| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shrinker: fix bogus set_shrinker_bit() with cgroup.memory=nokmem
With cgroup.memory=nokmem, shrinker_memcg_alloc() bails out early and
never allocates an id, so shrinker->id keeps the 0 it got from the
kzalloc() in shrinker_alloc(). __list_lru_init() then copies that 0 into
lru->shrinker_id, where it looks like a valid bit index.
Nothing calls expand_shrinker_info() on nokmem either, so shrinker_nr_max
stays 0 and every memcg ends up with an empty map (map_nr_max == 0).
deferred_split_folio() hands a real memcg to __list_lru_add() regardless
of whether the lru is memcg aware, so the first THP queued in a cgroup
does set_shrinker_bit(memcg, nid, 0) and trips the bounds check:
WARNING: mm/shrinker.c:212 at set_shrinker_bit+0x7d/0x90, CPU#126
Call Trace:
<TASK>
deferred_split_folio+0x18c/0x220
map_anon_folio_pmd_nopf+0xdd/0x130
map_anon_folio_pmd_pf+0x14/0xb0
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x1a1/0x620
__handle_mm_fault+0xea9/0x10d0
handle_mm_fault+0xe5/0x320
do_user_addr_fault+0x1cc/0x870
exc_page_fault+0x81/0x1b0
asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
</TASK>
Harmless, the WARN_ON_ONCE() is what keeps the out of bounds unit[] read
from happening, but the id should not look valid in the first place.
Clear it before returning.
Two other spots could paper over this: drop the id in __list_lru_init()
when nokmem turns memcg_aware off, or make deferred_split_folio() pass
NULL like list_lru_add_obj() does. Both leave shrinker->id lying around
for the next caller, so fix it where the id is handed out. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skbuff: do not leave stale header offsets after pskb_carve()
pskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() remove
the first bytes of a packet and reallocate skb->head.
All the headers that were present before the operation are gone,
but both functions call skb_headers_offset_update(skb, 0), which
is a no-op : skb->mac_header, skb->network_header,
skb->transport_header and skb->csum_start keep their old values and
now describe bytes which are no longer there.
Both helpers size the new head from the old skb_end_offset(), so the
stale offsets still land inside the new allocation. They point past
skb_tail_pointer() though, to bytes that were never initialized.
pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() is the worst case, because it leaves a
zombie skb with an empty linear part (skb->data ==
skb_tail_pointer(skb), skb_headlen(skb) == 0), while
skb_mac_header_was_set() is still true and skb->mac_header is way
ahead of skb->data.
The only user of pskb_extract() is rds_tcp_data_recv(), and the
carved skb is queued on tinc->ti_skb_list. When the RDS incoming
message is released, rds_tcp_inc_free() calls skb_queue_purge(),
which frees the skbs with SKB_DROP_REASON_QUEUE_PURGE. This is
visible from drop_monitor, which then tries to pull back to the
(bogus) mac header :
skbuff: __skb_pull(len=234)
skb len=6968 data_len=6968 headroom=0 headlen=0 tailroom=0
end-tail=384 mac=(234,14) mac_len=14 net=(248,40) trans=288
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=1428 type=16 segs=5))
csum(0x100120 start=288 offset=16 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0)
hash(0x7b446c6c sw=0 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=60
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2847!
Add skb_carve_reset_headers() to mark the mac and transport headers
as not set, reset the network header, clear skb->mac_len, and drop
a now meaningless CHECKSUM_PARTIAL (csum_start no longer describes
anything).
Invalidate the inner offsets as well. Unlike mac_header and
transport_header they have no "unset" sentinel, so a leftover
non-zero value still looks like a real header. Zero
skb->inner_mac_header, skb->inner_network_header,
skb->inner_transport_header, skb->inner_protocol and
skb->encapsulation, so that all the header state is invalidated in
one place.
v2: fixed an inaccurate changelog. The stale offsets stay inside the
new skb->head, which is never smaller than the old one, they
simply point past skb_tail_pointer() to bytes that are gone.
