| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| open-webui before 0.3.14 contains a cross-origin resource sharing misconfiguration allowing arbitrary origins with allow_origins=* and authenticated requests to the /api/v1/functions endpoint. Attackers can execute arbitrary code on the openwebui instance by crafting malicious cross-site requests from attacker-controlled websites when an admin user visits them. |
| Open WebUI before 0.9.5 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the OAuth authentication flow where the picture claim URL MIME type is inferred from file extension rather than Content-Type header, allowing SVG files to bypass the profile image validator and be stored as data URIs. Authenticated users who visit the profile image endpoint receive attacker-controlled SVG content with inline disposition and no default security headers, enabling script execution in the same origin to steal authentication tokens and achieve account takeover. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the file upload path accepted metadata.knowledge_id and auto-linked uploaded files to a target knowledge base without applying the write-access check used by /api/v1/knowledge//file/add, allowing read-only knowledge-base users to add arbitrary files. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 before 0.10.0, _sanitize_proxy_path in backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py decoded proxy paths only eight times, allowing a nine-times percent-encoded ../ traversal value to pass normalization checks and be decoded by the upstream terminal server. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.2 before 0.10.0, the SKILL_MENTION_RE and strip_re regular expressions in backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py parsed <$skillId|label> skill mentions with overlapping quantifiers, allowing an authenticated chat message containing <$ without a closing > to trigger quadratic backtracking and block the asyncio event loop. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py built the ws_terminal upstream URL from an unencoded session_id and appended user_id as a query parameter, allowing query injection to make the terminal backend resolve another user identity; the HTTP proxy path also forwarded X-User-Id as an integrity-unbound identity claim. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, channel thread parent and reply handling did not bind parent_id to the channel in the URL, allowing an authenticated user to reference a message from another private or DM channel and disclose thread context across channels. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.0 before 0.10.0 with Redis configured, Socket.IO connect, user-join, join-channels, join-note, and the terminal websocket first-message authentication used decode_token without the Redis-backed is_valid_token revocation check, allowing revoked JWTs to continue authenticating realtime connections. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST matching compared configured host entries against URL strings and non-label-boundary suffixes, allowing path-based blocklist bypasses such as !internal.example.com in a URL path and sibling-domain matches that did not reflect the intended hostname policy. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 before 0.10.0, _verify_knowledge_file_access only checked read access while file write and delete routes later trusted object-derived access through writable model meta.knowledge entries, allowing a user with read-only knowledge file access to upgrade to file write or delete operations. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the /api/v1/auths/signin endpoint looked users up by email and only ran bcrypt password verification when a credential existed, making registered-account attempts measurably slower than missing-email attempts and allowing unauthenticated account enumeration. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0. |
| Open WebUI before 0.6.27 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint that allows authenticated users to bypass SSRF protections. Attackers can manipulate URL parameters with location redirect headers to access internal services and potentially execute commands via instance secrets. |
| DO NOT USE THIS CVE RECORD. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This record was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: none. |
| DO NOT USE THIS CVE RECORD. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This record was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: none. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the chat message listener allows non-same-origin input:prompt and action:submit messages, so an external site can set prompt text and trigger submitPrompt() in an authenticated victim session. I validated this with a cross-origin attacker page that auto-posted messages and caused unauthorized POST /api/v1/chats/new and POST /api/chat/completions requests containing attacker-controlled prompts. This enables cross-site forced actions and model/tool execution under victim privileges without consent. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, Open WebUI patched SVG XSS in user profile images and webhook profile images but forgot to apply the same fix to model profile images. The ModelMeta class has no validate_profile_image_url field validator, and the model image serving endpoint has no MIME allowlist or nosniff header. Any authenticated user with workspace.models permission (enabled by default) can store a data:image/svg+xml;base64,... payload in a model's profile image and achieve full account takeover of anyone who navigates to the image URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, several direct, index-addressed Ollama proxy routes accept a caller-supplied url_idx path parameter and use it as a raw index into the admin-configured OLLAMA_BASE_URLS list. Access control on these routes validates only whether the user may use the requested model, never which backend the request is routed to. Any authenticated user can append an arbitrary url_idx to force their request onto an Ollama backend they were never authorized to reach, including internal, higher-privilege, or explicitly admin-disabled backends. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6. |
