| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Avoid deadlock between PCI error recovery and mlx5 crdump
Do not block PCI config accesses through pci_cfg_access_lock() when
executing the s390 variant of PCI error recovery: Acquire just
device_lock() instead of pci_dev_lock() as powerpc's EEH and
generig PCI AER processing do.
During error recovery testing a pair of tasks was reported to be hung:
mlx5_core 0000:00:00.1: mlx5_health_try_recover:338:(pid 5553): health recovery flow aborted, PCI reads still not working
INFO: task kmcheck:72 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kmcheck state:D stack:0 pid:72 tgid:72 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
[<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590
[<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0
[<000000065256f572>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x22/0x30
[<0000000652570a94>] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x484/0x8a8
[<000003ff800673a4>] mlx5_unload_one+0x34/0x58 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff8006745c>] mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000652556c5a>] zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xf2/0x398
[<0000000651b9184a>] __zpci_event_error+0x23a/0x2c0
INFO: task kworker/u1664:6:1514 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u1664:6 state:D stack:0 pid:1514 tgid:1514 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:00:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
[<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590
[<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0
[<0000000652172e28>] pci_wait_cfg+0x80/0xe8
[<0000000652172f94>] pci_cfg_access_lock+0x74/0x88
[<000003ff800916b6>] mlx5_vsc_gw_lock+0x36/0x178 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff80098824>] mlx5_crdump_collect+0x34/0x1c8 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff80074b62>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump+0x6a/0xe8 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000652512242>] devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x82/0x168
[<0000000652513212>] devlink_health_report+0x19a/0x230
[<000003ff80075a12>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xba/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
No kernel log of the exact same error with an upstream kernel is
available - but the very same deadlock situation can be constructed there,
too:
- task: kmcheck
mlx5_unload_one() tries to acquire devlink lock while the PCI error
recovery code has set pdev->block_cfg_access by way of
pci_cfg_access_lock()
- task: kworker
mlx5_crdump_collect() tries to set block_cfg_access through
pci_cfg_access_lock() while devlink_health_report() had acquired
the devlink lock.
A similar deadlock situation can be reproduced by requesting a
crdump with
> devlink health dump show pci/<BDF> reporter fw_fatal
while PCI error recovery is executed on the same <BDF> physical function
by mlx5_core's pci_error_handlers. On s390 this can be injected with
> zpcictl --reset-fw <BDF>
Tests with this patch failed to reproduce that second deadlock situation,
the devlink command is rejected with "kernel answers: Permission denied" -
and we get a kernel log message of:
mlx5_core 1ed0:00:00.1: mlx5_crdump_collect:50:(pid 254382): crdump: failed to lock vsc gw err -5
because the config read of VSC_SEMAPHORE is rejected by the underlying
hardware.
Two prior attempts to address this issue have been discussed and
ultimately rejected [see link], with the primary argument that s390's
implementation of PCI error recovery is imposing restrictions that
neither powerpc's EEH nor PCI AER handling need. Tests show that PCI
error recovery on s390 is running to completion even without blocking
access to PCI config space. |
| Improper input validation in the Linux kernel-mode driver for some Intel(R) 800 Series Ethernet before version 1.17.2 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| Insufficient control flow management in the Linux kernel-mode driver for some Intel(R) 800 Series Ethernet before version 1.17.2 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Fix linking a duplicate key to a keyring's assoc_array
When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request
code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the
assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by
a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in
a crash.
Example report:
[2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652!
[2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3
[2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs]
[2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40
[2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f
[2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005
[2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28
[2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740
[2158499.700585] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[2158499.700610] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[2158499.700702] Call Trace:
[2158499.700741] ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0
[2158499.700768] ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700790] __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700814] request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730
[2158499.700847] ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver]
[2158499.700873] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[2158499.700898] request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700926] dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver]
[2158499.701127] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs]
[2158499.701164] ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90
[2158499.701190] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[2158499.701211] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[2158499.701405] reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs]
[2158499.701603] cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs]
[2158499.701632] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0
[2158499.701658] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0
[2158499.701682] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0
[2158499.701703] kthread+0x10d/0x130
[2158499.701723] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[2158499.701746] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
The situation occurs as follows:
* Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for
example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver
cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to
request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link().
* Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context
object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to
type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to
dns_resolver_cmp().
* Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes
search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not
found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() ->
construct_alloc_key().
* Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for
"abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache.
* Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs
__key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to
insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is,
using keyring_compare_object(). The operation
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix "kernel NULL pointer dereference" error
When rxe_queue_init in the function rxe_qp_init_req fails,
both qp->req.task.func and qp->req.task.arg are not initialized.
Because of creation of qp fails, the function rxe_create_qp will
call rxe_qp_do_cleanup to handle allocated resource.
Before calling __rxe_do_task, both qp->req.task.func and
qp->req.task.arg should be checked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: omap_hsmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc_add_host() may return error, if we ignore its return value,
it will lead two issues:
1. The memory that allocated in mmc_alloc_host() is leaked.
2. In the remove() path, mmc_remove_host() will be called to
delete device, but it's not added yet, it will lead a kernel
crash because of null-ptr-deref in device_del().
Fix this by checking the return value and goto error path wihch
will call mmc_free_host(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio: Fix NULL pointer dereference caused by uninitialized group->iommufd
group->iommufd is not initialized for the iommufd_ctx_put()
[20018.331541] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[20018.377508] RIP: 0010:iommufd_ctx_put+0x5/0x10 [iommufd]
...
[20018.476483] Call Trace:
[20018.479214] <TASK>
[20018.481555] vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x506/0x690 [vfio]
[20018.487586] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6a/0xb0
[20018.491773] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xc5/0xe0
[20018.496347] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x90
[20018.500340] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0xb5 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Fix QP destroy to wait for all references dropped.
Delay QP destroy completion until all siw references to QP are
dropped. The calling RDMA core will free QP structure after
successful return from siw_qp_destroy() call, so siw must not
hold any remaining reference to the QP upon return.
A use-after-free was encountered in xfstest generic/460, while
testing NFSoRDMA. Here, after a TCP connection drop by peer,
the triggered siw_cm_work_handler got delayed until after
QP destroy call, referencing a QP which has already freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: ocxl: fix possible name leak in ocxl_file_register_afu()
If device_register() returns error in ocxl_file_register_afu(),
the name allocated by dev_set_name() need be freed. As comment
of device_register() says, it should use put_device() to give
up the reference in the error path. So fix this by calling
put_device(), then the name can be freed in kobject_cleanup(),
and info is freed in info_release(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix possible memory leak in stmmac_dvr_probe()
The bitmap_free() should be called to free priv->af_xdp_zc_qps
when create_singlethread_workqueue() fails, otherwise there will
be a memory leak, so we add the err path error_wq_init to fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seccomp: Move copy_seccomp() to no failure path.
Our syzbot instance reported memory leaks in do_seccomp() [0], similar
to the report [1]. It shows that we miss freeing struct seccomp_filter
and some objects included in it.
We can reproduce the issue with the program below [2] which calls one
seccomp() and two clone() syscalls.
The first clone()d child exits earlier than its parent and sends a
signal to kill it during the second clone(), more precisely before the
fatal_signal_pending() test in copy_process(). When the parent receives
the signal, it has to destroy the embryonic process and return -EINTR to
user space. In the failure path, we have to call seccomp_filter_release()
to decrement the filter's refcount.
Initially, we called it in free_task() called from the failure path, but
the commit 3a15fb6ed92c ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully
dead") moved it to release_task() to notify user space as early as possible
that the filter is no longer used.
To keep the change and current seccomp refcount semantics, let's move
copy_seccomp() just after the signal check and add a WARN_ON_ONCE() in
free_task() for future debugging.
[0]:
unreferenced object 0xffff8880063add00 (size 256):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.914s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
backtrace:
do_seccomp (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/seccomp.c:666 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffffc90000035000 (size 4096):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
__vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3226)
__vmalloc_node (mm/vmalloc.c:3261 (discriminator 4))
bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (kernel/bpf/core.c:91)
bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888003fa1000 (size 1024):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/bpf/core.c:95)
bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888006360240 (size 16):
comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
01 00 37 00 76 65 72 6c e0 83 01 06 80 88 ff ff ..7.verl........
backtrace:
bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1137)
bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428)
do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ipw2200: fix memory leak in ipw_wdev_init()
In the error path of ipw_wdev_init(), exception value is returned, and
the memory applied for in the function is not released. Also the memory
is not released in ipw_pci_probe(). As a result, memory leakage occurs.
