| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ti: icssg-prueth: fix missing data copy and wrong recycle in ZC RX dispatch
emac_dispatch_skb_zc() allocates a new skb via napi_alloc_skb() but
never copies the packet data from the XDP buffer into it. The skb is
passed up the stack containing uninitialized heap memory instead of
the actual received packet, leaking kernel heap contents to userspace.
Copy the received packet data from the XDP buffer into the skb using
skb_copy_to_linear_data().
Additionally, remove the skb_mark_for_recycle() call since the skb is
backed by the NAPI page frag allocator, not page_pool. Marking a
non-page_pool skb for recycle causes the free path to return pages to
a page_pool that does not own them, corrupting page_pool state.
The non-ZC path (emac_rx_packet) does not have these issues because it
uses napi_build_skb() to wrap the existing page_pool page directly,
requiring no copy, and correctly marks for recycle since the page comes
from page_pool_dev_alloc_pages(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet
where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2
and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso
offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm
at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao
would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called
and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that
offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining
packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end
of the packet data into skb_shared_info?
Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and
ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?
This patch implements the first suggestion.
I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed.
A separate patch would be better anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err()
Oskar Kjos reported the following problem.
ip4ip6_err() calls icmp_send() on a cloned skb whose cb[] was written
by the IPv6 receive path as struct inet6_skb_parm. icmp_send() passes
IPCB(skb2) to __ip_options_echo(), which interprets that cb[] region
as struct inet_skb_parm (IPv4). The layouts differ: inet6_skb_parm.nhoff
at offset 14 overlaps inet_skb_parm.opt.rr, producing a non-zero rr
value. __ip_options_echo() then reads optlen from attacker-controlled
packet data at sptr[rr+1] and copies that many bytes into dopt->__data,
a fixed 40-byte stack buffer (IP_OPTIONS_DATA_FIXED_SIZE).
To fix this we clear skb2->cb[], as suggested by Oskar Kjos.
Also add minimal IPv4 header validation (version == 4, ihl >= 5). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption
When decrypting data that is not in-place (src != dst), there is
no need to save the high-order sequence bits in dst as it could
simply be re-copied from the source.
However, the data to be hashed need to be rearranged accordingly.
Thanks, |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: xilinx: axienet: Fix BQL accounting for multi-BD TX packets
When a TX packet spans multiple buffer descriptors (scatter-gather),
axienet_free_tx_chain sums the per-BD actual length from descriptor
status into a caller-provided accumulator. That sum is reset on each
NAPI poll. If the BDs for a single packet complete across different
polls, the earlier bytes are lost and never credited to BQL. This
causes BQL to think bytes are permanently in-flight, eventually
stalling the TX queue.
The SKB pointer is stored only on the last BD of a packet. When that
BD completes, use skb->len for the byte count instead of summing
per-BD status lengths. This matches netdev_sent_queue(), which debits
skb->len, and naturally survives across polls because no partial
packet contributes to the accumulator. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix regsafe() for pointers to packet
In case rold->reg->range == BEYOND_PKT_END && rcur->reg->range == N
regsafe() may return true which may lead to current state with
valid packet range not being explored. Fix the bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix soft lockup in mptcp_recvmsg()
syzbot reported a soft lockup in mptcp_recvmsg() [0].
When receiving data with MSG_PEEK | MSG_WAITALL flags, the skb is not
removed from the sk_receive_queue. This causes sk_wait_data() to always
find available data and never perform actual waiting, leading to a soft
lockup.
Fix this by adding a 'last' parameter to track the last peeked skb.
This allows sk_wait_data() to make informed waiting decisions and prevent
infinite loops when MSG_PEEK is used.
[0]:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 156s! [server:1963]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1963 Comm: server Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8 #61 PREEMPT(none)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_wait_data+0x15/0x190
Code: 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 41 56 41 55 41 54 49 89 f4 55 48 89 d5 53 48 89 fb <48> 83 ec 30 65 48 8b 05 17 a4 6b 01 48 89 44 24 28 31 c0 65 48 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000603ca0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102bf0800 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc90000603d18 RDI: ffff888102bf0800
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000101
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000075 R12: ffffc90000603d18
R13: ffff888102bf0800 R14: ffff888102bf0800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f6e38b8c4c0(0000) GS:ffff8881b877e000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055aa7bff1680 CR3: 0000000105cbe000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mptcp_recvmsg+0x547/0x8c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2329
inet_recvmsg+0x11f/0x130 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891
sock_recvmsg+0x94/0xc0 net/socket.c:1100
__sys_recvfrom+0xb2/0x130 net/socket.c:2256
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:2267
do_syscall_64+0x59/0x2d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131
RIP: 0033:0x7f6e386a4a1d
Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8d 05 f1 de 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 20 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 b8 2d 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 6b f3 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 41 56 41
RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c4bb078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000861e RCX: 00007f6e386a4a1d
RDX: 00000000000003ff RSI: 00007ffc3c4bb150 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007ffc3c4bb570 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005605dbc00be0
R13: 00007ffc3c4bb650 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: x_tables: ensure names are nul-terminated
Reject names that lack a \0 character before feeding them
to functions that expect c-strings.
