| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Go MCP SDK used Go's standard encoding/json.Unmarshal for JSON-RPC and MCP protocol message parsing in versions prior to 1.3.1. Go's standard library performs case-insensitive matching of JSON keys to struct field tags — a field tagged json:"method" would also match "Method", "METHOD", etc. This violated the JSON-RPC 2.0 specification, which defines exact field names. A malicious MCP peer may have been able to send protocol messages with non-standard field casing that the SDK would silently accept. This had the potential for bypassing intermediary inspection and coss-implementation inconsistency. Go's standard JSON unmarshaling was replaced with a case-sensitive decoder in commit 7b8d81c. Users are advised to update to v1.3.1 to resolve this issue. |
| A vulnerability with the Ethernet VPN (EVPN) Layer 2 ingress packet processing of Cisco Nexus 3600 Platform Switches and Cisco Nexus 9500-R Series Switching Platforms could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to trigger a Layer 2 traffic loop.
This vulnerability is due to a logic error when processing a crafted Layer 2 ingress frame. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a stream of crafted Ethernet frames through the targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a Layer 2 Virtual eXtensible LAN (VxLAN) traffic loop, which, in turn, could result in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This Layer 2 loop could oversubscribe the bandwidth on network interfaces, which would result in all data plane traffic being dropped. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be Layer 2-adjacent to the affected device.
Note: To stop active exploitation of this vulnerability, manual intervention is required to both stop the crafted traffic and flap all involved network interfaces. For additional assistance if a Layer 2 loop that is related to this vulnerability is suspected, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or the proper support provider. |
| A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco FXOS Software and Cisco UCS Manager Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against a user of the interface.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the web-based management interface of an affected system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious data into specific pages of the interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected interface or access sensitive, browser-based information. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid credentials for a user account with the role of Administrator or AAA Administrator. |
| An Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource vulnerability in the On-Box Anomaly detection framework of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to execute code as root.
The On-Box Anomaly detection framework should only be reachable by other internal processes over the internal routing instance, but not over an externally exposed port. With the ability to access and manipulate the service to execute code as root a remote attacker can take complete control of the device.
Please note that this service is enabled by default as no specific configuration is required.
This issue affects Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series:
* 25.4 versions before 25.4R1-S1-EVO, 25.4R2-EVO.
This issue does not affect Junos OS Evolved versions before 25.4R1-EVO.
This issue does not affect Junos OS. |
| Fleet is open source device management software. A SQL injection vulnerability in versions prior to 4.80.1 allowed authenticated users to inject arbitrary SQL expressions via the `order_key` query parameter. Due to unsafe use of `goqu.I()` when constructing the `ORDER BY` clause, specially crafted input could escape identifier quoting and be interpreted as executable SQL. An authenticated attacker with access to the affected endpoint could inject SQL expressions into the underlying MySQL query. Although the injection occurs in an `ORDER BY` context, it is sufficient to enable blind SQL injection techniques that can disclose database information through conditional expressions that affect result ordering. Crafted expressions may also cause excessive computation or query failures, potentially leading to degraded performance or denial of service. No direct evidence of reliable data modification or stacked query execution was demonstrated. Version 4.80.1 fixes the issue. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, users should restrict access to the affected endpoint to trusted roles only and ensure that any user-supplied sort or column parameters are strictly allow-listed at the application or proxy layer. |
| LORIS (Longitudinal Online Research and Imaging System) is a self-hosted web application that provides data- and project-management for neuroimaging research. Starting in version 24.0.0 and prior to versions 26.0.5, 27.0.2, and 28.0.0, an authenticated user with the appropriate authorization can read configuration files on the server by exploiting a path traversal vulnerability. Some of these files contain hard-coded credentials. The vulnerability allows an attacker to read configuration files containing hard-coded credentials. The attacker could then authenticate to the database or other services if those credentials are reused. The attacker must be authenticated and have the required permissions. However, the vulnerability is easy to exploit and the application source code is public. This problem is fixed in LORIS v26.0.5 and v27.0.2 and above, and v28.0.0 and above. As a workaround, the electrophysiogy_browser in LORIS can be disabled by an administrator using the module manager. |
| n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22, a second-order expression injection vulnerability existed in n8n's Form nodes that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to inject and evaluate arbitrary n8n expressions by submitting crafted form data. When chained with an expression sandbox escape, this could escalate to remote code execution on the n8n host. The vulnerability requires a specific workflow configuration to be exploitable. First, a form node with a field interpolating a value provided by an unauthenticated user, e.g. a form submitted value. Second, the field value must begin with an `=` character, which caused n8n to treat it as an expression and triggered a double-evaluation of the field content. There is no practical reason for a workflow designer to prefix a field with `=` intentionally — the character is not rendered in the output, so the result would not match the designer's expectations. If added accidentally, it would be noticeable and very unlikely to persist. An unauthenticated attacker would need to either know about this specific circumstance on a target instance or discover a matching form by chance. Even when the preconditions are met, the expression injection alone is limited to data accessible within the n8n expression context. Escalation to remote code execution requires chaining with a separate sandbox escape vulnerability. The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations. Review usage of form nodes manually for above mentioned preconditions, disable the Form node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.form` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable, and/or disable the Form Trigger node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.formTrigger` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures. |
