| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-fc: Do not cancel requests in io target before it is initialized
A new nvme-fc controller in CONNECTING state sees admin request timeout
schedules ctrl->ioerr_work to abort inflight requests. This ends up
calling __nvme_fc_abort_outstanding_ios() which aborts requests in both
admin and io tagsets. In case fc_ctrl->tag_set was not initialized we
see the warning below. This is because ctrl.queue_count is initialized
early in nvme_fc_alloc_ctrl().
nvme nvme0: NVME-FC{0}: starting error recovery Connectivity Loss
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe
lpfc 0000:ab:00.0: queue 0 connect admin queue failed (-6).
you didn't initialize this object before use?
turning off the locking correctness validator.
Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_fc_ctrl_ioerr_work [nvme_fc]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x80
register_lock_class+0x567/0x580
__lock_acquire+0x330/0xb90
lock_acquire.part.0+0xad/0x210
blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter+0xf9/0xc00
__nvme_fc_abort_outstanding_ios+0x23f/0x320 [nvme_fc]
nvme_fc_ctrl_ioerr_work+0x172/0x210 [nvme_fc]
process_one_work+0x82c/0x1450
worker_thread+0x5ee/0xfd0
kthread+0x3a0/0x750
ret_from_fork+0x439/0x670
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Update the check in __nvme_fc_abort_outstanding_ios() confirm that io
tagset was created before iterating over busy requests. Also make sure
to cancel ctrl->ioerr_work before removing io tagset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: zero-initialize stack-allocated cifs_open_info_data
Stack-allocated cifs_open_info_data may contain random data.
This can make some fields have wrong value if they are not set later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpaa2-switch: rework FDB management on the bridge leave path
On bridge leave, the dpaa2_switch_port_set_fdb() function always
allocates a new FDB for the port which is becoming standalone. In case
no FDB is found, then the port leaving a bridge will continue to use the
current one.
The above logic does not cover the case in which there are multiple
bridges which have ports from the same DPSW instance. In this case, when
the last port leaves bridge #1, it finds an unused FDB to switch to, but
the old FDB is not marked as unused. Since the number of FDBs is equal
to the number of DPSW interfaces, this will eventually lead to multiple
ports sharing the same FDB.
Fix this by changing how we are managing the FDBs on the leave path.
Instead of directly allocating a new FDB, first verify if the current
port is the last one to leave a bridge. If this is the case, then
continue to use the current FDB and only allocate another FDB if there
are other ports remaining in the bridge. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ibm: emac: mal: fix potential system hang in mal_remove()
napi_disable() is not idempotent and calling it on an already-disabled
or unenabled NAPI context will cause the kernel to spin indefinitely
waiting for the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit to clear.
In mal_remove(), napi_disable() is called unconditionally. If no MACs were
registered, NAPI was never enabled. Also, if they were registered but
subsequently unregistered, NAPI was already disabled in
mal_unregister_commac(). In either case, calling napi_disable() causes
the kernel to hang upon module removal.
Fix this by only calling napi_disable() in mal_remove() if the commac list
is not empty (which implies NAPI is enabled). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xhci: Prevent queuing new commands if xhci is inaccessible
Refuse to queue a new command on the command ring if xHC is marked
inaccessible with the HCD_FLAG_HW_ACCESSIBLE.
HCD_FLAG_HW_ACCESSIBLE is set and cleared in suspend and resume.
Also print a warning if xhci is being suspended with commands
still pending on the command ring. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: Avoid warning when removing a device while its supplier is unbinding
During driver removal, the following warning can appear:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 139 at drivers/base/core.c:1497 __device_links_no_driver+0xcc/0xfc
...
Call trace:
__device_links_no_driver+0xcc/0xfc (P)
device_links_driver_cleanup+0xa8/0xf0
device_release_driver_internal+0x208/0x23c
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xe0/0x108
device_release_driver_internal+0xec/0x23c
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xe0/0x108
device_release_driver_internal+0xec/0x23c
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xe0/0x108
device_release_driver_internal+0xec/0x23c
driver_detach+0xa0/0x12c
bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc
driver_unregister+0x30/0x60
pci_unregister_driver+0x20/0x9c
lan966x_pci_driver_exit+0x18/0xa90 [lan966x_pci]
This warning is triggered when a consumer is removed because the links
status of its supplier is not DL_DEV_DRIVER_BOUND and the link flag
DL_FLAG_SYNC_STATE_ONLY is not set.
