| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS
When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled
aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function,
which waits for the work to end if it has already started.
However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will
try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired.
The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state
is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since
disabling aRFS deletes the rules.
Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is
enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled.
Kernel log:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I
------------------------------------------------------
ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90
arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0
worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0
kthread+0xd7/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
__flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
__cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270
netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
__sys_sendto+0x113/0x170
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&priv->state_lock);
lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
lock(&priv->state_lock);
lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by ethtool/386089:
#0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
#1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240
#2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x144/0x160
__lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
? save_trace+0x3e/0x360
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
__flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80
? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
__cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
? ethn
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion
When the mirred action is used on a classful egress qdisc and a packet is
mirrored or redirected to self we hit a qdisc lock deadlock.
See trace below.
[..... other info removed for brevity....]
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] ============================================
[ 82.890906] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 82.890906] 6.8.0-05205-g77fadd89fe2d-dirty #213 Tainted: G W
[ 82.890906] --------------------------------------------
[ 82.890906] ping/418 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] but task is already holding lock:
[ 82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 82.890906] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] CPU0
[ 82.890906] ----
[ 82.890906] lock(&sch->q.lock);
[ 82.890906] lock(&sch->q.lock);
[ 82.890906]
[ 82.890906] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 82.890906]
[..... other info removed for brevity....]
Example setup (eth0->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth0
Another example(eth0->eth1->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth1
tc qdisc add dev eth1 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth1 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
action mirred egress redirect dev eth0
We fix this by adding an owner field (CPU id) to struct Qdisc set after
root qdisc is entered. When the softirq enters it a second time, if the
qdisc owner is the same CPU, the packet is dropped to break the loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: Get runtime PM before walking tree for clk_summary
Similar to the previous commit, we should make sure that all devices are
runtime resumed before printing the clk_summary through debugfs. Failure
to do so would result in a deadlock if the thread is resuming a device
to print clk state and that device is also runtime resuming in another
thread, e.g the screen is turning on and the display driver is starting
up. We remove the calls to clk_pm_runtime_{get,put}() in this path
because they're superfluous now that we know the devices are runtime
resumed. This also squashes a bug where the return value of
clk_pm_runtime_get() wasn't checked, leading to an RPM count underflow
on error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: mediatek: Do a runtime PM get on controllers during probe
mt8183-mfgcfg has a mutual dependency with genpd during the probing
stage, which leads to a deadlock in the following call stack:
CPU0: genpd_lock --> clk_prepare_lock
genpd_power_off_work_fn()
genpd_lock()
generic_pm_domain::power_off()
clk_unprepare()
clk_prepare_lock()
CPU1: clk_prepare_lock --> genpd_lock
clk_register()
__clk_core_init()
clk_prepare_lock()
clk_pm_runtime_get()
genpd_lock()
Do a runtime PM get at the probe function to make sure clk_register()
won't acquire the genpd lock. Instead of only modifying mt8183-mfgcfg,
do this on all mediatek clock controller probings because we don't
believe this would cause any regression.
Verified on MT8183 and MT8192 Chromebooks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial/pmac_zilog: Remove flawed mitigation for rx irq flood
The mitigation was intended to stop the irq completely. That may be
better than a hard lock-up but it turns out that you get a crash anyway
if you're using pmac_zilog as a serial console:
ttyPZ0: pmz: rx irq flood !
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, swapper/0
That's because the pr_err() call in pmz_receive_chars() results in
pmz_console_write() attempting to lock a spinlock already locked in
pmz_interrupt(). With CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y, this produces a fatal
BUG splat. The spinlock in question is the one in struct uart_port.
Even when it's not fatal, the serial port rx function ceases to work.
Also, the iteration limit doesn't play nicely with QEMU, as can be
seen in the bug report linked below.
A web search for other reports of the error message "pmz: rx irq flood"
didn't produce anything. So I don't think this code is needed any more.