| n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22, an authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could exploit a vulnerability in the JavaScript Task Runner sandbox to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox boundary. On instances using internal Task Runners (default runner mode), this could result in full compromise of the n8n host. On instances using external Task Runners, the attacker might gain access to or impact other task executed on the Task Runner. Task Runners must be enabled using `N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED=true`. The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations. Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only, and/or use external runner mode (`N8N_RUNNERS_MODE=external`) to limit the blast radius. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures. |
| n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22, an authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could inject arbitrary scripts into pages rendered by the n8n application using different techniques on various nodes (Form Trigger node, Chat Trigger node, Send & Wait node, Webhook Node, and Chat Node). Scripts injected by a malicious workflow execute in the browser of any user who visits the affected page, enabling session hijacking and account takeover. The issues have been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1 and 1.123.21. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations. Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only, and/or disable the Webhook node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.webhook` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures. |
| TinyWeb is a web server (HTTP, HTTPS) written in Delphi for Win32. Versions prior to version 2.02 are vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack known as Slowloris. The server spawns a new OS thread for every incoming connection without enforcing a maximum concurrency limit or an appropriate request timeout. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust server concurrency limits and memory by opening numerous connections and sending data exceptionally slowly (e.g. 1 byte every few minutes). Anyone hosting services using TinyWeb is impacted. Version 2.02 fixes the issue. The patch introduces a `CMaxConnections` limit (set to 512) and a `CConnectionTimeoutSecs` idle timeout (set to 30 seconds). As a temporary workaround if upgrading is not immediately possible, consider placing the server behind a robust reverse proxy or Web Application Firewall (WAF) such as nginx, HAProxy, or Cloudflare, configured to buffer incomplete requests and aggressively enforce connection limits and timeouts. |
| TinyWeb is a web server (HTTP, HTTPS) written in Delphi for Win32. Versions prior to version 2.02 have a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability via memory exhaustion. Unauthenticated remote attackers can send an HTTP POST request to the server with an exceptionally large `Content-Length` header (e.g., `2147483647`). The server continuously allocates memory for the request body (`EntityBody`) while streaming the payload without enforcing any maximum limit, leading to all available memory being consumed and causing the server to crash. Anyone hosting services using TinyWeb is impacted. Version 2.02 fixes the issue. The patch introduces a `CMaxEntityBodySize` limit (set to 10MB) for the maximum size of accepted payloads. As a temporary workaround if upgrading is not immediately possible, consider placing the server behind a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or reverse proxy (like nginx or Cloudflare) configured to explicitly limit the maximum allowed HTTP request body size (e.g., `client_max_body_size` in nginx). |
| Budibase is a low code platform for creating internal tools, workflows, and admin panels. Prior to version 3.30.4, an unsafe `eval()` vulnerability in Budibase's view filtering implementation allows any authenticated user (including free tier accounts) to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on the server. This vulnerability ONLY affects Budibase Cloud (SaaS) - self-hosted deployments use native CouchDB views and are not vulnerable. The vulnerability exists in `packages/server/src/db/inMemoryView.ts` where user-controlled view map functions are directly evaluated without sanitization. The primary impact comes from what lives inside the pod's environment: the `app-service` pod runs with secrets baked into its environment variables, including `INTERNAL_API_KEY`, `JWT_SECRET`, CouchDB admin credentials, AWS keys, and more. Using the extracted CouchDB credentials, we verified direct database access, enumerated all tenant databases, and confirmed that user records (email addresses) are readable. Version 3.30.4 contains a patch. |
| The Dart and Flutter SDKs provide software development kits for the Dart programming language. In versions of the Dart SDK prior to 3.11.0 and the Flutter SDK prior to version 3.41.0, when the pub client (`dart pub` and `flutter pub`) extracts a package in the pub cache, a malicious package archive can have files extracted outside the destination directory in the `PUB_CACHE`. A fix has been landed in commit 26c6985c742593d081f8b58450f463a584a4203a. By normalizing the file path before writing file, the attacker can no longer traverse up via a symlink. This patch is released in Dart 3.11.0 and Flutter 3.41.0.vAll packages on pub.dev have been vetted for this vulnerability. New packages are no longer allowed to contain symlinks. The pub client itself doesn't upload symlinks, but duplicates the linked entry, and has been doing this for years. Those whose dependencies are all from pub.dev, third-party repositories trusted to not contain malicious code, or git dependencies are not affected by this vulnerability. |
