| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: esd_usb: esd_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").
In esd_usb_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to
the dev->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback
esd_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In
esd_usb_close() the URBs are freed by calling
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in esd_usb_close().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
esd_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev->rx_submitted anchor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ctxfi: Fix potential OOB access in audio mixer handling
In the audio mixer handling code of ctxfi driver, the conf field is
used as a kind of loop index, and it's referred in the index callbacks
(amixer_index() and sum_index()).
As spotted recently by fuzzers, the current code causes OOB access at
those functions.
| UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /build/reproducible-path/linux-6.17.8/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctamixer.c:347:48
| index 8 is out of range for type 'unsigned char [8]'
After the analysis, the cause was found to be the lack of the proper
(re-)initialization of conj field.
This patch addresses those OOB accesses by adding the proper
initializations of the loop indices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge
Patch series "mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted
merge", v2.
Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA
merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge
scenarios.
However, it is handling merges incorrectly when it comes to mremap() of a
faulted VMA adjacent to an unfaulted VMA. The issues arise in three
cases:
1. Previous VMA unfaulted:
copied -----|
v
|-----------|.............|
| unfaulted |(faulted VMA)|
|-----------|.............|
prev
2. Next VMA unfaulted:
copied -----|
v
|.............|-----------|
|(faulted VMA)| unfaulted |
|.............|-----------|
next
3. Both adjacent VMAs unfaulted:
copied -----|
v
|-----------|.............|-----------|
| unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| unfaulted |
|-----------|.............|-----------|
prev next
This series fixes each of these cases, and introduces self tests to assert
that the issues are corrected.
I also test a further case which was already handled, to assert that my
changes continues to correctly handle it:
4. prev unfaulted, next faulted:
copied -----|
v
|-----------|.............|-----------|
| unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| faulted |
|-----------|.............|-----------|
prev next
This bug was discovered via a syzbot report, linked to in the first patch
in the series, I confirmed that this series fixes the bug.
I also discovered that we are failing to check that the faulted VMA was
not forked when merging a copied VMA in cases 1-3 above, an issue this
series also addresses.
I also added self tests to assert that this is resolved (and confirmed
that the tests failed prior to this).
I also cleaned up vma_expand() as part of this work, renamed
vma_had_uncowed_parents() to vma_is_fork_child() as the previous name was
unduly confusing, and simplified the comments around this function.
This patch (of 4):
Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA
merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge
scenarios.
The key piece of logic introduced was the ability to merge a faulted VMA
immediately next to an unfaulted VMA, which relies upon dup_anon_vma() to
correctly handle anon_vma state.
In the case of the merge of an existing VMA (that is changing properties
of a VMA and then merging if those properties are shared by adjacent
VMAs), dup_anon_vma() is invoked correctly.
However in the case of the merge of a new VMA, a corner case peculiar to
mremap() was missed.
The issue is that vma_expand() only performs dup_anon_vma() if the target
(the VMA that will ultimately become the merged VMA): is not the next VMA,
i.e. the one that appears after the range in which the new VMA is to be
established.
A key insight here is that in all other cases other than mremap(), a new
VMA merge either expands an existing VMA, meaning that the target VMA will
be that VMA, or would have anon_vma be NULL.
Specifically:
* __mmap_region() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping.
* do_brk_flags() - expanding an existing VMA.
* vma_merge_extend() - expanding an existing VMA.
* relocate_vma_down() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping.
In addition, we are in the unique situation of needing to duplicate
anon_vma state from a VMA that is neither the previous or next VMA being
merged with.
dup_anon_vma() deals exclusively with the target=unfaulted, src=faulted
case. This leaves four possibilities, in each case where the copied VMA
is faulted:
1. Previous VMA unfaulted:
copied -----|
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: scarlett2: Fix buffer overflow in config retrieval
The scarlett2_usb_get_config() function has a logic error in the
endianness conversion code that can cause buffer overflows when
count > 1.
The code checks `if (size == 2)` where `size` is the total buffer size in
bytes, then loops `count` times treating each element as u16 (2 bytes).
This causes the loop to access `count * 2` bytes when the buffer only
has `size` bytes allocated.
Fix by checking the element size (config_item->size) instead of the
total buffer size. This ensures the endianness conversion matches the
actual element type. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: cdev: Fix resource leaks on errors in lineinfo_changed_notify()
On error handling paths, lineinfo_changed_notify() doesn't free the
allocated resources which results leaks. Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: mcba_usb: mcba_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").
