| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix crash when moving to switchdev mode
When moving to switchdev mode when the device doesn't support IPsec,
we try to clean up the IPsec resources anyway which causes the crash
below, fix that by correctly checking for IPsec support before trying
to clean up its resources.
[27642.515799] WARNING: arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1276 at
do_user_addr_fault+0x18a/0x680, CPU#4: devlink/6490
[27642.517159] Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE
ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_nat nf_nat xt_addrtype
rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay mlx5_fwctl nfnetlink
zram zsmalloc mlx5_ib fuse rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi
scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_core
ib_core
[27642.521358] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 6490 Comm: devlink Not tainted
6.19.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2026_01_14_16_47 #1 NONE
[27642.522923] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[27642.524528] RIP: 0010:do_user_addr_fault+0x18a/0x680
[27642.525362] Code: ff 0f 84 75 03 00 00 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 e8 5e b9 22
00 49 89 c0 48 85 c0 0f 84 a8 02 00 00 f7 c3 60 80 00 00 74 22 31 c9 eb
ae <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 10 48 89 ea 48 89 de 4c 89 f7 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d
41
[27642.528166] RSP: 0018:ffff88810770f6b8 EFLAGS: 00010046
[27642.529038] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX:
ffff88810b980f00
[27642.530158] RDX: 00000000000000a0 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI:
ffff88810770f728
[27642.531270] RBP: 00000000000000a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000000
[27642.532383] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffff888103f3c4c0
[27642.533499] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810770f728 R15:
0000000000000000
[27642.534614] FS: 00007f197c741740(0000) GS:ffff88856a94c000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[27642.535915] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[27642.536858] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 000000011334c003 CR4:
0000000000172eb0
[27642.537982] Call Trace:
[27642.538466] <TASK>
[27642.538907] exc_page_fault+0x76/0x140
[27642.539583] asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[27642.540282] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x30
[27642.541134] Code: 07 85 c0 75 11 ba ff 00 00 00 f0 0f b1 17 75 06 b8
01 00 00 00 c3 31 c0 c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 9c 5b fa 31 c0 ba 01 00 00
00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 05 48 89 d8 5b c3 89 c6 e8 7e 02 00 00 48 89 d8
5b
[27642.543936] RSP: 0018:ffff88810770f7d8 EFLAGS: 00010046
[27642.544803] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000202 RCX:
ffff888113ad96d8
[27642.545916] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff88810770f818 RDI:
00000000000000a0
[27642.547027] RBP: 0000000000000098 R08: 0000000000000400 R09:
ffff88810b980f00
[27642.548140] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888101845a80 R12:
00000000000000a8
[27642.549263] R13: ffffffffa02a9060 R14: 00000000000000a0 R15:
ffff8881130d8a40
[27642.550379] complete_all+0x20/0x90
[27642.551010] mlx5e_ipsec_disable_events+0xb6/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[27642.552022] mlx5e_nic_disable+0x12d/0x220 [mlx5_core]
[27642.552929] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x66/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[27642.553822] mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x5b/0x120 [mlx5_core]
[27642.554821] mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x419/0x590 [mlx5_core]
[27642.555757] ? xa_load+0x53/0x90
[27642.556361] __esw_offloads_load_rep+0x54/0x70 [mlx5_core]
[27642.557328] mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x45/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[27642.558320] esw_offloads_enable+0xb4b/0xc90 [mlx5_core]
[27642.559247] mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x34e/0x4f0 [mlx5_core]
[27642.560257] ? mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x222/0x2d0 [mlx5_core]
[27642.561284] mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x5ac/0x9c0 [mlx5_core]
[27642.562334] ? devlink_rate_set_ops_supported+0x21/0x3a0
[27642.563220] devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x67/0xe0
[27642.564026] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe0/0x130
[27642.564816] genl_rcv_msg+0x183/0x290
[27642.565466] ? __devlink_nl_pre_doit.isra.0+0x160/0x160
[27642.566329] ? d
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xprtrdma: Decrement re_receiving on the early exit paths
In the event that rpcrdma_post_recvs() fails to create a work request
(due to memory allocation failure, say) or otherwise exits early, we
should decrement ep->re_receiving before returning. Otherwise we will
hang in rpcrdma_xprt_drain() as re_receiving will never reach zero and
the completion will never be triggered.