Thanks to Xuanqiang Luo for insisting on this.
Also invalidate the inner header state, as suggested by the
netdev AI review :
https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260911114922.621937-1-edumazet%40google.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() from the dev_fill_forward_path() loop check
ipip_fill_forward_path() and ip6_tnl_fill_forward_path() look up the
route to the tunnel's remote endpoint and set ctx->dev to its device,
which is the tunnel itself when that route resolves back to the tunnel.
dev_fill_forward_path() then makes no progress and trips
WARN_ON_ONCE(last_dev == ctx->dev) as soon as a flowtable tries to
offload a flow through the tunnel. That routing loop is a configuration
any CAP_NET_ADMIN user can set up, and ip_tunnel_xmit() and
ip6_tnl_xmit() already treat it as a tx error, so remove the warning and
just fail the walk, as commit 008e7a7c293b ("net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE
when accessing forward path array") did for the path stack overflow. |
| Pexip Infinity before 41.1 is affected by improper input validation in the media implementation that allows a remote attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service. |
| Frame protocol metadissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| The getblock RPC method in zebra-rpc before 11.0.0, used by the Zcash Foundation's Zebra node, panics on verbosity 2 for a side-chain block because the block's -1 confirmations sentinel is converted to u32 with .expect(), aborting the process. Remote unauthenticated attackers, directly or through lightwalletd, can repeat this call to keep the node in a crash loop. |
| A reachable assertion vulnerability exists in the Matter SDK (connectedhomeip) 1.3 thru 1.4, specifically within the Level Control cluster's server tick logic (`emberAfLevelControlClusterServerTickCallback`). When a MoveToLevel command is executed and followed by a conflicting write to the OperationMode attribute (in the Pump Configuration and Control cluster), an invariant check (`minLevel < currentLevel`) fails and causes the device to abort. This leads to a denial of service condition. The issue is confirmed in SDK versions 1.3 and 1.4 (commit ab3d5ae), and is triggered remotely without authentication. |
| Pexip Infinity before 40.1 is affected by improper input validation in the signaling implementation that allows a malicious attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service. |
| Pexip Infinity before 38.2, plus 39.0, 39.1 and 40.0, is affected by improper input validation in the media implementation which allows a remote attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service. |
| Pexip Infinity before 38.2, plus 39.0, 39.1, and 40.0, is affected by improper input validation in the media implementation that allows a remote attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service |
| A reachable assertion vulnerability exists in the Matter SDK (connectedhomeip) before 1.4.0, in the interaction model command processing logic. When an InvokeCommandRequest is sent to a nonexistent endpoint and cluster (e.g., 0x34), the code incorrectly treats the endpoint as valid due to missing checks in CodegenDataModelProvider::Invoke. This causes a VerifyOrDie failure in ProcessCommandDataIB and results in a crash (SIGABRT). The issue has been acknowledged and fixed in a later revision (PR #37207). |
| In Qt for MCUs, a Text element that displays styled text halts the device if an <img> tag in the text contains an attribute with an empty value. The text parser passes the empty value to an internal check that only accepts non-empty values. The check fails and reports an error, and the default error handler halts the device. |
| A flaw was found in ModemManager. When parsing a Cell Broadcast Message, some 3GPP data-coding-scheme values (8-bit and reserved character sets) are not handled. The process hits a reachable assertion and aborts. An attacker who can deliver a crafted Cell Broadcast PDU over the radio network, or via a modem AT channel, can cause ModemManager to exit. Repeated aborts can exhaust systemd's default start limit and leave the service failed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject non-scalar bpf_loop iteration counts
bpf_loop() declares its nr_loops argument as ARG_ANYTHING. Privileged
programs may pass pointer values to such arguments, so check_func_arg()
lets a pointer-valued R1 reach the helper-specific checks.
