| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Check ROM header and data structure addr before accessing
We meet a crash when running stress-ng on x86_64 machine:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffa0000007f40000
RIP: 0010:pci_get_rom_size+0x52/0x220
Call Trace:
<TASK>
pci_map_rom+0x80/0x130
pci_read_rom+0x4b/0xe0
kernfs_file_read_iter+0x96/0x180
vfs_read+0x1b1/0x300
Our analysis reveals that the ROM space's start address is
0xffa0000007f30000, and size is 0x10000. Because of broken ROM space,
before calling readl(pds), the pds's value is 0xffa0000007f3ffff, which is
already pointed to the ROM space end, invoking readl() would read 4 bytes
therefore cause an out-of-bounds access and trigger a crash. Fix this by
adding image header and data structure checking.
We also found another crash on arm64 machine:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000dd1393ff
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000021
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
The call trace is the same with x86_64, but the crash reason is that the
data structure addr is not aligned with 4, and arm64 machine report
"alignment fault". Fix this by adding alignment checking.
[bhelgaas: shorten function names, wrap comments] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: Fix possible token leak in mt7996_tx_prepare_skb()
If link_conf or link_sta lookup fails in mt7996_tx_prepare_skb routine,
mt7996 driver leaks an already allocated tx token. Fix the issue
releasing the token in case of error. |
| Inclusion of functionality from untrusted control sphere in Visual Studio Code - Python extension allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally. |
| A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in UniFi Access Application to access files on the host device. |
| In Eclipse Jetty, the HTTP/1.1 parser is vulnerable to request smuggling when chunk extensions are used, similar to the "funky chunks" techniques outlined here:
* https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html
* https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html
Jetty terminates chunk extension parsing at \r\n inside quoted strings instead of treating this as an error.
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
1;ext="val
X
0
GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1
...
Note how the chunk extension does not close the double quotes, and it is able to inject a smuggled request. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota resolved OpenAPI $ref values by fetching remote http(s) URLs and reading local absolute or out-of-tree file paths, allowing `kiota generate` on an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced description to perform build-time SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion by inlining external schemas such as REMOTE_KIOTA_PROP or Leaked into generated clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5 by AllowedExternalOriginsStreamLoader and the --allowed-external-origins option. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.0, Kiota's Python generator let attacker-controlled enum value descriptions from x-ms-enum.values[].description flow through KiotaBuilder.SetEnumOptions into Documentation.DescriptionTemplate and PythonConventionService.RemoveInvalidDescriptionCharacters without newline sanitization, allowing generated inline comments to split and execute attacker-controlled Python code at module scope when generated modules were imported. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.0. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.0, Kiota's Ruby generator embedded OpenAPI default fields, property names, and other schema-derived strings through CodeMethodWriter.cs and SanitizeForQuotedLiteral() in Writers/StringExtensions.cs into Ruby double-quoted literals without escaping #, allowing attacker-controlled #{expr}, #$var, or #@var interpolation markers to inject arbitrary Ruby code into generated model classes. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.0. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Versions prior to 1.29.1 and 1.31.1 are affected by a code-generation literal injection vulnerability in multiple writer sinks (for example: serialization/deserialization keys, path/query parameter mappings, URL template metadata, enum/property metadata, and default value emission). When malicious values from an OpenAPI description are emitted into generated source without context-appropriate escaping, an attacker can break out of string literals and inject additional code into generated clients. This issue is only practically exploitable when the OpenAPI description used for generation is from an untrusted source, or a normally trusted OpenAPI description has been compromised/tampered with. Only generating from trusted, integrity-protected API descriptions significantly reduces the risk. To remediate the issue, upgrade Kiota to 1.29.1, 1.31.1, or later and regenerate/refresh existing generated clients as a precaution. Refreshing generated clients ensures previously generated vulnerable code is replaced with hardened output. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK
tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count
from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it
does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK
message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction
wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true
and starving the connection of further transmits.
Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the
message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,
for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a
TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: meson: aiu: Validate written enum values
The AIU HDMI and internal codec mux put callbacks use the written enum
value with snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() before checking whether the value is
valid for the enumeration.
