have reg->precise as
false in regsafe), we can end up with invalid programs passing the
verifier which can do access beyond what should have been the correct
mem_size in that explored state.
To show a concrete example of the problem:
0000000000000000 <prog>:
0: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80)
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76)
2: r3 = r1
3: r3 += 4
4: if r3 > r2 goto +18 <LBB5_5>
5: w2 = 0
6: *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
7: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
8: r2 = 1
9: if w1 == 0 goto +1 <LBB5_3>
10: r2 = -1
0000000000000058 <LBB5_3>:
11: r1 = 0 ll
13: r3 = 0
14: call bpf_ringbuf_reserve
15: if r0 == 0 goto +7 <LBB5_5>
16: r1 = r0
17: r1 += 16777215
18: w2 = 0
19: *(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
20: r1 = r0
21: r2 = 0
22: call bpf_ringbuf_submit
00000000000000b8 <LBB5_5>:
23: w0 = 0
24: exit
For the first case, the single line execution's exploration will prune
the search at insn 14 for the branch insn 9's second leg as it will be
verified first using r2 = -1 (UINT_MAX), while as w1 at insn 9 will
always be 0 so at runtime we don't get error for being greater than
UINT_MAX/4 from bpf_ringbuf_reserve. The verifier during regsafe just
sees reg->precise as false for both r2 registers in both states, hence
considers them equal for purposes of states_equal.
If we propagated precise markers using the backtracking support, we
would use the precise marking to then ensure that old r2 (UINT_MAX) was
within the new r2 (1) and this would never be true, so the verification
would rightfully fail.
The end result is that the out of bounds access at instruction 19 would
be permitted without this fix.
Note that reg->precise is always set to true when user does not have
CAP_BPF (or when subprog count is greater than 1 (i.e. use of any static
or global functions)), hence this is only a problem when precision marks
need to be explicitly propagated (i.e. privileged users with CAP_BPF).
A simplified test case has been included in the next patch to prevent
future regressions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: fix stuck flows on cleanup due to pending work
To clear the flow table on flow table free, the following sequence
normally happens in order:
1) gc_step work is stopped to disable any further stats/del requests.
2) All flow table entries are set to teardown state.
3) Run gc_step which will queue HW del work for each flow table entry.
4) Waiting for the above del work to finish (flush).
5) Run gc_step again, deleting all entries from the flow table.
6) Flow table is freed.
But if a flow table entry already has pending HW stats or HW add work
step 3 will not queue HW del work (it will be skipped), step 4 will wait
for the pending add/stats to finish, and step 5 will queue HW del work
which might execute after freeing of the flow table.
To fix the above, this patch flushes the pending work, then it sets the
teardown flag to all flows in the flowtable and it forces a garbage
collector run to queue work to remove the flows from hardware, then it
flushes this new pending work and (finally) it forces another garbage
collector run to remove the entry from the software flowtable.