Fixes tag is the most recent commit that needs this change. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect()
sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding
the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same
socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading
to use-after-free.
The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed
with additional logging instrumentation:
Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect):
sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk)
sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN
(pass, no lock) (pass, no lock)
sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk):
hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock
hci_connect_sco <- blocked
-> hcon1
sco_conn_add->conn1
lock_sock(sk)
sco_chan_add:
conn1->sk = sk
sk->conn = conn1
sk_state=BT_CONNECT
release_sock
hci_dev_unlock
hci_dev_lock
sco_conn_del:
lock_sock(sk)
sco_chan_del:
sk->conn=NULL
conn1->sk=NULL
sk_state=
BT_CLOSED
SOCK_ZAPPED
release_sock
hci_dev_unlock
(unblocked)
hci_connect_sco
-> hcon2
sco_conn_add
-> conn2
lock_sock(sk)
sco_chan_add:
sk->conn=conn2
sk_state=
BT_CONNECT
// zombie sk!
release_sock
hci_dev_unlock
Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to
BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and
use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned
when sco_conn_del() cleared the association.
Fix this by:
- Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in
sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts
- Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually
return the error instead of just assigning it
- Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock()
to catch state changes during the window between the locks
- Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent
double-attach of a socket to multiple connections
- Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent
HCI connection leaks |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in set_cig_params_sync
hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in
set_cig_params_sync, otherwise it's possible it is freed concurrently.
Take hdev lock to prevent hci_conn from being deleted or modified
concurrently. Just RCU lock is not suitable here, as we also want to
avoid "tearing" in the configuration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt
hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in
hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt, otherwise it's possible it is freed
concurrently.
Extend the hci_dev_lock critical section to cover all conn usage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: sockmap: Fix use-after-free of sk->sk_socket in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready().
syzbot reported use-after-free of AF_UNIX socket's sk->sk_socket
in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). [0]
In unix_stream_sendmsg(), the peer socket's ->sk_data_ready() is
called after dropping its unix_state_lock().
Although the sender socket holds the peer's refcount, it does not
prevent the peer's sock_orphan(), and the peer's sk_socket might
be freed after one RCU grace period.
Let's fetch the peer's sk->sk_socket and sk->sk_socket->ops under
RCU in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880594da860 by task syz.4.1842/11013
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 11013 Comm: syz.4.1842 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278
unix_stream_sendmsg+0x8a3/0xe80 net/unix/af_unix.c:2482
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:721 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x972/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2585
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2639
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2671 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1bd/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7facf899c819
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007facf9827028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007facf8c15fa0 RCX: 00007facf899c819
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000500 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007facf8a32c91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007facf8c16038 R14: 00007facf8c15fa0 R15: 00007ffd41b01c78
</TASK>
Allocated by task 11013:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4538 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4866 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x2b8/0x640 mm/slub.c:4885
sock_alloc_inode+0x28/0xc0 net/socket.c:316
alloc_inode+0x6a/0x1b0 fs/inode.c:347
new_inode_pseudo include/linux/fs.h:3003 [inline]
sock_alloc net/socket.c:631 [inline]
__sock_create+0x12d/0x9d0 net/socket.c:1562
sock_create net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
__sys_socketpair+0x1c4/0x560 net/socket.c:1803
__do_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1856 [inline]
__se_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1853 [inline]
__x64_sys_socketpair+0x9b/0xb0 net/socket.c:1853
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 15:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2685 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:6165 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x187/0x630 mm/slub.c:6295
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/x25: Fix potential double free of skb
When alloc_skb fails in x25_queue_rx_frame it calls kfree_skb(skb) at
line 48 and returns 1 (error).
This error propagates back through the call chain:
x25_queue_rx_frame returns 1
|
v
x25_state3_machine receives the return value 1 and takes the else
branch at line 278, setting queued=0 and returning 0
|
v
x25_process_rx_frame returns queued=0
|
v
x25_backlog_rcv at line 452 sees queued=0 and calls kfree_skb(skb)
again
This would free the same skb twice. Looking at x25_backlog_rcv:
net/x25/x25_in.c:x25_backlog_rcv() {
...
queued = x25_process_rx_frame(sk, skb);
...
if (!queued)
kfree_skb(skb);
} |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix incorrect pruning due to atomic fetch precision tracking
When backtrack_insn encounters a BPF_STX instruction with BPF_ATOMIC
and BPF_FETCH, the src register (or r0 for BPF_CMPXCHG) also acts as
a destination, thus receiving the old value from the memory location.
The current backtracking logic does not account for this. It treats
atomic fetch operations the same as regular stores where the src
register is only an input. This leads the backtrack_insn to fail to
propagate precision to the stack location, which is then not marked
as precise!
Later, the verifier's path pruning can incorrectly consider two states
equivalent when they differ in terms of stack state. Meaning, two
branches can be treated as equivalent and thus get pruned when they
should not be seen as such.
Fix it as follows: Extend the BPF_LDX handling in backtrack_insn to
also cover atomic fetch operations via is_atomic_fetch_insn() helper.