Reject out-of-range values before converting the enum item, matching the
validation already done by the G12A HDMI and internal codec mux controls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci: validate codec capability element length
Read Local Codec Capabilities returns a sequence of capability elements.
Each element starts with a one-byte length followed by that many payload
bytes.
hci_read_codec_capabilities() checks that the skb contains the length
byte, but then validates only caps->len against the remaining skb
length. A malformed controller response with one remaining byte and
caps->len set to one passes that check even though the element needs two
bytes. The parser then records a two-byte capability and copies one
byte beyond the advertised response payload into the codec list.
Validate the full element size, including the length byte, before adding
it to the accumulated capability length. This preserves all well-formed
capability elements and drops only truncated controller responses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix invalid pointer dereference in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs()
In the beginning of the loop, we try to obtain a locked delayed ref head,
if 'locked_ref' is currently NULL, by calling btrfs_select_ref_head(),
which can return an error pointer. If the error pointer is -EAGAIN we do
a continue and go back to the beginning of the loop, which will not try
again to call btrfs_select_ref_head() since 'locked_ref' is no longer
NULL but it's ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN), and then we do:
spin_lock(&locked_ref->lock);
against a ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) value, generating an invalid pointer
dereference.
Fix this by ensuring that 'locked_ref' is set to NULL when
btrfs_select_ref_head() returns ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) and incrementing 'count'
as well, to prevent infinite looping. We do this by doing a goto to the
bottom of the loop that already sets 'locked_ref' to NULL and does a
cond_resched(), with an increment to 'count' right before the goto.
These measures were in place before the refactoring in commit 0110a4c43451
("btrfs: refactor __btrfs_run_delayed_refs loop") but were unintentionally
lost afterwards. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: fix wrong pci_get_drvdata type in AER handlers
rtw89 stores an ieee80211_hw pointer via pci_set_drvdata() at probe
time, but io_error_detected() and io_resume() retrieve it as a
net_device pointer. This causes netif_device_detach/attach to
operate on an ieee80211_hw struct, reading and writing at wrong
offsets. The adjacent io_slot_reset() already does it correctly.
Use ieee80211_stop_queues/wake_queues instead, consistent with
every other queue stop/start path in the driver.
Tested on RTL8852CE by calling the handlers from a test module
before and after the fix. |
| In Roundcube Webmail before 1.6.18 and 1.7.x before 1.7.3, responses from the CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) proxy were not validated, which may result in information disclosure or XSS (cross-site scripting) via MIME sniffing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: fix integer overflow in radeon_align_pitch()
radeon_align_pitch() has the same kind of overflow issue as the old
amdgpu helper: both the alignment round-up add and the final
'aligned * cpp' calculation can overflow signed int.
If that wraps, radeon_mode_dumb_create() can end up returning an
invalid pitch or creating a zero-sized dumb buffer.
Fix this by using check_add_overflow() for the alignment round-up and
check_mul_overflow() for the final pitch calculation, returning 0 on
overflow. Also reject zero pitch and size in
radeon_mode_dumb_create().
Found via AST-based call-graph analysis using sqry. |
| Improper neutralization of special elements used in an sql command ('sql injection') in Microsoft Entra Connect Sync allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex allows SQL Injection via the :comment option of Postgrex.stream/4. An attacker who can influence that value can close the comment delimiter with */ and extend the streamed statement with their own clauses, which execute under the connection's role. Ecto exposes the same option through Ecto.Repo.stream/2.
Postgrex appends the comment by concatenating it into the statement text sent in the Parse message, without escaping or rejecting */. The option is validated by comment_not_present!/1 at every other execution point; stream/4 never calls it. Because Parse accepts a single command, the injection is confined to the streamed statement and further statements cannot be chained.
This issue affects postgrex: from 0.19.3 before 0.22.4. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions due to unsafe reflection. |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle Configure to Order product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Supply to Order Workbench). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Configure to Order. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Configure to Order accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Configure to Order accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N). |