The topology in terms of consumers/suppliers used was the following
(consumer ---> supplier):
i2c -----------> OIC ----> PCI device
| ^
| |
+---> pinctrl ---+
When the PCI device is removed, the OIC (interrupt controller) has to be
removed. In order to remove the OIC, pinctrl and i2c need to be removed
and to remove pinctrl, i2c need to be removed. The removal order is:
1) i2c
2) pinctrl
3) OIC
4) PCI device
In details, the removal sequence is the following (with 0000:01:00.0 the
PCI device):
driver_detach: call device_release_driver_internal(0000:01:00.0)...
device_links_busy(0000:01:00.0):
links->status = DL_DEV_UNBINDING
device_links_unbind_consumers(0000:01:00.0):
0000:01:00.0--oic link->status = DL_STATE_SUPPLIER_UNBIND
call device_release_driver_internal(oic)...
device_links_busy(oic):
links->status = DL_DEV_UNBINDING
device_links_unbind_consumers(oic):
oic--pinctrl link->status = DL_STATE_SUPPLIER_UNBIND
call device_release_driver_internal(pinctrl)...
device_links_busy(pinctrl):
links->status = DL_DEV_UNBINDING
device_links_unbind_consumers(pinctrl):
pinctrl--i2c link->status = DL_STATE_SUPPLIER_UNBIND
call device_release_driver_internal(i2c)...
device_links_busy(i2c): links->status = DL_DEV_UNBINDING
__device_links_no_driver(i2c)...
pinctrl--i2c link->status is DL_STATE_SUPPLIER_UNBIND
oic--i2c link->status is DL_STATE_ACTIVE
oic--i2c link->supplier->links.status is DL_DEV_UNBINDING
The warning is triggered by the i2c removal because the OIC (supplier)
links status is not DL_DEV_DRIVER_BOUND. Its links status is indeed set
to DL_DEV_UNBINDING.
It is perfectly legit to have the links status set to DL_DEV_UNBINDING
in that case. Indeed we had started to unbind the OIC which triggered
the consumer unbinding and didn't finish yet when the i2c is unbound.
Avoid the warning when the supplier links status is set to
DL_DEV_UNBINDING and thus support this removal sequence without any
warnings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, s390: Clear fetch destination on faulting arena atomic
Same missing register clear as on riscv64. A RMW atomic on an arena pointer
is converted to BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC and gets an exception table entry, but
bpf_jit_probe_atomic_pre() only fills in the arena base and the probe
offset, leaving probe->reg at the -1 that bpf_jit_probe_init() set, which
bpf_jit_probe_post() writes into the entry and ex_handler_bpf() then reads
back as "there is nothing to clear".
That is right for a plain BPF_{ADD,AND,OR,XOR}, which only writes memory,
but an RMW carrying BPF_FETCH also reads the old value into a register:
src_reg for BPF_{ADD,AND,OR,XOR} | BPF_FETCH and BPF_XCHG, and r0 for
BPF_CMPXCHG. So on a fault over an unmapped arena page the program resumes
at the landing pad with whatever that register held before the atomic
instead of the 0 that every other BPF_PROBE_* access delivers.
Fill probe->reg in from bpf_atomic_load_reg(). Unlike x86-64 and arm64,
s390x does not report arena violations from its exception handler, so there
is no access direction to correct here, only the missing register clear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: avoid force-completing uninitialized UVD rings
uvd_v7_0_sw_init() does not initialize the UVD decode ring for an
SR-IOV VF. However, amdgpu_uvd_resume() unconditionally force-completes
the decode ring when restoring its fence sequence.
Skip fence completion when the fence driver is not initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/ttm: Drop tt->restore after successful restore
ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() can successfully complete the restore
process via ttm_pool_restore_commit(), but tt->restore is not dropped
afterward. As a result, subsequent backup/restore flows observe what
appears to be a completed restore, while in reality shmem handles are
still installed in tt->pages, leading to the stack trace below.
Fix this by freeing and dropping tt->restore in
ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() upon successful completion of the restore.