Since commit bb124da69c47 ("bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop
callback iterations"), the verifier marks R1 precise and reads its upper
bound to limit callback simulation. Precision backtracking only accepts
scalar registers, so passing a pointer instead triggers the "backtracking
misuse" verifier warning. Kernels with panic_on_warn enabled subsequently
panic.
Introduce ARG_SCALAR for helper arguments that only accept scalar values
and use it for bpf_loop() nr_loops. Generic helper argument validation then
rejects pointers before loop inlining and precision processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix under-reservation of blocks when repairing sf directories
Whilst running QA on XFS for-next as of 7.3-rc2 with MKFS_OPTIONS="-n
size=8192", I observed the following (trimmed) dmesg splat:
XFS: Assertion failed: args->total >= dp->i_nblocks - nblks, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.c, line: 2387
WARNING: fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:104 at assfail+0x46/0x4a [xfs], CPU#0: xfs_scrub/1426511
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1426511 Comm: xfs_scrub Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc2-djwx #rc2 PREEMPT(lazy) 6e418570b606a39783b0e7e7b30dc407b965f9e8
Tainted: [W]=WARN
RIP: 0010:assfail+0x46/0x4a [xfs]
RSP: 0018:ffffc900010d7890 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffd1
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000021 RDI: ffffffffa059fd38
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000000000000a R11: 000000007fffffff R12: ffffc900010d7940
R13: ffff888368d8f980 R14: ffffc900010d7a48 R15: ffffc900010d78d0
FS: 00007f445c5ce680(0000) GS:ffff8884a97ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f443803b9a8 CR3: 0000000107a4b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xfs_da_grow_inode_int+0x2e0/0x300 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_dir2_grow_inode+0x6e/0x150 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_dir2_sf_to_block+0x149/0x870 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_dir_swap_prep+0xe2/0x110 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_dir_swap+0xfb/0x2f0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_dir_rebuild_tree+0x99/0x100 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_directory+0x83/0x1c0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_attempt+0x4f/0x1e0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_scrub_metadata+0x393/0x5b0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x306/0x570 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_file_ioctl+0xa4f/0x1150 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x7a/0x3b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
This is a consequence of commit 0fe77e57588b98, which added the
following assertion to xfs_da_grow_inode_int:
ASSERT(args->total >= dp->i_nblocks - nblks);
Tracing this back to xrep_dir_swap_prep, I noticed that the xfs_da_args
object that's passed to xfs_dir2_sf_to_block sets args->total to 1.
This is incorrect because mkfs set the directory block size to 8k and
the filesystem block size to 4k. In other words, args->total should be
2 here, not 1.
Dave Chinner tripped over the same problem with the same branch through
a different channel -- his test setup set the fs block size to 1k, in
which case the directory block size is still set to 4k. Here,
args->total should be 4.
Changing the assignment of args->total to sc->mp->m_dir_geo->fsbcount
makes the assertion go away, but that isn't a complete fix. In
xrep_tempexch_estimate, we also incorrectly assume that a shortform
conversion requires 1 fsblock when it should be m_dir_geo->fsbcount.
Without that, we can under-reserve space in the transaction and cause a
filesystem shutdown.
Note that the xfs_dabuf_nfsb helper will compute the correct value for
directories and xattr, so we use that instead of open-coding the logic.
Also fix xrep_xattr_swap_prep to assign args->total via xfs_dabuf_nfsb
to avoid one logic bomb if we ever support multi-fsblock attrs.
Tripped-by: 0fe77e57588b98 ("xfs: assert the reservation covers each da fork growth") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
affs: handle set_blocksize failures
affs uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting we will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bfs: handle set_blocksize failures
bfs uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qnx4: handle set_blocksize failures
qnx4 uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: handle set_blocksize failures
jfs uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting we will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hpfs: handle set_blocksize failures
hpfs uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