So memory release needs to be added to the error path of ipw_wdev_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: mm: add missing memcpy in kasan_init
Hi Atish,
It seems that the panic is due to the missing memcpy during kasan_init.
Could you please check whether this patch is helpful?
When doing kasan_populate, the new allocated base_pud/base_p4d should
contain kasan_early_shadow_{pud, p4d}'s content. Add the missing memcpy
to avoid page fault when read/write kasan shadow region.
Tested on:
- qemu with sv57 and CONFIG_KASAN on.
- qemu with sv48 and CONFIG_KASAN on. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used
Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in nla_put() called from
nfc_genl_send_target() when target->sensb_res_len, which is duplicated
from an nfc_target in pn533, is too large as the nfc_target is not
properly initialized and retains garbage values. Clear nfc_targets with
memset() before they are used.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put
Call Trace:
memcpy
nla_put
nfc_genl_dump_targets
genl_lock_dumpit
netlink_dump
__netlink_dump_start
genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit
genl_rcv_msg
netlink_rcv_skb
genl_rcv
netlink_unicast
netlink_sendmsg
sock_sendmsg
____sys_sendmsg
___sys_sendmsg
__sys_sendmsg
do_syscall_64 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: BPF: Sign-extend struct ops return values properly
The ns_bpf_qdisc selftest triggers a kernel panic:
Oops[#1]:
CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000741d58, era == 90000000851b5ac0, ra == 90000000851b5aa4
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 449 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.16.0+ #3 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
pc 90000000851b5ac0 ra 90000000851b5aa4 tp 90000001076b8000 sp 90000001076bb600
a0 0000000000741ce8 a1 0000000000000001 a2 90000001076bb5c0 a3 0000000000000008
a4 90000001004c4620 a5 9000000100741ce8 a6 0000000000000000 a7 0100000000000000
t0 0000000000000010 t1 0000000000000000 t2 9000000104d24d30 t3 0000000000000001
t4 4f2317da8a7e08c4 t5 fffffefffc002f00 t6 90000001004c4620 t7 ffffffffc61c5b3d
t8 0000000000000000 u0 0000000000000001 s9 0000000000000050 s0 90000001075bc800
s1 0000000000000040 s2 900000010597c400 s3 0000000000000008 s4 90000001075bc880
s5 90000001075bc8f0 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000741ce8 s8 0000000000000000
ra: 90000000851b5aa4 __qdisc_run+0xac/0x8d8
ERA: 90000000851b5ac0 __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8
CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE)
ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
BADV: 0000000000741d58
PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)]
Process test_progs (pid: 449, threadinfo=000000009af02b3a, task=00000000e9ba4956)
Stack : 0000000000000000 90000001075bc8ac 90000000869524a8 9000000100741ce8
90000001075bc800 9000000100415300 90000001075bc8ac 0000000000000000
900000010597c400 900000008694a000 0000000000000000 9000000105b59000
90000001075bc800 9000000100741ce8 0000000000000050 900000008513000c
9000000086936000 0000000100094d4c fffffff400676208 0000000000000000
9000000105b59000 900000008694a000 9000000086bf0dc0 9000000105b59000
9000000086bf0d68 9000000085147010 90000001075be788 0000000000000000
9000000086bf0f98 0000000000000001 0000000000000010 9000000006015840
0000000000000000 9000000086be6c40 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 4f2317da8a7e08c4 0000000000000101 4f2317da8a7e08c4
...
Call Trace:
[<90000000851b5ac0>] __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8
[<9000000085130008>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x578/0x10f0
[<90000000853701c0>] ip6_finish_output2+0x2f0/0x950
[<9000000085374bc8>] ip6_finish_output+0x2b8/0x448
[<9000000085370b24>] ip6_xmit+0x304/0x858
[<90000000853c4438>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x100/0x170
[<90000000852b32f0>] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x490/0xdd0
[<90000000852b47fc>] tcp_connect+0xbcc/0x1168
[<90000000853b9088>] tcp_v6_connect+0x580/0x8a0
[<90000000852e7738>] __inet_stream_connect+0x170/0x480
[<90000000852e7a98>] inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x88
[<90000000850f2814>] __sys_connect+0xe4/0x110
[<90000000850f2858>] sys_connect+0x18/0x28
[<9000000085520c94>] do_syscall+0x94/0x1a0
[<9000000083df1fb8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158
Code: 4001ad80 2400873f 2400832d <240073cc> 001137ff 001133ff 6407b41f 001503cc 0280041d
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The bpf_fifo_dequeue prog returns a skb which is a pointer. The pointer
is treated as a 32bit value and sign extend to 64bit in epilogue. This
behavior is right for most bpf prog types but wrong for struct ops which
requires LoongArch ABI.