When the fetch dst register is being tracked for precision, clear it,
and propagate precision over to the stack slot. For non-stack memory,
the precision walk stops at the atomic instruction, same as regular
BPF_LDX. This covers all fetch variants.
Before:
0: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1=8
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; R1=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=8
2: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2=0
3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) ; R2=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
4: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3=fp0 R10=fp0
5: (0f) r3 += r2
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 4: (bf) r3 = r10
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2)
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 2: (b7) r2 = 0
6: R2=8 R3=fp8
6: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0=0
7: (95) exit
After:
0: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1=8
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; R1=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=8
2: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2=0
3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) ; R2=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
4: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3=fp0 R10=fp0
5: (0f) r3 += r2
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 4: (bf) r3 = r10
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2)
mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 2: (b7) r2 = 0
mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b7) r1 = 8
6: R2=8 R3=fp8
6: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0=0
7: (95) exit |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rsrc: reject zero-length fixed buffer import
validate_fixed_range() admits buf_addr at the exact end of the
registered region when len is zero, because the check uses strict
greater-than (buf_end > imu->ubuf + imu->len). io_import_fixed()
then computes offset == imu->len, which causes the bvec skip logic
to advance past the last bio_vec entry and read bv_offset from
out-of-bounds slab memory.
Return early from io_import_fixed() when len is zero. A zero-length
import has no data to transfer and should not walk the bvec array
at all.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_import_reg_buf+0x697/0x7f0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002bcc254 by task poc/103
Call Trace:
io_import_reg_buf+0x697/0x7f0
io_write_fixed+0xd9/0x250
__io_issue_sqe+0xad/0x710
io_issue_sqe+0x7d/0x1100
io_submit_sqes+0x86a/0x23c0
__do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xa98/0x1590
Allocated by task 103:
The buggy address is located 12 bytes to the right of
allocated 584-byte region [ffff888002bcc000, ffff888002bcc248) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Buffer overflow in drivers/xen/sys-hypervisor.c
The build id returned by HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_build_id) is
neither NUL terminated nor a string.
The first causes a buffer overflow as sprintf in buildid_show will
read and copy till it finds a NUL.
00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 38 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q..8..eGR..q.P|
00000010 b9 a8 01 42 6f 2e 32 |...Bo.2|
00000017
So use a memcpy instead of sprintf to have the correct value:
00000000 f4 91 51 f4 dd 00 9e 9d 65 47 52 eb 10 71 db 50 |..Q.....eGR..q.P|
00000010 b9 a8 01 42 |...B|
00000014
(the above have a hack to embed a zero inside and check it's
returned correctly).
This is XSA-485 / CVE-2026-31786 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86: Fix potential bad container_of in intel_pmu_hw_config
Auto counter reload may have a group of events with software events
present within it. The software event PMU isn't the x86_hybrid_pmu and
a container_of operation in intel_pmu_set_acr_caused_constr (via the
hybrid helper) could cause out of bound memory reads. Avoid this by
guarding the call to intel_pmu_set_acr_caused_constr with an
is_x86_event check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix u8 overflow in SSID scan buffer size calculation
The variable valuesize is declared as u8 but accumulates the total
length of all SSIDs to scan. Each SSID contributes up to 33 bytes
(IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN + 1), and with WILC_MAX_NUM_PROBED_SSID (10)
SSIDs the total can reach 330, which wraps around to 74 when stored
in a u8.
This causes kmalloc to allocate only 75 bytes while the subsequent
memcpy writes up to 331 bytes into the buffer, resulting in a 256-byte
heap buffer overflow.
Widen valuesize from u8 to u32 to accommodate the full range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix potential out-of-bounds read in iwl_mvm_nd_match_info_handler()
The memcpy function assumes the dynamic array notif->matches is at least
as large as the number of bytes to copy. Otherwise, results->matches may
contain unwanted data. To guarantee safety, extend the validation in one
of the checks to ensure sufficient packet length.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs()
sqe->len is __u32 but gets stored into sr->len which is int. When
userspace passes sqe->len values exceeding INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF),
sr->len overflows to a negative value. This negative value propagates
through the bundle recv/send path:
1. io_recv(): sel.val = sr->len (ssize_t gets -1)
2. io_recv_buf_select(): arg.max_len = sel->val (size_t gets
0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
3. io_ring_buffers_peek(): buf->len is not clamped because max_len
is astronomically large
4. iov[].iov_len = 0xFFFFFFFF flows into io_bundle_nbufs()
5. io_bundle_nbufs(): min_t(int, 0xFFFFFFFF, ret) yields -1,
causing ret to increase instead of decrease, creating an
infinite loop that reads past the allocated iov[] array
This results in a slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs() from
the kmalloc-64 slab, as nbufs increments past the allocated iovec
entries.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ae05c8 by task exp/145
Call Trace:
io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160
io_recv_finish+0x117/0xe20
io_recv+0x2db/0x1160
Fix this by rejecting negative sr->len values early in both
io_sendmsg_prep() and io_recvmsg_prep(). Since sqe->len is __u32,
any value > INT_MAX indicates overflow and is not a valid length. |