In mcba_usb_probe() -> mcba_usb_start(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are
allocated, added to the priv->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the
complete callback mcba_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and
resubmitted. In mcba_usb_close() -> mcba_urb_unlink() the URBs are freed by
calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in usb_kill_anchored_urbs().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
mcba_usb_read_bulk_callback()to the priv->rx_submitted anchor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): unanchor URL on usb_submit_urb() error
In commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix
URB memory leak"), the URB was re-anchored before usb_submit_urb() in
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() to prevent a leak of this URB during
cleanup.
However, this patch did not take into account that usb_submit_urb() could
fail. The URB remains anchored and
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&parent->rx_submitted) in gs_can_close() loops
infinitely since the anchor list never becomes empty.
To fix the bug, unanchor the URB when an usb_submit_urb() error occurs,
also print an info message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.
fou_udp_recv() has the same problem mentioned in the previous
patch.
If FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO is set to 0, skb is not freed by
fou_udp_recv() nor "resubmit"-ted in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu().
Let's forbid 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
be2net: Fix NULL pointer dereference in be_cmd_get_mac_from_list
When the parameter pmac_id_valid argument of be_cmd_get_mac_from_list() is
set to false, the driver may request the PMAC_ID from the firmware of the
network card, and this function will store that PMAC_ID at the provided
address pmac_id. This is the contract of this function.
However, there is a location within the driver where both
pmac_id_valid == false and pmac_id == NULL are being passed. This could
result in dereferencing a NULL pointer.
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to pass the address of a stub
variable to the function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_free()
When snd_usb_create_mixer() fails, snd_usb_mixer_free() frees
mixer->id_elems but the controls already added to the card still
reference the freed memory. Later when snd_card_register() runs,
the OSS mixer layer calls their callbacks and hits a use-after-free read.
Call trace:
get_ctl_value+0x63f/0x820 sound/usb/mixer.c:411
get_min_max_with_quirks.isra.0+0x240/0x1f40 sound/usb/mixer.c:1241
mixer_ctl_feature_info+0x26b/0x490 sound/usb/mixer.c:1381
snd_mixer_oss_build_test+0x174/0x3a0 sound/core/oss/mixer_oss.c:887
...
snd_card_register+0x4ed/0x6d0 sound/core/init.c:923
usb_audio_probe+0x5ef/0x2a90 sound/usb/card.c:1025
Fix by calling snd_ctl_remove() for all mixer controls before freeing
id_elems. We save the next pointer first because snd_ctl_remove()
frees the current element. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
slimbus: core: fix device reference leak on report present
Slimbus devices can be allocated dynamically upon reception of
report-present messages.
Make sure to drop the reference taken when looking up already registered
devices.
Note that this requires taking an extra reference in case the device has
not yet been registered and has to be allocated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
intel_th: fix device leak on output open()
Make sure to drop the reference taken when looking up the th device
during output device open() on errors and on close().
Note that a recent commit fixed the leak in a couple of open() error
paths but not all of them, and the reference is still leaking on
successful open(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: dac: ad3552r-hs: fix out-of-bound write in ad3552r_hs_write_data_source
When simple_write_to_buffer() succeeds, it returns the number of bytes
actually copied to the buffer. The code incorrectly uses 'count'
as the index for null termination instead of the actual bytes copied.
If count exceeds the buffer size, this leads to out-of-bounds write.
Add a check for the count and use the return value as the index.
The bug was validated using a demo module that mirrors the original
code and was tested under QEMU.
Pattern of the bug:
- A fixed 64-byte stack buffer is filled using count.
- If count > 64, the code still does buf[count] = '\0', causing an
- out-of-bounds write on the stack.
Steps for reproduce:
- Opens the device node.
- Writes 128 bytes of A to it.
- This overflows the 64-byte stack buffer and KASAN reports the OOB.
Found via static analysis. This is similar to the
commit da9374819eb3 ("iio: backend: fix out-of-bound write") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: smbd: fix dma_unmap_sg() nents
The dma_unmap_sg() functions should be called with the same nents as the
dma_map_sg(), not the value the map function returned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: fix isolate sysfs check condition
uacce supports the device isolation feature. If the driver
implements the isolate_err_threshold_read and
isolate_err_threshold_write callback functions, uacce will create
sysfs files now. Users can read and configure the isolation policy
through sysfs. Currently, sysfs files are created as long as either
isolate_err_threshold_read or isolate_err_threshold_write callback
functions are present.
However, accessing a non-existent callback function may cause the
system to crash. Therefore, intercept the creation of sysfs if
neither read nor write exists; create sysfs if either is supported,
but intercept unsupported operations at the call site. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gue: Fix skb memleak with inner IP protocol 0.
syzbot reported skb memleak below. [0]
The repro generated a GUE packet with its inner protocol 0.
gue_udp_recv() returns -guehdr->proto_ctype for "resubmit"
in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu(), but this only works with
non-zero protocol number.
Let's drop such packets.