So let's sign extend struct ops return values according to the LoongArch
ABI ([1]) and return value spec in function model.
[1]: https://loongson.github.io/LoongArch-Documentation/LoongArch-ELF-ABI-EN.html |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: flower: fix filter idr initialization
The cited commit moved idr initialization too early in fl_change() which
allows concurrent users to access the filter that is still being
initialized and is in inconsistent state, which, in turn, can cause NULL
pointer dereference [0]. Since there is no obvious way to fix the ordering
without reverting the whole cited commit, alternative approach taken to
first insert NULL pointer into idr in order to allocate the handle but
still cause fl_get() to return NULL and prevent concurrent users from
seeing the filter while providing miss-to-action infrastructure with valid
handle id early in fl_change().
[ 152.434728] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
[ 152.436163] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
[ 152.437269] CPU: 4 PID: 3877 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4+ #5
[ 152.438110] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 152.439644] RIP: 0010:fl_dump_key+0x8b/0x1d10 [cls_flower]
[ 152.440461] Code: 01 f2 02 f2 c7 40 08 04 f2 04 f2 c7 40 0c 04 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 00 01 00 00 48 89 c8 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 04 10 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 98 19 00 00 8b 13 85 d2 74 57
[ 152.442885] RSP: 0018:ffff88817a28f158 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 152.443851] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 152.444826] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffffff8500ae80 RDI: ffff88810a987900
[ 152.445791] RBP: ffff888179d88240 R08: ffff888179d8845c R09: ffff888179d88240
[ 152.446780] R10: ffffed102f451e48 R11: 00000000fffffff2 R12: ffff88810a987900
[ 152.447741] R13: ffffffff8500ae80 R14: ffff88810a987900 R15: ffff888149b3c738
[ 152.448756] FS: 00007f5eb2a34800(0000) GS:ffff88881ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 152.449888] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 152.450685] CR2: 000000000046ad19 CR3: 000000010b0bd006 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
[ 152.451641] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 152.452628] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 152.453588] Call Trace:
[ 152.454032] <TASK>
[ 152.454447] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xcb0
[ 152.455109] ? sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
[ 152.455689] ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x535/0x6b0
[ 152.456320] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170
[ 152.456916] ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 152.457529] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 152.458321] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170
[ 152.458958] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xb5/0x140
[ 152.459564] ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 152.460122] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 152.460852] ? fl_dump_key_options.part.0+0xea0/0xea0 [cls_flower]
[ 152.461710] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0
[ 152.462299] ? _raw_read_lock_irq+0x30/0x30
[ 152.462924] ? nla_put+0x15e/0x1c0
[ 152.463480] fl_dump+0x228/0x650 [cls_flower]
[ 152.464112] ? fl_tmplt_dump+0x210/0x210 [cls_flower]
[ 152.464854] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1a7/0x330
[ 152.465592] ? nla_put+0x15e/0x1c0
[ 152.466160] tcf_fill_node+0x515/0x9a0
[ 152.466766] ? tc_setup_offload_action+0xf0/0xf0
[ 152.467463] ? __alloc_skb+0x13c/0x2a0
[ 152.468067] ? __build_skb_around+0x330/0x330
[ 152.468814] ? fl_get+0x107/0x1a0 [cls_flower]
[ 152.469503] tc_del_tfilter+0x718/0x1330
[ 152.470115] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xa/0x20
[ 152.470765] ? tc_ctl_chain+0xee0/0xee0
[ 152.471335] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
[ 152.471948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x56/0xa0
[ 152.472639] ? __thaw_task+0x150/0x150
[ 152.473218] ? arch_stack_walk+0x98/0xf0
[ 152.473839] ? __stack_depot_save+0x35/0x4c0
[ 152.474501] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xc0
[ 152.475119] ? security_capable+0x51/0x90
[ 152.475741] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2c1/0x9d0
[ 152.476387] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x2b0/0x2b0
[ 152.477042]
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: taprio: Limit TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_SCHED_CYCLE_TIME to INT_MAX.
syzkaller found zero division error [0] in div_s64_rem() called from
get_cycle_time_elapsed(), where sched->cycle_time is the divisor.