20545 [ 309.784531] RIP: 0010:sg_alloc_append_table_from_pages+0x38c/0x490
20547 [ 309.809570] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000623b838 EFLAGS: 00010206
20548 [ 309.814827] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: ffff88816e42a160 RCX: 0000000000000000
20549 [ 309.821986] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000001000
20550 [ 309.829147] RBP: ffff88816e42a168 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000007ffff000
20551 [ 309.836310] R10: ffffc9000623b928 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000007ffff000
20552 [ 309.843471] R13: ffff88815ba5a100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
20553 [ 309.850634] FS: 00007f9ff305e700(0000) GS:ffff888276c94000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
20554 [ 309.858749] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
20555 [ 309.864519] CR2: 00007f9fca701000 CR3: 00000001565e2005 CR4: 0000000008f70ef0
20556 [ 309.871678] PKRU: 55555558
20557 [ 309.874403] Call Trace:
20558 [ 309.876866] <TASK>
20559 [ 309.878988] sg_alloc_table_from_pages_segment+0x60/0x100
20560 [ 309.884415] ? ttm_resource_manager_usage+0x36/0x60 [ttm]
20561 [ 309.889845] ? xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe]
20562 [ 309.894045] xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe]
20563 [ 309.898037] xe_bo_move+0x927/0xaa0 [xe]
20564 [ 309.902029] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xba/0x170 [ttm]
20565 [ 309.907022] ttm_bo_validate+0xbe/0x190 [ttm]
20566 [ 309.911405] xe_bo_validate+0x9a/0x120 [xe]
20567 [ 309.915663] xe_gpuvm_validate+0xd9/0x140 [xe]
20568 [ 309.920206] drm_gpuvm_validate+0x2f0/0x5b0 [drm_gpuvm]
20569 [ 309.925459] ? drm_exec_lock_obj+0x63/0x210 [drm_exec]
20570 [ 309.930627] xe_vm_validate_rebind+0x46/0xb0 [xe]
20571 [ 309.935428] xe_exec_fn+0x20/0x40 [xe]
20572 [ 309.939249] drm_gpuvm_exec_lock+0x78/0xc0 [drm_gpuvm]
20573 [ 309.944410] xe_validation_exec_lock+0x5a/0xa0 [xe]
20574 [ 309.949385] xe_exec_ioctl+0x806/0xc30 [xe]
20575 [ 309.953639] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xd9/0xf0
20576 [ 309.957935] ? __pfx_xe_exec_fn+0x10/0x10 [xe]
20577 [ 309.962449] ? __wake_up_common+0x73/0xa0
20578 [ 309.966482] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe]
20579 [ 309.971263] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa3/0x100
20580 [ 309.975209] drm_ioctl+0x213/0x440
20581 [ 309.978637] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe]
20582 [ 309.983415] xe_drm_ioctl+0x67/0xd0 [xe]
20583 [ 309.987408] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci: bail out of setup if the controller is inaccessible
xhci_gen_setup() locates the operational registers using the capability
length read from the very first register:
xhci->op_regs = hcd->regs +
HC_LENGTH(readl(&xhci->cap_regs->hc_capbase));
If the controller is dead or has dropped off the bus, that read returns
~0, HC_LENGTH() truncates it to 0xff, and op_regs ends up 0xff bytes
past the page-aligned MMIO base, i.e. unaligned. The first access
through it, xhci_halt() -> xhci_handshake() reading op_regs->status, is
then an unaligned readl() on device memory. arm64 faults on unaligned
device accesses, so instead of xhci_handshake() catching the all-ones
value and returning -ENODEV, setup oopses:
xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: Unable to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible
xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: xHCI Host Controller
xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80030a770103
ESR = 0x0000000096000021
FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP
pc : xhci_halt [xhci_hcd]
Call trace:
xhci_halt
xhci_gen_setup
xhci_pci_setup
usb_add_hcd
usb_hcd_pci_probe
xhci_pci_common_probe
xhci_pci_renesas_probe
This was hit with a Renesas uPD720201 that failed to power up ("Unable
to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible") yet still
reached the HCD probe path.
Read the capability register once, and if it reads back the all-ones
value (as xhci_handshake() and xhci_reset() already test for), abort
setup with -ENODEV before op_regs is derived from it. Reading it once
also avoids re-reading a register that may change under a concurrent
hot-removal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fec: only stop PTP if it was initialized
fec_ptp_init() is only called when fep->bufdesc_ex is available.
However, fec_probe() unconditionally calls fec_ptp_stop() on the
failed_init path, and fec_drv_remove() unconditionally calls
fec_ptp_stop() during device removal.
Check fep->bufdesc_ex before calling fec_ptp_stop() in both paths
to avoid stopping PTP when it was not initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: skip double clone set expressions on element insert
Both the dynset and newsetelem path clone the existing set expressions
when setting set element expressions if no override expressions are
provided. This results in a double clone, once to clone the template set
expressions then another clone on the new element. Add a flag to
annotate if userspace provides a override expression (ie. expression of
the same type of the set but different configuration), otherwise borrow
the existing expression from the set. Add conditionals to release
expression iif they represent an override. Use this new override_exprs
flag to dump the dynset expression override to userspace.
This simplifies the existing logic and it also fixes a bug with the
connlimit expression which results in a module refcount imbalance
WARNING splat when resorting on the default set expressions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: atm: usbatm: fix invalid ci_range initialization
syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds in __vcc_connect():
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/atm/common.c:382:32
shift exponent -1 is negative
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5987 Comm: syz.0.18 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/05/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:233
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x36d/0x400 lib/ubsan.c:494
__vcc_connect+0x14b4/0x19c0 net/atm/common.c:382
vcc_connect+0x328/0x8f0 net/atm/common.c:498
pvc_bind+0x272/0x380 net/atm/pvc.c:52
__sys_bind+0x2e3/0x410 net/socket.c:1976
__x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1979
...