Remove it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memory-failure: fix deadlock when hugetlb_optimize_vmemmap is enabled
When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770
page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0
__cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0
_cpu_up+0xeb/0x210
cpu_up+0x91/0xe0
cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0
bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0
smp_init+0x25/0xa0
kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0
kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
__hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
__page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x387/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
lock(pcp_batch_high_lock);
rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by bash/46904:
#0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
#1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
#2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
#3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70
#4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40
stack backtrace:
CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x129/0x140
__lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0
lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0
cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0
static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60
__hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200
dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260
__page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0
memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70
hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
vfs_write+0x387/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887
Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c
R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00
In short, below scene breaks the
---truncated--- |
| eventlet before 0.35.2, as used in dnspython before 2.6.0, allows remote attackers to interfere with DNS name resolution by quickly sending an invalid packet from the expected IP address and source port, aka a "TuDoor" attack. In other words, dnspython does not have the preferred behavior in which the DNS name resolution algorithm would proceed, within the full time window, in order to wait for a valid packet. NOTE: dnspython 2.6.0 is unusable for a different reason that was addressed in 2.6.1. |
| A vulnerability has been found in Apereo CAS 6.6 and classified as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /login. The manipulation of the argument redirect_uri leads to open redirect. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| The password recovery mechanism for the forgotten password in Riello Netman 204 allows an attacker to reset the admin password and take over control of the device.This issue affects Netman 204: through 4.05. |
| An issue was discovered in libexpat before 2.6.3. xmlparse.c does not reject a negative length for XML_ParseBuffer. |
| Cacti provides an operational monitoring and fault management framework. Prior to version 1.2.27, Cacti calls `compat_password_hash` when users set their password. `compat_password_hash` use `password_hash` if there is it, else use `md5`. When verifying password, it calls `compat_password_verify`. In `compat_password_verify`, `password_verify` is called if there is it, else use `md5`. `password_verify` and `password_hash` are supported on PHP < 5.5.0, following PHP manual. The vulnerability is in `compat_password_verify`. Md5-hashed user input is compared with correct password in database by `$md5 == $hash`. It is a loose comparison, not `===`. It is a type juggling vulnerability. Version 1.2.27 contains a patch for the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: zynqmp_dp: Fix a deadlock in zynqmp_dp_ignore_hpd_set()
Instead of attempting the same mutex twice, lock and unlock it.
This bug has been detected by the Clang thread-safety analyzer. |
| mailboxd component in Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.7.x before 8.7.11p10 has an XML External Entity injection (XXE) vulnerability, as demonstrated by Autodiscover/Autodiscover.xml. |
| SupportAssist for Home PCs versions 4.8.2 and prior and SupportAssist for Business PCs versions 4.5.3 and prior, contain an UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) following vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access to the system could potentially exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary files only in that affected system. |
| Zitadel is open-source identity infrastructure software. Prior to 4.6.0, 3.4.3, and 2.71.18, a potential vulnerability exists in ZITADEL's password reset mechanism. ZITADEL utilizes the Forwarded or X-Forwarded-Host header from incoming requests to construct the URL for the password reset confirmation link. This link, containing a secret code, is then emailed to the user. If an attacker can manipulate these headers (e.g., via host header injection), they could cause ZITADEL to generate a password reset link pointing to a malicious domain controlled by the attacker. If the user clicks this manipulated link in the email, the secret reset code embedded in the URL can be captured by the attacker. This captured code could then be used to reset the user's password and gain unauthorized access to their account. It's important to note that this specific attack vector is mitigated for accounts that have Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or Passwordless authentication enabled. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.0, 3.4.3, and 2.71.18. |
| ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: Additional analysis indicates that the files referenced in the stack trace do not exist in Bison. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: uncache inode which has failed entering the group
Syzbot has reported the following BUG:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509!