Stack trace:
[47773.882335] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.883634] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888103b45aa8 by task kworker/u20:6/543704
[47773.885634] CPU: 3 PID: 543704 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2
[47773.886745] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009)
[47773.888438] Workqueue: nf_ft_offload_del flow_offload_work_handler [nf_flow_table]
[47773.889727] Call Trace:
[47773.890214] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[47773.890818] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140
[47773.892990] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8
[47773.894459] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0
[47773.895174] down_read+0x99/0x460
[47773.899706] nf_flow_offload_tuple+0x24f/0x3c0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.907137] flow_offload_work_handler+0x72d/0xbe0 [nf_flow_table]
[47773.913372] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0
[47773.921325]
[47773.921325] Allocated by task 592159:
[47773.922031] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.922730] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[47773.923411] tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x3cb/0x1230 [act_ct]
[47773.924363] tcf_ct_init+0x71c/0x1156 [act_ct]
[47773.925207] tcf_action_init_1+0x45b/0x700
[47773.925987] tcf_action_init+0x453/0x6b0
[47773.926692] tcf_exts_validate+0x3d0/0x600
[47773.927419] fl_change+0x757/0x4a51 [cls_flower]
[47773.928227] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070
[47773.936652]
[47773.936652] Freed by task 543704:
[47773.937303] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[47773.938039] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[47773.938731] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[47773.939467] __kasan_slab_free+0xe7/0x120
[47773.940194] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x86/0x190
[47773.941038] kfree+0xce/0x3a0
[47773.941644] tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work
Original patch description and stack trace by Paul Blakey. |
| A flaw was found in the exFAT driver of the Linux kernel. The vulnerability exists in the implementation of the file name reconstruction function, which is responsible for reading file name entries from a directory index and merging file name parts belonging to one file into a single long file name. Since the file name characters are copied into a stack variable, a local privileged attacker could use this flaw to overflow the kernel stack. |
| A flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s IP framework for transforming packets (XFRM subsystem). This issue may allow a malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges to cause a 4 byte out-of-bounds read of XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH when parsing netlink attributes, leading to potential leakage of sensitive heap data to userspace. |
| A possible unauthorized memory access flaw was found in the Linux kernel's cpu_entry_area mapping of X86 CPU data to memory, where a user may guess the location of exception stacks or other important data. Based on the previous CVE-2023-0597, the 'Randomize per-cpu entry area' feature was implemented in /arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c, which works through the init_cea_offsets() function when KASLR is enabled. However, despite this feature, there is still a risk of per-cpu entry area leaks. This issue could allow a local user to gain access to some important data with memory in an expected location and potentially escalate their privileges on the system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: clear optc underflow before turn off odm clock
[Why]
After ODM clock off, optc underflow bit will be kept there always and clear not work.
We need to clear that before clock off.
[How]
Clear that if have when clock off. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix use-after-free on amdgpu_bo_list mutex
If amdgpu_cs_vm_handling returns r != 0, then it will unlock the
bo_list_mutex inside the function amdgpu_cs_vm_handling and again on
amdgpu_cs_parser_fini. This problem results in the following
use-after-free problem:
[ 220.280990] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 220.281000] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 220.281019] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3746 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 220.281029] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 220.281415] CPU: 1 PID: 3746 Comm: chrome:cs0 Tainted: G W L ------- --- 5.20.0-0.rc0.20220812git7ebfc85e2cd7.10.fc38.x86_64 #1
[ 220.281421] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX X570-I GAMING, BIOS 4403 04/27/2022
[ 220.281426] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[ 220.281431] Code: 01 01 e8 79 4a 6f 00 0f 0b e9 42 47 a5 00 80 3d de
7e be 01 00 75 85 48 c7 c7 f8 98 8e 98 c6 05 ce 7e be 01 01 e8 56 4a
6f 00 <0f> 0b e9 1f 47 a5 00 80 3d b9 7e be 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48
c7
[ 220.281437] RSP: 0018:ffffb4b0d18d7a80 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 220.281443] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 220.281448] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff988d06dc RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 220.281452] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb4b0d18d7930
[ 220.281457] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffa0672e2fffe8 R12: ffffa058ca360400
[ 220.281461] R13: ffffa05846c50a18 R14: 00000000fffffe00 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 220.281465] FS: 00007f82683e06c0(0000) GS:ffffa066e2e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 220.281470] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 220.281475] CR2: 00003590005cc000 CR3: 00000001fca46000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 220.281480] Call Trace:
[ 220.281485] <TASK>
[ 220.281490] amdgpu_cs_ioctl+0x4e2/0x2070 [amdgpu]
[ 220.281806] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0xe0/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 220.282028] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa4/0x150
[ 220.282043] drm_ioctl+0x21f/0x420
[ 220.282053] ? amdgpu_cs_find_mapping+0xe0/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 220.282275] ? lock_release+0x14f/0x460
[ 220.282282] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60
[ 220.282290] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x60
[ 220.282297] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 220.282305] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60
[ 220.282317] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4a/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ 220.282534] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0
[ 220.282545] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
[ 220.282551] ? futex_wake+0x6c/0x150
[ 220.282568] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140
[ 220.282580] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 220.282585] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 220.282592] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 220.282597] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[ 220.282602] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 220.282609] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 220.282616] RIP: 0033:0x7f8282a4f8bf
[ 220.282639] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10
00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00
0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 18 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
00
[ 220.282644] RSP: 002b:00007f82683df410 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 220.282651] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f82683df588 RCX: 00007f8282a4f8bf
[ 220.282655] RDX: 00007f82683df4d0 RSI: 00000000c0186444 RDI: 0000000000000018
[ 220.282659] RBP: 00007f82683df4d0 R08: 00007f82683df5e0 R09: 00007f82683df4b0
[ 220.282663] R10: 00001d04000a0600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c0186444
[ 220.282667] R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00007f82683df588 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 220.282689] </TASK>
[ 220.282693] irq event stamp: 6232311
[ 220.282697] hardirqs last enabled at (6232319): [<ffffffff9718cd7e>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0x70
[ 220.282704] hardirqs last disabled at (6232326): [<ffffffff9718cd63>] __up_console_sem+0x43/0x70
[ 220.282709] softirqs last enabled at (6232072): [<ffffffff970ff669>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf9/0x170
[ 220.282716] softirqs last disabled at (6232061): [<ffffffff97
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: start MHI channel after endpoit creation
MHI channel may generates event/interrupt right after enabling.
It may leads to 2 race conditions issues.
1)
Such event may be dropped by qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback() at check:
if (!qdev || mhi_res->transaction_status)
return;
Because dev_set_drvdata(&mhi_dev->dev, qdev) may be not performed at
this moment. In this situation qrtr-ns will be unable to enumerate
services in device.
---------------------------------------------------------------
2)
Such event may come at the moment after dev_set_drvdata() and
before qrtr_endpoint_register(). In this case kernel will panic with
accessing wrong pointer at qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback():
rc = qrtr_endpoint_post(&qdev->ep, mhi_res->buf_addr,
mhi_res->bytes_xferd);
Because endpoint is not created yet.
--------------------------------------------------------------
So move mhi_prepare_for_transfer_autoqueue after endpoint creation
to fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: don't replace page in rq_pages if it's a continuation of last page
The splice read calls nfsd_splice_actor to put the pages containing file
data into the svc_rqst->rq_pages array. It's possible however to get a
splice result that only has a partial page at the end, if (e.g.) the
filesystem hands back a short read that doesn't cover the whole page.
nfsd_splice_actor will plop the partial page into its rq_pages array and
return. Then later, when nfsd_splice_actor is called again, the
remainder of the page may end up being filled out. At this point,
nfsd_splice_actor will put the page into the array _again_ corrupting
the reply. If this is done enough times, rq_next_page will overrun the
array and corrupt the trailing fields -- the rq_respages and
rq_next_page pointers themselves.
If we've already added the page to the array in the last pass, don't add
it to the array a second time when dealing with a splice continuation.
This was originally handled properly in nfsd_splice_actor, but commit
91e23b1c3982 ("NFSD: Clean up nfsd_splice_actor()") removed the check
for it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: lan78xx: Limit packet length to skb->len
Packet length retrieved from descriptor may be larger than
the actual socket buffer length. In such case the cloned
skb passed up the network stack will leak kernel memory contents.
Additionally prevent integer underflow when size is less than
ETH_FCS_LEN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: PPTT: Fix to avoid sleep in the atomic context when PPTT is absent
Commit 0c80f9e165f8 ("ACPI: PPTT: Leave the table mapped for the runtime usage")
enabled to map PPTT once on the first invocation of acpi_get_pptt() and
never unmapped the same allowing it to be used at runtime with out the
hassle of mapping and unmapping the table. This was needed to fetch LLC
information from the PPTT in the cpuhotplug path which is executed in
the atomic context as the acpi_get_table() might sleep waiting for a
mutex.
