| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: synproxy: refresh tcphdr after skb_ensure_writable
synproxy_tstamp_adjust() rewrites the TCP timestamp option in place
and then patches the TCP checksum via inet_proto_csum_replace4() on
the caller-supplied tcphdr pointer. Both ipv4_synproxy_hook() and
ipv6_synproxy_hook() obtain that pointer with skb_header_pointer()
before calling in, so it may either alias skb->head directly or
point at the caller's on-stack _tcph buffer.
Between obtaining the pointer and using it, the function calls
skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend), which on a cloned or non-linear
skb invokes pskb_expand_head() and frees the old skb->head. After
that point the cached th is stale:
caller (ipv[46]_synproxy_hook)
th = skb_header_pointer(skb, ..., &_tcph)
synproxy_tstamp_adjust(skb, protoff, th, ...)
skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend)
pskb_expand_head() /* kfree(old skb->head) */
...
inet_proto_csum_replace4(&th->check, ...)
/* writes into freed head, or
into the caller's stack copy
leaving the on-wire checksum
stale */
The option bytes are written through skb->data and are fine; only
the checksum update goes through th and so lands in the wrong
place. The result is either a write into freed slab memory or a
packet leaving with a checksum that does not match its payload.
Fix by re-deriving th from skb->data + protoff immediately after
skb_ensure_writable() succeeds, so the subsequent checksum update
targets the linear, writable header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Do not re-initialize smc hashtables
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&smc_v*_hashinfo.ht) are called after smc_nl_init(),
proto_register() and sock_register(). This can lead to smc_v*_hashinfo.ht
being reset even though hash entries already exist and are being used,
possibly resulting in a corrupted list.
Remove unnecessary and dangerous re-initialisation of smc_v*_hashinfo.ht in
smc_init(); it is implicitly initialised to zero anyhow. Add
HLIST_HEAD_INIT to the definitions for clarity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: fix locking in .getsockopt
Mirror iucv_sock_setsockopt() and wrap the whole switch in
lock_sock()/release_sock(). The pre-existing SO_MSGLIMIT-only lock
becomes redundant and is removed.
Any AF_IUCV HIPER user can potentially crash the kernel by racing
recvmsg() with getsockopt(SO_MSGSIZE): the SO_MSGSIZE arm dereferences
iucv->hs_dev->mtu after iucv_sock_close() (called from the racing
recvmsg()) has set hs_dev to NULL, producing a NULL pointer dereference
oops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Run queues for all non-SDEV_DEL devices from scsi_run_host_queues
While a SCSI host is in a recovery state, scsi_mq_requeue_cmd() will not
set the requeue list for a requeued command to be kicked in the future.
The expectation is a call to scsi_run_host_queues() will kick all SCSI
devices once the recovery state is cleared.
However, scsi_run_host_queues() uses shost_for_each_device() which uses
scsi_device_get() and so will ignore devices in a partially removed
state like SDEV_CANCEL. But these devices may also have requeued
requests, leaving their requests stuck from not being kicked and causing
the removal process of the device to hang.
scsi_run_host_queues() needs to run against more devices than the macro
shost_for_each_device() allows. Instead of using the too limiting
scsi_device_get() state checks, only ignore devices in SDEV_DEL state or
when unable to acquire a reference. Attempt to run the queues for all
other devices when scsi_run_host_queues() is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table()
ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports
too soon.
Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly
use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hsr: fix potential OOB access in supervision frame handling
Ensure the entire TLV header is linearized before access by adding
sizeof(struct hsr_sup_tlv) to the pskb_may_pull() calls. Without this,
a truncated frame could cause an out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length
Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than
what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes.
Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just
be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted,
so let's protect the kernel.
The existing check protects from short replies. We need to
protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero
rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct
and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation
or short-reply handling:
- cmis_cdb_validate_password()
- cmis_cdb_module_features_get()
- cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get()
so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not
have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message
to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong...
Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from
last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len.
Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload
itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack),
but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard,
so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like
defensive programming. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: cmis: validate start_cmd_payload_size from module
The CMIS firmware update code reads start_cmd_payload_size from
the module's FW Management Features CDB reply and uses it directly
as the byte count for memcpy. The destination buffer is 112 bytes
(ETHTOOL_CMIS_CDB_LPL_MAX_PL_LENGTH - 8). So a malicious
module (or corrupted response) can cause a OOB write later on in
cmis_fw_update_start_download().
Let's error out. If modules that expect longer LPL writes actually
exist we should revisit.
struct cmis_cdb_start_fw_download_pl's definition has to move,
no change there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()
Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and
iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr()
before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head.
Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables
after the skb_cow() call.
Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can change skb->head.
Reusing old_iph afer skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can cause an UAF.
Use instead ip_hdr(skb) as done in drivers/net/bareudp.c
and drivers/net/geneve.c.
Found by Sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: do not assume transport header in iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp()
In some cases, iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() can be called while
skb transport header is not set.
This triggers an out-of-bound access, because
(typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U is 65535.
Access the icmp header based on IPv4 network header,
after making sure icmp->type is present in skb linear part.
Note that iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6()) is fine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: coalesce: cap profile updates at NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES
ethnl_update_profile() walks the ETHTOOL_A_PROFILE_IRQ_MODERATION
nest list with an index 'i' and writes new_profile[i++] without
bounding i. The destination is kmemdup()'d at NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES
entries (5), but the Netlink nest count is entirely user-controlled.
Netlink policies do not have support for constraining the number
of nested entries (or number of multi-attr entries). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback
The Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM
(fallback_set_params()) validates that offset < eeprom_len,
but does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len.
The ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has
always enforced both bounds:
if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len)
return -EINVAL;
This could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW.
Add the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(),
mirroring the ioctl.
Similarly - ethtool core in general, and ethtool_get_any_eeprom()
in particular tries to zero-init all buffers passed to the drivers
to avoid any extra work of zeroing things out. eeprom_fallback()
uses a plain kmalloc(), change it to zalloc. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:
outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3);
hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently
truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):
(128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8
The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header
at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8,
but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header
plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the
decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this
overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet.
The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which
prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left
field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing
__u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not
fit.
Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving
hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed
header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly
past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127
segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Use spin_lock_bh for hn_lock
nvmet_tcp_state_change(), a socket callback that runs in BH context,
can reach handshake_req_cancel() via nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue()
and tls_handshake_cancel(). handshake_req_cancel() acquires
hn->hn_lock with plain spin_lock(). If a process-context thread on
the same CPU holds hn->hn_lock when a softirq invokes the cancel path,
the lock attempt deadlocks. This is the only caller that invokes
tls_handshake_cancel() from BH context; every other consumer calls it
from process context.
Deferring the cancel to process context in the NVMe target is not
straightforward: nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() must call
tls_handshake_cancel() atomically with its state transition to
DISCONNECTING. If the cancel were deferred, the handshake completion
callback could fire in the window before the cancel runs, observe the
unexpected state, and return without dropping its kref on the queue.
Reworking that interlock is considerably more invasive than hardening
the handshake lock. Convert all hn->hn_lock acquisitions from
spin_lock/spin_unlock to spin_lock_bh/spin_unlock_bh so the lock is
never taken with softirqs enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit
handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net
pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit()
reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in
FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a
consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put()
(svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases
sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing
sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code
either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory.
The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt
protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are
independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer
owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected.
Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was
pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file.
Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels
between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching
FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in
handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side
takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference
inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side
operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel()
can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference,
either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by
dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit
get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore
redundant and goes away.
Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the
FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count
assertions stay balanced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit
The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are
reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto
hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent
drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that
had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace
is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on
the handshake_req allocation.
Pass the source and destination in the documented order
(list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending
list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through
handshake_complete().
Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After
the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers,
threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests.
A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's
TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not
taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls
remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list).
__remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the
scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same
call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an
entry hits LIST_POISON instead.
Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under
hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The
drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing
test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates
between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use
list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list
does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry.
The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false,
but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on
HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference.
Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees
the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list.
Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list,
and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpll: zl3073x: use __dpll_device_change_ntf() and remove change_work
The change_work was introduced to send device change notifications
from DPLL device callbacks without deadlocking on dpll_lock, since
the callbacks are already invoked under that lock. Now that
__dpll_device_change_ntf() is exported for callers that already
hold dpll_lock, use it directly and remove the change_work
infrastructure entirely.
This eliminates a race condition where change_work could be
re-scheduled after cancel_work_sync() during device teardown,
potentially causing the handler to dereference a freed or NULL
dpll_dev pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan->ident on ECRED reconfiguration success
l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing
chan->ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp,
l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan->ident after a
successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent
responses with the recycled ident value.
A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can
replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to
match and destroy the already-established channel via
l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET).
Clear chan->ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the
failure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with
other L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp
If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec
requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del
may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and
in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned
previously it really needs to be disconnected.
Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so
instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel
asynchronously. |
