| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information, Insufficiently Protected Credentials vulnerability in rustdesk-client RustDesk Client rustdesk-client on Windows, MacOS, Linux, iOS, Android (Address book sync, Heartbeat sync loop modules) allows Sniffing Attacks.
The client places the preset address-book password verbatim into the heartbeat sync JSON body (src/hbbs_http/sync.rs). Over an intact HTTPS session it is not exposed in transit, but it is a reusable shared secret rather than a zero-knowledge proof, so it is recovered by any party that becomes the API endpoint - under the automatic invalid-certificate TLS downgrade (CVE-2026-30794) or a re-homed/rogue API server (CVE-2026-30797) - and the leaked credential then authorizes the server-side address book.
This vulnerability is associated with program files src/hbbs_http/sync.rs and program routines heartbeat sync body builder (emits preset-address-book-password).
This issue affects RustDesk Client: through 1.4.8. |
| This CVE ID has been withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. Reason: This candidate was issued in error. Notes: All references and descriptions in this candidate have been removed to prevent accidental usage. |
| Worksnaps before version 1.6.20260201 contains hardcoded cloud credentials and related secret material in the Worksnaps client application binaries. The exposed credentials included AWS access keys, S3 bucket names, and related cloud access information. The originally exposed AWS credentials authenticated as the AWS account root identity and provided access to Worksnaps production cloud resources, including S3 buckets containing sensitive data such as screenshots of user desktops. An attacker with access to the affected client binaries could extract or recover the credentials and use them to access affected Worksnaps cloud resources. |
| Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in Softlab Core < 1.2.11 versions. |
| Unauthenticated SQL Injection in ListingPro <= 2.9.10 versions. |
| Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in EmallShop <= 2.4.21 versions. |
| Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Kapee < 1.7.0 versions. |
| Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Elementra <= 1.0.9 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in MagOne <= 9.0 versions. |
| Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Laurits <= 1.5.1 versions. |
| Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Behold <= 1.5 versions. |
| Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Valeska <= 1.2.2 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in JobSearch <= 3.2.7 versions. |
| Unauthenticated SQL Injection in wpDataTables <= 7.3.6 versions. |
| Subscriber Arbitrary Code Execution in Cornerstone < 7.8.8 versions. |
| Streambert is a cross-platform Electron Desktop App to stream and download any video media. In versions 2.4.0 and prior, a high-severity Zip Slip vulnerability was identified in Streambert's subtitle extraction logic. The application does not sanitize archive entry filenames during extraction, allowing a malicious archive to perform path traversal and write arbitrary files to the host filesystem. The subtitle extraction process downloads a ZIP archive and extracts its entries. The destination file path is constructed by concatenating the raw archive entry name (extracted.name) directly to the temporary directory path. If a malicious ZIP archive containing directory traversal sequences is processed, it escapes the temporary directory boundaries. The application then writes the extracted payload anywhere on the host filesystem subject to the application's current write permissions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in ACPT ACPT (Pro) - Custom Post Types Plugin for WordPress allows Remote Code Inclusion.
This issue affects ACPT (Pro) - Custom Post Types Plugin for WordPress: from n/a through 2.0.47. |
| Remark42 is a self-hosted comment engine for blogs, articles, or any other place where readers can add comments. Versions 1.6.0 through 1.15.0 contain a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exploitable through content-type spoofing. The Remark42 image proxy fetches an arbitrary remote URL and re-serves the response from Remark42's own origin. During the download phase, the proxy determines whether the resource is an image by inspecting only the Content-Type header advertised by the remote server, never examining the actual bytes; during the serving phase, it instead derives the response Content-Type by sniffing those bytes with http.DetectContentType. An attacker can exploit this inconsistency by hosting a URL that advertises Content-Type: image/png while returning an HTML/JavaScript body: the download check accepts it as an image, the serving path sniffs the body and emits Content-Type: text/html, and the browser renders the attacker-controlled HTML/JavaScript as a document within Remark42's origin. Exploitation requires no Remark42 account on the target instance; the attacker only needs to host the malicious upstream URL and deliver the proxy link to a victim by any means, such as email, direct message, or a link on another website. This issue has been fixed in version 1.16.0. |
| Backpropagate is a Python library for fine-tuning large language models on a single GPU. In versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the optional Reflex web UI exposes a training control plane without authentication: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push. The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: --auth user:pass — documented as "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI." and--share — documented as "expose the UI on a public address; requires --auth." When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled (user: <username>) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend (backpropagate/ui_app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port — local or remote, depending on whether --share is used — has full UI access. An inline comment at backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: "For Phase 1 the variable is exported but Reflex doesn't read it yet." This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP_GATE) advertised the contract as enforced. An attacker who reaches the bound port can read uploaded datasets, trigger arbitrary training runs against any local base models as well as read their paths, trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes and cause disk-fill DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0. If developers cannot immediately upgrade to 1.2.0 run backprop ui with no flags so it binds to localhost, use SSH port-forwarding (ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 <training-host>) instead of --share for remote access, and audit any host previously launched with --share, re-issuing any HF tokens used during those sessions. |