On a system with high memory pressure, this can appear as the following
hung task:
INFO: task kworker/u385:17:8393 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Tainted: G S E 6.19.0 #3
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u385:17 state:D stack:0 pid:8393 tgid:8393 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4248060 flags:0x00080000
Workqueue: xprtiod xprt_autoclose [sunrpc]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x48b/0x18b0
? ib_post_send_mad+0x247/0xae0 [ib_core]
schedule+0x27/0xf0
schedule_timeout+0x104/0x110
__wait_for_common+0x98/0x180
? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10
wait_for_completion+0x24/0x40
rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect+0x444/0x460 [rpcrdma]
xprt_rdma_close+0x12/0x40 [rpcrdma]
xprt_autoclose+0x5f/0x120 [sunrpc]
process_one_work+0x191/0x3e0
worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x10d/0x230
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| 18next-http-middleware is a middleware to be used with Node.js web frameworks like express or Fastify and also for Deno. Versions prior to 3.9.3 allow an unauthenticated HTTP client to pollute Object.prototype in the Node.js process hosting the middleware, via two unvalidated entry points that reach internal object-key writes: getResourcesHandler and missingKeyHandler. This can break authorisation checks (if (user.isAdmin) returning true for any user), cause type-confusion DoS, and depending on downstream code it can be chained into RCE. |
| In th30d4y/IP from version 1.0.1 to before version 2.0.1, a DOM-Based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in an IP Reputation Checker application. Unsanitized user input was directly rendered in the browser, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: tcp - fix packet extraction from stream
When processing TCP stream data in ovpn_tcp_recv, we receive large
cloned skbs from __strp_rcv that may contain multiple coalesced packets.
The current implementation has two bugs:
1. Header offset overflow: Using pskb_pull with large offsets on
coalesced skbs causes skb->data - skb->head to exceed the u16 storage
of skb->network_header. This causes skb_reset_network_header to fail
on the inner decapsulated packet, resulting in packet drops.
2. Unaligned protocol headers: Extracting packets from arbitrary
positions within the coalesced TCP stream provides no alignment
guarantees for the packet data causing performance penalties on
architectures without efficient unaligned access. Additionally,
openvpn's 2-byte length prefix on TCP packets causes the subsequent
4-byte opcode and packet ID fields to be inherently misaligned.
Fix both issues by allocating a new skb for each openvpn packet and
using skb_copy_bits to extract only the packet content into the new
buffer, skipping the 2-byte length prefix. Also, check the length before
invoking the function that performs the allocation to avoid creating an
invalid skb.
If the packet has to be forwarded to userspace the 2-byte prefix can be
pushed to the head safely, without misalignment.
As a side effect, this approach also avoids the expensive linearization
that pskb_pull triggers on cloned skbs with page fragments. In testing,
this resulted in TCP throughput improvements of up to 74%. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: ec_bhf: Fix dma_free_coherent() dma handle
dma_free_coherent() in error path takes priv->rx_buf.alloc_len as
the dma handle. This would lead to improper unmapping of the buffer.
Change the dma handle to priv->rx_buf.alloc_phys. |
| Other issue in the WebRTC component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox ESR 140.10.2 and Thunderbird 140.10.2. |
| An issue in fohrloop dash-uploader v.0.1.0 through v.0.7.0a2 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the dash_uploader/httprequesthandler.py, dash_uploader/upload.py in the Upload function and max_file_size parameter, dash_uploader/configure_upload.py components |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: restore failed global reservations to subpool
Commit a833a693a490 ("mm: hugetlb: fix incorrect fallback for subpool")
fixed an underflow error for hstate->resv_huge_pages caused by incorrectly
attributing globally requested pages to the subpool's reservation.
Unfortunately, this fix also introduced the opposite problem, which would
leave spool->used_hpages elevated if the globally requested pages could
not be acquired. This is because while a subpool's reserve pages only
accounts for what is requested and allocated from the subpool, its "used"
counter keeps track of what is consumed in total, both from the subpool
and globally. Thus, we need to adjust spool->used_hpages in the other
direction, and make sure that globally requested pages are uncharged from
the subpool's used counter.
Each failed allocation attempt increments the used_hpages counter by how
many pages were requested from the global pool. Ultimately, this renders
the subpool unusable, as used_hpages approaches the max limit.
The issue can be reproduced as follows:
1. Allocate 4 hugetlb pages
2. Create a hugetlb mount with max=4, min=2
3. Consume 2 pages globally
4. Request 3 pages from the subpool (2 from subpool + 1 from global)
4.1 hugepage_subpool_get_pages(spool, 3) succeeds.
used_hpages += 3
4.2 hugetlb_acct_memory(h, 1) fails: no global pages left
used_hpages -= 2
5. Subpool now has used_hpages = 1, despite not being able to
successfully allocate any hugepages. It believes it can now only
allocate 3 more hugepages, not 4.
With each failed allocation attempt incrementing the used counter, the
subpool eventually reaches a point where its used counter equals its
max counter. At that point, any future allocations that try to
allocate hugeTLB pages from the subpool will fail, despite the subpool
not having any of its hugeTLB pages consumed by any user.