| mchange-commons-java, a library that provides Java utilities, includes code that mirrors early implementations of JNDI functionality, including support for remote `factoryClassLocation` values, by which code can be downloaded and invoked within a running application. If an attacker can provoke an application to read a maliciously crafted `jaxax.naming.Reference` or serialized object, they can provoke the download and execution of malicious code. Implementations of this functionality within the JDK were disabled by default behind a System property that defaults to `false`, `com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase`. However, since mchange-commons-java includes an independent implementation of JNDI derefencing, libraries (such as c3p0) that resolve references via that implementation could be provoked to download and execute malicious code even after the JDK was hardened. Mirroring the JDK patch, mchange-commons-java's JNDI functionality is gated by configuration parameters that default to restrictive values starting in version 0.4.0. No known workarounds are available. Versions prior to 0.4.0 should be avoided on application CLASSPATHs. |
| The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in versions on the 19.x branch prior to 19.2.21, the 20.x branch prior to 20.3.17, and the 21.x branch prior to 21.1.5 and 21.2.0-rc.1. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes. This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking. In order to be vulnerable, the application must use Angular SSR, the application must have routes that perform internal redirects, the infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header to the SSR process without sanitization, and the cache must not vary on the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header. Versions 21.2.0-rc.1, 21.1.5, 20.3.17, and 19.2.21 contain a patch. Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their`server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request. |
| LangGraph Checkpoint defines the base interface for LangGraph checkpointers. Prior to version 4.0.0, a Remote Code Execution vulnerability exists in LangGraph's caching layer when applications enable cache backends that inherit from `BaseCache` and opt nodes into caching via `CachePolicy`. Prior to `langgraph-checkpoint` 4.0.0, `BaseCache` defaults to `JsonPlusSerializer(pickle_fallback=True)`. When msgpack serialization fails, cached values can be deserialized via `pickle.loads(...)`. Caching is not enabled by default. Applications are affected only when the application explicitly enables a cache backend (for example by passing `cache=...` to `StateGraph.compile(...)` or otherwise configuring a `BaseCache` implementation), one or more nodes opt into caching via `CachePolicy`, and the attacker can write to the cache backend (for example a network-accessible Redis instance with weak/no auth, shared cache infrastructure reachable by other tenants/services, or a writable SQLite cache file). An attacker must be able to write attacker-controlled bytes into the cache backend such that the LangGraph process later reads and deserializes them. This typically requires write access to a networked cache (for example a network-accessible Redis instance with weak/no auth or shared cache infrastructure reachable by other tenants/services) or write access to local cache storage (for example a writable SQLite cache file via permissive file permissions or a shared writable volume). Because exploitation requires write access to the cache storage layer, this is a post-compromise / post-access escalation vector. LangGraph Checkpoint 4.0.0 patches the issue. |
| LangChain is a framework for building LLM-powered applications. Prior to version 1.1.8, a redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019). Users should upgrade to `@langchain/community` 1.1.18, which validates every redirect hop by disabling automatic redirects and re-validating `Location` targets before following them. In this version, automatic redirects are disabled (`redirect: "manual"`), each 3xx `Location` is resolved and validated with `validateSafeUrl()` before the next request, and a maximum redirect limit prevents infinite loops. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the restoreConfig function in vikunja/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go of the go-vikunja/vikunja repository fails to sanitize file paths within the provided ZIP archive. A maliciously crafted ZIP can bypass the intended extraction directory to overwrite arbitrary files on the host system. Additionally, we’ve discovered that a malformed archive triggers a runtime panic, crashing the process immediately after the database has been wiped permanently. The application trusts the metadata in the ZIP archive. It uses the Name attribute of the zip.File struct directly in os.OpenFile calls without validation, allowing files to be written outside the intended directory. The restoration logic assumes a specific directory structure within the ZIP. When provided with a "minimalist" malicious ZIP, the application fails to validate the length of slices derived from the archive contents. Specifically, at line 154, the code attempts to access an index of len(ms)-2 on an insufficiently populated slice, triggering a panic. Version 2.0.0 fixes the issue. |
| Spin is an open source developer tool for building and running serverless applications powered by WebAssembly. When Spin is configured to allow connections to a database or web server which could return responses of unbounded size (e.g. tables with many rows or large content bodies), Spin may in some cases attempt to buffer the entire response before delivering it to the guest, which can lead to the host process running out of memory, panicking, and crashing. In addition, a malicious guest application could incrementally insert a large number of rows or values into a database and then retrieve them all in a single query, leading to large host allocations. Spin 3.6.1, SpinKube 0.6.2, and `containerd-shim-spin` 0.22.1 have been patched to address the issue. As a workaround, configure Spin to only allow access to trusted databases and HTTP servers which limit response sizes. |
| WireGuard Portal (or wg-portal) is a web-based configuration portal for WireGuard server management. Prior to version 2.1.3, any authenticated non-admin user can become a full administrator by sending a single PUT request to their own user profile endpoint with `"IsAdmin": true` in the JSON body. After logging out and back in, the session picks up admin privileges from the database. When a user updates their own profile, the server parses the full JSON body into the user model, including the `IsAdmin` boolean field. A function responsible for preserving calculated or protected attributes pins certain fields to their database values (such as base model data, linked peer count, and authentication data), but it does not do this for `IsAdmin`. As a result, whatever value the client sends for `IsAdmin` is written directly to the database. After the exploit, the attacker has full admin access to the WireGuard VPN management portal. The problem was fixed in v2.1.3. The docker images for the tag 'latest' built from the master branch also include the fix. |