Note that 0 is a valid number (IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option).
I think it is not practical to encap HOPOPT in GUE, so once
someone starts to complain, we could pass down a resubmit
flag pointer to distinguish two zeros from the upper layer:
* no error
* resubmit HOPOPT
[0]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888109695a00 (size 240):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 6088, jiffies 4294943096
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 40 c2 10 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@..............
backtrace (crc a84b336f):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4958 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3b4/0x590 mm/slub.c:5270
__build_skb+0x23/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:474
build_skb+0x20/0x190 net/core/skbuff.c:490
__tun_build_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1541 [inline]
tun_build_skb+0x4a1/0xa40 drivers/net/tun.c:1636
tun_get_user+0xc12/0x2030 drivers/net/tun.c:1770
tun_chr_write_iter+0x71/0x120 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x45d/0x710 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0xa7/0x170 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: fix cdev handling in the cleanup path
When cdev_device_add fails, it internally releases the cdev memory,
and if cdev_device_del is then executed, it will cause a hang error.
To fix it, we check the return value of cdev_device_add() and clear
uacce->cdev to avoid calling cdev_device_del in the uacce_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
migrate: correct lock ordering for hugetlb file folios
Syzbot has found a deadlock (analyzed by Lance Yang):
1) Task (5749): Holds folio_lock, then tries to acquire i_mmap_rwsem(read lock).
2) Task (5754): Holds i_mmap_rwsem(write lock), then tries to acquire
folio_lock.
migrate_pages()
-> migrate_hugetlbs()
-> unmap_and_move_huge_page() <- Takes folio_lock!
-> remove_migration_ptes()
-> __rmap_walk_file()
-> i_mmap_lock_read() <- Waits for i_mmap_rwsem(read lock)!
hugetlbfs_fallocate()
-> hugetlbfs_punch_hole() <- Takes i_mmap_rwsem(write lock)!
-> hugetlbfs_zero_partial_page()
-> filemap_lock_hugetlb_folio()
-> filemap_lock_folio()
-> __filemap_get_folio <- Waits for folio_lock!
The migration path is the one taking locks in the wrong order according to
the documentation at the top of mm/rmap.c. So expand the scope of the
existing i_mmap_lock to cover the calls to remove_migration_ptes() too.
This is (mostly) how it used to be after commit c0d0381ade79. That was
removed by 336bf30eb765 for both file & anon hugetlb pages when it should
only have been removed for anon hugetlb pages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: limit BOND_MODE_8023AD to Ethernet devices
BOND_MODE_8023AD makes sense for ARPHRD_ETHER only.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:63 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __hw_addr_add_ex+0x25d/0x760 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
Read of size 16 at addr ffffffff8bf94040 by task syz.1.3580/19497
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 19497 Comm: syz.1.3580 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x2b0/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
__hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:63 [inline]
__hw_addr_add_ex+0x25d/0x760 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
__dev_mc_add net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:868 [inline]
dev_mc_add+0xa1/0x120 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:886
bond_enslave+0x2b8b/0x3ac0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2180
do_set_master+0x533/0x6d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2963
do_setlink+0xcf0/0x41c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3165
rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3776 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3935 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x161c/0x1c90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7cf/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958
netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x82f/0x9e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x820 net/socket.c:2592
___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2646
__sys_sendmsg+0x164/0x220 net/socket.c:2678
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:83 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x1dc/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:307
do_fast_syscall_32+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:332
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
lacpdu_mcast_addr+0x0/0x40 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: fixes for PMD table sharing (incl. using
mmu_gather)", v3.
One functional fix, one performance regression fix, and two related
comment fixes.
I cleaned up my prototype I recently shared [1] for the performance fix,
deferring most of the cleanups I had in the prototype to a later point.
While doing that I identified the other things.
The goal of this patch set is to be backported to stable trees "fairly"
easily. At least patch #1 and #4.
Patch #1 fixes hugetlb_pmd_shared() not detecting any sharing
Patch #2 + #3 are simple comment fixes that patch #4 interacts with.
Patch #4 is a fix for the reported performance regression due to excessive
IPI broadcasts during fork()+exit().
The last patch is all about TLB flushes, IPIs and mmu_gather.
Read: complicated
There are plenty of cleanups in the future to be had + one reasonable
optimization on x86. But that's all out of scope for this series.
Runtime tested, with a focus on fixing the performance regression using
the original reproducer [2] on x86.
This patch (of 4):
We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent shared
count. Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding
speculative references) and instead use ptdesc->pt_share_count to identify
sharing.
We didn't convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never
detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer
touches the refcount of a PMD table.
Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating
folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are not
exclusive. In smaps we would account them as "private" although they are
"shared", and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the
pagemap interface.
Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared(). |