Once this happens, there is no way to make the subpool usable again,
since there is no way to decrement the used counter as no process is
really consuming the hugeTLB pages.
The underflow issue that the original commit fixes still remains fixed
as well.
Without this fix, used_hpages would keep on leaking if
hugetlb_acct_memory() fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kexec: derive purgatory entry from symbol
kexec_load_purgatory() derives image->start by locating e_entry inside an
SHF_EXECINSTR section. If the purgatory object contains multiple
executable sections with overlapping sh_addr, the entrypoint check can
match more than once and trigger a WARN.
Derive the entry section from the purgatory_start symbol when present and
compute image->start from its final placement. Keep the existing e_entry
fallback for purgatories that do not expose the symbol.
WARNING: kernel/kexec_file.c:1009 at kexec_load_purgatory+0x395/0x3c0, CPU#10: kexec/1784
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bzImage64_load+0x133/0xa00
__do_sys_kexec_file_load+0x2b3/0x5c0
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x610
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[me@linux.beauty: move helper to avoid forward declaration, per Baoquan] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: adxl380: Avoid reading more entries than present in FIFO
The interrupt handler reads FIFO entries in batches of N samples, where N
is the number of scan elements that have been enabled. However, the sensor
fills the FIFO one sample at a time, even when more than one channel is
enabled. Therefore,the number of entries reported by the FIFO status
registers may not be a multiple of N; if this number is not a multiple, the
number of entries read from the FIFO may exceed the number of entries
actually present.
To fix the above issue, round down the number of FIFO entries read from the
status registers so that it is always a multiple of N. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: don't BUG() on unexpected delayed ref type in run_one_delayed_ref()
There is no need to BUG(), we can just return an error and log an error
message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Eagerly init vgic dist/redist on vgic creation
If vgic_allocate_private_irqs_locked() fails for any odd reason,
we exit kvm_vgic_create() early, leaving dist->rd_regions uninitialised.
kvm_vgic_dist_destroy() then comes along and walks into the weeds
trying to free the RDs. Got to love this stuff.
Solve it by moving all the static initialisation early, and make
sure that if we fail halfway, we're in a reasonable shape to
perform the rest of the teardown. While at it, reset the vgic model
on failure, just in case... |
| Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe allows unauthenticated denial of service via quadratic fragment-name uniqueness validation.
'Elixir.Absinthe.Phase.Document.Validation.UniqueFragmentNames':run/2 iterates over all fragments and for each one calls duplicate?/2, which evaluates Enum.count(fragments, &(&1.name == name)) — a full linear scan of the fragment list. The result is O(N²) comparisons per document, where N is the number of fragment definitions supplied by the caller.
Because input.fragments is built directly from the GraphQL query body, N is fully attacker-controlled. A minimum-size fragment definition is roughly 16 bytes, so a ~1 MB document carries ~60,000 fragments and forces ~3.6 × 10⁹ comparisons inside this single validation phase. No authentication, schema knowledge, or special configuration is required.
This issue affects absinthe: from 1.2.0 before 1.10.2. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe allows unauthenticated denial of service via atom table exhaustion when parsing attacker-controlled GraphQL SDL.
Multiple Blueprint.Draft.convert/2 implementations in Absinthe's SDL language modules call String.to_atom/1 on attacker-controlled names from parsed GraphQL SDL documents, including directive names, field names, type names, and argument names. Because atoms are never garbage-collected and the BEAM atom table has a fixed limit (default 1,048,576), each unique name permanently consumes one slot. An attacker can exhaust the atom table by submitting SDL documents containing enough unique names, causing the Erlang VM to abort with system_limit and taking down the entire node.
Any application that passes attacker-controlled GraphQL SDL through Absinthe's parser is exposed — for example, a schema-upload endpoint, a federation gateway that ingests remote SDL, or any developer tool that runs the parser over user-supplied documents.