ATM device ci_range fields (vpi_bits and vci_bits) represent the
number of bits supported for VPI and VCI addressing on the device.
net/atm/common.c directly uses these fields as bit shift counts:
vpi >> dev->ci_range.vpi_bits
vci >> dev->ci_range.vci_bits
1 << vcc->dev->ci_range.vpi_bits
1 << vcc->dev->ci_range.vci_bits
usbatm_atm_init() sets ci_range.vpi_bits and ci_range.vci_bits to
ATM_CI_MAX (-1), which is defined in <uapi/linux/atmdev.h> as a
sentinel value for userspace ATM_SETCIRANGE requests, not a valid bit
count. Shifting by -1 is undefined behavior and triggers UBSAN
warnings.
ATM UNI cell headers allow up to 8 bits for VPI (0..255) and 16 bits
for VCI (0..65535). Initialize vpi_bits to 8 and vci_bits to 16, as
done by solos-pci. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: move hardware offload step after building the chain blob
Allocate the chain blob before the ruleset offload to reduce chances of
entering an inconsistent state where the offloaded ruleset in the nic
and the software ruleset differ. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: st33zp24: Return zero on status read failure
st33zp24_status() ignores the result of the transport read and returns
data even when no byte was received. The I2C transport, for example,
skips i2c_master_recv() when the register-select write is short or fails,
leaving data uninitialized. The resulting stack value can be interpreted
as TPM_STS flags and let status checks complete spuriously.
The status callback cannot propagate a transport error. Return zero
unless recv() reports exactly one byte. With no status bits set, callers
retry or take their existing timeout or error path instead of acting on
an invalid status value.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual
source review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring
The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid
disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing
was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the
connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT
reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in
fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and
cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and
queue->lock).
The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change,
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers
to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only
non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it.
Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.
Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a
fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT
is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.
Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.
If there should be a report from any library or application we
probably need to revert this commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Compare iterator types during state pruning
An iterator stack slot can be MEM_RCU or PTR_UNTRUSTED. These states
must not be equal, or the verifier can prune an unsafe path.
Compare the pointer type for STACK_ITER slots. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/bpf: Replace ly instruction with llgf
cpu_nr is a 32 bit value and BPF_REG_0 is a 64 bit register, when ly loads
the cpu_nr into BPF_REG_0 it does not zero the upper bits, but llgf does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: visconti: Make sure clk_init_data is fully initialized
The clk_init_data structure contains several mutually-exclusive members
for different methods to specify the possible parents of a clock,
prompting drivers to initialize only the members they need. However,
not initializing all members may cause subtle issues, which are only
exposed when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN or CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE is
enabled.
visconti_clk_register_gate() fills in init.parent_data, and assumes that
init.parent_names is NULL. However, the latter in uninitialized, and
thus may cause a crash.
Make sure all members are fully initialized, to fix such bugs, and to
avoid future breakage when converting drivers to a different method for
specifying the parents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
null_blk: use DEFINE_MUTEX for the file-scope mutex
In null_init(), mutex_init(&lock) currently happens after
configfs_register_subsystem(), which exposes the nullb subsystem to
userspace. A racing mkdir() into /sys/kernel/config/nullb/ can reach
null_find_dev_by_name() -> mutex_lock(&lock) before the mutex is
initialized, trigger warning:
[ 123.137788] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
[ 123.137796] WARNING: kernel/locking/mutex.c:159 at mutex_lock+0x171/0x1c0, CPU#13: mkdir/1301
[ 123.140090] Modules linked in: null_blk(+) nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4
......
[ 123.154926] Call Trace:
[ 123.155172] <TASK>
[ 123.155419] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 123.156181] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 123.156571] nullb_group_make_group+0x20/0x100 [null_blk]
[ 123.157011] configfs_mkdir+0x47b/0xc70
[ 123.157337] ? __pfx_configfs_mkdir+0x10/0x10
[ 123.157719] ? may_create_dentry+0x242/0x2e0
[ 123.158061] vfs_mkdir+0x2a9/0x6c0
[ 123.158352] filename_mkdirat+0x3dc/0x500
[ 123.158710] ? __pfx_filename_mkdirat+0x10/0x10
[ 123.159070] ? strncpy_from_user+0x3a/0x1d0
[ 123.159413] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x6b/0x90
[ 123.159760] do_syscall_64+0xea/0x600
Replace the runtime mutex_init(&lock) with a static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock)
declaration to fix this issue. |
