| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| ORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. Ory Oathkeeper is often deployed behind other components like CDNs, WAFs, or reverse proxies. Depending on the setup, another component might forward the request to the Oathkeeper proxy with a different protocol (http vs. https) than the original request. In order to properly match the request against the configured rules, Oathkeeper considers the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header when evaluating rules. The configuration option `serve.proxy.trust_forwarded_headers` (defaults to false) governs whether this and other `X-Forwarded-*` headers should be trusted. Prior to version 26.2.0, Oathkeeper did not properly respect this configuration, and would always consider the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. In order for an attacker to abuse this, an installation of Ory Oathkeeper needs to have distinct rules for HTTP and HTTPS requests. Also, the attacker needs to be able to trigger one but not the other rule. In this scenario, the attacker can send the same request but with the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header in order to trigger the other rule. We do not expect many configurations to meet these preconditions. Version 26.2.0 contains a patch. Ory Oathkeeper will correctly respect the `serve.proxy.trust_forwarded_headers` configuration going forward, thereby eliminating the attack scenario. We recommend upgrading to a fixed version even if the preconditions are not met. As an additional mitigation, it is generally recommended to drop any unexpected headers as early as possible when a request is handled, e.g. in the WAF. |
| ORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. Versions prior to 26.2.0 are vulnerable to authentication bypass due to cache key confusion. The `oauth2_introspection` authenticator cache does not distinguish tokens that were validated with different introspection URLs. An attacker can therefore legitimately use a token to prime the cache, and subsequently use the same token for rules that use a different introspection server. Ory Oathkeeper has to be configured with multiple `oauth2_introspection` authenticator servers, each accepting different tokens. The authenticators also must be configured to use caching. An attacker has to have a way to gain a valid token for one of the configured introspection servers. Starting in version 26.2.0, Ory Oathkeeper includes the introspection server URL in the cache key, preventing confusion of tokens. Update to the patched version of Ory Oathkeeper. If that is not immediately possible, disable caching for `oauth2_introspection` authenticators. |
| Ory Kratos is an identity, user management and authentication system for cloud services. Prior to version 26.2.0, the ListCourierMessages Admin API in Ory Kratos is vulnerable to SQL injection due to flaws in its pagination implementation. Pagination tokens are encrypted using the secret configured in `secrets.pagination`. An attacker who knows this secret can craft their own tokens, including malicious tokens that lead to SQL injection. If this configuration value is not set, Kratos falls back to a default pagination encryption secret. Because this default value is publicly known, attackers can generate valid and malicious pagination tokens manually for installations where this secret is not set. As a first line of defense, immediately configure a custom value for `secrets.pagination` by generating a cryptographically secure random secret. Next, upgrade Kratos** to a fixed version, 26.2.0 or later, as soon as possible. |
| Ory Hydra is an OAuth 2.0 Server and OpenID Connect Provider. Prior to version 26.2.0, the listOAuth2Clients, listOAuth2ConsentSessions, and listTrustedOAuth2JwtGrantIssuers Admin APIs in Ory Hydra are vulnerable to SQL injection due to flaws in its pagination implementation. Pagination tokens are encrypted using the secret configured in `secrets.pagination`. If this value is not set, Hydra falls back to using `secrets.system`. An attacker who knows this secret can craft their own tokens, including malicious tokens that lead to SQL injection. This issue can be exploited when one or more admin APIs listed above are directly or indirectly accessible to the attacker; the attacker can pass a raw pagination token to the affected API; and the configuration value `secrets.pagination` is set and known to the attacker, or `secrets.pagination` is not set and `secrets.system` is known to the attacker. An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL queries through forged pagination tokens. As a first line of defense, immediately configure a custom value for `secrets.pagination` by generating a cryptographically secure random secret. Next, upgrade Hydra to the fixed version, 26.2.0 as soon as possible. |
| Ory Keto is am open source authorization server for managing permissions at scale. Prior to version 26.2.0, the GetRelationships API in Ory Keto is vulnerable to SQL injection due to flaws in its pagination implementation. Pagination tokens are encrypted using the secret configured in `secrets.pagination`. An attacker who knows this secret can craft their own tokens, including malicious tokens that lead to SQL injection. If this configuration value is not set, Keto falls back to a hard-coded default pagination encryption secret. Because this default value is publicly known, attackers can generate valid and malicious pagination tokens manually for installations where this secret is not set. This issue can be exploited when GetRelationships API is directly or indirectly accessible to the attacker, the attacker can pass a raw pagination token to the affected API, and the configuration value `secrets.pagination` is not set or known to the attacker. An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL queries through forged pagination tokens. As a first line of defense, immediately configure a custom value for `secrets.pagination` by generating a cryptographically secure random secret. Next, upgrade Keto to a fixed version, 26.2.0 or later, as soon as possible. |
| Ory Polis, formerly known as BoxyHQ Jackson, bridges or proxies a SAML login flow to OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect. Versions prior to 26.2.0 contain a DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Ory Polis's login functionality. The application improperly trusts a URL parameter (`callbackUrl`), which is passed to `router.push`. An attacker can craft a malicious link that, when opened by an authenticated user (or an unauthenticated user that later logs in), performs a client-side redirect and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of their browser. This could lead to credential theft, internal network pivoting, and unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the victim. Version 26.2.0 contains a patch for the issue. |