This issue affects absinthe: from 1.5.0 before 1.10.2. |
| i18next-locize-backend is a simple i18next backend for locize.com which can be used in Node.js, in the browser and for Deno. Prior to version 9.0.2, i18next-locize-backend interpolates lng, ns, projectId, and version directly into the configured loadPath / privatePath / addPath / updatePath / getLanguagesPath URL templates with no path-component validation and no encoding. When an application exposes any of these values to user-controlled input (?lng= / ?ns= query parameters via i18next-browser-languagedetector, cookies, request headers, or a URL-derived projectId), a crafted value can change the structure of the outgoing request URL. Affected call sites in lib/index.js (pre-patch): the interpolate() helper is used at the five URL-build sites — _readAny/read (line 415 for private, 426 for public), getLanguages (lines 271 and 296), and writePage (lines 616 and 622) for the missing-key and update POST paths. The helper interpolate in lib/utils.js substitutes raw values with no encoding. This issue has been patched in version 9.0.2. |
| openvpn-auth-oauth2 is a plugin/management interface client for OpenVPN server to handle an OIDC based single sign-on (SSO) auth flows. From version 1.26.3 to before version 1.27.3, when openvpn-auth-oauth2 is deployed in the experimental plugin mode (shared library loaded by OpenVPN via the plugin directive), clients that do not support WebAuth/SSO (e.g., the openvpn CLI on Linux) are incorrectly admitted to the VPN despite being denied by the authentication logic. The default management-interface mode is not affected because it does not use the OpenVPN plugin return-code mechanism. This issue has been patched in version 1.27.3. |
| Akamai Guardicore Platform Agent (GPA) and Zero Trust Client on Linux and macOS allow TOCTOU-based local privilege escalation. The GPA service creates an IPC socket in the world-writable /tmp directory. It accepts unauthenticated IPC control messages. This enables a TOCTOU vulnerability in the HandleSaveLogs() function of the GPA service, by creating a log file and manipulating it into a symlink that points to the targeted path; this can allow an unprivileged local user to make arbitrary root-owned files world-writable. In addition, a diagnostic collection tool (gimmelogs) running with root privileges was vulnerable to command injection from the dbstore, offering a second privilege escalation vector. (On Windows, gimmelogs does not have command injection but does allow writing a ZIP archive to an unintended location.) This affects Akamai Guardicore Platform Agent 7.0 through 7.3.1 and Akamai Zero Trust Client 6.0 through 6.1.5. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: proximity: hx9023s: Protect against division by zero in set_samp_freq
Avoid division by zero when sampling frequency is unspecified. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumes
Currently a user can trigger a transaction abort by snapshotting a
previously received snapshot a bunch of times until we reach a
BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item overflow (the maximum item size we
can store in a leaf). This is very likely not common in practice, but
if it happens, it turns the filesystem into RO mode. The snapshot, send
and set_received_subvol and subvol_setflags (used by receive) don't
require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, just inode_owner_or_capable(). A malicious user
could use this to turn a filesystem into RO mode and disrupt a system.
Reproducer script:
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster.
mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
# Create a subvolume and set it to RO so that it can be used for send.
btrfs subvolume create $MNT/sv
touch $MNT/sv/foo
btrfs property set $MNT/sv ro true
# Send and receive the subvolume into snaps/sv.
mkdir $MNT/snaps
btrfs send $MNT/sv | btrfs receive $MNT/snaps
# Now snapshot the received subvolume, which has a received_uuid, a
# lot of times to trigger the leaf overflow.
total=500
for ((i = 1; i <= $total; i++)); do
echo -ne "\rCreating snapshot $i/$total"
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/snaps/sv $MNT/snaps/sv_$i > /dev/null
done
echo
umount $MNT
When running the test:
$ ./test.sh
(...)
Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/sv'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/sv
At subvol sv
Creating snapshot 496/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Value too large for defined data type
Creating snapshot 497/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 498/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 499/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 500/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
And in dmesg/syslog:
$ dmesg
(...)
[251067.627338] BTRFS warning (device sdi): insert uuid item failed -75 (0x4628b21c4ac8d898, 0x2598bee2b1515c91) type 252!
[251067.629212] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[251067.630033] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75)
[251067.630871] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1907 at create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x52/0x465 [btrfs], CPU#10: btrfs/615235
[251067.632851] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...)
[251067.644071] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 615235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
[251067.646165] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[251067.646733] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[251067.648735] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x55/0x465 [btrfs]
[251067.649984] Code: f0 48 0f (...)
[251067.653313] RSP: 0018:ffffce644908fae8 EFLAGS: 00010292
[251067.653987] RAX: 00000000ffffff01 RBX: ffff8e5639e63a80 RCX: 00000000ffffffd3
[251067.655042] RDX: ffff8e53faa76b00 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919750
[251067.656077] RBP: ffffce644908fbd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffce644908f820
[251067.657068] R10: ffff8e5adc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8e53c0431bd0
[251067.658050] R13: ffff8e5414593600 R14: ffff8e55efafd000 R15: 00000000ffffffb5
[251067.659019] FS: 00007f2a4944b3c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27dae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[251067.660115] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[251067.660943] CR2: 00007ffc5aa57898 CR3: 00000005813a2003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[251067.661972] Call Trace:
[251067.662292] <TASK>
[251067.662653] create_pending_snapshots+0x97/0xc0 [btrfs]
[251067.663413] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x26e/0xc00 [btrfs]
[251067.664257] ? btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x35/0x390 [btrfs]
[251067.665238] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30
[251067.665837] ? record_root_
---truncated--- |