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x5f/0xb0
? die+0x9e/0xc0
? do_trap+0x15a/0x3a0
? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160
? do_error_trap+0x1dc/0x2c0
? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160
? __pfx_do_error_trap+0x10/0x10
? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40
? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160
? exc_invalid_op+0x38/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x2e/0x160
? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x144/0x160
? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160
ocfs2_group_add+0x39f/0x15a0
? __pfx_ocfs2_group_add+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? mnt_get_write_access+0x68/0x2b0
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0xb7/0x160
? __pfx_rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x10/0x10
? smack_log+0x123/0x540
? mnt_get_write_access+0x68/0x2b0
? mnt_get_write_access+0x68/0x2b0
? mnt_get_write_access+0x226/0x2b0
ocfs2_ioctl+0x65e/0x7d0
? __pfx_ocfs2_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? smack_file_ioctl+0x29e/0x3a0
? __pfx_smack_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x43d/0x780
? __pfx_lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ocfs2_ioctl+0x10/0x10
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfb/0x170
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
</TASK>
When 'ioctl(OCFS2_IOC_GROUP_ADD, ...)' has failed for the particular
inode in 'ocfs2_verify_group_and_input()', corresponding buffer head
remains cached and subsequent call to the same 'ioctl()' for the same
inode issues the BUG() in 'ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate()' (trying
to cache the same buffer head of that inode). Fix this by uncaching
the buffer head with 'ocfs2_remove_from_cache()' on error path in
'ocfs2_group_add()'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: fix fault at system suspend if device was already runtime suspended
If the device was already runtime suspended then during system suspend
we cannot access the device registers else it will crash.
Also we cannot access any registers after dwc3_core_exit() on some
platforms so move the dwc3_enable_susphy() call to the top. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rw: fix missing NOWAIT check for O_DIRECT start write
When io_uring starts a write, it'll call kiocb_start_write() to bump the
super block rwsem, preventing any freezes from happening while that
write is in-flight. The freeze side will grab that rwsem for writing,
excluding any new writers from happening and waiting for existing writes
to finish. But io_uring unconditionally uses kiocb_start_write(), which
will block if someone is currently attempting to freeze the mount point.
This causes a deadlock where freeze is waiting for previous writes to
complete, but the previous writes cannot complete, as the task that is
supposed to complete them is blocked waiting on starting a new write.
This results in the following stuck trace showing that dependency with
the write blocked starting a new write:
task:fio state:D stack:0 pid:886 tgid:886 ppid:876
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x1d8/0x348
__schedule+0x8e8/0x2248
schedule+0x110/0x3f0
percpu_rwsem_wait+0x1e8/0x3f8
__percpu_down_read+0xe8/0x500
io_write+0xbb8/0xff8
io_issue_sqe+0x10c/0x1020
io_submit_sqes+0x614/0x2110
__arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x524/0x1038
invoke_syscall+0x74/0x268
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x238
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
el0_svc+0x44/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x118/0x128
el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
INFO: task fsfreeze:7364 blocked for more than 15 seconds.
Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-00063-g76aaf945701c #7963
with the attempting freezer stuck trying to grab the rwsem:
task:fsfreeze state:D stack:0 pid:7364 tgid:7364 ppid:995
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x1d8/0x348
__schedule+0x8e8/0x2248
schedule+0x110/0x3f0
percpu_down_write+0x2b0/0x680
freeze_super+0x248/0x8a8
do_vfs_ioctl+0x149c/0x1b18
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x1a0
invoke_syscall+0x74/0x268
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x238
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
el0_svc+0x44/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x118/0x128
el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
Fix this by having the io_uring side honor IOCB_NOWAIT, and only attempt a
blocking grab of the super block rwsem if it isn't set. For normal issue
where IOCB_NOWAIT would always be set, this returns -EAGAIN which will
have io_uring core issue a blocking attempt of the write. That will in
turn also get completions run, ensuring forward progress.
Since freezing requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the first place, this isn't
something that can be triggered by a regular user. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_init_flow()
There are code paths from which the function is called without holding
the RCU read lock, resulting in a suspicious RCU usage warning [1].
Fix by using l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index() which will acquire
the RCU read lock before calling
l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu().
[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/361:
#0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110
lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6
dev_get_by_index_rcu+0x1d3/0x210
l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu+0x2b/0xf0
ip_tunnel_bind_dev+0x72f/0xa00
ip_tunnel_newlink+0x368/0x7a0
ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170
__rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0
rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60
netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80
____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20
___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0
__sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