| GoDoxy is a reverse proxy and container orchestrator for self-hosters. Prior to version 0.27.5, the file content API endpoint at `/api/v1/file/content` is vulnerable to path traversal. The `filename` query parameter is passed directly to `path.Join(common.ConfigBasePath, filename)` where `ConfigBasePath = "config"` (a relative path). No sanitization or validation is applied beyond checking that the field is non-empty (`binding:"required"`). An authenticated attacker can use `../` sequences to read or write files outside the intended `config/` directory, including TLS private keys, OAuth refresh tokens, and any file accessible to the container's UID. Version 0.27.5 fixes the issue. |
| Zoraxy is a general purpose HTTP reverse proxy and forwarding tool. Prior to version 3.3.2, an authenticated path traversal vulnerability in the configuration import endpoint allows an authenticated user to write arbitrary files outside the config directory, which can lead to RCE by creating a plugin. Version 3.3.2 patches the issue. |
| InvenTree is an Open Source Inventory Management System. Prior to version 1.2.6, certain API endpoints associated with bulk data operations can be hijacked to exfiltrate sensitive information from the database. The bulk operation API endpoints (e.g. `/api/part/`, `/api/stock/`, `/api/order/so/allocation/`, and others) accept a filters parameter that is passed directly to Django's ORM queryset.filter(**filters) without any field allowlisting. This enables any authenticated user to traverse model relationships using Django's __ lookup syntax and perform blind boolean-based data extraction. This issue is patched in version 1.2.6, and 1.3.0 (or above). Users should update to the patched versions. No known workarounds are available. |
| InvenTree is an Open Source Inventory Management System. Prior to version 1.2.6, a path traversal vulnerability in the report template engine allows a staff-level user to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem via crafted template tags. Affected functions: `encode_svg_image()`, `asset()`, and `uploaded_image()` in `src/backend/InvenTree/report/templatetags/report.py`. This requires staff access (to upload / edit templates with maliciously crafted tags). If the InvenTree installation is configured with high access privileges on the host system, this path traversal may allow file access outside of the InvenTree source directory. This issue is patched in version 1.2.6, and 1.3.0 (or above). Users should update to the patched versions. No known workarounds are available. |
| ImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. Prior to 7.1.2-18 and 6.9.13-43, an out-of-bounds write of a zero byte exists in the X11 `display` interaction path that could lead to a crash. Versions 7.1.2-18 and 6.9.13-43 patch the issue. |
| Lychee is a free, open-source photo-management tool. The patch introduced for GHSA-cpgw-wgf3-xc6v (SSRF via `Photo::fromUrl`) contains an incomplete IP validation check that fails to block loopback addresses and link-local addresses. Prior to version 7.5.1, an authenticated user can still reach internal services using direct IP addresses, bypassing all four protection configuration settings even when they are set to their secure defaults. Version 7.5.1 contains a fix for the issue. |
| TSPortal is the WikiTide Foundation’s in-house platform used by the Trust and Safety team to manage reports, investigations, appeals, and transparency work. Prior to version 34, a flaw in TSPortal allowed attackers to create arbitrary user records in the database by abusing validation logic. While validation correctly rejected invalid usernames, a side effect within a validation rule caused user records to be created regardless of whether the request succeeded. This could be exploited to cause uncontrolled database growth, leading to a potential denial of service (DoS). Version 34 contains a fix for the issue. |
| MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Prior to version 4.4.6, MobSF's `read_sqlite()` function in `mobsf/MobSF/utils.py` (lines 542-566) uses Python string formatting (`%`) to construct SQL queries with table names read from a SQLite database's `sqlite_master` table. When a security analyst uses MobSF to analyze a malicious mobile application containing a crafted SQLite database, attacker-controlled table names are interpolated directly into SQL queries without parameterization or escaping. This allows an attacker to cause denial of service and achieve SQL injection. Version 4.4.6 patches the issue. |
| PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission. |
| PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab's security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows. |
| PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints. In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API, especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first, user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even though it does not by itself change the intrinsic base characteristics of the bug. This was fully addressed in `v0.8.5` by applying `RateLimitMiddleware` in the production handler chain, deriving the client address from the immediate peer IP instead of trusting forwarded headers by default, and removing the `/health` and `/metrics` exemption so auth-checkable endpoints are throttled as well. |
| PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled. `POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy. This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation. The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes. As of time of publication, a patched version is not yet available. |
| PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.4` contains a Windows-only command injection issue in the orphaned Chrome cleanup path. When an instance is stopped, the Windows cleanup routine builds a PowerShell `-Command` string using a `needle` derived from the profile path. In `v0.8.4`, that string interpolation escapes backslashes but does not safely neutralize other PowerShell metacharacters. If an attacker can launch an instance using a crafted profile name and then trigger the cleanup path, they may be able to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands on the Windows host in the security context of the PinchTab process user. This is not an unauthenticated internet RCE. It requires authenticated, administrative-equivalent API access to instance lifecycle endpoints, and the resulting command execution inherits the permissions of the PinchTab OS user rather than bypassing host privilege boundaries. Version 0.8.5 contains a patch for the issue. |
| ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. In versions on the 4.1 branch and earlier, the opfilter Endpoint Security system extension enforced file access policy exclusively by intercepting ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN events. Seven additional file operation event types were not intercepted, allowing any locally running process to bypass the configured FAA policy without triggering a denial. Commit a3d1733 adds subscriptions for all seven event types and routes them through the existing FAA policy evaluator. AUTH_RENAME and AUTH_UNLINK additionally preserve XProtect change detection: events on the XProtect path are allowed and trigger the existing onXProtectChanged callback rather than being evaluated against user policy. All versions on the 4.2 branch contain the fix. No known workarounds are available. |