However it missed to handle the case when there is no PPTT on the system
which results in acpi_get_pptt() being called from all the secondary
CPUs attempting to fetch the LLC information in the atomic context
without knowing the absence of PPTT resulting in the splat like below:
| BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/semaphore.c:164
| in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1
| preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
| RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
| no locks held by swapper/1/0.
| irq event stamp: 0
| hardirqs last enabled at (0): 0x0
| hardirqs last disabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40
| softirqs last enabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40
| softirqs last disabled at (0): 0x0
| CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1 #1
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0xac/0x138
| show_stack+0x30/0x48
| dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xb0
| dump_stack+0x18/0x28
| __might_resched+0x160/0x270
| __might_sleep+0x58/0xb0
| down_timeout+0x34/0x98
| acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x7c/0xc0
| acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x58/0x108
| acpi_get_table+0x40/0xe8
| acpi_get_pptt+0x48/0xa0
| acpi_get_cache_info+0x38/0x140
| init_cache_level+0xf4/0x118
| detect_cache_attributes+0x2e4/0x640
| update_siblings_masks+0x3c/0x330
| store_cpu_topology+0x88/0xf0
| secondary_start_kernel+0xd0/0x168
| __secondary_switched+0xb8/0xc0
Update acpi_get_pptt() to consider the fact that PPTT is once checked and
is not available on the system and return NULL avoiding any attempts to
fetch PPTT and thereby avoiding any possible sleep waiting for a mutex
in the atomic context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/amd/core: Always clear status for idx
The variable 'status' (which contains the unhandled overflow bits) is
not being properly masked in some cases, displaying the following
warning:
WARNING: CPU: 156 PID: 475601 at arch/x86/events/amd/core.c:972 amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq+0x216/0x270
This seems to be happening because the loop is being continued before
the status bit being unset, in case x86_perf_event_set_period()
returns 0. This is also causing an inconsistency because the "handled"
counter is incremented, but the status bit is not cleaned.
Move the bit cleaning together above, together when the "handled"
counter is incremented. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_dh_alua: Fix memleak for 'qdata' in alua_activate()
If alua_rtpg_queue() failed from alua_activate(), then 'qdata' is not
freed, which will cause following memleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88810b2c6980 (size 32):
comm "kworker/u16:2", pid 635322, jiffies 4355801099 (age 1216426.076s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
40 39 24 c1 ff ff ff ff 00 f8 ea 0a 81 88 ff ff @9$.............
backtrace:
[<0000000098f3a26d>] alua_activate+0xb0/0x320
[<000000003b529641>] scsi_dh_activate+0xb2/0x140
[<000000007b296db3>] activate_path_work+0xc6/0xe0 [dm_multipath]
[<000000007adc9ace>] process_one_work+0x3c5/0x730
[<00000000c457a985>] worker_thread+0x93/0x650
[<00000000cb80e628>] kthread+0x1ba/0x210
[<00000000a1e61077>] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Fix the problem by freeing 'qdata' in error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix perf_output_begin parameter is incorrectly invoked in perf_event_bpf_output
syzkaller reportes a KASAN issue with stack-out-of-bounds.
The call trace is as follows:
dump_stack+0x9c/0xd3
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170
__kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
__perf_event_header__init_id+0x34/0x290
perf_event_header__init_id+0x48/0x60
perf_output_begin+0x4a4/0x560
perf_event_bpf_output+0x161/0x1e0
perf_iterate_sb_cpu+0x29e/0x340
perf_iterate_sb+0x4c/0xc0
perf_event_bpf_event+0x194/0x2c0
__bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x55/0xf0
__cls_bpf_delete_prog+0xea/0x120 [cls_bpf]
cls_bpf_delete_prog_work+0x1c/0x30 [cls_bpf]
process_one_work+0x3c2/0x730
worker_thread+0x93/0x650
kthread+0x1b8/0x210
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
commit 267fb27352b6 ("perf: Reduce stack usage of perf_output_begin()")
use on-stack struct perf_sample_data of the caller function.
