| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox is vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability in the
archive creation functionality. Because the archive path is
user-controlled and insufficiently validated, an attacker can manipulate
the input to traverse directories. This allows the creation of folders
in arbitrary locations, including sensitive directories such as
C:\Windows or for different users. This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524. |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox does not enforce authentication or authorization checks
when serving these log files. As a result, attackers can obtain
sensitive error information or internal application details, potentially
aiding in further attacks. This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524. |
| External control of file name or path vulnerability in TÜBİTAK BİLGEM Software Technologies Research Institute pardus-image-writer allows Removing Important Client Functionality.
This issue affects pardus-image-writer: before 0.9.0. |
| OpenBK7231T's http_fn_ota_exec() (src/httpserver/http_fns.c) reflects the `host` query parameter directly into an HTML response via hprintf255(request, "<h3>OTA requested for %s!</h3>", tmpA) with no HTML encoding, allowing a crafted URL such as /ota_exec?host=<script>alert(1)</script> to execute JavaScript in an authenticated admin's browser when they click a malicious link. |
| Command injection vulnerability in console.run_module_with_output() in pymetasploit3 through version 1.0.6 allows attackers to inject newline characters into module options such as RHOSTS. This breaks the intended command structure and causes the Metasploit console to execute additional unintended commands, potentially leading to arbitrary command execution and manipulation of Metasploit sessions. |
| Nexxt Solutions Nebula 300+ firmware through version 12.01.01.37 does not implement rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms on authentication interfaces. An attacker can perform unlimited authentication attempts against endpoints that rely on credential validation, enabling brute-force attacks to guess administrative credentials without restriction. |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox is vulnerable to a local file inclusion vulnerability in
the send email, fax, SMS, etc. functionality. By specifying an '@@attach' command in the form field 'scjob', files can be attached to a message,
which can then be downloaded by an authenticated user. A filter is in
place that restricts access to the David con-fig folder and the user
folder. However, this filter can be bypassed by specifying an alternate
data stream, allowing the download of sensitive files such as other
users' access files containing their passwords or the server's private
key. This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524. |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox is vulnerable to HTTP header injection through the
request body in the application's link storing functionality
(//ServerClient_celink.htm), which is appended to the redirect target in
the 302 HTTP response. If a line feed is added, this will also be added
to the redirect link, resulting in the ability to control the response
headers. This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524. |
| The Webbox of TeamDavid by Tobit Laboratories AG constructs redirect URLs using user-supplied input,
which is appended to the redirect target in a 302 HTTP response. By
using URL-encoded characters such as “%2e” (representing a dot), an
attacker can manipulate the portion of the URL following the top-level
domain (TLD). If a similar, registerable TLD exists (for example, if
“.com” is the application’s domain, and “.company” is available for
registration), an attacker can craft a URL to redirect users to a
malicious “.company” domain. By using URL-encoded line feeds, it becomes
possible to insert arbitrary response headers in the server's HTTP
response.
This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524. |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox is vulnerable to an arbitrary file deletion
vulnerability in the send email, fax, SMS, etc. functionality. By
specifying an @@COMMENTFILE command in the form field scjob, any file on
the system can be deleted. This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524. |
| Improper input validation in Samsung Message prior to SMR Aug-2026 Release 1 allows physical attackers to access sensitive information. |
| Improper input validation in MPEG4 codec in libsavsvc.so prior to SMR Aug-2026 Release 1 allows local attackers to write out-of-bounds memory. |
| The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin before 3.12.28 does not require a sufficient capability on one of its appointment-listing REST endpoints, restricting it only to a capability that every authenticated user holds, allowing users with subscriber-level access to read all bookings on the site, including customer names, schedules, and statuses. |
| A weakness has been identified in SourceCodester Simple Doctors Appointment System 1.0. The affected element is an unknown function of the file /admin/ajax.php?action=set_appointment. This manipulation of the argument ID causes sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. |
| The method "sock_recvfrom_into()" of "asyncio.ProacterEventLoop" (Windows only) was missing a boundary check for the data buffer when using nbytes parameter. This allowed for an out-of-bounds buffer write if data was larger than the buffer size. Non-Windows platforms are not affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal
brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule
drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()
and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free ->
wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending
or running during removal can outlive drvr.
Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work
callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe
brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset ->
brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for
the running work and deadlock.
Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through
brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is
marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls
brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing
and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes
the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming
path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in
the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail
path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in
sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the
firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;
on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which
also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is
initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees
drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;
resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.
Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire
before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr
(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.
The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to
every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),
SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the
debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending
bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the
scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released
those DMA buffers.
This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does
not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the
asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That
callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked
separately.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rhashtable: clear stale iter->p on table restart
rhashtable_walk_start_check() has two restart paths when resuming a walk.
When iter->walker.tbl is valid, it re-validates iter->p against the table
and sets iter->p = NULL if the object is gone. When iter->walker.tbl is
NULL (table was freed during resize), it resets slot and skip but forgets
to clear iter->p.
rhashtable_walk_next() then dereferences the stale iter->p, reading
freed memory. This is a use-after-free.
Any caller that does multi-fragment rhashtable walks across
walk_stop/walk_start boundaries is affected. Concrete cases include
netlink_diag (__netlink_diag_dump in net/netlink/diag.c) and TIPC
(tipc_nl_sk_walk in net/tipc/socket.c).
Crash stack (netlink_diag):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rhashtable_walk_next+0x365/0x3c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801a9d2438 (freed kmalloc-2k, offset 1080)
Call Trace:
rhashtable_walk_next+0x365/0x3c0 (lib/rhashtable.c:1016)
__netlink_diag_dump+0x160/0x760 (net/netlink/diag.c:122)
netlink_diag_dump+0xc2/0x240
netlink_dump+0x5bc/0x1270
netlink_recvmsg+0x7a3/0x980
sock_recvmsg+0x1bc/0x200
__sys_recvfrom+0x1d4/0x2c0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.
Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.
The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.
The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: logitech-dj: Fix maxfield check in DJ short report validation
Commit b6a57912854e ("HID: logitech-dj: Prevent REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT
related user initiated OOB write") added validation for the DJ short
output report, but the error path dereferences rep->field[0] even when
rep->maxfield is zero.
Commit 8b9a097eb2fc ("HID: logitech-dj: fix wrong detection of bad
DJ_SHORT output report") made the check conditional on rep being present,
but a crafted descriptor can still create report ID 0x20 with only padding
output items. hid-core registers the report, ignores the padding field,
and leaves rep->maxfield as zero.
In that case the validation enters the rep->maxfield < 1 branch and then
dereferences rep->field[0]->report_count while printing the error message,
causing a NULL pointer dereference during probe. This is reproducible with
uhid by emulating a Logitech receiver with a padding-only DJ short output
report:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in logi_dj_probe+0xb1/0x754 [hid_logitech_dj]
Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000028 by task kworker/4:1/129
...
Call Trace:
logi_dj_probe+0xb1/0x754 [hid_logitech_dj]
hid_device_probe+0x329/0x3f0 [hid]
really_probe+0x162/0x570
__device_attach+0x137/0x2c0
bus_probe_device+0x38/0xc0
device_add+0xa56/0xce0
hid_add_device+0x19c/0x280 [hid]
uhid_device_add_worker+0x2c/0xb0 [uhid]
Reject the zero-field report before printing the field report_count. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit
handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net
pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit()
reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in
FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a
consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put()
(svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases
sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing
sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code
either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory.
The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt
protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are
independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer
owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected.
Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was
pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file.
Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels
between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching
FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in
handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side
takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference
inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side
operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel()
can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference,
either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by
dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit
get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore
redundant and goes away.
Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the
FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count
assertions stay balanced. |