We have tests in parse_taprio_schedule() so that cycle_time will never
be 0, and actually cycle_time is not 0 in get_cycle_time_elapsed().
The problem is that the types of divisor are different; cycle_time is
s64, but the argument of div_s64_rem() is s32.
syzkaller fed this input and 0x100000000 is cast to s32 to be 0.
@TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_SCHED_CYCLE_TIME={0xc, 0x8, 0x100000000}
We use s64 for cycle_time to cast it to ktime_t, so let's keep it and
set max for cycle_time.
While at it, we prevent overflow in setup_txtime() and add another
test in parse_taprio_schedule() to check if cycle_time overflows.
Also, we add a new tdc test case for this issue.
[0]:
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 103 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:div_s64_rem include/linux/math64.h:42 [inline]
RIP: 0010:get_cycle_time_elapsed net/sched/sch_taprio.c:223 [inline]
RIP: 0010:find_entry_to_transmit+0x252/0x7e0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:344
Code: 3c 02 00 0f 85 5e 05 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 08 4d 8b bd 40 01 00 00 48 8b 7c 24 48 48 89 c8 4c 29 f8 48 63 f7 48 99 48 89 74 24 70 <48> f7 fe 48 29 d1 48 8d 04 0f 49 89 cc 48 89 44 24 20 49 8d 85 10
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000acf260 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 177450e0347560cf RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 177450e0347560cf
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000100000000
RBP: 0000000000000056 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed10020a0934
R10: ffff8880105049a7 R11: ffff88806cf3a520 R12: ffff888010504800
R13: ffff88800c00d800 R14: ffff8880105049a0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88806cf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0edf84f0e8 CR3: 000000000d73c002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
get_packet_txtime net/sched/sch_taprio.c:508 [inline]
taprio_enqueue_one+0x900/0xff0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:577
taprio_enqueue+0x378/0xae0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:658
dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x46/0x170 net/core/dev.c:3732
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3821 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1b2f/0x3000 net/core/dev.c:4169
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3088 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1552 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output+0x4a7/0x780 net/core/neighbour.c:1532
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:544 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x924/0x17d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:135
__ip6_finish_output+0x620/0xaa0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:196
ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:207 [inline]
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:292 [inline]
ip6_output+0x206/0x410 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:228
dst_output include/net/dst.h:458 [inline]
NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xea/0x260 include/linux/netfilter.h:303
ndisc_send_skb+0x872/0xe80 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:508
ndisc_send_ns+0xb5/0x130 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:666
addrconf_dad_work+0xc14/0x13f0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4175
process_one_work+0x92c/0x13a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2597
worker_thread+0x60f/0x1240 kernel/workqueue.c:2748
kthread+0x2fe/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
</TASK>
Modules linked in: |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: atmel-mci: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc_add_host() may return error, if we ignore its return value,
it will lead two issues:
1. The memory that allocated in mmc_alloc_host() is leaked.
2. In the remove() path, mmc_remove_host() will be called to
delete device, but it's not added yet, it will lead a kernel
crash because of null-ptr-deref in device_del().
So fix this by checking the return value and calling mmc_free_host()
in the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hpsa: Fix possible memory leak in hpsa_init_one()
The hpda_alloc_ctlr_info() allocates h and its field reply_map. However, in
hpsa_init_one(), if alloc_percpu() failed, the hpsa_init_one() jumps to
clean1 directly, which frees h and leaks the h->reply_map.
Fix by calling hpda_free_ctlr_info() to release h->replay_map and h instead
free h directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/i10nm: fix refcount leak in pci_get_dev_wrapper()
As the comment of pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot() says, it returns
a PCI device with refcount incremented, so it doesn't need to
call an extra pci_dev_get() in pci_get_dev_wrapper(), and the PCI
device needs to be put in the error path. |