However, perf_event_bpf_output uses incorrect parameter to convert
small-sized data (struct perf_bpf_event) into large-sized data
(struct perf_sample_data), which causes memory overwriting occurs in
__perf_event_header__init_id. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qed/qed_sriov: guard against NULL derefs from qed_iov_get_vf_info
We have to make sure that the info returned by the helper is valid
before using it.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE
static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm crypt: add cond_resched() to dmcrypt_write()
The loop in dmcrypt_write may be running for unbounded amount of time,
thus we need cond_resched() in it.
This commit fixes the following warning:
[ 3391.153255][ C12] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#12 stuck for 23s! [dmcrypt_write/2:2897]
...
[ 3391.387210][ C12] Call trace:
[ 3391.390338][ C12] blk_attempt_bio_merge.part.6+0x38/0x158
[ 3391.395970][ C12] blk_attempt_plug_merge+0xc0/0x1b0
[ 3391.401085][ C12] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x398/0x550
[ 3391.405856][ C12] submit_bio_noacct+0x308/0x380
[ 3391.410630][ C12] dmcrypt_write+0x1e4/0x208 [dm_crypt]
[ 3391.416005][ C12] kthread+0x130/0x138
[ 3391.419911][ C12] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix use-after-free bug in refresh_cache_worker()
The UAF bug occurred because we were putting DFS root sessions in
cifs_umount() while DFS cache refresher was being executed.
Make DFS root sessions have same lifetime as DFS tcons so we can avoid
the use-after-free bug is DFS cache refresher and other places that
require IPCs to get new DFS referrals on. Also, get rid of mount
group handling in DFS cache as we no longer need it.
This fixes below use-after-free bug catched by KASAN
[ 379.946955] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __refresh_tcon.isra.0+0x10b/0xc10 [cifs]
[ 379.947642] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888018f57030 by task kworker/u4:3/56
[ 379.948096]
[ 379.948208] CPU: 0 PID: 56 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc7-lku #23
[ 379.948661] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 379.949368] Workqueue: cifs-dfscache refresh_cache_worker [cifs]
[ 379.949942] Call Trace:
[ 379.950113] <TASK>
[ 379.950260] dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x67
[ 379.950510] print_report+0x16a/0x48e
[ 379.950759] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd8/0x160
[ 379.951040] ? __phys_addr+0x41/0x80
[ 379.951285] kasan_report+0xdb/0x110
[ 379.951533] ? __refresh_tcon.isra.0+0x10b/0xc10 [cifs]
[ 379.952056] ? __refresh_tcon.isra.0+0x10b/0xc10 [cifs]
[ 379.952585] __refresh_tcon.isra.0+0x10b/0xc10 [cifs]
[ 379.953096] ? __pfx___refresh_tcon.isra.0+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 379.953637] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 379.953915] ? lock_release+0xb6/0x720
[ 379.954167] ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[ 379.954443] ? refresh_cache_worker+0x34e/0x6d0 [cifs]
[ 379.954960] ? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10
[ 379.955239] refresh_cache_worker+0x4ad/0x6d0 [cifs]
[ 379.955755] ? __pfx_refresh_cache_worker+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 379.956323] ? __pfx_lock_acquired+0x10/0x10
[ 379.956615] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20
[ 379.956898] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12/0x220
[ 379.957235] process_one_work+0x535/0x990
[ 379.957509] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
[ 379.957812] ? lock_acquired+0xb7/0x5f0
[ 379.958069] ? __list_add_valid+0x37/0xd0
[ 379.958341] ? __list_add_valid+0x37/0xd0
[ 379.958611] worker_thread+0x8e/0x630
[ 379.958861] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 379.959148] kthread+0x17d/0x1b0
[ 379.959369] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 379.959630] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
[ 379.959879] </TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session
There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may
lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after
sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:
sess->session_info[i] = session_info;
if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data
structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is
accessed within amdtee_open_session().
The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in
amdtee_open_session(). |
